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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK and 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK 




Appeal from the First Judicial District, Bonner County, Idaho 
HONORABLE BARBARA A. BUCHANAN, presiding 
James L. Martin 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields 
PO Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ATIORNEY FOR FARM BUREAU 
Michael T. Howard 
Winston & Cashatt 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
ATIORNEY FOR EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK 
Wes. S. Larsen 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
ATIORNEY FOR JOSEPH STANCZAK 
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Date: 4/20/2017 
Time: 10:12 AM 
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
User: CFLOWERS 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr. , Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
5/2/2016 NGOC HUMRICH New Case Filed - Other Claims Barbara A. Buchanan 
APER HUMRICH Plaintiff: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Barbara A. Buchanan 
Company of Idaho Appearance James L Martin 
HUMRICH Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Barbara A. Buchanan 
Court of any type not listed in categories E, F and 
H(1) Paid by: Moffatt Thomas Receipt number: 
0006476 Dated: 5/2/2016 Amount: $221.00 
(Check) For: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company of Idaho (plaintiff) 
COMP HUMRICH Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Filed Barbara A. Buchanan 
SMIS HUMRICH Summons: Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. Issued - Barbara A. Buchanan 
Original to file 
DOSI HUMRICH Summons: Document Service Issued: on Barbara A. Buchanan 
5/2/2016 to Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr.; Assigned to . 
Service Fee of $0.00. Summons Issued (Edgar 
Wilkins Cook, Jr.) - Original to fi le 
SMIS HUMRICH Summons: Joseph Stanczak Issued - Original to Barbara A. Buchanan 
file 
DOSI HUMRICH Summons: Document Service Issued: on Barbara A. Buchanan 
5/2/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to . 
Service Fee of $0.00. Summons: Joseph 
Stanczak Issued - Original to file 
SMIS HUMRICH Summons: Laurie Francis Cook Issued - Original Barbara A. Buchanan 
to file 
DOSI HUMRICH Summons: Document Service Issued: on Barbara A. Buchanan 
5/2/2016 to Laurie Frances Cook; Assigned to. 
Service Fee of $0.00. Summons: Laurie Francis 
Cook Issued - Original to file 
6/3/2016 COMP HENDRICKSO Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Barbara A. Buchanan 
6/13/2016 DOSN HENDRICKSO Summons: Document Returned Not Served on Barbara A. Buchanan 
6/13/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to. 
Service Fee of $0.00. 
DOSI HENDRICKSO Summons: Document Service Issued: on Barbara A. Buchanan 
6/13/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to . 
Service Fee of $0.00. Amended Summons 
SMIS HENDRICKSO Amended Summons Issued - original to file Barbara A. Buchanan 
6/14/2016 SMIS HENDRICKSO Amended Summons Issued - original to file Barbara A. Buchanan 
7/28/2016 AFSV HENDRICKSO Affidavit Of Service - served 07-23-2016 Barbara A. Buchanan 
CINF HENDRICKSO Affidavit of Service does not indcate who the Barbara A. Buchanan 
Substitute Service was for. 
Only states who was served 
8/1/2016 ACSV ANITAD Acceptance Of Service Barbara A. Buchanan 
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
User: CFLOWERS 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
8/10/2016 HENDRICKSO Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Barbara A. Buchanan 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Craig 
Vernon / James Vernon & Week Receipt 
number: 0011779 Dated: 8/10/2016 Amount: 
$136.00 (Credit card) For: Stanczak, Joseph 
( defendant) 
HENDRICKSO Filing: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Craig Barbara A. Buchanan 
Vernon / James Vernon & Week Receipt 
number: 0011779 Dated: 8/10/2016 Amount: 
$3.00 (Credit card) For: Stanczak, Joseph 
(defendant) 
APER HENDRICKSO Defendant: Cook, Edgar Wilkins Jr. Appearance Barbara A. Buchanan 
Michael T. Howard 
APER HENDRICKSO Defendant: Cook, Laurie Frances Appearance Barbara A. Buchanan 
Michael T. Howard 
HENDRICKSO Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Barbara A. Buchanan 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Winston & 
Cashatt Receipt number: 0011902 Dated: 
8/12/2016 Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Cook, 
Edgar Wilkins Jr. (defendant) and Cook, Laurie 
Frances (defendant) 
ANSW HENDRICKSO Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative Barbara A. Buchanan 
Defenses, and Counterclaim 
ANSW OPPELT Defendant Stanczak's Answer to Amended Barbara A. Buchanan 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 
APER OPPELT Defendant: Stanczak, Joseph Appearance Wes S Barbara A. Buchanan 
Larsen 
DOSS HENDRICKSO Summons: Document Returned Served on Barbara A. Buchanan 
8/10/2016 to Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr.; Assigned to 
. Service Fee of $0.00. 
DOSS HENDRICKSO Summons: Document Returned Served on Barbara A. Buchanan 
8/10/2016 to Laurie Frances Cook; Assigned to . 
Service Fee of $0.00. 
8/12/2016 DOSS HENDRICKSO Summons: Document Returned Served on Barbara A. Buchanan 
8/12/2016 to Joseph Stanczak; Assigned to . 
Service Fee of $0.00. 
8/18/2016 REPL HENDRICKSO Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Barbara A. Buchanan 
Idaho's Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for 
Jury Trial 
9/2/2016 HRSC RASOR Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Barbara A. Buchanan 
10/05/2016 09:00 AM) 
RASOR Notice Of Scheduling Conference Barbara A. Buchanan 
9/16/2016 CINF GLAZE Clerk Information Notice of Disqualification Barbara A. Buchanan 
of Designated Alternate Presiding Judge 
NOTC HENDRICKSO Notice of Disqualification of Designated Alternate Barbara A. Buchanan 
Presiding Judge Mitchell (faxed document) 
9/19/2016 MODQ HENDRICKSO Notice of Disqualification of Designated Alternate Barbara A. Buchanan 
Presiding Judge Mitchell 
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
User: CFLOWERS 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
9/20/2016 ORDQ RASOR Order Granting Disqualification Barbara A. Buchanan 
DISA RASOR Disqualification Of Judge - Judge John T. Mitchell Barbara A. Buchanan 
10/5/2016 CMIN SECK Court Minutes Barbara A. Buchanan 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 10/5/2016 
Time: 9:03 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Minutes Clerk: Melissa Seek 
Tape Number: 1 
Wes Larsen 
Mike Howard, Ben Richie, Michael Chisholm by 
phone 
DCHH RASOR Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Barbara A. Buchanan 
scheduled on 10/05/2016 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages James Martin 
by phone 
Michael Howard by phone 
HRSC RASOR Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Barbara A. Buchanan 
12/15/2017 10:00 AM) 
HRSC RASOR Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 5 Days Barbara A. Buchanan 
01/23/2018 09:00 AM) 
RASOR OrderSetting Trial And Pretrial Order Barbara A. Buchanan 
MISC HENDRICKSO ***END OF FILE #1***BEGIN FILE #2**** Barbara A. Buchanan 
***BEGIN EXPANDO*** 
10/20/2016 MOTN HENDRICKSO Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company Barbara A. Buchanan 
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO HENDRICKSO Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Barbara A. Buchanan 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
MISC HENDRICKSO Declaration of Steven Johnson in Support of Barbara A. Buchanan 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment 
MISC HENDRICKSO Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchie In Support of Barbara A. Buchanan 
Plaintiff Farm Burea Mutual Insurance Company 
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment 
MISC HENDRICKSO Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne in Support of Barbara A. Buchanan 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment 
CINF HENDRICKSO No Notice of Hearing filed at the time of the above Barbara A. Buchanan 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
10/21/2016 CINF GLAZE Clerk Information - Defendant Stanczak's Barbara A. Buchanan 
Motion to Strike 
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
User: CFLOWERS 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
10/21/2016 CINF GLAZE Clerk Information - Memorandum In Barbara A Buchanan 
Support of Defendant Stanczak's Motion 
to Strike 
MOTN HENDRICKSO Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike Barbara A Buchanan 
MEMO HENDRICKSO Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stanczak's Barbara A Buchanan 
Motion to Strike 
CINF HENDRICKSO No Notice of Hearing filed at the time of the above Barbara A Buchanan 
Motion to Strike 
10/27/2016 CINF GLAZE Clerk Information - Notice of Hearing Barbara A Buchanan 
NOHG HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing Barbara A Buchanan 
re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
HRSC HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Barbara A Buchanan 
Judgment 12/21/2016 01 :30 PM) Plaintiff's 
motion 
10/28/2016 CINF ROSTECK STANCZAKS MOTION TO STRIKE-JO Barbara A Buchanan 
NOHG HENDRICKSO Notice of Hearing on Defendant Stanczak's Barbara A Buchanan 
Motion to Strike 
HRSC HENDRICKSO Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/21/2016 01 :29 Barbara A Buchanan 
PM) Defendant's Motion to Strike 
MISC HENDRICKSO *****END OF FILE #2***BEGIN FILE #3**** Barbara A Buchanan 
12/7/2016 CINF ROSTECK Defendant Stanczaks opposition to plaintiffs Barbara A Buchanan 
motion for summary judgement-jo 
RSPN HENDRICKSO Defendant Stanozak's Response in Opposition to Barbara A Buchanan 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment 
12/9/2016 MEMO HENDRICKSO Edgar and Laurie Cook's Memorandum in Barbara A Buchanan 
Opposition to Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
12/14/2016 CINF GLAZE Clerk Information - Plaintiff Farm Bureau Barbara A Buchanan 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's 
Response to Stanczak's Motion to Strike 
MOTN HENDRICKSO Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company Barbara A Buchanan 
of Idaho's Response to Stanczak's Motion to 
Strike 
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
User: CFLOWERS 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar W ilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
12/21/2016 CMIN AYERLE Court Minutes Barbara A Buchanan 
Hearing type: Pl Mtn Summary Jdgmnt; Def Mtn 
Strike 
Hearing date: 12/21/2016 
Time: 1:31 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Minutes Clerk: Susan Ayerle 
Tape Number: 1 
Ben Ritchie for Pl 
Mike Howard for Defs Cook 
Wes Larsen for Def Stanczak 
DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Barbara A. Buchanan 
scheduled on 12/21/2016 01 :30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for th is hearing 
estimated: Plaintiffs motion - James Martin to 
listen in on the phone and will not be participating 
- Ben Ritchie will be here to Argue Motion - Less 
Than 100 Pages 
DCHH OPPELT Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Barbara A Buchanan 
12/21/2016 01 :29 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Kathy Plizga 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Defendant's Motion to Strike - Less 
Than 100 Pages 
1/20/2017 MEMO OPPELT Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Barbara A Buchanan 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
JDMT OPPELT Judgment Barbara A Buchanan 
HRVC OPPELT Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Barbara A Buchanan 
on 12/15/2017 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRVC OPPELT Hearing result for Jury Trial - 5 Days scheduled Barbara A Buchanan 
on 01/23/2018 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
CDIS HENDRICKSO Civil Disposition entered for: Cook, Edgar Wilkins Barbara A Buchanan 
Jr. , Defendant; Cook, Laurie Frances, Defendant; 
Stanczak, Joseph, Defendant; Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 1/20/2017 
STAT HENDRICKSO STATUS CHANGED: closed Barbara A Buchanan 
2/7/2017 MEMO ROSS Farm Bireau Mutual Insurance Company Of Barbara A Buchanan 
Idaho's Verified Memorandum Of Costs 
2/9/2017 MEMO ANITAD Cooks' Opposition to Farm Bureau's Barbara A Buchanan 
Memorandum of Cost 
2/24/2017 ORDR HENDRICKSO Order Settling Amount of Costs Barbara A Buchanan 
JDMT HENDRICKSO Amended Judgment Barbara A Buchanan 
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Time: 10:12 AM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 7 Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
3/2/2017 CFLOWERS Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Idaho Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Paid by: Winston & Cashatt 
Receipt number: 0002921 Dated: 3/3/2017 
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Cook, Edgar 
Wilkins Jr. (defendant) and Cook, Laurie Frances 
(defendant) 
NOTC CFLOWERS Notice of Appeal Idaho Supreme Court 
BNDC CFLOWERS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2924 Dated Barbara A. Buchanan 
3/3/2017 for 100.00) 
CHJG CFLOWERS Change Assigned Judge Idaho Supreme Court 
3/7/2017 CCOA CFLOWERS Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal Idaho Supreme Court 
CERT CFLOWERS Certificate Of Mailing of Clerk's Certificate of Idaho Supreme Court 
Appeal and attachments via USPS Certified Mail 
to Idaho Supreme Court (7016 2070 0000 4878 
0080) 
3/8/2017 REQU ANITAD Plaintiff/Respondent's Farm Bureau Mutual Idaho Supreme Court 
Insurance Company of Idaho's Request For 
Additional Documents in The Clerks's Record and 
Request for Transcript 
3/13/2017 DCRR CFLOWERS Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - Idaho Idaho Supreme Court 
Supreme Court (7016 2070 0000 4878 0080) 
3/17/2017 BNDC CFLOWERS Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 3781 Dated Idaho Supreme Court 
3/20/2017 for 150.00) 
NOTC CFLOWERS Notice of Plaintiffs Payment of Transcript Fee for Idaho Supreme Court 
December 21, 2016 Hearing 
NOTC CFLOWERS Notice of Transcript Preparation - Motions Idaho Supreme Court 
Hearing 12/21/2016 (K. Plizga) 
MISC CFLOWERS Invoice no. 0028 $136.50 - Motions Hearing Idaho Supreme Court 
12/21/2016 (K. Plizga) 
TRAN CFLOWERS Transcript Filed - Motions Hearing 12/21/2016 (K. Idaho Supreme Court 
Plizga) 
3/21/2017 SCDF CFLOWERS Supreme Court Document Filed - Email: Filed Idaho Supreme Court 
Notice of Appeal - no Transcripts requested; 
however, Court Reporter was provided service. 
3/22/2017 CERT CFLOWERS Certificate Of Mailing - Transcript of Hearing Idaho Supreme Court 
dated December 21, 2016 via USPS Certified 
Mail to Moffatt Thomas (7016 2070 0000 4878 
1933), Winston & Cashatt (7016 2070 0000 4878 
1940), and James, Vernon & Weeks (7016 2070 
0000 4878 1957) 
3/24/2017 BNDV CFLOWERS Bond Converted (Transaction number 310 dated Idaho Supreme Court 
3/24/2017 amount 100.00) 
MISC CFLOWERS Letter - to Winston & Cashatt requesting Idaho Supreme Court 
remainder of Transcript fee 
3/27/2017 DCRR CFLOWERS Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - James, Idaho Supreme Court 
Vernon & Weeks (7016 2070 0000 4878 1957) 
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First Judicial District Court - Bonner County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0000590 Current Judge: Idaho Supreme Court 
User: CFLOWERS 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., etal. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho vs. Edgar Wilkins Cook Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, Joseph Stanczak 
Date Code User Judge 
3/27/2017 DCRR CFLOWERS Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - Winston Idaho Supreme Court 
& Cashatt (7016 2070 0000 4878 1940) 
MISC CFLOWERS Receipt of Transcript - Wes Larsen Idaho Supreme Court 
3/31/2017 DCRR CFLOWERS Domestic Certified Mail Return Receipt - Moffatt Idaho Supreme Court 
Thomas (7016 2070 0000 4878 1933) 
4/3/2017 BNDV CFLOWERS Bond Converted (Transaction number 342 dated Idaho Supreme Court 
4/3/2017 amount 136.50) 
BNDE CFLOWERS Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 13.50) Idaho Supreme Court 
4/14/2017 MISC CFLOWERS Receipt of Transcript - Pamela Buckley Idaho Supreme Court 
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_J 
James L. Martin, ISB No. 4226 
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB No. 6632 
Benjamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants. 
Case N 0. C V a O I Lu - 0 5 q a 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
FEE: $221.00 
FEE CATEGORY: A 
ASSIGNE TO 
JU CE UCHANAN 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1 Client:4130615.2 
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Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm Bureau"), by 
and through undersigned counsel, hereby complains and alleges as follows against Edgar 
Wilkins Cook, Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, and Joseph Stanczak. 
1. This is a claim for declaratory judgment regarding whether there is 
coverage for certain claims under an insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau. 
2. Farm Bureau is an Idaho Domestic Insurance Company authorized to do 
business in the state ofldaho, with its principal place of business in Pocatello, Bannock County, 
Idaho, whose business includes entering into insurance contracts, including automobile insurance 
policies and homeowner' s insurance policies. 
3. Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks") are 
husband and wife and, upon information and belief, are residents of Bonner County. 
4. Upon information and belief, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") is a resident 
of Boundary County, Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12 of 
the Idaho Code, the Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal 
relationships of the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment. A controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cooks' 
Farm Bureau insurance policy for some or all of the claims that Stanczak has or will make 
against the Cooks. In order to determine and end that controversy, it is necessary that a 
declaration be made as to the rights and obligations that Farm Bureau owes or does not owe 
related to claims asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 2 Client:4130615.2 
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6. While Stanczak is not a named insured under the insurance policy at issue, 
he is properly included as a defendant in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211, because he claims an 
interest in the Farm Bureau insurance policy which will be affected by the Court's declaration. 
7. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404 because 
some of the defendants reside in Bonner County, Idaho. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
The Insurance Policy and the Bloom Lake Property 
8. Farm Bureau issued to Idaho residents and policy holders Edgar Wilkins 
Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook ("the Cooks") a Farm Bureau Country Squire Policy No. Ol-
A-038872-01 ("the Cook Policy") with a policy period of January 26, 2015 to January 26, 2016. 
A true and correct copy of the Cook Policy and Declaration Sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A" and by this reference is made a part hereof. 
9. The Cook Policy has a number of provisions and exclusions that are 
implicated and applicable to this dispute. 
10. The Cook Policy insures, among other things, a number of properties 
owned by the Cooks, including certain real property owned by the Cooks located near Bloom 
Lake, Bonner County, Idaho ("the Bloom Lake Property"). 
11. The Bloom Lake Property consists of 200 acres, Bloom Lake, and a small 
cabin. 
12. For the past seventeen years and up and until approximately June 28, 
2015, the Cooks have allowed an individual by the name of Michael Jessie Chisholm a/k/a 
Michael Allen Pederson ("Chisholm"), to reside in the cabin at the Bloom Lake Property in 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 3 Client:4130615.2 
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exchange for taking care of the Bloom Lake Property, including the lake, the cabin, and a small 
campground that apparently is located on the Bloom Lake Property. 
13. The Cooks have indicated that Chisholm's maintenance activities included 
weed management, trash removal, and road and lake maintenance. 
14. The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm did not receive any 
monetary compensation for his maintenance activities. 
15. The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm paid for gas, propane, and 
other supplies used for heating and maintaining the Bloom Lake Property and that they provided 
a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator to Chisholm. 
16. The Cooks have maintained that there is not and never was an 
employment relationship between the Cooks and Chisholm. 
The Shooting 
17. On June 28, 2015 Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") and his girlfriend Susan 
Jackson were camping at the Bloom Lake Property. 
18. Chisholm invited Stanczak and Susan Jackson into the cabin. 
19. A dispute arose between Chisholm and Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin 
and Chisolm followed. Chisolm had a .45 caliber handgun and shot Stanczak twice, once in the 
arm and once in the back. 
20. Chisholm left the scene, but was later apprehended by local authorities and 
Chisholm was later charged in Bonner County, Idaho with Aggravated Battery and Use of a 
Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony. Chisholm ultimately entered an Alford Plea in the 
criminal case and was found guilty of aggravated battery against Stanczak. Chisholm is 
currently incarcerated. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4 Client:4130615.2 
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21. Stanczak survived the shooting, but sustained various injuries. 
The Insurance Claim and Denial 
22. Stanczak has retained counsel and made a claim against the Cooks for the 
injuries he sustained at the hands of Chisholm (the "Stanczak Claim"). 
23. The Cooks have tendered the Stanczak Claim to Farm Bureau under the 
Cook Policy seeking confirmation of whether Farm Bureau would defend or indemnify the 
Cooks for this claim. 
24. After conducting an investigation of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the Stanczak Claim made against the Cooks and the resulting tender, Farm Bureau 
advised the Cooks that based upon the evidence, the facts, and the language of the Cook Policy, 
that there was no coverage under the Cook Policy for Chisholm's actions or Stanczak's injuries 
and therefore, Farm Bureau has neither a duty to defend or to indemnify the Cooks related to the 
Stanczak Claim. 
25. Farm Bureau's conclusions regarding its coverage position are contained 
in two letters directed to the Cooks, one dated March 2, 2016---Farm Bureau's initial reservation 
of rights, and one dated March 22, 2016---Farm Bureau's denial of coverage. These two letters 
are attached hereto as Exhibits B and C respectively. 
COUNT 1 - DECLARATORY RELIEF 
26. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12, 
Idaho Code, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal relationships of 
the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. A 
controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim 
against the Cooks. In order to determine and end that controversy it is necessary that a 
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declaration be made as to the rights and obligations under the Cook Policy related to the 
Stanczak Claim and whether Farm Bureau has a duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks related to 
the claim. 
27. Because Farm Bureau has taken the position that there is no coverage 
under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim, and the fact that the parties hereto have different 
positions as to that coverage position, a justiciable controversy, as contemplated by Rule 57 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code §10-1202, et.seq. exists between Farm 
Bureau, the Cooks, and Stanczak concerning whether there is any coverage under the Cook 
Policy for Stanczak's injuries and claimed damages. 
28. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et.seq., Farm Bureau is entitled to a 
determination of its rights, status, and/or other legal relations under the Cook Policy. 
29. Specifically, Farm Bureau is entitled to a determination by this Court that 
there is no coverage under the Cook Policy for Stanczak's claimed injuries or damages sustained 
when Chisholm shot Stanczak at the Bloom Lake Property on June 28, 2015. 
30. Farm Bureau is further entitled to a determination by this Court that Farm 
Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks related to the Stanczak Claim. 
31. Farm Bureau has been required to retain the services of an attorney in 
order to prosecute this action and is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs of this suit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, and Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 10-1210. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Farm Bureau prays for relief as follows: 
1. For declaratory judgment finding that: (a) Farm Bureau does not owe 
under any contract of insurance either a duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks for the claims 
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that Stanczak has asserted against the Cooks, and (2) there is no insurance coverage under the 
Cook Policy for the claims or damages asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks arising out of the 
shooting incident that occurred on the Cook's Bloom Lake Property on or about June 28, 2015. 
2. For an award of costs, and its reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the 
prosecution of this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 10-1210, 12-121, 12-123, and 41-1839, Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and other applicable law; and 
3. For judgment against the Cooks and Stanczak and in favor of Farm 
Bureau, granting such other and further relief to Farm Bureau as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this 29th day of April, 2016. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By ~---
J rtles L. Martin- Of the Firm 
/Attorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho 






FARM BUREAU HUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848 
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
THE INSURANCE PROVIDED AS INDICATED BY THESE DECLARATIONS SUPERSEDES 
ANO REPLACES ALL INSURANCE PREVIOUSLY AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY. 




INSURED: EDGAR HILKINS COOK JR POLICY NUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK POLICY PERIOD: 01-26-2015 UNTIL 01-26-2016 
491476 HIGHHAY 95 AT 12:01 AH STANDARD TIHE 
SANDPOINT ID 83864-8153 COUNTY: BONNER 
AGENCY: ZEMAITIS AGENCY 
AGENT: DINNING HALTER 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015 
ISSUE DATE: 03-31-2015 
SECTION I - PROPERTY 
LIHITS OF APPLICABLE APPLICABLE ANNUAL 
LIABILITY COVERAGE PERILS ENDORSEMENTS PREMIUM 
260000 A RESIDENCE PREMISE FRAME 1-19 $1,697.00 
BUILDING NUMBER: 002 LOCATION: 02 
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25%) •1183 (1014j 
HAIVE DEDUCTIBLE ON GLASS •1171 (0108 
26000 DETACHED CARAGESl STORAGE SHEDS(MAX. 200 SQ FT) 
13000 LIMITED FUNGI HT OR DRY ROT, OR BACTERIA ,.. 1133 ( 1014) 
SMOKE ALARM~ 6EAD BOLT LOCKS, AND NONSMOKER 
DISCOUNTS A PLIED 
52000 B LOSS OF USE 
130000 C PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-19 
REPLACEMENT COST ... 1111 (1014) 
750 REFRIGERATED PRIXJUCTS 
215000 A OHELLING PREMISE FRAME 1-19 $1,170.00 
BUILDING NUMBER: 004 LOCATION: 04 
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25l) •1183110141 
HAIVE DEDUCTIBLE ON GLASS •l17l 0108 
21500 DETACHED CARAGESt STORAGE SHEDS(HAll. 200 SQ FT) 
10750 LIMITED FUNGI HT OR ORY ROT, OR BACTERIA •1133 (1014) 
SMOKE ALARM~ DEAD BOLT LOCKS, AND NONSMOKER 
DISCOUNTS A PLIED 
43000 B LOSS OF USE 
53750 C PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-19 
REPLACEMENT COST •llll (1014) 
750 REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS 
35000 E BARN FRAHE 4000SQF 1-9 . $173.00 
BUILDING NUMBER: 011 LOCATION: 02 
16000 E DHELLING PREMISE MOBILE N/0 FOUND 868SQFT 1-9 1169 (0408) $166.00 
BUILDING NUMBER: 012 LOCATION: 02 
40000 E DHELLIHG PREMISE FRAME lOBOSQF 1-9 $221.00 
BUILDING NUMBER: 014 LOCATION: 03 
33750 D FARM PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-10~20, $281.00 
ELIMINATE LIVESTOCK 
24, 6 
... 1130 (0108} 
1000 TONS PER STACK LIHIT 
500 FIRE DEPARTMENT SERVICE CHARGE 
1000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TO EACH SECTION I LOSS 
TOTAL SECTION I ANNUAL PREMIUM $3,708.00 
• ENDORSEMENT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET 




FARH BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848 
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
SECTION I IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHING AllllTIONAL ENDORSEMENTS: 
ENDORSEMENT I116 (1014) - COSMETIC ROOF DAMAGE ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
SECTION II - LIABILITY 
LIMITS OF 
LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Fl BODILY INJURY 
G PROPERTY DAMAGE 
500000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
1000000 FARMING ACTIVITIES ANNUAL AGGREGATE 
F2 PREH1SES MEDICAL 
25000 EACH PERSON 
125000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
H DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF OTHERS 
1000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH 
1000 EACH PERSON 





02 2 RES 135 ACRES 491476 HIGHHAY 95 SANDPOINT IO 83864 
02 SECTION=03 TOHNSHIP=59N RANGE:OlH BONNER COUNTY 
03 1 RES 200 ACRES SECHON .. 01 TOHNSHIP=59N RANGE=OlH· BONNER COUNTY 
04 1 RES 7 ACRES 49083 HHY 95 SANDPOINT ID 83864 
04 SECTION=03 TOHHSHIP=59N RANGE=Ol.H BONNER COUNTY 




POLICY NUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01 




TOTAL SECTION II ANNUAL PREHIUH $548.00 
SECTION II IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLONJNG ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS: 
(~~~:~~~~:f ~ii~ !~~i: : [~~,i~t0E~ir~~~R~iH[Ile~r1~~v~~~i~E~l~TG,(tl~N~ED(f~1~~(0p~~Itl)EB~Ri~)BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEMENT 1282 (1014 - • PERSONAL INJURV ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEMENT 1287 (0208 - LIMITED POLLUTION COVERAGE ENOORSE~ENT 
SECTION III - AUTOMOBILE 
LIMITS OF 
LIABILITY COVERAGE 
N BODILY INJURY 
0 PROPERTY DAMAGE 
500000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
p UNINSURED MOTORIST 
500000 EAOf OCCURRENCE 
Pl UNDERINSUREO MOTORIST 
500000 EAOf OCCURRENCE 
Q MEDICAL 
25000 EACH PERSON 
s 100 COMPREHENSIVE DEDUCTIBLE 
T 250 COLLISION DEDUCTIBLE 
ROADSIDE ASSISTANCE 
100 EACH OCCURRENCE 
CAR RENTAL REIMBURSEMENT 
25 PER DAV 






FARH BUREAU HUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848 
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
DECLARATIONS 
PAGE 3 
POLICY HUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015 
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LOSS OF USE BY THEFT 
25 PER DAY 
500 PER ACCIDENT 
INSURED VEHICLES: 
DESCRIPTION 
1992 CHEV PU 1GCGK24F7NE173320 
FARM - AGE 70-74 







03-190-X i~~ ~Hf~ET~~~7fC4GP54L55R291443 ~O~D~f~l·is~f!TANCE •1334 (1014) 
LIABILITY PREMIUM $390.00 CAR RENTAL REIMBURSEMENT •1368 (1014) 





TOTAL SECTION III ANNUAL PREMIUM $1,095.00 
• ENDORSEMENT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET 
SECTION III IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHIHG ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS: 
ENDORSEMENT 1313 (1014) - COMBINED SINGLE LIMIT ENDORSEMENT - COVERAGE P AND P-1 (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEMENT I320 {1014) - COMBINED SINGLE LIMIT ENDORSEMENT - COVERAGES N ANDO {PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEMENT 1324 l1014l - HEH VEHICLE LOAN COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEMENT I326 (1014 - HEH VEHICLE ADDITIONAL COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
SECTION IV - INLAND MARINE 
NO COVERAGE 
THIS POLICY IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHIHG FORKS AND ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS: 
POLICY BOOKLET ID-CQ-02-01(1014) - COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY ARE SHOHH IN HHOLE DOLLARS 
NO CONTINGENT LIABILITY. THE POLICY IS HITHOUT CONTINGENT LIABILITY AND IS HONASSESSABLE. 
EHDORSEHEIITS 
TOTAL ANNUAL PREMIUM $5,351.00 
•••• THIS IS NOT A BILLING•••• 
THIS IS THE DECLARATIONS FOR YOUR NEH OR RENEHAL POLICY. INCLUDED ARE COPIES OF ANY ENDORSEMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO IT THAT ARE 
NOT IN YOUR POLICY BOOKLET. IF VDU MAKE ANY HDDIFICATIONS TO THE POUCY DURING THE POLICY PERIOD HE HILL SEND YOU A 
REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS SHOHING THESE CHANGES. THE REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS Hill CONTINUE TO SHOii HHICH ENDORSEMENTS APPLY, 
BUT HE HILL NOT SEND YOU HEH COPIES OF THESE ENDORSEMENTS. HE HILL SEND YOU A COPY Of ANY HEH ENDORSEMENT THAT HAS BEEN 
ADDED OR OF ANY ENDORSEMENT THAT HAS BEEN CHANGED. 
FEDERATION MEMBERSHIP 
THIS lHSURANCE IS ONE OF THE BENEFITS OF THE IDAHO FARM BUREAU FEDERATION AND IS OFFERED ONLY TO ITS MEMBERS. HHILE THIS 
POLICY IS IN FORCE YOU HUST MAINTAIN MEMBERSHIP IN THE IDAHO FARK BUREAU FEDERATIONi IKC AND AN AFFlLIATED COUNTY FARM 
BUREAU. IF YOU DO NOT MAINTAIN THIS MEMBERSHIP YOU HILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS HEnBER SERVICE BENEFIT AND HE HILL BE 
REQUIRED TO CANCEL THIS INSURANCE. 




FARM BUREAU HUrUAL INSURANCE COMPANY Of IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848 
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING 
COUHTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
DECLARATIONS 
·p GE 4 
POLICY NUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015 
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE HEHBERS HILL BE HELD AT THE HOHE OFFICE AT 275 TIERRA VISTA DRIVE( POCATELL01, IDAHO AT 10 A.H. OH THE FIRST FRIDAY OF FEBRUARY UNLESS THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHOOSES A DIFFERENT TIHE OR PACE. THIS "ILL BE YOUR ONLY 
NOTICE OF THIS HEETING UNLESS THE TIHE OR PLACE IS CHANGED. NOTICE OF ANY CHANGE HILL BE SENT TO YOU NOT HORE THAN 60 DAYS 
NOR LESS THAN 10 DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEETING. THE MEETING SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTING DIRECTORS ANO THE 
TRANSACTION OF SUCH OTHER BUSINESS AS HAY PROPERLY COHE BEFORE SUCH HEETING. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VOTE IN PERSON OR BY PROXY 
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1. We wlll provide the insurance described in this 
policy and the Declarations If you have paid the 
premium and have complied with the policy 
provisions and conditions. This policy is divided 
into four sections, some with multiple coverages. 
You have only the coverages for which you have 
paid premium. These coverages are indicated In 
the Declarations and are subject to the indicated 
limits of insurance. 
2. The insured first named in the Declarations, or 
that personrEl spouse if also named, is authorized 
to act on behalf of all insureds with respect to 
giving or receiving notices, receiving refunds, or 
agreeing to or making any changes in this policy. 
3. By acceptance of this policy, you agree that the 
Declarations indicate the coverages you pur-
chased. No agreement in conflict with, 
modifying, or extending this policy is valid 
unless In writing and made a part of the policy. 
4. This policy booklet, the Declarations, and 
applicable endorsements constitute your 
policy. The Declarations references coverages 
and endorsements that are included in your 
policy. Upon renewal or change of your policy 
you will receive an updated Declarations but 
no new policy booklet unless the policy booklet 
changes. 
5. This policy will be governed by the laws of the 
state of Idaho. 
READ THE DECLARATIONS TO DETERMINE 
WHICH COVERAGES PERTAIN TO YOU. 
DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this policy, we, us, and our, mean Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho. You 
and your mean a person named In the Declarations 
as an insured and that personrs spouse if a resident 
of the same household. You and your also refer to a 
partnership, corporation, limited liablllty company, or 
trust, named in the DeclaraUons as an insured. You 
and your do not Include an additional insured such 
as a lessor, trustee, or landlord. The following 
defined words appear in bold print In the policy. 
DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTIONS I 
(Property Insurance), II (Liability Insurance), AND 
IV (Inland Marine Insurance) 
The following definitions apply to Sections I, II, and 
IV. They do not apply to Section Ill {Automobile 
Insurance). 
Bodily Injury means physical injury to, or sickness, 
disease, or death of, a person. Bodily Injury does 
not include: 
1. Any sexually transmitted disease. 
2. Any emotional, psychological, or mental injury or 
effect, unless it arises out of actual physical 
Injury to a person. 
ID-CQ-02-01(1014) 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, 
profession, occupation, or activity, engaged in for 
compensation, other than farming or custom 
farming. Business includes rental of atl or any part 
of an Insured location to others, or held for rental by 
you, other than: 
1. Your residence premises if rented occasionally; 
2. Garages, if not more than three car spaces are 
rented; 
3. One-, two-, three-, or four-family dwellings 
described in the Declarations; or 
4. Your farm. 
Business does not include: 
1. The operation of roadside stands principally for 
the sale of produce raised on the insured 
location; 
2. Newspaper defivery, lawn care, or other 
activities, perfonned by a self-employed minor 
on a part-time basis; or 
3. Childcare services provided by any insured if 
the number of children is six or fewer and then 
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only if care is provided for fewer than a total of 
31 days during your policy period. Part-time child 
care services provided by any insured who is a 
minor is not considered a business. 
Custom farming means an insured rs use of a draft 
animal or mobile agricultural machinery to perform 
farming operations for others for a charge or other 
benefit. 
Dwelling means a one-, two-, three-, or four-family 
residence. 
Dwelling premises means a dwelling listed fn the 
Declarations, including its grounds and private 
garages. A dwelling premises includes a residence 
premises. 
Farm employee means someone employed by you 
whose duties are in connection with the maintenance 
or use of the insured location as a farm, including 
the maintenance or use of your farm equipment. 
Farm employee does not include you or your minor 
child, but includes exchange labor. 
Farm personal property means your personal 
property which is usual to the operation of a farm and 
is used on your farm. It includes livestock, mobile 
agricultural machinery, tools, supplies, equipment, 
and harvested crops, used in or resulting from your 
farming operation. It includes property you are 
purchasing under an installment plan whether or not 
you have title to the property. 
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field 
crops, or the raising or keeping of livestock, fish, or 
bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small 
mammals primarily for fur production. It includes 
wholesale but not retail sales, except incidental retail 
sales of your unprocessed farm products with the 
resulting gross income being less than 25% of your 
combined farming gross income. 
Insured means you or the entity named in the 
Declarations. The following are also Insureds: 
1. If you are a person, Insured also means, if 
resid~nts of your household, your spouse, your 
relatives, and minors in the care of you or your 
relatives. Insured does not include a relative 
age 25 or over who is a student and lives away 
from your residence premises while attending 
school. 
2. If you are a partnership, insured also means 
your members and your partners, but only with 
respect to their duties in the partnership. 
3. If you are a limited liability company, insured 
also means your members and managers, but 
ID-CQ-02-01(1014) 
only with respect to their duties as members or 
managers. 
4. If you are a trust, insured also means the 
trustees, but only with respect to their duties as a 
trustee. 
5. If you are an organization other than a type listed 
above, insured also means your executive 
officers and directors, but only with respect to 
their duties as your officers or directors. Your 
stockholders are also insureds with respect to 
their liability as stockholders. 
6. Under Section II, insured means a person 
operating your watercraft or recreational motor 
vehicle within the scope of your permission; or a 
person operating your mobile agricultural 
machinery within the scope of your permission 
in your farming operation covered by this policy. 
7. Under Section II, Insured means a person in 
charge of your domestic animals, including 
livestock: (a) to which Section II applies, (b) with 
your permission, and (c) in your activities 
covered by this policy. 
Insured location means: 
1. A location listed in the Declarations where you 
maintain a farm or residence, including private 
approaches; 
2. A location acquired by you during the policy 
period where you maintain a farm or residence, 
including private approaches. This does not 
include a location purchased by you that is 
outside the state of Idaho; 
3. Your cemetery plots or burial vaults; 
4. A location you do not own where you temporarily 
reside; and 
5. Vacant land owned by you and listed in the 
Declarations, or vacant land in the state of Idaho 
acquired by you during the pollcy period. 
Insured location does not include property where a 
business is conducted. 
Livestock means cattle, horses, llamas, alpacas, 
mules, swine, poultry, donkeys, goats, or sheep. 
Mobile agricultural machinery means a land 
vehicle, including any machinery or attached 
apparatus, whether or not self-propelled, usual to the 
operation of a farm, used primarily for agricultural 
purposes, not subject to licensing, and designed for 
use principally off public roads. 
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Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle, 
trailer, or semi-trailer (including any attached 
machinery or apparatus), designed principally for 
travel on public roads. The following are not 
considered motor vehicles unless they are being 
towed by or carried on a motor vehicle: 
1. Utility, boat, camping, or travel trailers; 
2. Mobile agricultural machinery; 
3. Recreational motor vehicles; or 
4. Any equipment which is designed for use princi-
pally off public roads. 
Occurrence means an accident, including contin-
uous or repeated exposure to the same harmful 
conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury 
or property damage during the policy period. Afl 
bodily injury and property damage resulting from a 
common cause will be considered the result of one 
occurrence. 
Personal property means personal property usual 
to the use of the dwelling premises as a dwelling. 
Pollutants means any solrd, liquid, gaseous, or 
thermal Irritant or contaminant, Including but not 
limited to, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals, petroleum products, waste, lead, 
asbestos, or anything defined by federal or state law 
as a pollutant. Waste includes materials to be 
recycled, reconditioned, or reclaimed. 
Property damage means injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, Including resulting loss of use. 
Recreational motor vehicle means any motorized 
vehicle designed for recreational use off public 
roads, including but not limited to, golf carts, 
snowmobiles, trail bikes, mopeds, dune buggies, 
motorcycles, or all-terrain vehicles. It does not 
include motorcycles that are licensable for road use. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, who is a resident of your 
household, including a ward or foster child. This 
definition applies only if you are a person. 
Residence employee means someone employed by 
you who performs duties in connection with the 
maintenance or use of the residence premises. 
This Includes a person who performs duties for you 
elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with 
your business or farming. 
Residence premises means, if shown in the 
Declarations: {a) a dwelling that Is your principal 
residence, including its grounds and private garages, 
or {b) that part of any other building where you 
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reside. A residence premises does not Include any 
part of a building used for business. 
DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION Ill 
(Automobile Insurance) 
Bodily injury means physical injury to a person and 
any resulting sickness, disease, or death. 
Business and Farming have the same definitions 
under Section Ill as under DEFINITIONS APPLI-
CABLE TO SECTIONS I (Property Insurance), II 
(Liability Insurance), AND IV (Inland Marine 
Insurance). 
Insured means: 
1. Under Coverages N, 0, R, S, and T, with respect 
to an insured vehicle: 
a. You or any relative; or 
b. Anyone using an Insured vehicle within the 
scope of your permission or within the scope 
of permission of your adult relative. This 
does not include a passenger. 
2. Under Coverages N and O with respect to a 
nonowned vehicle, you or your relatives when 
opera!lng a nonowned vehicle. This does not 
Include a relative who owns a licensed motor 
vehicle not insured by this policy. 
Insured does not include the United States Govern-
ment, its agencies, or any person when acting as an 
employee of the United States Government when the 
Federal Tort Claim Act applies. 
Insured vehicle means: 
1. Any vehicle owned by you and described In the 
Declarations; 
2. Any vehicle in your care, custody, or control, that 
you drive on a regular basis, and that is 
described in the Declarations; 
3. A temporary substitute vehicle. The same 
coverages apply to the temporary substitute 
vehicle as apply to the Insured vehicle for 
which it is being substituted; 
4. Under Coverages N and O only, any trailer while 
attached to a motor vehicle to which these 
coverages apply; 
5. Under Coverages R, S, and T, any camper, 
camper shell, topper, or other shell, described in 
the Declarations; 




6. Under Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q , any 
licensed private passenger automobile, pickup, 
SUV, farm truck, passenger van, motorcycle, or 
motor home, ownership of which is acquired by 
you during the policy period; 
7. Under Coverages S and T, any licensed private 
passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, farm truck, 
trailer, passenger van, motorcycle, or motor 
home, ownership of which Is acquired by you 
during the policy period; and 
8. Under Coverages S and T, any camper, camper 
shell, topper, or similar shell, ownership of which 
is acquired by you during the policy period. 
The newly acquired vehicles or equipment in 
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above are not insured 
vehicles unless we insure all of your insured 
vehicles and you ask us to insure the newly acquired 
vehicle or equipment during the policy period or 
within 30 days of its acquisition, whichever is shorter. 
The separate Coverages described in paragraphs 6, 
7, and 8, above do not apply to a newly acquired 
vehicle unless that Coverage applies to at least one 
Insured vehicle described in the Declarations. 
A newly acquired vehicle Includes a vehicle that 
replaces one shown In the Declarations. Ownership 
includes your written lease of a motor vehicle for 
more than 6 continuous months. 
Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle 
designed principally for travel on public roads. The 
term motor vehicle does not include a trailer. 
Nonowned vehicle means a trailer or motor 
vehicle with a gross vehicle rating of 26,000 lbs. or 
fess, as lndicated by the manufacturer, operated by 
you or your relatives, or In the custody of you or 
your relatives, provided the actual use is within the 
scope of the permission of the owner. 
A nonowned vehicle does not include: 
1. A vehicle owned by you or your relatives or that 
is available for regular use by you or your 
relatives. This limitation does not apply to a 
motor vehicle owned by you or your relatives, 
that is driven by you, and Is described as an 
insured vehicle in the Declarations of another 
policy issued by us or Western Community 
Insurance Company, if It otherwise qualifies as a 
nonowned vehicle. 
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2. Any pickup, truck, van, or trailer, used for any 
business purpose. This limitation does not apply 
to a pickup or passenger van that otherwise 
qualifies as a nonowned vehicle if we Insure a 
pickup or van shown in the Declarations for 
which premium Is charged based on a business 
use class. 
3. A motor vehicle rented to an insured for more 
than three weeks. 
Occupying means in, upon, or getting into or getting 
out of. 
Occurrence means an accident arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to the 
same harmful conditions. which results in unex-
pected bodily injury or property damage during the 
policy period. All bodily injury and property 
damage resulting from a common cause will be 
considered the result of one occurrence. 
Property damage means injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, Including resulting loss of use. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, who is a resident of your 
household, including a ward or foster chlld . This 
definition applies only if you are a person. 
Temporary substitute vehicle, means a motor 
vehicle or trailer you do not own while temporarily 
used as a substitute for a vehicle described In the 
Declarations when that vehlcle cannot be used 
because of breakdown or servicing. 
Trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a 
private passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, van, or 
farm truck. It also includes a fam, wagon, farm semi-
trailer, or farm implement, while being towed by an 
Insured vehicle. Trailer does not include any 
vehicles being used: 
1. To haul passengers; 
2. As an office, store, or for display purposes; or 
3. As a permanent residence. 





GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS POLICY 
Unless otherwise indicated, the following conditions 
are applicable to this policy. 
1. Abandonment of Property. We are not obligated 
to pay for or accept any property abandoned by 
an insured. 
2. Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to 
liability coverages, or uninsured or underinsured 
motorist coverages. An Insured or we may make 
a written demand for arbitration to determine all 
disputed issues as to (1) whether an insured is 
entitled under the policy to coverage for a loss, or 
(2) the value of a loss to real or personal property 
where coverage is not disputed. Each party wifl 
select a competent, impartial arbitrator within 20 
days of receipt of the written demand. The two 
arbitrators will select a third arbitrator. If they 
cannot agree upon a third arbitrator within 10 
days, either may request that a judge of a court 
having jurisdict1on selects a third arbitrator. Both 
parties shall make disclosure to each other of all 
Information as required by the arbitrator(s) in the 
scheduling and discovery order. Each party will 
pay the expenses it Incurs, including attorney fees 
and related costs, and bear the expenses of the 
third arbitrator equally. Arbitration will take place 
in Idaho in the county where the policy was 
issued unless both parties agree otherwise. Local 
rules of law as to arbitration procedure and 
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two 
of the arbitrators will be binding. 
3. Assignment. No assignment or transfer of this 
policy to another person or entity will be valid. 
4. Premium. The premium stated in the Declara-
tions will be computed according to our rules and 
rating plans. The premium is for insurance from 
the pollcy inception date to its expiration date. 
5. Bankruptcy of An Insured. Bankruptcy or 
insolvency of an insured will not relieve us of our 
obligations under this policy. 
6. Cancellation. Our cancetlation rights are limited 
by state insurance law. 
a. You may cancel this entire policy by mailing 
to us written notice stating the future date this 
cancellation will be effective. 
b. We may cancel all or part of Sections l, II, or 
IV, by mailing notice to the first named in· 
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sured in the Declarations at least 30 days 
before the cancellation date. If cancellation is 
because you did not pay the premium we 
may cancel by mailing notice to you at least 
15 days before the cancellation date. 
c. When allowed by state law, we may cancel all 
or part of Section Ill of this policy by mailing 
notice to you: 
(1) At least 10 days before the cancellation 
date if the policy has not been In force for 
60 days or if the cancellation is because 
you did not pay the premium. Under this 
paragraph, if the notice is mailed, the 10 
day period begins 5 days after the date 
our notice is postmarked; 
(2) At least 30 days before the cancellation 
date if the cancellation pertains to a 
commercial vehicle, unless cancellation is 
because of non-payment of premium; we 
will then give you notice at least 1 O days 
before cancellation; or 
(3) At least 20 days before the cancellation 
date if the cancellation is for any other 
reason. 
d. Payment or tender of unearned premium is 
not a condition of cancellation. We will mail 
any notice of cancellation to you at the 
address shown in the Declarations. Our proof 
of mailing will be sufficient proof of the 
mailing of notice. The effective date and hour 
of cancellat!on stated in the notice will 
become the end of the policy period. Our 
hand delivery of this written notice will be 
equivalent to malling. 
e. If you or we cancel, earned premiums will be 
computed pro rata based on the effective 
date of cancellation. Premium adjustment 
may be made at this time or as soon after as 
is practical. Our check mailed or delivered will 
be sufficient tender of any refund of premium. 
7. Changes. We reserve the right to adjust the 
amount of your premiums if there is a change in 
the information used to calculate your policy 
premiums. 
8. Concealment or Fraud. We will not provide 
coverage if any Insured has intentionally con-
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cealed or misrepresented any material fact or 
circumstance relating to this insurance. 
9. Cooperation of Insured. If any insured fails to 
cooperate with us or send us legal papers as 
required, we have the right to refuse any further 
coverage for the occurrence or loss. 
10. Death. Upon your death, we will continue through 
the current policy period to insure any member of 
your household who is an insured at the time of 
your death. We will also insure: 
a. With respect to your property, the person 
having proper temporary custody of the 
property until appointment and qualification of 
a legal representative; or 
b. Your legal representative, but only with 
respect to: 
(1) Your property that we covered at the time 
of your death; and 
(2) Your legal liability covered by this policy. 
11. Deductible Clause. Loss from each occurrence 
will be adjusted separately. We will not pay for 
any covered loss unlit the amount of loss exceeds 
the applicable deductible shown in the Declara-
tions. We do not cover the deductible portion of a 
loss. We will apply only one deductible (the 
highest one applicable) to a loss to which more 
than one section of this policy applies, or if two or 
more insured vehicles or other covered items 
are damaged in a single occurrence. 
12. Dividends or Credits. Any obligation of ours for 
dividend or credit will not in any way extend or 
change the policy period. 
13. Inspection and Audit. You must permit us to 
inspect and audit your Insured property and 
operation at any reasonable time. The purpose is 
to determine insurability and the appropriate 
premium charge. We are not obligated to conduct 
inspections. We are not obligated to give you a 
copy of any inspection or audit report. Any 
Inspection or audit wlll not be considered a 
representation that the operation or property Is 
safe or complies with any legal requirements. 
14. Insured cs Interest and Limit of Liability. lf more 
than one person has an insurable interest in the 
property covered by this policy, we will not be 
liable to the Insured for an amount greater than 
the insured[) interest, subject to the applicable 
limit of liability. 
15. Liberallzatlon Clause. If within 60 days prior to 
or during the policy period we adopt any revision 
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that broadens the coverage under this policy 
without payment of additional premium, the 
broadened coverage will apply to this policy. This 
clause does not apply to changes implemented 
through introduction of a new edition of our policy. 
16. Loss Payment. This paragraph does not apply to 
liability coverages. We wlll adjust all losses with 
you unless someone else is entitled to payment 
under this policy. Payment for loss will be made 
within 60 days after we receive and accept as 
complete your signed, sworn proof of loss, and 
ascertainment of the loss is made by: (a) 
agreement with you; (b) entry of a final judgment; 
or (c) the filing of an arbitration award with us. 
17. Loss Payable Clause (Applicable to Coverage 
D-Farm Personal Property and Section IV). This 
clause is applicable if a loss payee is named in 
the Declarations. A loss payee includes a 
lienholder. 
a. If a payable loss is for the value of the 
covered property, we will pay you and the 
loss payee. If a payable loss is under $10,000 
and is for repairs, payment may be made to 
you only. At our option we may pay you and 
the loss payee for any loss. 
b. We may cancel the policy during the policy 
period. We will mail notice of cancellation to 
the lienholder at least 10 days before the date 
the cancellation takes effect. 
c. If we make any payment to the loss payee, 
we will obtain their rights against any other 
party. 
d. We will pay the loss payee for. their interest 
directly if the covered property has been 
repossessed. 
e. If we deny your claim, that denial will not 
apply to a valid claim of the loss payee, if the 
loss payee: 
(1) Notifies us of any change In ownership, 
occupancy, or substantial change in risk 
of which the loss payee is aware; 
(2) Pays any premium due under this policy 
on demand if you have neglected to pay 
the premium; and 
(3) Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss 
within 60 days after receiving notice from 
us of your failure to do so. 
f . If we pay the loss payee for any loss and 
deny payment to you: 
Page 6 of45 
' r. 
28
(1) We are subrogated to all the rights of the 
loss payee granted under their lien on the 
property; or 
(2) At our option, we may pay to the loss 
payee the whole principal on their lien 
plus any accrued interest. In this event, 
we have the right to receive a full 
assignment and transfer. 
g. Subrogation will not impair the right of the 
loss payee to recover the full amount of their 
claim. 
h. Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit 
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the 
loss payee. 
18. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any 
assignment or grant any coverage for the benefit 
of any person or organization holding, storing, or 
transporting property for a fee regardless of any 
other provision of this policy. 
19. Nonduplication of Insurance Benefits. No 
person entitled to any payment or benefit under 
any coverage of this policy Is entitled to recover 
any duplicate payment or benefit for the same 
elements of loss under any other coverage of this 
policy, including liability coverages, or any other 
policy. 
20. Our Option. If we give you notice within 30 days 
after we receive and accept your signed, sworn 
proof of loss, we may: 
a. Take all or any part of the property at the 
agreed or appraised value. If we exercise this 
option, you must sign any papers we require 
for transfer of title; or 
b. Repair, rebuild, or replace any part of the 
property with equivalent property. We will not 
be liable for any loss resulting from delay in 
repair or choice of repairmen. 
21. Policy Period. The policy period is shown in the 
Declarations and Is subject to cancellation as 
stated in the policy. This policy applies only to 
occurrences which take place during the policy 
period. Losses to your insured property are 
covered only if the peril originates and causes 
loss during the policy period. The time shown in 
the Declarations is standard time at your primary 
residence. To the extent that this policy replaces 
another policy or coverage that terminates at a 
different hour on the effective date of this policy, 
this policy is not effective until the other policy 
terminates. 
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22. Policy Renewals . 
a. Subject to our consent, you may renew this 
policy for successive periods by payment to 
us of the premium we require to renew the 
policy. If we are willing to renew this policy we 
will give you notice of the amount of premium 
or estimated premium to be paid at least 20 
days before it is due. Premium payment for 
any renewal period will be due before the 
expiration of the preceding policy period. We 
may change the terms of your policy at 
renewal. We will give you notice of any 
change resulting in a decrease in coverage at 
least 30 days before it becomes effective. 
b. We will give you notice of our intent to non-
renew all or part of any commercial coverage 
under this policy at least 45 days before the 
end of the policy period. 
c. We will give you notice of our intent to non-
renew all or part of any noncommercial 
coverage under this policy at least 30 days 
before the end of the policy period. 
23. Polley Termination. If you fail to pay the renewal 
premium when due, this policy w!II terminate on 
its expiration date without any notice or action by 
us. If you purchase another policy to replace this 
one, this policy terminates on the inception of 
such policy without notice by you or us. 
24. Premium Waiver. If this policy is cancelled, 
lapses, or is nonrenewed, any premium you owe 
us that is less than $10 or any premium we owe 
you that is less than $5, is waived. 
25. Recovered Property. If an insured or we 
recover any property for which we have made 
payment under this policy, the Insured or we will 
notify the other of the recovery. We are the owner 
of this property. At our option, we will return the 
property to the insured upon insured[S payment 
of the amount we, in our discretion, may agree to. 
26. Subrogation oour Right to Recover Payment. 
a. If we make payment under this policy and the 
person to or for whom payment was made 
has a right to recover damages, we will be 
subrogated to that right (have that right 
transferred to us). That person must do 
whatever is necessary to enable us to 
exercise our rights and must do nothing after 
the loss to prejudice our rights. An insured 
must not pursue our subrogated interest 
without our written permission. 
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b. If we make a payment under this policy, and 
the person to or for whom payment was 
made recovers damages from another, that 
person must reimburse us to the extent of our 
payment. 
c. We may prosecute in the name of any 
insured for the recovery of these payments. 
We may use any documents in our files to 
pursue our subrogation claim. 
27. Special or Lower Limit, or Additional Cover-
ages o Section I. Under some Section I 
coverages there may be a special or lower limit or 
an additional coverage for a particular type of 
property or loss. Unless the policy specifically 
states otherwise, such limit is included within and 
does not increase the applicable coverage limit. 
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28. Sult Against Us. No action Is to be brought 
against us unless there has been compliance with 
the policy provisions. No one has any right to join 
us as a party to any action against an Insured. 
No action with respect to liability coverages is to 
be brought against us until the obligation of the 
insured has been determined by final judgment 
or agreement signed by us. 
29. Terms of Policy to Conform to Statute. If any of 
the terms of this policy are in conflict with the 
statutes of the state of Idaho, they are hereby 
amended to conform to such statutes. 
30. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A 
waiver or change of any provision of this policy 
must be in writing by us to be valid. 
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SECTION I D PROPERTY INSURANCE 
We cover the property insured under Section I for 
direct physical loss only, caused by specified perils. 
For most coverages, the applicable perils, limit of 
llability, and deductible, are indicated in the Declara-
tions; for some coverages, one or more of these may 
be indicated in the policy booklet or an applicable 
endorsement. 
COVERAGE A o DWELLINGS 
We cover the following: 
1. The dwelling on the residence premises 
described in the Declarations used principally as 
your private residence, including: 
a. Structures attached to the dwelling; 
b. Permanently installed outdoor equipment 
pertaining to the dwelling; and 
c. Materlals and supplies located on the 
residence premises for use in the con-
struction, alteration, or repair of the dwelling 
or its private garage. 
2. The dwelling(s) shown in the Declarations, other 
than the dwelling on the residence premises, 
used principally as a private residence, including: 
a. Structures attached to the dwelling(s); 
b. Permanently installed outdoor equipment 
pertaining to the dwelling(s); and 
c. Materials and supplies on these dwelling 
premises for use in the construction, 
alteration, or repair of the dwelling(s) or its 
private garage. 
We cover detached private garages, swimming pools, 
and storage sheds, on the dwelling premises 
pertaining to the above dwelllng(s). Our aggregate 
limit of liabillty for these structures is indicated in the 
Declarations and is a separate llmit. We do not cover 
these structures if used for any business, profession-
al, or farming purposes. We do not cover any garage 
or storage shed rented to someone other than a 
tenant of the dwelling. Under this coverage a storage 
shed means a structure for storage of your personal 
property, with exterior dimensions no greater than 
200 square feet. A garage means a carport, or a fully 
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enclosed building, designed to house one or more 
motor vehicles. We do not cover field, corral, or 
pasture fences, even if attached to a dwelling. We do 
not cover bridges designed to be used by motor 
vehicles or boat docks. 
COVERAGE B o LOSS OF USE 
1. Additional Living Expense. If a loss covered 
under Coverage A makes your covered dwelling 
uninhabitable, we will pay any reasonable and 
necessary increase in livlng expenses incurred by 
you so that your family can maintain its normal 
standard of living. Payment will be for the shortest 
time required to repair or replace the premises, or 
if you permanently relocate, the shortest time 
required for your household to settle elsewhere. 
This period of time is not limited by expiration of 
this policy. We will not pay for any increase in 
living expenses resulting from your rental or use 
of any real property that is more than 150 miles 
from the covered dwelling. 
2. Fair Rental Value. If a loss under Coverage A 
causes your covered dwelling rented to others to 
become uninhabitable, we will pay the fair rental 
value of the dwelling premises. Payment will be 
for the shortest time required to repair or replace 
the part of the premises rented or held for rental. 
This period of time is not limited by expiration of 
this policy. Fair rental value does not include any 
expenses that do not continue while part of the 
dwelling premises rented or held for rental is 
uninhabitable. 
3. Prohibited Use. If a civil authority prohibits you 
from use of the dwelllng premises as a result of 
direct damage to neighboring premises by a peril 
insured against in this policy, we cover any 
resulting additional living expenses or fair rental 
value loss incurred by you for a period not 
exceeding two weeks during which use is 
prohibited. 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation 
of a lease or agreement. 
COVERAGE C o PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We cover personal property owned or used by an 
insured while ii is anywhere in the world. At your 
request, we will cover uninsured personal property 
owned by others while the property is In that part of 
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the residence premises occupied exclusively by an 
insured. Coverage C is subject to the following 
limitations and exclusions. 
1. Newly Acquired Residence. We cover your 
personal property at a newly acquired principal 
residence for 30 days immediately after you begin 
to move the property there. If your personal 
property is distributed between your residence 
premises and this newly acquired principal 
residence, the limit of liability applies at each 
location in the proportion that the value at each 
location bears to the total value of all property 
distributed between the two locations. 
2. Multiple Insured Dwelling Premises. If you 
have more than one dwelling premises Insured 
under Section I, a different Coverage C limit of 
liability applies to each dwelling premises. 
These limits are stated In the Declarations. The 
limit applicable to one Insured dwelling premises 
cannot be applied to a loss at another insured 
dwelling premises. 
3. Special Limits of Liability. Special limits of 
liability apply to the following categories of 
property. If an item of property Is subject to more 
than one category, only the category with the 
lowest limit applies. The special limit for each 
following category ls the total aggregate limit for 
each loss for all property in that category: 
a. $250 on money, bank notes, numismatic 
property, bullion, gold other than goldware, 
silver other than silverware, platinum, coins, 
medals, gift cards or certificates, scrip, smart 
cards, or stored value cards; 
b. $1,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, 
evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes 
other than bank notes, manuscripts, personal 
records, passports, tickets, sports collection 
cards, and stamps. This limit applies 
regardless of the medium (such as paper or 
computer software) on which the material 
exists. This limit includes the cost to 
research, replace, or restore the information 
from the lost or damaged material; 
c. $1,500 on watercraft, including their trailers, 
attached equipment, and outboard motors. 
We do not cover any loss by windstorm or 
hail to this property unless it is inside a fully 
enclosed building; 
d. $1,500 on trailers, not including trailers used 
with any watercraft; 
e. $2,000 on any one article and $4,000 in the 
aggregate for loss by theft of jewelry, 
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watches, furs, and precious and semi-
precious stones; 
f. $4,000 for loss by theft of firearms, firearm 
optics, and firearm attachments; 
g. $3,500 for loss by theft of silverware, silver-
plated ware, goldware, gold-plated ware, and 
pewter.vare; 
h. $4,000 on property on the residence 
premises used at any time for any business 
purpose and $2,000 for such property away 
from the residence premises. This includes 
computers, blank electronic storage ·media, 
and pre-recorded computer programs 
available to the publlc. We do not cover cash, 
securities, books of account, drawings, other 
paper or electronic records, CD-ROM, 
electronic data processing tapes, DVDs, 
disks, or other software media; 
I. $1,500 on DVD players, GPS devices, cell or 
mobile phones, televisions, computers, and 
other electronic data processing equipment, 
while this property is in or upon a motor 
vehicle. This limitation applies to portable 
equipment that is capable of being operated 
by the motor vehicle[S electrical system; 
j. $5,000 on any one article and $10,000 in the 
aggregate for loss by theft of any rug, carpet, 
tapestry, wall hanging, or other similar article; 
k. $5,000 on your personal property which is 
usually located at your residence premises 
while this property is at any other dwelling 
owned by you and insured by us; 
I. $8,000 on hand, electronicJ power, and 
similar tools that can be used for carpentry, 
buildlng construction, or dwelling or vehicle 
maintenance or repair; and 
m. $3,000 on saddles and tack. 
If you have purchased addltlonal coverage for any 
of the above special limits, this is shown in the 
Declarations and replaces the applicable limit(s) 
shown above. 
4. Exclusions. Section I Exclusions and the 
followlng additional exclusions apply to Coverage 
C. Coverage C does not cover: 
a. Farm personal property; 
b. Animals, llvestock, birds, fish, or pets; 
c. Mobile agrlcultural machinery, motorized 
land vehicles, and their parts, except vehicles 
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designed for assisting the handicapped and 
vehicles used solely to service your dwelling, 
provided they cannot be licensed for road 
use; 
d. Aircraft and their parts; 
e. Property of roomers, tenants, and boarders, 
not related to an insured; 
f. Recreational motor vehicles, trailer homes, 
camper shells, tent trallers, and campers, and 
their parts; 
g. Any personal property located at any 
dwelling, its grounds, garages, or sheds, 
which are owned by you and not insured 
under Section I or by Western Community 
Insurance Company; 
h. Articles separately insured by this or other 
insurance; 
I. Materials and supplies on any dwelling 
premises for the construction, alteration, or 
repair of the dwelling premises or its private 
garages; or 
j. Personal property owned and insured by 
someone who is not an Insured. 
Additional Coverages. Subject to any special limits, 
Coverage C includes the following additional 
coverages: 
1. We cover loss to property insured under 
Coverage C while at the insured location due to 
change In temperature as a result of physical 
damage to the building or its equipment caused 
by a peril insured against. 
2. Credit Card, Bank Transfer Card, Counterfeit 
Currency, and Forgery. We will pay up to 
$1,000 for: 
a. The legal obligation of an insured to pay 
because of the theft or unauthorized use of 
credit cards or bank debit cards issued to or 
registered in any insuredcs name. We do not 
cover credit card or bank debit card use if any 
insured has not complied with all terms and 
conditions under which the card was issued; 
b. Loss suffered by an insured caused by 
forgery or alteration of any check or 
negotiable instrument; or 
c. Loss suffered by an Insured through 
acceptance in good faith of counterfeit United 
States or Canadian paper currency. 
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Our annual aggregate limit for this coverage is 
$2,000. We do not cover losses resulting from 
business pursuits or dishonesty of any insured. 
COVERAGE D D FARM PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We cover your farm personal property on the 
Insured location. We also cover your farm personal 
property away from the Insured location except 
while: 
a. Stored in or being processed in manufac-
turing plants, public elevators, warehouses, 
seed houses, or drying plants; 
b. In transit by common or contract carrier; or 
c. In public sales barns or sales yards. 
1. Coverage Limitations. 
a. Leased Property. We cover farm personal 
property leased by you for the conduct of 
your farming operation only if this property is 
added to Coverage D by endorsement. Our 
coverage on leased farm personal property 
is excess over any other valid and collectible 
insurance available to the owner. 
b. Livestock Coverage. Except for the peril of 
theft, we cover your livestock only if the 
specified peril causes death. Our limit of 
liability will not exceed the actual cash value 
of the livestock subject to the maximum per 
head limit stated in the Declarations. Death 
must result within 30 days from the date of 
occurrence. 
c. Crop Coverage. Woodchips, sawdust, and 
the following harvested crops: grain, seed, 
silage, fodder, peas, beans, hay, and straw, 
are covered for loss caused by peril 1 (fire or 
lightning) only. Our limit of liability for any one 
stack of hay or straw, whether free standing 
or in a building, will not exceed the number of 
tons per stack stated in the Declaratlons. If a 
stack or building is exposed within 125 feet of 
another stack or building, the applicable per 
stack tonnage limit will apply to the aggregate 
of all such exposed stacks or buildings. For 
example, if stack Y is 100 feet from stack X 
and stack Z is 100 feet from stack Y and 200 
feet from stack X, the aggregate limit 
applicable to stacks X, Y, and Z ls the per 
stack tonnage limit stated in the Declarations. 
d. Computers. Peril 18 (sudden and accidental 
damage from artificially generated electrical 
current) also applies to your laptop or desktop 
computers that qualify as farm personal 
property. 
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e. Records and Electronlc Data Processing 
Property. Our liability for loss to any records, 
software programs, electronic data, or other 
information, however stored or recorded, will 
not exceed the cost of pre-recorded computer 
programs available to the public, or of blank 
media or material, plus the cost incurred by 
you for transcribing, copying, reentering, or 
recreating such data or software. 
Our fimlt of liability for this coverage is $2,500 
for all loss sustained in a policy period. 
2. Coinsurance. You must maintain insurance on 
your farm personal property insured under 
Coverage D to the extent of at least 80% of the 
actual cash value at the time of any loss. For 
example, if at the tlme of a loss your covered 
farm personal property is worth $100,000, then 
the amount of insurance must be at least 
$80,000. If you fall to keep this percentage of 
coverage, you will share in each loss in addition 
to the deductible. We will pay the proportion of 
each loss represented by the amount you did 
insure at the time of loss divided by the amount 
you should have insured, less any applicable 
deductible. If you purchase mobile agricultural 
machinery during the policy period, we will not 
apply this coinsurance clause to any loss to that 
equipment that occurs within 30 days of its 
purchase. 
If the aggregate claim for any loss under this 
coverage Is less than 2% of the total amount of 
insurance under Coverage D, you will not be 
required to furnlsh an inventory of the undamaged 
property. This does not mean we waive any of our 
rights concerning coinsurance. 
3. Exclusions. Section I Exclusions and the 
following additional exclusions apply to Coverage 
D. We do not insure under Coverage D: 
a. Personal property; 
b. Animals, other than livestock; 
c. Accounts, bills, currency, deeds, evidences of 
debt, money, or securities; 
d. Irrigation equipment, including irrigation 
pumps, buried water lines, electric pump 
motors, panels, wiring, transformers, or 
permanently installed or portable sprinkler 
lines and sprinkler equipment (includfng any 
sprinklerts electric equipment); 
e. Fences, sawmill equipment, windmills, wind 
chargers, towers, power poles, light poles, 
telephone poles, or radio and television 
towers and antennas; 
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f. Vehicles primarily designed and licensed for 
road use other than wagons and trailers 
designed for farming purposes and used 
principally on the Insured location; 
g. Motor vehicles, house trailers, motorcycles, 
watercraft, recreational motor vehicles, 
ATVs, mini trucks, aircraft, or their parts or 
accessories; 
h. Unharvested or unthreshed crops or stubble; 
i. Any harvested crops, including root crops, 
bulbs, or fruits, except to the extent they are 
covered under the Crop Coverage above; 
j. Structures and buildings except portable 
buildings on skids in an amount not to exceed 
$1,000 per building; 
k. Any damage arising from wear and tear, 
freezing, or mechanical breakdown or failure. 
This exclusion does not apply to loss covered 
by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), peril 8 
(smoke), or peril 20 (collision with another 
object or overturn); 
I. Under peril 20 (collision or overturn 
coverage), damage to tires, unless damaged 
by the same cause as other loss covered 
under Coverage D; 
m. Bees, their larvae, bee boards, beehives, or 
any other bee nesting or housing enclosure; 
n. Loss to livestock caused by the direct or 
indirect result of fright, freezing, running into 
fences or other objects, running into streams 
or ditches, or smothering, whether an insured 
peril is involved or not; or 
o. Property which is separately described and 
specifically insured in whole or in part by this 
or any other insurance. 
COVERAGE E DADDlTIONAL BUlLDINGS 
The Declarations describe your dwellings, buHdings, 
fences, and structures that we cover under Coverage 
E. Coverage A does not apply to any property insured 
under Coverage E. 
1. Buildings. Coverage on buildings includes their 
permanent fixtures and attached sheds, but 
excludes fences. 
2. Materials and Supplies. Coverage on a building 
or structure is extended to cover all materials and 
supplies on the premises intended to be used in 
the construction, alteration, or repair of such 
building or structure. 
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3. Utility Poles. Coverage on private utillty poles 
includes attached switch boxes, fuse boxes, and 
other electrical equipment mounted on the poles. 
4. Fences and Similar Structures. For fences, 
corrals, and similar structures, we will be liable for 
no greater portion of any loss than the amount of 
insurance bears to 100% of the actual cash value 
of the property at the time of the loss. 
5. Antennas, Aerials, and Receivers. Coverage on 
outdoor radio and television antennas, aerials, 
and satellite receivers, including their lead-in 
wiring, masts, and towers, is subject to a 
maximum payment of $250, unless this 
equipment is specifically insured for a greater 
amount. No deductible applies to this coverage. 
SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
Section I includes the following additional coverages. 
1. Debris Removal. This coverage does not include 
the expense of removing pollutants. 
a. We will pay the reasonable expense incurred 
by you for the removal of debris of covered 
property provided coverage is afforded for the 
peril causing the loss. This includes the cost 
to remove from a building or from personal 
property in a building, ash, dust, or particles, 
resulting from a covered loss caused by peril 
19 (volcanic eruption). Debris removal 
expense is included in the limit of liability 
applying to the damaged property. 
b. When the amount payable under Coverage A 
for the actual damage to the property plus the 
expense for debris removal exceeds the 
Coverage A limit of liability for the damaged 
property, an additional 5% of that limit of 
liability wlll be available to cover debris 
removal expense. This additional limit does 
not apply to paragraph 7 below (Trees, 
Shrubs, and Other Plants). 
2. Fallen Tree Removal. We will pay up to $1,000 
for the reasonable cost for removal from the 
residence premises of: 
a. Your tree(s) felled by perll 3 (windstorm or 
hail); 
b. Your tree(s) felled by peril 12 {weight of ice, 
snow, or sleet); or 
c. A neighboris tree(s) feiled by perils 1 through 
19; 
provided the tree(s) damages a covered structure 
or blocks your driveway or sidewalk. The $1,000 
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limit Is the most we will pay in any one loss 
regardless of the number of fallen trees. 
3. Pollutants. If a loss under Coverage A is caused 
by perils 1 through 18, or peril 27, and that loss 
results in pollutants contaminating land or water 
on the dwelling premises, and you are required 
by law to extract these pollutants, we will pay for 
that extraction, provided you report the 
contamination within 180 days of the date of the 
peril causing the loss. Our limit of liabllity for this 
coverage is $10,000. This limit is in addition to the 
Coverage A limit of lfabillty. This additional 
coverage includes the cost of necessary testing 
for, monitoring, or assessing pollutants as a part 
of extraction from land or water. 
4. Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable 
costs incurred by you for necessary repairs made 
solely to protect covered property from further 
damage provided coverage is afforded for the 
peril causing the loss. 
5. Door Locks. We will pay up to $200 for the cost 
of re-keying or replacing locks to exterior doors 
on the residence premises if your keys have 
been stolen during the policy period. No deduct-
ible applies to this coverage. 
6. Headstones. We will pay up to $5,000 for loss 
caused by perils 1 through 19 to a headstone for 
your spouse, parent, or child. 
7. Trees, Shrubs, and Other Plants. We cover 
trees, shrubs, plants, lawns, and decorative bark, 
on a dwelling premises Insured under Coverage 
A for loss caused by peril 1 (fire or lightning), peril 
4 (explosion), peril 5 (riot or civil commotion), peril 
6 (aircraft), peril 7 (vehicles}, peril 9 (vandalism or 
malicious mischief), or peril 10 (theft). The limit of 
liability for all loss under this coverage (including 
debris removal) shall not exceed 5% of the limit of 
liability specified for the Coverage A dwelling at 
the same dwelling premises. Our limit of liability, 
including debris removal, for any one tree, shrub, 
or plant is $500, and $750 for decorative bark. 
We do not cover property grown for business or 
farming purposes. We do not cover any property 
located farther than 100 feet from the covered 
dwelling. 
8. Refrigerated Products. If Coverage C applies to 
your policy, we will pay an amount not to exceed 
the limit of liability stated in the Declarations for 
loss to contents of a freezer or refrigerator at the 
residence premises. This coverage does not 
apply to farm personal property. The loss or 
damage must be caused by a change in 
temperature resulting from: 
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a. Interruption of electrical service to refriger-
ation equipment caused by damage to the 
generating or transmission equipment which 
results in a shutdown of the system; 
b. Mechanical or electrical breakdown of the 
refrigeration system; or 
c. A tripped breaker or blown fuse. 
You must exercise diligence in Inspecting and 
maintaining refrigeration equipment in proper 
working condition. If interruption of electrical 
service or mechanical or electrical breakdown is 
known, you must exercise all reasonable means 
to protect the insured property from further 
damage. 
9. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay 
up to the amount shown in the DeclaraUons for 
your liability assumed by contract or required by 
law for tire department charges incurred when the 
fire department is called to save or protect your 
covered property from a peril insured against. No 
deductible applies to this coverage. 
10. Sinking or Swamping of a Boat. If you have 
Coverage C, we will pay up to $2,500 for the loss 
of an insuredls personal property in a boat and 
caused by the sinking or swamping of the boat. 
This coverage does not apply to the boat, its 
attached equipment and motors, to money, or 
Jewelry. Our limit of liability is the total aggregate 
limit for each loss for all covered property. 
11. Leaking Main Water Line. If Coverage A applies 
to your residence premises, we will pay up to 
$2,500 of the cost to excavate its main water line 
if it is leaking. 
12. Building Ordinance or Law Coverage. When 
your dwelling insured under Coverage A sustains 
a covered loss, we will pay for the increased cost 
to repair or rebuild your dwelling required by the 
enforcement of a building, zoning, or land use 
ordinance or law, if the enforcement is because of 
repairs to the covered damages and the 
requirement is in effect at the time the loss 
occurs. This coverage includes legally required 
changes to the undamaged portion of your 
dwelling if the enforcement of a building, zoning, 
or land use ordinance or law, is directly related to 
the same covered loss and the requirement Is in 
effect at the time the covered loss occurs. This 
coverage does not include the cost to remove, 
neutralize, treat, monitor, or test for pollutants. 
Subject to the applicable limit of liability, the 
following limitations apply to this coverage: 
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a. We will not pay more for a covered upgrade 
to the undamaged portion of your dwelling 
than the depreciated value of the undamaged 
portion of the dwelling. 
b. We will not pay more for a covered loss than 
the amount you actually spend to make 
necessary upgrades or repairs your dwelling. 
c. We will not pay for any upgrade for any part 
of your dwelling that did not comply with 
code or ordinance requirements at the time it 
was constructed. 
d. The Loss Settlement paragraph under 
SECTION I CONDITIONS that applies to 
dwellings insured under Coverage A also 
applies to this coverage. 
Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability under this 
coverage for all losses is 10% of the Coverage A 
limit of liability for the dwelling that sustains the 
loss. This limit is included within and does not 
increase the limit of liability for the dwelling. 
SECTION I PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
We cover for direct physical loss to property insured 
caused by the following perils if shown in the 
Declarations: 
1. Fire or lightning. 
2. Removal. When property ls removed because it 
is endangered by other insured perils, we pay for 
direct accidental loss from any cause to that 
property while it is being removed and for 30 
days after removal to a safe place. 
3. Windstorm or hail. 
a. This peril does not include loss to the interior 
or contents of a building caused by rain, 
snow, sleet, sand, or dust, unless the direct 
force of wind or hail damages the building 
causing an opening in a roof or wall through 
which the rain, snow, sleet, sand, or dust 
enters. 
b. This peril does not include loss caused 
directly or indirectly by frost, cold weather, ice 
(other than hail), snowstorm, or sleet, all 
whether driven by wind or not. 
c. This peril does not apply to a structure with a 
roof or outer wall made in whole or part of 
fabric or to personal property in this structure. 
4. Explosion. This peril does not include rupture or 
bursting of steam boilers, steam pipes, steam 
turbines, steam engines, or water pipes, if 
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owned by, leased, or operated under the control 
of an insured. 
5. Riot or civil commotion. 
6. Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and 
spacecraft. We cover only direct loss caused by 
physical contact of the covered property with an 
aircraft. 
7. Vehicles, meaning direct loss caused by a 
collision between the covered property and a 
vehicle, or an object thrown up by a vehicle . We 
also cover an lnsuredl:S personal property 
while it is In or on a land vehicle, for loss caused 
by rollover of the vehicle or collision of the 
vehicle or the personal property with another 
vehicle, an object, animal, or structure. 
8. Smoke, meaning sudden and accldental 
damage from smoke. This peril includes a puff 
back of smoke from a furnace. This peril does 
not include loss caused by smoke from 
agricultural smudging or industrial operations. 
9. Vandalism or malicious mischief, meaning the 
wlllful and malicious damage to or destruction of 
the covered property by someone other than an 
Insured. We do not cover: 
a. Loss if the dwelling has been vacant or 
unoccupied for more than 60 consecutive 
days Immediately before the loss. Any 
ensuing loss caused by the vandalism or 
malicious mischief is also not covered. A 
dwelling being constructed is not considered 
vacant or unoccupied; or 
b. Vandalism or malicious mischief by your 
tenants or members of their household. 
10. Theft, lncluding attempted theft. 
Proof of theft must be based on evidence that 
confirms the property more llkely than not has 
been stolen. The term theft does not include 
escape, inventory shortage, wrongful conversion, 
or embezzlement. 
Property of a student who Is an Insured is 
covered while at the studentis temporary 
residence away from the residence premises 
only if the student has been there at any time 
during the 45 days Immediately before the loss. 
We do not cover loss: 
a. Caused by any Insured or any person 
residing at any dwelling premises; 
b. In or to a building under construction; 
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c. Of materials, tools, or supplies, for use in the 
construction of a building until it is completed 
and occupied; 
d. To property of others from any part of a 
residence premises rented by an insured to 
other than an insured; 
e. Of property while in the custody of the postal 
service or similar government or private 
business; 
f. Caused by any of your tenants, members of 
their households, or your employees; or 
g. Caused by someone to whom an Insured 
has entrusted or voluntarily given possession 
of the property. 
11. Breakage of glass or safety glazing material 
that is part of the covered building. This 
coverage extends to storm doors and storm 
windows in summer storage. This peril does not 
Include loss if the building has been vacant more 
than 30 consecutive days immediately before the 
loss. A building being constructed Is not 
considered vacant. This peril does not include 
loss to window framing or other materials that 
are not glass. 
12. Weight of Ice, snow, or sleet, which causes 
damage to a building or property contained in a 
building. This peril does not Include loss to an 
awning, fence, patio, pavement, swimming pool, 
foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf, 
or dock. 
13. Collapse of a building or any part of a building. 
Collapse means the abrupt falling down or 
caving in of all or part of a building resulting in 
the building being unfit for occupancy and its 
intended use. A building that Is In danger of 
falling down or caving In is not in a state of 
collapse. A building that is standing is not in a 
state of collapse even if It is cracking, bulging, 
sagging, bending, leaning, settling, shrinking, or 
expanding. 
We cover collapse only if caused by one or more 
of the following : 
a. Perils 1 through 12 or 14 through 17; 
b. Hidden decay if unknown to the insured prior 
to the collapse; 
c. Hidden Insect or vermin damage if unknown 
to the Insured prior to the collapse; 
d. Weight of contents, equipment, animals, or 
people; 
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e. Weight of rain which collects on a roof; or 
f. Use of defective material or methods in 
construction, remodeling, or renovation, but 
only if the collapse occurs during the course 
of the construction, remodeling, or renova-
tion. 
We do not cover loss to an awning, structure 
adjacent to the building, fence, patio, pavement, 
outdoor equipment, swimming pool, underground 
pipe, flue, drain, cesspool, septic tank, founda-
tion, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock, 
under items b through f unless the loss is a direct 
result of the collapse of a building. 
14. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or 
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning, or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system, or from within a household 
appliance. We also pay for tearing out and 
replacing any part of the building on the 
dwelling premises necessary to repair the 
system or appliance from which the water or 
steam escaped. 
We do not cover loss: 
a. On the dwelling premises if the dwelllng 
has been vacant for more than 30 
consecutive days immediately before the 
loss. A dwelling being constructed is not 
considered vacant; 
b. Caused by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria; 
c. To the system or appliance from which the 
water or steam escaped; 
d. Caused by or resulting from freezing, except 
as provided In peril 17 (freezing); or 
e. On the dwelfing premises caused by 
accidental discharge or overflow which 
occurs off the dwelling premise. 
In this peril, a plumbing system does not include a 
septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain, 
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or 
related equipment. 
15. Sudden or accidental tearing apart, cracking, 
burning, or bulging of a steam or water heating 
system, an air conditioning system, or an 
appliance for heating water. We do not cover loss 
caused by or resulting from freezing under this 
peril. 
16. Falling objects. This peril does not include loss 
to the interior of a building or property contained 
in the building unless the roof or an exterior wall 
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of the building is first damaged by a falling 
object. We do not cover loss to outdoor 
equipment, awnings, fences, and retaining walls. 
We do not cover damage to the falling object 
Itself. 
17. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air con-
ditioning, or automatic fire protective sprink-
ler system, or of a household appliance, but 
only if you have used reasonable care to: 
a. Maintain heat in the building; or 
b. Have shut off the water supply and drained 
the systems and appliances of water. 
We do not cover under this peril: 
c. Loss to an outdoor hot tub, spa, or swimming 
pool, including any related plumbing; or 
d. Loss to sidewalks, driveways, patios, or other 
outdoor property. 
In this peril, a plumbing system does not include 
a septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain, 
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or 
related equipment. 
18. Sudden and accidental damage from 
artificially generated electrical current. This 
peril does not include loss to a tube, transistor, 
integrated circuit, or similar electronic com-
ponent unless caused by a sudden and 
accidental increase or decrease of artificially 
generated electrical current. Our limit of liability 
under this peril is $2,500 for each damaged item 
of personal property with a per occurrence 
limit for all damaged items of $5,000. 
19. Volcanic eruption, meaning direct loss by 
volcanic eruption, including volcanic blast, air 
born shock wave, lava flow, and volcanic fallout, 
except as to trees, shrubs, lawns, plants, and 
grounds. 
We do not cover loss caused directly or indirectly 
by earthquake, land shock wave, landslide, mud 
flow, tidal wave, flooding, or earth sinking, rising, 
or shifting, resulting from volcanic eruption, 
except for direct loss by fire, theft, or breakage of 
glass. 
One or more volcanic eruptions that occur within 
a 72-hour period will constitute a single volcanic 
eruption. 
20. Colflsion with another object or overturn. 
This peril does not apply to livestock. Impact 
with the ground or roadbed is not considered a 
collision. 




21. Electrocution. This peril applies only to live-
stock. 
22. A direct attack by dogs or wild animals 
causing mortal wounds. This peril applies only 
to livestock. It does not include attack by dogs 
owned by you or any person residing on the 
insured location. 
23. Accidental shooting. This peril applies only to 
livestock. This peril does not include loss 
caused by any insured, employee of an 
insured, or person residing on the insured 
location. 
24. Loading, unloading, collision with another 
object, or overturn while in transit. This peril 
applies only to livestock and mobile 
agricultural machinery. In transit means being 
carried by vehicle. 
25. Drowning. This peril applies only to livestock. 
26. Collapse of a building onto mobile 
agricultural machinery, meaning a building 
collapse that would qualify for coverage under 
perH 13 (collapse) that causes damage to your 
mobile agricultural machinery. This peril 
applies only to mobile agricultural machinery. 
27. Special form. We insure for direct physical loss 
to the property insured, except for any loss 
excluded below. Under items a through m below, 
any ensuing loss not excluded by any other 
policy provision is covered. We also cover under 
peril 27 any loss which would have been 
covered had perils 1 through 19 applied to your 
covered property. We do not cover under this 
peril any loss excluded under SECTION I 
EXCLUSIONS. 
Exclusions Applicable to Peril 27 
The following additional exclusions apply. We do 
not cover under peril 27 any loss caused directly 
or indirectly by: 
a. Theft, except as provided in peril 10; 
b. Collapse, except as provided in peril 13; 
c. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or 
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning, or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system, or from a household 
appliance, except as provided in peril 14; 
d. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air condition-
ing, or automatic fire protective sprinkler 
system, or household appliance, except as 
provided in peril 17; 
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e. Freezing, thawing, pressure, or weight of 
water or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to 
an awning, fence, concrete, pavement, patio, 
swimming pool, foundation, retaining wall, 
bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock; 
f. Vandalism, malicious mischief, or breakage 
of glass and safety-glazing materials, if the 
building has been vacant or unoccupied for 
more than 60 consecutive days immediately 
before the loss. A building being constructed 
is not considered vacant or unoccupied; 
g. Wear and tear, marring, scratching, 
deterioration, inherent vice, hidden or latent 
defect, or mechanical breakdown or failure; 
h. Mold, fungus, rust, electrolysis, wet or dry rot, 
bacteria, or any other corrosion; 
i. Smog or contamination; 
j. Smoke from agricultural smudging or indus-
trial operations; 
k. Settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, or ex-
pansion of pavements, patios, foundations, 
walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings; 
I. Birds, vermin, rodents, insects, or domestic 
animals. Hidden insect or vermin damage 
causing collapse, however, is covered but 
only as provided in peril 13 (collapse). The 
word vermin, includes but is not limited to, 
bats, beavers, coyotes, mice, porcupines, 
raccoons, rats, skunks, snails, snakes, slugs, 
or squirrels; 
m. Pressure from or presence of tree, plant, or 
shrub roots; or 
n. Any pollution, contamination, or environ-
mental impairment, unless the loss or 
damage follows immediately as a result of a 
loss caused directly by perils 1 through 10, 
and then only to the extent of such direct 
loss. 
If peril 27 applies to Coverage C, the following 
additional exclusions also apply. We do not cover 
any loss caused directly or indirectly by: 
o. Breakage of eyeglasses, glassware, statuary, 
bric-a-brac, porcelains, and similar fragile 
articles, other than jewelry, watches, bronzes, 
cameras, and photographic lenses. These 
items are covered only if breakage results 
from perils 1 through 10 or 12 through 19; 
p. Dampness or dryness of atmosphere or 
extremes of temperature; 
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q. Refinishing, renovating, or repairing property 
other than watches, jewelry, and furs; 
r. Any malicious or harmful computer code, 
including but not limited to, computer virus, 
trojan, worm, or spyware; 
s. Rain, snow, or sleet to personal property 
that is outdoors; 
t. Collision, other than collision of the insured 
property with a land vehicle; or 
u. Sinking, swamping, or stranding of watercraft, 
including their trailers, attached equipment, or 
motors. 
SECTION I EXCLUSIONS 
We do not cover loss under Section I resulting directly 
or indirectly from the following. Such loss is excluded 
regardless of any other cause or event contributing 
concurrently or in any sequence to the loss. 
1. Ordinance or law, meaning If because of any 
loss caused by any covered perll you are required 
during repairs or replacement to comply with any 
ordinance or law regulating the construction, 
repair, or demolition of your insured property 
which increases the cost of repairs or replace-
ment beyond our obligation to repair or replace 
with like kind and quality, we do not cover that 
increased cost. This exclusion includes any 
requirement that you test for, monitor, clean up, 
remove, or respond in any way to pollutants. 
Limited pollution or ordinance or law coverage, 
however, may apply to a Coverage A dwelling 
under SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES. 
2. Earth movement, including but not limited to, 
earthquake, landslide, mine subsidence, mudflow, 
earth sinking, rising, or shiftlng. Direct loss by 
peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion}, peril 10 (theft), or 
peril 11 (breakage of glass or safety glazing 
materials), resulting from earth movement is 
covered if these perils apply to your covered 
property. 
3. Water damage, meaning: 
a. Flood, surface water, Ice flow, waves, tidal 
water, storm surge, tsunami, seiche, overflow 
of a body of water, or spray from any of 
these, whether or not driven by wind. This 
exclusion applies even if an excluded peril Is 
caused in whole or in part by man, the failure 
of a man-made structure, or other non-natural 
means; 
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b. Rain or other natural precipitation that seeps 
or enters through or around doors, windows, 
or other openings; 
c. Water or sewage that backs up or overflows 
from a sewage, septic, or drainage system, a 
drain, sump, sump pump, or related 
equipment. A blockage on the dwelllng 
premises In a sewer or septic drain caused 
by solid material that stops the flow of water 
from a plumbing system in the dwelling is not 
considered a backup or overflow. We do not, 
however, cover any loss caused by a septic 
tank that Is full or in need of servicing. We do 
not cover the cost to service, clear, or repair 
your drains, sewer or septic system; or 
d. Water below the surface of the ground, 
including water that exerts pressure on, or 
seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, 
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming 
pool, or other structure. This includes water 
from a drain or plumbing system. 
Direct loss by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), or 
peril 10 (theft), resulting from water damage Is 
covered if these perils apply to your covered 
property. 
4. Neglect, meaning neglect of an Insured to use 
all reasonable means to save and preserve 
property at and after the time of loss, or when 
property is endangered by a peril insured against. 
5. War, including undeclared war, civil war, 
insurrection, rebelllon, revolution, warlike act by 
military force or military personnel, destruction or 
seizure of property for use for any military 
purpose, and including any consequence of any 
of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be 
deemed a warlike act even if accidental. 
6. Power, heating, or coollng fallure, unless the 
failure results from physical damage to power, 
heating, or cooling equipment situated on the 
dwelling premises where the loss occurs. This 
failure must be caused by a peril insured against. 
7. Depreciation, decay, deterioration, change In 
temperature or humidity, loss of market, or 
from any other consequential or indirect loss of 
any kind. 
8. Nuclear hazard, meaning any nuclear reaction, 
radiation, or radioactive contamination, whether 
controlled or uncontrolled or however caused, or 
any consequence of any of these. Loss caused 
by the nuclear hazard is not considered to be loss 
caused by fire, explosion, or smoke, whether 
these perils are specifically named or otherwise 
included within the perils insured against in 
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Section I. If nuclear reaction or radiation result in 
fire, however, we will pay for loss or damage 
caused by that fire if otherwise covered by this 
policy. 
9. Weather conditions, meaning any weather 
condition which results in: 
a. Landslide, mudflow, or earth sinking, rising, 
or shifting; 
b. Flood, surface water, ice flow, waves, tidal 
water, storm surge, tsunami, seiche, overflow 
of a body of water, or spray from any of 
these, whether or not driven by wind; 
c. Water or sewage backing up through sewers, 
drains, or a septic system; or 
d. Water below the surface of the ground, 
including water that exerts pressure on, or 
seeps or leaks through a building, sidewalk, 
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming 
pool, or other structure. 
Direct loss by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), or 
peril 1 O (theft), resulting from weather conditions 
is covered if these perils apply to your covered 
property. 
Section I also does not cover the following: 
10. Any loss where one or more of the following at 
any time directly or indirectly cause, contribute to, 
or aggravate the loss: 
a. Any conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of 
any person, organization, or governmental 
entity, whether intentional, wrongful, negli-
gent, or without fault; 
b. Any faulty, inadequate, or defective compac-
tion, design, development, grading, plannlng, 
siting, specifications, surveying, workman-
ship, or zoning; 
c. Any faulty, inadequate, or defective construc-
tion, remodeling, renovation, repair, work-
manship, or materials, except as is specif-
ically covered under paragraph f of peril 13 
(collapse); or 
d. Any maintenance of all or any part of any 
property whether on or off the insured loca-
tion. 
Any ensuing loss not excluded by any other policy 
provision, however, is covered if the loss is 
caused by perils 1 through 19, and they apply to 
the loss. 
ID-CQ-02-01(1014) 
11. Any CD player, MP3 player, satellite radio 
receiver, citizens band radio, scanning monitor, or 
radar detector, while such device is in or upon 
any motorized vehicle if the device is used 
primarily in a vehicle. Such device is covered, 
however, ff it is factory installed in mobile agri-
cultural machinery insured under Coverage D. 
12. Any disc, CD, DVD, or other medium, including 
downloaded media, while such items are in a 
motorized vehicle. This exclusion does not apply 
to a prerecordE';ld software program available to 
the public and purchased for use in a laptop or 
desktop computer. 
13. Any loss caused intentionally by or at the 
direction of any Insured. 
14. Any loss caused by the possession or manu-
facturing of a controlled substance. 
15. Any loss caused by the intentional dispersal or 
application by anyone of pathogenic, poisonous, 
biological, or chemical materials. 
16. Any land or water. 
SECTION I CONDITIONS 
1. Dwelling Not Owned by You. If we choose to 
insure a dwelllng premises under Section I not 
owned by you, the Insured and applicable 
coverages are shown in the Declarations. 
2. Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this 
insurance may apply, the Insured must see that 
the following duties are performed: 
a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and 
also to the police if the loss is suspected to 
be caused by someone[s violation of law. In 
case of loss under the credit or bank card 
coverage, also notify the issuing card 
company; 
b. Protect the property from further damage, 
make reasonable and necessary repairs 
required to protect the property, and keep an 
accurate record of repair expenditures; 
c. Prepare an inventory of damaged or stolen 
property showing in detail the quantity, 
description, actual cash value, and amount of 
loss. Attach to the inventory all bills, receipts, 
and related documents, that substantiate the 
figures and ownership of property in the 
inventory; 
d. As often as we may reasonably require: 
show us your property; provide us with 
records and documents we request and allow 
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us to make copies; and submit to examination 
under oath while not in the presence of any 
other insured and sign the same; and 
e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us 
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth 
the following information to the best of the 
insuredt.s knowledge and belief: 
(1) The time and cause of loss; 
(2) The interest of the insured and all others 
in the property involved and all encum-
brances on the property; 
(3) Other insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4} Changes in title or occupancy of the 
property during the term of the policy; 
(5} Specifications of any damaged property 
and detailed estimates for repair of the 
damage; 
(6} An inventory of damaged or stolen 
property as described above; 
(7) Receipts for additional living expenses 
incurred and records supporting any fair 
rental value loss; 
(8) Evidence or affidavit supporting a claim 
under the credit card coverage stating the 
amount and cause of loss; and 
(9) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request. 
3. Limit of Liability. Subject to the provisions of this 
policy, the most we will pay for loss or damage 
from any occurrence is the applicable limit of 
liability stated in the Declarations, in the policy 
booklet, or in any applicable endorsement. 
4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the applicable limits 
stated in the Declarations, in the policy booklet, or 
in any applicable endorsement, covered property 
losses are settled as follows: 
a. We cover personal property, structures that 
are not buildings, farm personal property, 
and buildings Insured under Coverage E, for 
actual cash value at the time of loss but not 
exceeding the amount necessary to repair or 
replace. If repair or replacement results in 
better than like kind or quality, the insured 
must pay for the amount of the betterment. 
b. We cover floor coverings, domestic 
appliances, awnings, outdoor antennas, and 
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outdoor equipment, whether or not attached 
to the buildings, for actual cash value at the 
time of loss but not exceeding the amount 
necessary to repair or replace. 
c. We cover buildings insured under Coverage 
A, except for property described in paragraph 
4 b above, as follows: 
(1) When the full cost of repair or 
replacement for loss to a building under 
Coverage A is less than $5,000, we will 
pay the full cost of repair or replacement 
without deduction for depreciation. 
(2) If the limit of liability on the damaged 
building is less than 80% of its replace-
ment cost at the time of the loss, we will 
pay the larger of the following: 
i. Actual cash value of the damaged 
part of the buildings; or 
ii. That proportion of the replacement 
cost of the damaged part which our 
limit of liability on the building bears 
to 80% of the full replacement cost of 
the building. 
(3) If the limit of llability on the damaged 
building is at least 80% of Its replacement 
cost at the time of loss, we wilt pay the 
full cost of repair or replacement of the 
damaged part without deduction for 
depreciation, but not more than the 
smallest of the following amounts: 
i. The limit of liability applicable to the 
building; 
Ii. The cost to repair or replace the 
damage on the same premises using 
materials of equivalent kind and 
quality to the extent practicable; or 
iii. The amount actually and necessarily 
spent to repair or replace the 
damage. 
(4) When the cost to repair or replace 
exceeds 5% of the applicable limit of 
liability on the damaged building, we are 
not liable for more than the actual cash 
value of the loss until actual repair or 
replacement ls completed. Such repairs 
or rebuilding must be made at the same 
location as where the loss occurred. Any 
replacement structure must be of a 
similar type and use. 
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(5) You may make a claim for the actual 
cash value amount of the loss before 
repairs are made. A claim for any 
additional amount payable under this 
provision must be made and construction 
started within one year after the loss. 
d. We do not cover any reduction in value to 
your insured property after repairs are 
completed. 
5. Loss to a Panel, Section, Pair, or Set. In case 
of a loss to a panel, section, side, pair, set, or 
part, including a loss to cabinets, siding, roofing, 
or carpet, we may elect to: 
a. Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section, 
side, pair, set, or part, to its value before the 
loss; 
b. Pay the difference between the actual cash 
value of the property before and after the 
loss; or 
c. Pay the reasonable cost of providing a 
substitute to match as closely as practicable 
the remainder of the outer covering, panel, 
section, side, pair, or set. 
We do not guarantee the availability of parts or 
replacements. We are not obligated to repair, 
match, or replace the entire pair, set, series of 
objects, outer covering, or panel, when a section, 
side, set, or part, is lost or damaged. 
6. Glass Replacement. Covered loss for breakage 
of glass will be settled on the basis of 
replacement with safety glazing materials when 
required by ordinance or law. 
7. Waiver of Subrogation. You may waive in 
writing before a loss all right of recovery against 
any person. If not waived, we may require an 
assignment of rights for a loss to the extent that 
payment is made by us. 
B. Other Insurance. If you have other insurance on 
the property to which this policy applies, we will 
not be liable for a greater portion of any loss than 
our pro rata share in excess of any deductible. 
Our coverage Is excess, however, over any 
restoration plan, home warranty, or similar 
coverage, whether or not it is characterized as 
insurance. 
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9. Mortgagee Clause. The word ITnortgageeD 
includes a trustee of a deed of trust. If a 
mortgagee is named in this policy, any loss 
payable will be paid to the mortgagee and you, as 
interests appear. If a payable loss is under 
$10,000 and is for repairs, however, payment 
may, at our discretion, be made to you only. If 
more than one mortgagee is named, the order of 
payment will be the same as the order or 
precedence of the mortgages. 
If we deny your claim, that denial will not apply to 
a valid claim of the mortgagee, If the mortgagee: 
a. Notifies us of any change in ownership, 
occupancy, or substantial change in risk of 
which the mortgagee is aware; 
b. Pays any premium due under this policy on 
demand if you have neglected to pay the 
premium; and 
c. Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss within 
60 days after receiving notice from us of your 
failure to do so. 
Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit 
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the 
mortgagee. 
If this policy is canceled by us, notice will be 
mailed to the mortgagee at least 10 days before 
the date cancellation takes effect. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny 
payment to you: 
a. We are subrogated to all the rights of the 
mortgagee granted under the mortgage on 
the property; or 
b. At our option, we may pay to the mortgagee 
the whole principal on the mortgage plus any 
accrued interest. In this event, we have the 
right to.receive a full assignment and transfer. 
c. Subrogation will not impair the right of the 
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the 
mortgageels claim. 
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SECTION II o LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE F-1 D BODILY INJURY LIABILITY and 
COVERAGE G D PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
If a claim is made or a suit Is brought against any 
insured for damages because of bodily Injury or 
property damage, caused by an occurrence to 
which this coverage applies, we will: 
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for 
which the insured is legally liable (damages 
Includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of 
our choice. We may investigate and settle any 
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our 
obligation to defend any suit or claim ends when 
our limit of liability is paid in settlements or 
judgments. 
Additional Payments. Under Coverages F-1 and G, 
we will pay the following expenses In addition to our 
limit of liability, but our obligation for these payments 
ceases when our obligation to defend ends: 
1. Expenses for first aid to others incurred by any 
insured for. bodily injury covered under this 
policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any 
other insured; 
2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against 
any insured In any suit we defend. We do not 
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an 
Insured that are associated with any part of a 
judgment not covered by this policy; 
3. Premiums on bonds required in a suit defended 
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the 
limit of liability provided by Section 11 of this policy. 
We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any 
bond; 
4. Reasonable expenses incurred by any insured at 
our request, Including actual loss of earnings (but 
not loss of other income) up to $250 per day for 
assisting us In the investigation or defense of any 
claim or suit; and 
5. Interest on the entire judgment which accrues 
after entry of the judgment in any suit we defend 
and before we pay, tender, or deposit in court that 
part of the judgment which we cover and which 
does not exceed the applicable limit of liability. 
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COVERAGE F-2 D PREMISES MEDICAL 
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable 
and necessary medical and funeral expenses 
resulting from bodily injury caused by an 
occurrence as described below. This coverage does 
not apply to you or residents of your household other 
than residence employees. This coverage applies 
only: 
1. To a person on the Insured location with the 
permission of any insured; or 
2. To a person off the Insured location, if the 
bodily injury: 
a. Arises out of a condition in the insured 
location or the roads or walkways 
immediately adjoining; 
b. Is caused by the activities of any Insured; 
c. Is caused by the activities of a farm or 
residence employee in the course of 
employment by any insured; 
d. Is caused by an animal owned by or In the 
care of any insured; or 
e. Is sustained by any residence employee 
and arises out of and in the course of 
employment. 
We cover only expenses incurred within two years 
from the date of occurrence. Any payment under this 
coverage applies toward settlement of any claim for 
damages against any Insured. We may decline to 
make a payment under this coverage if you 
disapprove of the payment. 
COVERAGE J D NAMED PERSONS MEDICAL 
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable 
and necessary medical and funeral expenses 
resulting from bodily injury caused by an 
occurrence. This coverage applies only to persons 
named in the Declarations for this Coverage J. Any 
payment under this coverage applies toward 
settlement of any claim for damages against any 
Insured. We cover only expenses incurred within two 
years from the date of occurrence. We do not cover 
any expenses resulting from sickness or disease. 
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COVERAGE L UCUSTOM FARMING 
Coverages F-1 and G also cover your custom 
farming. 
Additional Exclusions. Section II Exclusions apply 
to Coverage L. The following additional exclusions 
apply. Coverage L does not apply to: 
1. Any damage, injury, or loss of use to the land or 
crops upon which the custom farming is 
performed or is to be performed, arising from: 
a. The mixing or application of fertilizers, 
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or other 
chemical treatment of real property, seeds, or 
crops; 
b. Cleaning of seed; or 
c. Any goods, products, or their containers, 
manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by 
or on behalf of any Insured. 
2. Damage, injury, or loss of use resuftlng from : 
a. A delay in or lack of performance by or on 
behalf of any insured of any contract or 
agreement, whether written or oral; or 
b. The failure of any insured!S products or work 
performed by or on behalf of any insured to 
meet the level of performance, quality, 
fitness, or result warranted or represented by 
an insured. 
3. Property damage to an lnsured!s work arising 
out of it or any part of It. An insuredrs work 
includes operations or work performed by an 
Insured or on the insured[& behalf. It also 
includes materials, parts, or equipment furnished 
in connection with the insured!s work or 
operations. 
4. Property damage to your product arising out of it 
or any part of it. Your product means any goods 
or products manufactured, sold, handled, 
distributed, or disposed of by you in connection 
with your custom farming. 
5. Any custom farming conducted more than 100 
miles outside the borders of the state of Idaho. 
COVERAGE M o DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF 
OTHERS 
We will pay for property damage to property of 
others caused by an Insured. 
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Exclusions. Section II Exclusions do not apply to 
Coverage M. The follow exclusions apply. We do not 
cover under Coverage M any property damage: 
1. Caused intentionally by any insured who is 13 
years of age or older; 
2. To property owned by or rented to any Insured, a 
tenant of any insured, or a resident of any 
insuredtS household. This exclusion does not 
apply to a rented golf cart when it is being used to 
play golf on a golf course; 
3. Arising out of: 
a. Any business; 
b. The ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or 
unloading of a motor vehicle or aircraft; 
c. Theft, mysterious disappearance, or loss of 
use;or 
d. Mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure, 
wear and tear, latent defect, or inherent vice; 
4. To tires; 
5. Caused by any goods, products, or containers 
manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or 
distributed by an insured; or 
6. Arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or 
escape of any pollutants. 
Additional Conditions. The following additional 
conditions apply to Coverage M: 
1. Additional Duties. The insured shall submit to 
us within 60 days after the loss, a signed, sworn 
proof of loss and exhibit the damaged property, if 
within the Insured~ control. 
2. Applfcatlon of Section I. if Section I of this 
policy also applies to a loss covered under 
Coverage M, Section I is primary and Coverage 
M is excess. You must pay any applicable 
Section I deductible before Coverage M applies. 
I 
3. Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability under 
Coverage M for property damage arising out of 
any occurrence will not exceed the lesser of: 
a. The actual cash value of the damaged 
property at the time of the loss; 
b. What it would then cost to repair or replace 
the damaged property with other property of 
like kind and quality; or 
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c. The limit of liability stated in the Declarations 
for Coverage M. 
Our limit of liability is the most we will pay for any 
occurrence regardless of the number of 
insureds under this policy or persons or organ-
izations sustaining property damage. Our limlt of 
liability is also the most we will pay for all 
damages arising out of one or more occurrences 
within a 24-hour period. 
4. No Coverage for Defense. We have no 
obligation under Coverage M to provide a 
defense against any claim or suit brought against 
any Insured. 
5. Occurrence. Under Coverage M only, the 
definition of occurrence includes property 
damage caused intentionally by an Insured who 
is under 13 years of age. 
6. Our Settlement Options. At our option, we may 
pay for the loss in money or may repair or replace 
the property. We may settle the claim for loss to 
property either with the owner or with you. At our 
option, any property paid for or replaced will 
become our property. We may Investigate and 
settle any claim or suit we decide is appropriate. 
SECTION II ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
Section II includes the following additional coverages: 
1. Fire Legal. Coverage G covers property 
damage to a lodging place and its furnishings 
rented to, occupied by, used by, or in the care of 
an Insured, if such property damage arises out 
of fire, smoke, or explosion. For purposes of this 
fire legal coverage, the term insured includes 
only you and those persons listed in paragraph 1 
of the definition of Insured. The care, custody, 
and control exclusion (exclusion 18) does not 
apply to this extension of coverage. 
2. Newly Acquired Locations. Section II applies to 
a newly acquired location if it qualifies as an 
Insured location. You must notify us of this 
acquisition on or prior to the next renewal date of 
the policy or coverage will not apply. You must 
pay any additional premium required. 
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under 
Section II except Coverage M. Section II does not 
cover bodily injury or property damage: 
1. Arising from any insured!s business activities or 
any professional service; 
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2. Arising from any location which an Insured owns, 
rents, leases, or controls, other than an Insured 
location. This exclusion does not apply to bodily 
injury of a residence employee arising out of 
and in the course of employment by an insured; 
3. Which is Intentionally caused by any insured. 
This exclusion does not apply to the use of 
reasonable force by an insured to protect a 
person or property; 
4. Arising from the maintenance, operation, use, 
entrustment to others, loading, or unloading of 
any of the following which any insured owns, 
borrows, rents, leases, or operates: 
a. Any aircraft; 
b. Any motor vehicle; coverage, however, 
applies on the Insured location if the motor 
vehicle is not licensed for road use and is 
used exclusively on the Insured location; or 
c. Any watercraft if 26 feet or more in length. 
This exclusion does not apply to bodily Injury 
sustained by a residence employee maintaining, 
loading, or unloading a motor vehicle in the 
course of employment; it also does not apply to 
Coverage J (Named Persons Medical); 
5. Arising out of the use of any aircraft, watercraft, or 
motorized land vehicle, including any motor 
vehicle, mobile agricultural machinery, or 
recreational motor vehicle, while being used in 
or following any prearranged or organized racing, 
speed, or stunting contest or activity, or in 
practice or preparation for any such contest or 
activity; 
6. Which results from Uability arising out of any 
contract or agreement; 
7. Arising out of custom farming unless coverage 
is indicated under Coverage L In the Declarations; 
8. Caused directly or indirectly by war, including 
undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, 
revolution, warlike act by a military force or 
military personnel, or destruction or seizure or 
use of property for any military purpose, and 
including any consequence of these. Discharge of 
a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike act 
even if accidental; 
9. Resulting from any act or omission of a 
residence or farm employee while away from 
the insured location if the employee is under the 
control and direction of some person other than 
an insured; 
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10. Caused by a substance released or discharged 
from an aircraft in connection with dusting or 
spraying operations; 
11. Arislng out of the actual, alleged, or threatened 
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, 
or escape of any pollutants. This exclusion 
applies only to occurrences arising from farming 
or custom farming; 
12. Caused by any goods, products, or containers 
manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or 
distributed by an insured, except farming 
products raised on the Insured location. Loss 
arising out of the failure of seed sold by an 
insured to conform to the variety, type, purpose, 
quality, or conditions specified by an insured, 
however, is not covered. This Includes but ls not 
limited to loss caused by any viral, fungal, 
bacterial, or any other type of seed disease. The 
term r.seedomeans seeds, bulbs, plants, roots, 
tubers, cuttings, or other similar means of plant 
propagation; 
13. Sustained by you or any insured as defined in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the definition of 
Insured or by any other resident of your 
residence premises; 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law, Youth 
Rehabilitation Act, or similar law, except traffic 
violations, if committed by any insured; 
15. With respect to which any Insured under this 
policy is also an insured under a nuclear energy 
liability policy issued by a Nuclear Energy Liabillty 
Insurance Association, Mutual Atomic Energy 
Liability Underwriters, Nuclear Insurance Associa-
tion of Canada, or any similar organization, or 
would be an insured under any such policy but for 
its termination upon exhaustion of its limits of 
liability; 
16. Arising out of the molestation, corporal punrsh-
ment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or mental 
abuse of any person; or 
17. Arising out of the posting of any information, 
opinion, statement, or material of any kind in an 
email, text message, or on the Internet by an 
Insured, including postings on chat rooms, bulle-
tin boards, social media, biogs, or gripe sites. 
Section II also does not cover the following: 
18. Property damage to property owned by, used by, 
rented to, or in the care, custody, or control of any 
Insured or the insured[S employees, or as to 
which any insured or the insuredrs employees 
exercrse physical control for any purpose; 
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19. Property damage to work completed by or for an 
insured, any damage arising out of such work, or 
out of the materials, parts, or equipment furnished 
in connection with such work; 
20. Property damage or injury, or loss in value, to 
livestock, goods, or products, including contain-
ers, which an Insured raises, manufactures, 
sells, handles, or distributes; 
21. Damages claimed for the withdrawal, inspection, 
repair, replacement, or loss of use of an 
lnsuredcs products, or work completed by or for 
an Insured, or for any property of which such 
products or work form a part, if such products, 
work, or property are withdrawn from the market 
or from use because of any known or suspected 
defect or deficiency; 
22. Punitive or exemplary damages; 
23. Bodily injury to any person eligible to receive 
any benefits required to be provided or voluntarily 
provided by any Insured under any worker[S 
compensation, non-occupational disease, disabil-
ity, or occupational disease law; 
24. Bodily injury to a farm employee that arises out 
of that employeels work for you. We also do not 
cover any damages that the spouse or any minor 
children of the farm employee may have that 
arise out of a farm employeels bodily Injury. 
This exclusion applies whether you may be liable 
as an employer or in any other capacity; 
25. Property damage to an insured location arising 
out of the alienation (for example: selling, leasing, 
separating, etc.) of that location; 
26. Bodily Injury under Coverage F-2 sustained by 
any person residing on the Insured location 
except a residence employee to whom workerlS 
compensation does not apply; 
27. Under Coverages F-2 and J: 
a. Bodily injury involving hernia or back injury, 
unless it is of recent origin, it is accompanied 
by pain at the time of occurrence, and it did 
not exist prior to the date of the alleged injury; 
b. Any person while conducting their business 
on the insured location, including the 
employees of that person; 
c. Bodily injury to the extent that any medical 
expenses are paid or payable under the 
provisions of any workers compensation or 
similar law; or 
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d. Expenses for any treatment administered by 
anyone not subject to state licensing and any 
expense for the purchase or rental of 
equipment not primarily designed to serve a 
medical purpose; 
28. Under Coverages F-1 and F-2, bodily injury 
sustained by any farm employee arising out of 
employment; 
29. Bodily Injury or property damage: 
a. Arising out of a rodeo or horse racing, 
including chariot or harness racing, or from 
practice or preparations for any of these 
activities. This exclusion does not apply to an 
insuredtS participation in a riding clubrs 
practice, preparation for, or performance in a 
rodeo; 
b. Arising out of the use of any horse rented by 
an Insured to others; 
c. Arising from rlding instruction given by an 
insured for compensation; 
d. Arising out of the training, care, boarding, 
pasturing, or act of breeding, of any horse not 
owned by an insured; or 
e. Arising out of the lease of all or part of the 
insured location for any activity involving 
horses; 
30. Any occurrence covered under Section Ill; or 
31. The transmission of any communicable disease, 
bacteria, virus, or parasite, by an insured. 
SECTION II CONDITIONS 
1. Duties after Loss. In case of an accident or 
occurrence, the insured shall perform the 
following duties to the extent possible: 
a. Give a written notice to us as soon as 
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the 
tnsuredrs knowledge and belief: 
(1) The identity of the policy and insured; 
(2) Reasonably available information on the 
time, place, and circumstances of the 
occurrence; 
(3) Names and addresses of any claimants 
and witnesses; and 
(4) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request; 
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b. Immediately forward to us every notice, 
demand, summons, or other process relating 
to the occurrence; and 
c. At our request, assist in: 
(1) Making settlement; 
(2) The enforcement of any right of contri-
bution or indemnity against any person or 
organization who may be liable to any 
insured; 
(3) The conduct of suits including attending 
hearings and trials; and 
(4) Securing and giving evidence and 
obtaining the attendance of witnesses. 
2. Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence 
involving a potential claim against an insured, an 
Insured must not, except at the insuredrs own 
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obligation, or Incur any expense other than for 
first aid to others at the time of the bodily injury. 
3. DutiesrJ Coverages F·2 and J. The injured 
person or claimant shall: 
a. Give us a signed, written proof of loss 
containing the Information we request, under 
oath if required, as soon as practicable; 
b. Submit to such medical or other examinations 
or evaluations by persons selected by us 
when and as often as we may reasonably 
require; 
c. At our request, submit to examination under 
oath as often as we may reasonably require, 
and subscribe the same; and 
d. Execute authorization to allow us to obtain 
copies of any medical or other reports or 
records. 
If a claim is being made because of the death of 
an injured person, the person(s) making the claim 
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above. 
4. Payment of Claim. A payment by us or any 
Insured Is not an admission of liability. 
5. Limits of Liabilityo Coverages F-1 and G. 
Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds under this policy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining dam-
ages, bodily injury, or property damage; or 
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c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence is subject to the 
following !imitations: 
d. Under Coverage F-1, the bodily injury 
liability limit for each person stated in the 
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will 
pay for all damages arising out of bodily 
Injury sustained by one person resulting from 
an occurrence, including any emotional 
distress or other damages resulting from this 
bodily injury and sustained by any other 
person. 
Subject to the bodily Injury limitation for 
each person, the bodily injury liability limit 
for each occurrence stated in the Declara-
tions is the maximum amount we will pay for 
all damages arising out of bodily injury 
sustained by two or more persons resulting 
from an occurrence; 
e. Under Coverage G, the property damage 
liability limit for each occurrence stated in 
the Declarations is the maximum amount we 
will pay for all property damage resulting 
from an occurrence; 
f. The per occurrence limit of liability for bodily 
injury and the per occurrence limit of liability 
for property damage caused by farm 
products produced on the Insured location 
are each the total aggregate limit of our 
liability for all such occurrences during the 
policy period; and 
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g. Subject to the above llmitatlons, the 
applicable annual aggregate limit of liability 
shown in the Declarations is the most we will 
pay for all damages from all occurrences 
during the policy period. This limitation 
applies only to occurrences arising from 
your farming activities. 
6. Limits of Liabllityu Coverages F-2 and J. Our 
limit of liability per person for Coverages F-2 and 
J is stated in the Declarations. This is the 
maximum amount we will pay for all covered 
expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person 
who sustains bodily Injury resulting from an 
occurrence. This limit is subject to reduction as 
explained below. 
a. Our limit of liability in the aggregate for all 
physical therapy, massage therapy, and any 
treatment by or at the direction of a 
chiropractor, per person per occurrence is 
the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of liability 
stated in the Declarations. 
b. Our limit of liability for funeral expenses per 
person is the lesser of $5,000 or the limit of 
liability stated in the Declarations. 
Subject to the limit of liability for each person, our 
total limit of liability for each occurrence for 
bodily injury sustained by two or more persons 
is the per occurrence limlt of liability stated in the 
Declarations. 
7. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section II 
is excess over any other valid and collectlble 
insurance. Coverages F-2 and J, however, are 
primary coverages. 
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SECTION Ill OAUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COVERAGE N O BODILY INJURY LIABILITY and 
COVERAGE O o PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any 
insured for damages because of bodily injury or 
property damage, arising out of an occurrence 
involving an Insured vehicle or a nonowned 
vehicle, we will: 
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for 
which the Insured is legally liable (damages 
includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of 
our choice. We may investigate and settle any 
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our 
obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when 
our limit of liability is paid in settlements or 
judgments. 
Additional Payments. Under Coverages N and 0, 
we will pay the following in addition to our limit of 
liability, but our obligation for these payments ceases 
when our obligation to defend ends: 
1. Expenses for first aid to others incurred by any 
insured for bodily Injury covered under this 
policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any 
other insured; 
2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against 
any insured in any suit we defend. We do not 
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an 
insured that are associated with any part of a 
judgment not covered by this policy; 
3. Premiums on bonds required in a suit defended 
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the 
limit of liability provided by this policy. We will also 
pay up to $250 for the premium of any bail bond 
required of an insured because of an arrest in 
connection with an accident resulting from the 
use of an insured vehicle. We are not obligated 
to apply for or furnish any bond; 
4. Reasonable expenses incurred by any Insured at 
our request, including actual loss of earnings (but 
not loss of other income) up to $250 per day for 
assisting us in the investigation or defense of any 
claim or suit; and 
5. Interest on the entire judgment which accrues 
after entry of the judgment in any suit we defend 
and before we pay, tender, or deposit in court that 
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part of the judgment which we cover and which 
does not exceed the applicable limit of liability. 
COVERAGE P D UNINSURED MOTORIST 
We wm pay damages which an Insured ls legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury 
sustained by an insured and caused by an 
occurrence. The ownerts or operatorls liability for 
these damages must arise from the ownership, main-
tenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. 
COVERAGE P-1 o UNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
We will pay damages which an Insured is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily 
Injury sustained by an Insured and caused by an 
occurrence. The owneris or operatorls liability for 
these damages must arise from the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of the underlnsured motor 
vehicle. 
Additional Definitions. The following additional de-
finitions apply to Coverages P and P-1: 
1. Insured means: 
a. If you are a person, you and any relative, 
except a relative who owns a licensed motor 
vehicle not Insured by this policy; 
b. Anyone occupying a nonowned vehicle 
while operated by you or your relative, 
except a relative who owns a licensed motor 
vehicle not insured by this policy; or 
c. Anyone occupying an Insured vehicle. 
2. Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor 
vehicle: 
a. To which a bodily Injury liability bond or 
policy does not apply at the time of the 
occurrence; 
b. For which an insuring or bonding company 
denies coverage or becomes insolvent: or 
c. Which Is a hit-and-run motor vehicle and 
neither the driver nor the owner can be 
identified. The hit-and-run motor vehicle 
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must hit an insured, an Insured vehicle, or a 
vehicle that an Insured is occupying. 
3. Underinsured motor vehicle means a motor 
vehicle for which the sum of liability limits of all 
applicable liability bonds or policies at the time of 
an occurrence Is less than the llmlts of this 
coverage. For an occurrence involving only one 
insured this means the sum of all applicable per 
person limits compared to the per person limit of 
this coverage. For an occurrence involving two 
or more Insureds, this means the sum of all 
applicable per occurrence limits compared to the 
per occurrence limit of this coverage. 
A motor vehicle cannot qualify as both an 
uninsured motor vehicle and an under-
insured motor vehlcle. 
4. An uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle 
does not Include any motor vehicle: 
a. Owned or operated by a self-insured as 
defined by any applicable motor vehicle law; 
b. Owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
c. Used as a residence; 
d. That does not collide with an Insured, an 
Insured vehicle, or a vehicle that an Insured 
is occupying, and neither the driver or the 
owner can be identified; 
e. Owned by or furnished for the regular use of 
you or any relative; or 
f. Which is an Insured vehicle. 
5. An uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle 
does not Include any motorized vehicle designed 
for recreation use off public roads, including but 
not limited to, golf carts, snowmobiles, trail bikes, 
mopeds, dune buggies, or all-terrain vehicles. 
Additional Exclusions. Section Ill Exclusions and 
the following additional exclusions apply to 
Coverages P and P-1 . Coverages P and P-1 do not 
apply to: 
1. Bodily injury sustained by an insured while 
occupying a motor vehicle or trailer without the 
permission of the owner; 
2. The direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-
Insured under any workerls compensation, 
disability benefits, or similar law; 
3. Bodily injury sustained by an insured while 
occupying a motor vehicle owned by or 
available for the regular use of any insured which 
is not an insured vehicle. Any Coverage P or 
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P-1 under your policy applies to you, however, 
while driving a motor vehicle Insured by us that 
is owned by a relative; 
4. Bodily injury sustained by an insured while 
occupying a motor vehicle owned by any 
insured if Coverages P and P-1 do not apply to 
that motor vehicle; 
5. The liability of an owner or operator of an Insured 
vehicle or nonowned vehicle for bodily injury 
sustained by a passenger of that vehicle; or 
6. Bodily Injury for which a claim against the owner 
or driver of the uninsured or underinsured 
motor vehicle is barred by the applicable statute 
of !imitations, unless we recelved notice of the 
claim before the statute of limitations has expired. 
Additional Conditions. The following additional con-
ditions apply to Coverages P and P-1: 
1. Limits of Liability. Under Coverages P and P-1, 
the bodily Injury liabllity limit for each person 
stated in the Declarations is the maximum 
amount we will pay for all damages arising out of 
bodily Injury sustained by one person resulting 
from an occurrence, including any emotional 
distress or other damages resulting from this 
bodily injury and sustained by any other person. 
Subject to the bodily injury limitation for each 
person, the bodily Injury liability limit for each 
occurrence stated in the Declarations is the 
maximum amount we will pay for all damages 
arising out of bodily injury sustained by two or 
more persons resulting from an occurrence. 
If both Coverages P and P-1 apply to the same 
occurrence, our combined limit of liability for all 
damages payable under both coverages for: (1) 
each person shall be the applicable Coverage P 
limit of liability for each person; and (2) each 
occurrence shall be the applicable Coverage P 
limit of liability for each occurrence. 
2. Nonstacking of Limits. Regardless of the 
number of insured vehicles, insureds, policies 
of insurance with us, premium charges, claims 
made, or vehicles involved in the occurrence, the 
most we wlll pay for all damages resulting from 
any occurrence is the limit of liability shown in 
the Declarations, subject to reduction as outlined 
in the next paragraph. 
3. Reduction of Amounts Payable. The amount 
payable under Coverages P and P-1 shall be the 
lesser of our limit of liability stated in the 
Declarations reduced by a and b below, or the 
total damages for bodily Injury reduced by a and 
b below: 
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a. All sums paid or payable by or on behalf of 
persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible for the bodily Injury to which this 
coverage applies. This includes all amounts 
paid under the liability coverage of this policy. 
This also includes all applicable liability bonds, 
or policies, regardless of whether such bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by judgments 
or payments; and 
b. The sum of all amounts payable under any 
workerls compensation, disability, or similar 
law. 
Any payment under this coverage to or for an 
insured will reduce any amount that person ls 
entitled to receive under this policyrs liability 
coverages. 
4. Payment of Loss. We will pay only after the 
insured has satisfied all duties under Section Ill 
Conditions, paragraph 6 (Additional Duties of an 
Injured Person Cl Coverages P, P-1, and Q) and it 
has been determined by agreement, arbitration, a 
final judgment, or other method agreed to by us, 
that the damages which the Insured Is legally 
entitled to recover under this coverage exceeds 
the limits of all applicable bonds or policies. We 
have the option to pay any amount due under this 
coverage as follows: 
a. To the insured; 
b. If the Insured is deceased, to the insured!:s 
surviving spouse; or 
c. To a person authorized by law to receive 
such payment, or to a person who is legally 
entitled to recover the damages that the 
payment represents. 
5. Persons not entitled to recovery. A person who 
is not an Insured under Coverage P and P-1 is 
not entitled to recover damages under these 
coverages, including damages for wrongful death 
of an Insured. 
6. Hit-and-Run Accident. At our request, the in-
sured shall make available for inspection any 
motor vehicle or trailer that the Insured 
occupied at the time of a hit-and-run accident. 
The insured must notify the police within 24 
hours of a hit-and-run accident. 
7. Mediation. After the Insured submits a proof of 
loss with the information requested by us, either 
the insured or we may make a written demand 
on the other for mediation to resolve a claim. 
After mediation has been demanded, the parties 
shall attempt to agree on a competent, impartial 
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mediator. In the event they cannot agree on a 
mediator within 10 days, either may request that a 
mediator be selected by a judge of a court having 
jurisdiction. Both parties shall make disclosure to 
each other of all required information at least 20 
days prior to mediation. Each party shall pay one-
half of the cost of the mediator; except if the claim 
is settled through mediation, we shall pay the 
mediatorrs full cost. A request for mediation can 
be made within 10 days after a request for 
arbitration and supersedes a request for 
arbitration. 
8. Arbitration and Litigation. If we and an Insured 
disagree whether the Insured is legally entitled to 
recover damages from the owner or driver of an 
uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or 
disagree as to the amount of damages, either 
party may make a written demand for arbitration. 
Each party will select a competent, impartial 
arbitrator within 20 days of receipt of the written 
demand. The two arbitrators will select a third 
arbitrator. If they cannot agree upon a third 
arbitrator within 10 days, either may request that 
a judge of a court having jurisdiction select a third 
arbitrator. Both parties shall make disclosure to 
each other of all Information as required by the 
arbitrator(s) in the scheduling and discovery 
order. Each party will pay the expenses it incurs, 
including attorney fees and related costs, and 
bear the expenses of the third arbitrator equally. 
Arbitration will take place in Idaho in the county 
where the policy was Issued unless both parties 
agree otherwise. Local rules of law apply as to 
arbitration procedure and evidence. A decision 
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding. 
At the option of either party, instead of arbitration, 
a dispute as to the amount, if any, of the 
insured!S loss owing under this coverage will be 
determined in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The party selecting this option must make it In 
writing and mail or hand deliver it to the other 
party. If either party has already asked for 
arbitration, the notice must be made no later than 
20 days after notice of arbitration was made. 
9. Trust Agreement. If a claim or payment is made 
under Coverages P or P-1: 
a. We will be entitled to reimbursement of 
payments we have made to an Insured to be 
taken from the proceeds of any judgment or 
settlement. 
b. Paragraph 24 (Our Right to Recover 
Payment) under General Conditions 
Applicable to This Policy applies to our 
recovery rights. 
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10. Nonblnding Judgment. No judgment resulting 
from a suit brought without our written consent is 
binding on us, either in determining the liability of 
the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle 
operator or owner, or the amount of damages to 
which the insured is entitled. 
11 . Interest. The term damages does not include 
interest. We are not liable for any interest on any 
payment we make under Coverages P or P-1. 
COVERAGE Q o MEDICAL 
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable 
and necessary medical and funeral expenses result-
ing from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as 
described below. 
The following are Insureds under Coverage Q: 
1. Any person occupying an insured vehicle with 
your permission or the pennission of an adult 
relative, who sustains bodily injury caused by 
an occurrence resulting from the use of this 
insured vehicle; 
2. You or your relatives who sustains bodily Injury 
caused by an occurrence while occupying an 
insured vehicle or a motor vehicle not owned 
by any insured; 
3. Any person who sustains bodily injury caused 
by an occurrence while occupying a nonowned 
vehicle operated by you or a relative; and 
4. If you are an individual, you or your relatives who 
sustains bodily Injury when struck by a motor 
vehicle or trailer while a pedestrian, an eques-
trian, or while on a bicycle or other vehicle. 
Any payment under this coverage applies toward 
settlement of any claim for damages against any 
insured. We cover only expenses incurred within two 
years from the date of occurrence. No payment 
under this coverage shall be subject to duplicate 
payment under Coverages P, P-1, or any liability 
coverage of this policy. 
COVERAGE R DFIRE AND THEFT ONLY 
We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or 
damage to, your insured vehicle and its equipment 
caused by: 
1. Fire, lightning, or windstorm; 
2. Smoke or smudge due to a sudden, unusual, and 
faulty operation of any heating equipment serving 
the premises in which the vehicle is located; 
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3. The stranding, sinking, burning, collision, or 
derailment of any conveyance in or upon which 
the vehicle is being transported; or 
4 . Theft. 
COVERAGE S D COMPREHENSIVE 
We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or 
damage to, your insured vehicle and its equipment 
not covered by Coverage T. We cover loss or 
damage from missiles, falling objects, theft, collision 
with animals, or accidental glass breakage under this 
coverage. 
COVERAGE T o COLLISION AND ROLLOVER 
We will pay for direct and accidental loss to your 
insured vehicle and its equipment when it is hit by or 
hits another vehicle or object, or rolls over. We will 
waive any applicable deductible if the collision 
involves insured vehicles of two or more of our 
policyholders. 
SECTION Ill ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
1. Loss to Personal Property. We will pay up to 
$750 for loss to personal property being 
transported by the insured vehicle if the loss 
results from an occurrence involving an Insured 
vehicle that is covered under Coverages R, S, or 
T. We do not cover cash or securities under this 
additional coverage. We do not cover loss by theft 
of any personal property unless the loss is 
caused by the Insured vehicle being stolen. 
2. Loss of Use by TheftD Reimbursement. 
a. Following a theft of an insured vehicle 
covered under Coverages R or S, we will 
reimburse you for expenses for the rental of a 
substitute automobile including taxicabs. 
b. Subject to our limit of liability, our duty to 
reimburse you begins after the theft has been 
reported to us and the police, and terminates, 
regardless of expiration of the policy period, 
on the date the Insured vehicle is returned 
to you, or on such earlier date as we make or 
offer settlement for this theft. 
c. Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability per day 
and per loss for this coverage are shown In 
the Declarations. 
3. Rental Car and Test Drive Coverage. If 
Coverages S and T apply to an Insured vehicle 
they also apply to a private passenger car, 
pickup, or passenger van that is rented, or test 
driven by an insured and qualifies as a 
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nonowned vehicle. Coverage applies only if the 
vehicle is owned by a new or used automobile 
dealer or rental car company. This coverage does 
not apply to a relative who owns a motor vehicle 
that is insured by another insurance company. 
4. Locks. We wlll pay up to $200 for the cost of re-
keying or replacing the locks of an insured 
vehicle to which Coverage S applies if the keys 
to the vehicle have been stolen during the policy 
period. No deductible applies to this coverage. 
5. Loaned trailer liability. Coverages N and 0 
apply to you or your adult relative for an 
occurrence resulting from the permissive use of 
your trailer by someone else. This does not apply 
to the use of a trailer for business purposes. 
SECTION Ill EXCLUSIONS 
Section Ill does not cover: 
1. Damages arislng out of the use of a vehicle to 
carry persons for a fee. This exclusion does not 
apply to a share-the-expense car pool; 
2. Any vehicle rented or !eased to others; 
3. Damages arising out of the use of a vehicle ln a 
pre-arranged race, speed contest, or other 
competition, or preparation for any of these 
activities; 
4. Damages which are intentionally caused by any 
insured; 
5. Any nonowned vehicle while an insured is 
using it in the business of selling, repairing, 
servicing, storing, or parking motor vehicles, 
including road testing and delivery of a motor 
vehicle; 
6. Damages caused by nuclear reaction, radiation, 
or radioactive contamination; 
7. Any radar or similar detection device, or any 
portable GPS or similar electronic device; 
8. Any device or instrument designed for recording, 
reproduction, amplification, receiving, or trans-
mitting of sound, radio waves, microwaves, or 
television signals; or tapes, records, CDs, DVDs, 
discs, or other medium, designed for use with this 
equipment. This exclusion does not apply to such 
device or instrument if it is permanently installed 
in the dash, trunk, or console opening at the time 
of manufacture or by a dealer when the insured 
vehicle is purchased new; 
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9. Damages caused directly or indirectly by war, 
including undeclared war, civil war, insurrection, 
rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a military force 
or military personnel, or destruction or seizure or 
use of property for any military purpose, and 
including any consequence of these. Discharge of 
a nuclear weapon shall be deemed a warlike act 
even lf accidental; 
10. Damages caused by the confiscation of Insured 
property by a duly constituted governmental or 
civil authority; 
11. Punitive or exemplary damages; 
12. Bodily injury to anyone eligible to receive 
benefits that an insured either provides or is 
required to provide under any workerrs 
compensation or occupational disease law; 
13. Under Coverage 0, damage to property owned 
by an Insured, or transported by, rented to, used 
by, or in the care, custody, or control of an 
Insured. This exclusion does not apply to 
property damage to: 
a. A residence or private garage rented to an 
insured; or 
b. A nonowned vehicle if there is no 
comprehensive or collision coverage on the 
vehicle; 
14. Under Coverages N, 0, P, and P-1, liability 
arising out of any contract or agreement; 
15. Under Coverage Q: 
a. Bodily Injury sustained while an Insured 
vehicle is used as a residence or temporary 
living quarters; 
b. Bodily injury sustained by a person engaged 
in the maintenance or repair of an insured 
vehicle; 
c. Bodily injury to anyone eligible to receive 
benefits under any workerls compensation or 
similar law; 
d. Any expenses for any treatment administered 
by anyone not subject to state licensing and 
any expense for the purchase or rental of 
equipment not primarily designed to serve a 
medical purpose; or 
e. Bodily injury arising from any lnsuredll use 
of a motor vehicle in the commission of a 
felony; 





16. Under Coverages R, S, and T: 
a. Any loss to a camper, camper shell, topper, 
or other shell, unless listed in the 
Declarations for these coverages, or unless it 
qualifies for coverage as newly acquired 
equipment under the definition of insured 
vehicle; 
b. Any loss to a camper, camper shell, motor 
home, or trailer caused by moisture coming 
through seals, joints, or cracks; or loss from 
mold, fungi, or wet or dry rot; 
c. Any loss by collapse, explosion, or implosion 
of any tank or container; 
d. Any welder or compressor; 
e. Any equipment or accessories contained in 
an insured motor home, camper unit, or 
trailer, unless the equipment or accessories 
are built in and form a permanent part of the 
vehicle; 
f. Any loss caused by recall of an Insured 
vehicle; 
g. Loss to tires, unless damaged concurrent 
with other loss covered under Coverages R, 
S, or T. This exclusion does not apply to loss 
caused by vandalism, theft, or fire; 
h. Damages caused by wear and tear, freezing, 
mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure; 
any ensuing damage is covered if caused by 
other loss covered under Coverages R, S, or 
T; 
i. Damages to ariy vehicle caused by any fuel 
or fuel additive not approved by the vehiclels 
manufacturer; 
J. Any loss resulting from conversion, embez-
zlement, or secretion, by any person pos-
sessing the vehicle under any lien, rental, or 
sales agreement; or 
k. Any loss to an insured vehicle caused by 
the possession or manufacturing of a 
controlled substance, including but not limited 
to, methamphetamines; or 
17. Under Coverage S, any loss resulting from 
defective title or failure to obtain proper title. 
SECTION IU CONDITIONS 
1. Out of State Insurance. If you have liability 
insurance under Section Ill and if an insured is 
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traveling outside the state of Idaho in a state or 
province which has a compulsory insurance, 
financial responsibility, or similar law applicable to 
nonresidents, we will automatically provide the 
required minimum amounts and types of 
coverages if your policy does not already provide 
these coverages, but only to the extent required 
by law and only with respect to the operation or 
use of the insured vehicle in that state or 
province. The required coverage, however, will be 
excess over any other valid and collectible 
insurance. 
2. Attached Trailers. A vehicle and an attached 
trailer will be considered one vehicle under 
Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q, and separate 
vehicles under Coverages R. S, and T. The 
maximum applicable limits of liability in this policy 
shall not be increased in any way by this 
paragraph. 
3. Other Vehicle Insurance in the Company. If 
this policy and any other vehicle insurance policy 
issued to you or your relative by us or Western 
Community Insurance Company apply to the 
same occurrence, the maximum limit of our 
liability under all of the policies shall not exceed 
the highest applicable limit of liability under any 
one policy. This is the most we will pay regardless 
of the number of Insureds, clafms made, Insured 
vehicles, or premium charges. 
4. Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence 
involving a potential claim against an Insured, the 
insured shall not, except at the insured~ own 
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obligation, or Incur any expense other than for 
first aid to others at the time of the occurrence. 
5. Duties after Loss. In case of an occurrence, the 
Insured shall perform the following duties to the 
extent possible: 
a. Give written notice to us as soon as 
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the 
lnsuredu; knowledge and belief: 
(1) The identity of the policy and the 
insured; 
(2) Reasonably available information on the 
time, place, and circumstances of the 
occurrence; 
(3) Names and addresses of any clafmants 
and available wHnesses; and 
(4) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request; 




b. Immediately forward to us every notice, 
demand, summons, or other process relating 
to the occurrence; and 
c. At our request, assist in: 
(1) Making settlement; 
(2) The enforcement of any right of contri-
bution or indemnity against any person or 
organization who may be liable to any 
insured; 
(3) The conduct of suits, including attending 
hearings and trials; and 
(4) Securing and giving evidence and 
obtaining the attendance of witnesses. 
6. Additional Duties of an Injured PersonD 
Coverages P, P-1, and Q. If Coverage P, P-1, or 
Q applies to a loss, the injured person shall: 
a. Give us a written proof of loss containing the 
information we request, signed under oath if 
required, as soon as practicable; 
b. Submit to such medical or other examinations 
or evaluations by persons selected by us 
when and as often as we may reasonably 
require; 
c. At our request, submit to examination under 
oath as often as we may reasonably require, 
and subscribe the same; and 
d. Execute authorization to allow us to obtain 
copies of any medical or other reports and 
records. 
If a claim is being made because of the death of 
an injured person, the person(s) making the claim 
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above. 
7. Additional Duties after Loss o Coverages R, S, 
and T. If Coverage R, S, or T applies to a loss, 
the insured shall perform the following duties: 
a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and 
also to the police If the toss is suspected to 
be caused by sorneoners violation of law; 
b. Protect the property from further damage, 
make reasonable and necessary repairs 
required to protect the property, and keep an 
accurate record of repair expenditures; 
c. Prepare an inventory of damaged or stolen 
property showing in detail the quantity, 
description, actual cash value, and amount of 
loss. Attach to the inventory all bills, receipts, 
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and related documents, that substantiate the 
figures and ownership of property in the 
inventory; 
d. As often as we may reasonably require: 
exhibit the damaged property, provide us with 
records and documents we request and allow 
us to make copies, and submit to examination 
under oath while not In the presence of any 
other insured and subscribe the same; and 
e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us 
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth 
the following information to the best of the 
insuredi:S knowledge and belief: 
(1) The time and cause of loss; 
(2) The interest of the insured and all others 
in the Insured vehicle involved and all 
encumbrances on the insured vehicle; 
(3) Other insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4) Changes in title of the Insured vehicle 
during the term of the policy; and 
(5) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request. 
8. Territory. This policy applies only to occur-
rences within the United States of America (USA) 
and Canada. If applicable to your insured 
vehicle, Coverages R, S, and T only are 
extended for trips into that part of the Republic of 
Mexico lying not more than 100 miles from the 
boundary line of the USA. Our liability will be 
determined on the basis of cost at the nearest 
USA point. 
WARNING: Automobile accidents in the Republic 
of Mexico are considered a criminal offense, 
rather than a civll matter. The insurance provided 
by this policy will not meet Mexico automobile 
insurance requirements. If you are in an 
automobile accident in Mexico and have not 
purchased Insurance through a licensed Mexican 
insurance company, you may be jailed and may 
have your automobile impounded. 
9. Payment of Claim. Any payment is not an 
admission of liability by any Insured or us. 
10. Limits of Liability D Coverages N, 0, and Q. 
Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds or vehicles insured under this 
policy; 
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b. Persons or organizations sustaining dam-
ages, bodily injury or property damage; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence is subject to the 
following limitations: 
d. Under Coverage N, the bodily injury liability 
limit for each person stated in the 
Declarations is the maximum amount we will 
pay for all damages arising out of bodily 
injury sustained by one person resulting from 
an occurrence, including any emotional 
distress or other damages resulting from this 
bodily injury and sustained by any other 
person. 
Subject to the bodily injury limitation for 
each person, the bodily injury liability limit 
for each occurrence stated in the 
Declarations is the maximum amount we will 
pay for all damages arising out of bodily 
injury sustained by two or more persons 
resulting from an occurrence; 
e. Under Coverage 0, the property damage 
liability limit for each occurrence stated in 
the Declarations is the maximum amount we 
.wflf pay for all property damage resulting 
from an occurrence; and 
f. Under Coverage Q, our limit of liability per 
person is stated in the Declarations. This is 
the maximum amount we will pay for all 
covered expenses incurred by or on behalf of 
each person who sustains bodily injury 
resulting from an occurrence. This limit is 
subject to reduction as explained below: 
(1) Our limit of liability in the aggregate for all 
physical therapy, massage therapy, and 
any treatment by or at the direction of a 
chlropractor, per person per occurrence 
is the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of 
liability stated in the Declarations; and 
(2) Our limit of liability for funeral expenses 
per person is the lesser of $5,000 or the 
limit of liability stated in the Declarations. 
11. Limit of Liability - Coverages R, S, and T. Our 
limit of liability under Coverages R, S, and Tis the 
lesser of: 
a. The actual cash value of the insured vehicle 
or covered property; or 
b. The cost of repair or replacement using parts 
of like kind and quality. 
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Actual cash value is determined by the market 
value, age, and condition, at the time the loss 
occurred. The cost of repair or replacement is 
based on the cost of repair agreed upon by us or 
an estimate written based upon the prevalling 
competitive price. The prevailing competitive price 
means labor rates, and parts and material prices, 
charged by a majority of repair facilities in the 
area where the Insured vehicle is to be repaired. 
We do not cover any reduction in value to your 
Insured vehicle after repairs are completed. 
12. Non-Original Manufacturer Parts. Under Cover-
ages R, S, and T, we have the right to base our 
payment on the cost of non-original equipment 
manufacturer parts provided they are certified by 
CAP.A., or a similar independent testing organ-
ization, as being equivalent to or better than 
original equipment. 
13. Betterment. Under Coverages R, S, and T, 
deductions for betterment and replacement will be 
made only for parts normally subject to repair and 
replacement during the useful life of the insured 
vehicle. Such deductions shall be the lesser of: 
a. An amount equal to the proportion that the 
expired life of the part bears to the normal 
useful life of the part; or 
b. The amount which the resale value of the 
vehicle is increased by the repair or 
replacement. 
14. Loss Payable Clause. This clause applies if a 
lienholder is named in the Declarations. 
a. If a payable loss is for repairs only, we will 
pay you. If a payable loss is for the value of 
the covered property, we will pay you and the 
lienholder as their interests may appear. At 
our option we may pay you and the fienholder 
for any loss. 
b. We cover the interest of the Henholder unless 
the loss is intentionally caused by you or is 
the result of fraudulent acts or omissions on 
your part. 
c. We may cancel this policy during the policy 
period. We will mail notice of cancellation to 
the lienholder at least 10 days before the dale 
the cancellation takes effect. 
d. If we make any payment to the lienholder we 
will obtain their rights against any other party. 
e. We wiff pay the lienholder for their interest 
directly if the covered property has been 
repossessed. 
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f . Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit 
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the 
lien holder. 
15. Loss Settlement. We have the right to settle a 
loss with you or the owner of the property in one 
of the following ways: 
a. Pay up to the actual cash value of the 
property; 
b. Pay to repair or replace the property or part 
with like kind and quality. If the repair or 
replacement results in better than like kind 
and quality, you must pay for the amount of 
the betterment; 
c. Return the stolen property and pay for any 
damage due to the theft; or 
d. Take the property at an agreed value, but it 
cannot be abandoned to us. 
16. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section Ill 
is excess over any other valid and collectible 
insurance. Coverage Q, however, is primary 
coverage. 
17. Vehicle Registration. We insure only motor 
vehicles registered in the state of Idaho. 
SECTION IV C INLAND MARINE INSURANCE 
The coverages under this section apply as indicated 
by endorsement. Applicable endorsements are listed 
in the Declarations. All Section IV policy provisions 
apply to these endorsements unless an endorsement 
specifically states otherwise. 
SECTION IV CONDITIONS 
1. Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this 
insurance may apply, the insured must see that 
the following duties are performed: 
a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and 
also to the police if the loss is suspected to 
be caused by someonern violation of law; 
b. Protect the property from further damage, 
make reasonable and necess1;1ry repairs 
required to protect the property, and keep an 
accurate record of repair expenditures; 
c. Prepare an Inventory of damaged or stolen 
property showing in detail the quantity, 
description, actual cash value, amount of 
loss, and ownership of property. Attach to the 
inventory all bills, receipts, and related 
documents, that substantiate the figures and 
ownership of property in the Inventory; 
d. As often as we may reasonably require: 
exhibit the damaged property; provide us with 
records and documents we request and allow 
us to make copies; and submit to examination 
under oath while not in the presence of any 
other insured and subscribe the same; and 
e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us 
the insuredi:s signed, sworn proof of loss 
which sets forth the following information to 
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the best of the lnsuredrs knowledge and 
belief: 
(1) The time and cause of loss; 
(2) The interest of the Insured and all others 
in the property Involved and all encum-
brances on the property; 
(3) other insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4) Changes in title during the term of the 
policy; 
(5) Specifications of any damaged property 
and detailed estimates for repair of the 
damage; 
{6) An inventory of damaged property as 
described above; and 
(7) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request. 
2. Loss to a Pair or Set. ln case of a loss to a 
panel, section, pair, set, or part, we may elect to: 
a. Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section, 
side, pair, set, or part, to Its value before the 
loss; 
b. Pay the difference between the actual cash 
value of the property before and after the 
loss; or 
c. Pay the reasonable cost of providing a 
substitute to match as closely as practicable 
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the remainder of the outer covering, panel, 
section, side, pair, or set. 
We do not guarantee the availability of parts or 
replacements. We are not obligated to match, 
repair, or replace the entire pair, set, series of 
objects, outer covering, piece, or panel, when a 
part is lost or damaged. 
3. Limit of Liability. Our applicable limit of liability is 
shown in each endorsement or an accompanying 
schedule. 
4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the limit of liability 
stated In the endorsement or schedule, our 
payment for covered losses shall be the lesser of: 
The actual cash value of the property; or 
a. The cost to repair or replace the property or 
part with like kind and quality. 
If repair or replacement results in better than like 
kind or quality, you must pay for the amount of 
betterment. We do not cover any reduction in 
value to your covered property after repairs are 
completed. 
5. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section 
IV is excess over any other valid and collectible 
insurance. 
POLICY ENDORSEMENTS 
The coverage In your policy may be modified by 
endorsement. Each of the following endorsements 
may or may not apply to your policy. An endorsement 
applies only when it is listed in the Declarations. In 
addition to the endorsements in this booklet, other 
endorsements may apply If listed in the Declarations. 
The policy provisions apply to endorsements unless 
an endorsement specifically states otherwise. 
SECTION I ENDORSEMENTS 
1104 (1014) Property Coverage Endorsement. Cov-
erage E, and perils 1 through 9, apply to the following 
property: 
1. New buildings or structures, or additions to 
property covered under Coverage E, while under 
construction on the Insured location; 
2. Permanent buildings at a newly acquired premise 
that qualifies as an insured location. We also 
cover buildings under construction, permanent 
structures, fixtures, and fixed equipment, at this 
premise; and 
3. Materials and supplies on the Insured location to 
be used in construction of the above covered 
property. 
You must report the new acquisitions on or before the 
next policy renewal date and pay the appropriate 
premium. New dwellings that qualify for Coverage A 
are not covered under this endorsement. This 
endorsement does not apply to an Insured location 
outside the state of Idaho. 
Limit of Liability. The total limit of additional insur-
ance for all property covered under this endorsement 
shall not exceed $300,000 untll you report values of 
the property to us. Additional premium is due and 
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computed from the date of property acquisition. At our 
discretion, the premium may not be billed until the 
next policy renewal. 
Loss Settlement Clause. Loss covered under this 
endorsement will be settled based on actual cash 
value. 
1109 (0108) Irrigation Equipment and Spare Truck 
Parts Endorsement. Coverage O is amended to 
include your irrigation equipment, including irrigation 
pumps, buried water lines, electric pump motors, 
panels, wiring, transformers, and permanently 
installed or portable sprinkler lines and sprinkler 
equipment (including any sprlnkleris electrical 
equipment). In addition to the perils that apply to 
Coverage D, this endorsement covers loss to your 
pivot or wheel lines caused by collapse if caused by 
either weight of ice or snow or by mechanical failure. 
Spare truck parts are included in this endorsement If 
Indicated in the Declarations. 
Our limit of liability for this endorsement is indicated in 
the Declarations. The coinsurance requirement under 
Coverage D applies separately to this endorsement. 
1111 (1014) Replacement Costo Personal Property 
Endorsement. Losses under Coverage C will be 
settled at replacement cost. This endorsement also 
covers domestic appliances, floor coverings, awnings, 
outdoor antennas, and outdoor equipment, pertaining 
to a dwelling insured under Coverage A. Limitations 
on this coverage are explained below. 
1. Property Not Ellgible . Property listed below is 
not eligible for replacement cost settlement. Any 
loss to this property will be settled at actual cash 
value at the time of loss but not exceeding the 
amount necessary to repair or replace. 





a. Antiques, fine arts, paintings, statues, and 
other articles, which by their inherent nature 
cannot be replaced with new items. 
b. Articles whose age or history contribute 
substantially to their value, includfng but not 
limited to, memorabilia, souvenirs, and 
collectorscltems. 
c. Personal property of others. 
d. Articles not maintained in good or workable 
condition. 
e. Articles that are outdated or obsolete and are 
stored or not being used. 
2. Limit of Coverage. Subject to the Coverage C 
limit of liability, we will not pay more than the 
smallest of the following amounts under this 
endorsement 
a. Replacement cost al time of loss without 
deduction for depreciation; 
b. The full cost of repair at time of loss; 
c. 400% of the actual cash value at time of loss; 
d. The actual cash value of any property 
purchased or acquired used; or 
e. Any special limit of liability applicable under 
Coverage C. 
Any payment under Coverage C that is not 
subject to replacement cost coverage under this 
endorsement reduces the Coverage C limit of 
liability available under this endorsement for the 
same occurrence. 
3. Additional Provisions. 
a. When the replacement cost for the entire loss 
under this endorsement exceeds $500, we 
will pay no more than the actual cash value 
for the loss or damage until the actual repair 
or replacement is completed. You must 
provide proof of replacement with purchase 
receipts or other proof of purchase. 
b. An insured may make a claim for loss on an 
actual cash value basis and then make claim 
within one year after the loss for any 
additional amount payable under this 
endorsement. 
c. Under this endorsement, replacement cost 
means the cost at the time of loss of a new 
item identical to the one for which the claim is 
made. If an identical item is not available, it 
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means the cost of a new article of 
comparable quality and features. 
1114 (1014) Borrowed Equipment Endorsement. 
We cover under Coverage D, loss to mobile 
agricultural machinery in which you have no interest 
and is not available for your regular use, provided 
such machinery has been borrowed by either you or 
your employees, and is being used in the conduct of 
your own farming operation. This coverage will apply 
as excess over any insurance that the owner has on 
this property. Our limit of liability per occurrence 
under this endorsement is stated in the Declarations. 
1116 (1014) Cosmetic Roof Damage Endorsement. 
Coverages A and E do not cover cosmetic damage to 
roof surfacing caused by wind or hail, meaning 
marring, pitting, or other superficial damage that 
alters the appearance of the roof surfacing but does 
not prevent it from functioning as a barrier to the 
elements to the same extent as before the cosmetic 
damage occurred. 
1118 (0108) Scheduled Farm Personal Property 
Endorsement. Coverage D is changed to cover only 
the scheduled categories of farm personal property 
listed in the Declarations. The coinsurance clause is 
changed to apply individually to each category. 
1125 (1014) Sewage or Sump System Backup 
Endorsement. Coverages A, B, and C are amended 
to inctude loss caused by water or sewage backup 
into your insured dwelling, meaning water or sewage 
backup from a sewer, septic or sump system not 
caused by peril 14 (Accidental discharge or 
overflow of water) . Section I Exclusions, except 
exclusion 3 c, apply to this endorsement. 
This coverage is limited to damage to your dwelling 
and personal property in the dwelling. It does not 
Include service, damage, or repair to a sewage, 
septic, or sump system. The Coverage A and C limits 
for this endorsement are stated in the Declarations. 
Each limit is the annual aggregate limit for all losses 
during the policy period. 
If a loss covered under this endorsement is caused by 
a broken sewer tine on the residence premises, we 
wilt pay up to $2,500 to excavate that sewer line, but 
not to repair it. Any amount paid for excavation is 
included in the limit applicable to this coverage. 
1130 (0108) Elimination of Livestock under Cover• 
age D Endorsement. There is no coverage for live-
stock under Coverage D. 
1133 (1014} Limited Fungi, Wet or Dry Rot, or 
Bacteria Coverage Endorsement. 
1. Definition. Fungi means any type or form of 
fungus, including mold, mildew, mycotoxins, 
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spores, scents, or their by-products which they 
produce. 
2. Coverage. Coverage under this endorsement 
applies only to dwellings insured under 
Coverage A (Your Dwellings) and personal 
property insured under Coverage C {Personal 
Property) located in those dwellings. We cover 
direct, physical loss caused by fungi, wet or dry 
rot, or bacteria, but only when such loss is the 
result of perils 1-19 under SECTION I PERILS 
INSURED AGAINST and only if all reasonable 
means were used to save and preserve the 
property from further damage resultfng from the 
peril insured against. SECTION I ADDITIONAL 
COVERAGES • Debris Removal does not apply 
to any loss under this endorsement. The fungi or 
bacterial exclusion in peril 14 (Accident dis-
charge or overflow of water} does not apply to 
coverage under this endorsement. 
3. Additional General Exclusion. Except as indi-
cated above, we do not cover any loss caused 
by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether an 
insured peril is involved or not. This exclusion 
applies to all property insured under Section I. 
4. Limit of liability. Our limit of liability for this 
coverage for loss to each Coverage A dwelling 
and the personal property located in that 
dwelling Is stated In the Declarations. Our limit 
of liability is the most we will pay for: 
a. The total of all loss caused by fungi, wet or 
dry rot, or bacteria; 
b. The cost to remove fungi, wet or dry rot, or 
bacteria from covered property; 
c. The cost to tear out and replace any part of 
the covered property as needed to gain 
access to the fungi, wet or dry rot, or 
bacteria; and 
d. The cost of testing of air or property to 
confirm the absence, presence, or level of 
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether 
performed prior to, during, or after removal, 
repair, restoration, or replacement. The cost 
of such testing will be provided only to the 
extent_ that there rs reason to believe that 
there is a presence of fungi, wet or dry rot, 
or bacteria. 
Our llmlt of liability ts the most we will pay for the 
total of all loss or costs under this endorsement 
for the covered dwelling and personal property 
located in that dwelling regardless of the 
number of claims made during the policy period. 
This limit does not increase our limit of liability 
under Coverage A or Coverage C. 
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5. Conditions. 
a. This endorsement applies only to perils and 
losses which occur during the policy period. 
b. If there Is any loss to covered property not 
caused in whole or in part by fungi, wet or 
dry rot, or bacteria, our loss payment will not 
be limited by the terms of this endorsement 
except to the extent that fungi, wet or dry 
rot, or bacteria, causes an increase in the 
loss. Any such increase in the loss will be 
subject to the terms of this endorsement. 
c. The limitations of coverage under this 
endorsement do not apply to loss from 
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria if such loss 
is a result of fire or lightning. 
d. The policy provisions apply unless this 
endorsement states otherwise. 
1171 (0108) Glass Deductible Waived Endorse-
ment. No deductible applies to glass breakage to the 
building(s) insured under Coverage A. This endorse-
ment does not apply to window framing or other 
materials that are not glass. 
1183 (1014) Increased Replacement Cost Endorse-
ment. Our limit of liability applicable to a dwelling 
insured under Coverage A to which this endorsement 
applies will be increased by the percentage shown In 
the Declarations for this endorsement if: 
1. You Insure your dwelling for 100% of its 
replacement cost as we estimate based on the 
accuracy of information you furnish, and you pay 
the premium we require; 
2. You accept any annual adjustment we make to 
the limit·applicable to your dwelling and you pay 
the additional premium; and 
3. You notify us within 90 days of the start of any 
additions or other physical changes that increase 
the value of your dwelllng on the dwelling 
premises by $5,000 or more, and pay the 
additional premium. 
Subject to our limit of liability, losses under this 
endorsement are covered for the cost of repair or 
replacement of the damaged part with new materials 
without deduction for depreciation, but not more than 
the amount spent to repair or replace the damage on 
the same premises using new materials of equivalent 
kind and quality to the extent practical. 
Paragraphs c (1 ), (2), and (3) of the Loss Settlement 
paragraph of SECTION I CONDITIONS are deleted. 
This endorsement is void if you fail to comply with its 
provisions. 
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Our calculation of the replacement cost of your 
insured dwelllng is our estimate using software 
widely used in the insurance industry. You are 
responsible to see that the limit that applies is 
adequate to replace your property. 
SECTION II ENDORSEMENTS 
1220 (1014) Combined Single Limit Endorsement-
Coverages F-1 and G. The Limits of Liability-
Coverages F-1 and G paragraph under SECTION fJ 
CONDITIONS is changed to read as follows: 
5. Limit of LiabiJityo Coverages F-1 and G. 
Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds under this policy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining dam-
ages, bodily Injury, or property damage; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence is subject to the 
following limitations: 
d. Our total combined single limit of liability 
under Coverages F-1 and G for all bodily 
Injury and property damage resulting from 
one occurrence shall not exceed the 
applicable limit of liability stated in the 
Declarations. 
e. The per occurrence combined single limit of 
liability for bodily injury and property 
damage caused by farm products produced 
on the Insured location is also the total limit 
of our liability for all occurrences during the 
policy period. 
f. Subject to the above limitations, the 
applicable annual aggregate limit of liability 
shown in the Declarations is the most we will 
pay for all damages from all occurrences 
during the policy period arising from your 
farming activities. 
1223 (0108) Limited Pollution Coverage Endorse• 
ment basic form. Coverages F-1 (Bodily Injury 
Liability} and G (Property Damage Liability) apply to 
bodily injury or property damage caused by an 
occurrence and arising out of the actual discharge, 
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of 
pollutants but only on the following conditions: (a) it 
is a claim or suit by a non-governmental entity or 
private person and (b) the claim meets alt the 
requirements of one of the three following numbered 
paragraphs: 
1. The bodily injury or property damage arises out 
of heat, smoke, or fumes from a hostile fire. As 
used in this endorsement, a hostile fire means 
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one that becomes uncontrollable or breaks out 
from where it was intended to be. 
2. The bodily injury or property damage arises 
from the accidental above ground contact with 
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or fertilizers, 
caused by the application of the same to an 
Insured location and provided that: 
a. The contact begins during the policy period; 
b. The contact begins at an established time 
and place; 
c. The contact ends no more than 7 days after 
the beginning of the contact as identified in 
the requirements of 2 b; 
d. The bodily injury or property damage must 
occur within 12 months of said application; 
and 
e. The application is not from an aircraft. 
3. The bodily injury or property damage arises out 
of a short-term pollution event. As used in this 
endorsement, a short-term pollution event means 
a discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of 
pollutants directly from either an insured 
location or mobile agricultural machinery 
being operated by an insured which: 
a. Begins during the policy period; 
b. Begins at an identified time and place; 
c. Ends at an identified time within 7 days of the 
beginning of the discharge, dispersal, 
release, or escape of the pollutants as 
identified in the requirements of 3 b, and 
involves no further discharge, dispersal, 
release, or escape of additional amounts of 
the pollutants after the end date; 
d. ls reported to us within 37 days of its 
beginning; 
e. Is not a repeat or resumption of a previous 
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of 
the same pollutants from essentially the 
same source within 14 months of a previous 
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape; 
f. Is not covered under paragraphs 1 or 2 
above; 
g. Does not originate from an underground 
storage tank; and 
h. Is not animal waste, which includes manure, 
or a by-product of animal waste from: 
Page 40 of45 
1. 
62
(i) Any farming operation where animals, 
Including fish, are fed and confined in any 
pen, corral, shed, barn, or other 
enclosure; or 
(ii) Any animal waste collection device, 
holding facility, or disposal system. 
Llmlt(s) of Liability, Expenses and Defense Costs. 
The limit(s) of liability applicable to occurrences 
under paragraph 3 is shown in the Declarations with 
reference to this endorsement. The per occurrence 
limit of liability is also the total aggregate limit of our 
liability for all such occurrences during the policy 
period. The limit(s) of liability applicable to Coverages 
F-1 and Coverage G applies to an occurrence under 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above. 
Claims expense and defense costs, for losses 
covered under paragraph 3, reduce the limft of 
liability, both per occurrence and aggregate limit of 
liability, notwithstanding any other defense provisions 
In the policy. 
Exclusions. We do not cover: 
(a) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any claim for treble 
damages, punitive damages, fines, penalties, 
monitoring tests, or similar assessments; 
(b) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any claim for 
nuisance or trespass; 
(c) Under paragraph 3, any claim for bodily injury 
which arises from or has as a component of the 
bodily Injury, asthma, cystlc fibrosis, or any 
other ailment caused by or aggravated by smoke 
or any other pollutants that comes from any 
agricultural burning, including but not limited to, 
the burning of weeds, grasses, fann crops, crop 
residue, or any other plant matter; 
(d) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any loss, damage, 
cost, or expense, directly or indirectly caused by, 
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of 
or in connection with any act of terrorism 
regardless of any other cause or event contribut-
ing concurrently or in any other sequence to the 
loss; or 
(e) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any loss, damage, 
cost, or expense, directly or indirectly caused by, 
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of 
or in connection with any action in controlling, 
preventing, suppressing, retaliating against, or 
responding to any act of terrorism. 
An act of terrorism Includes any act, preparation 
to act, or threat of action: (1) designed to 
influence the government de jure or de facto of 
any nation or any political division, (2) in pursuit of 
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political, religious, ideological, or s[milar 
purposes, or (3) to intimidate the pubHc or a 
section of the public of any nation, by any 
person(s) whether acting alone or on behalf of or 
in connection with any organization or 
government de jure or de facto, and which: 
(i) involves violence against any person; 
(ii) involves damage to property; 
(iii) endangers llfe other than that of the person 
committing the action; 
(iv) creates a risk to health or safety of the public 
or a section of the public; or 
(v) is designed to interfere with or to disrupt an 
electronic system. 
Additional Provisions. 
Except as specifically provided in paragraphs 1, 2, 
and 3, and subject to all conditions stated in those 
paragraphs, this endorsement does not apply to or 
provide any coverage for any liability arising out of the 
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release, or escape of pollutants. 
If Coverage L (Custom Farming) applles, all 
Coverage L conditions, limitations, and exclusions 
also apply to this endorsement. 
Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous, or 
thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, waste, 
or anything defined by federal or state law as a 
pollutant. Waste includes materials to be recycled, 
reconditioned, or reclaimed. 
The policy provisions apply unless this endorsement 
states otherwise. 
1259 (1014) Accidental Death Endorsement. If you 
or any of your unmarried children under age 25 who 
qualify as an Insured dies as a result of an 
occurrence, we will pay the limit of liability for this 
coverage as indicated in the Declarations. We do not 
cover any death that results more than 90 days from 
the date of the occurrence. 
1. Additional Exclusions. Except for exclusion 13, 
Section II Exclusions pertaining to bodily injury 
apply to coverage under this endorsement. The 
following exclusions also apply. We do not cover 
any death: 
a. Caused by suicide, attempted suicide, or any 
intentionally self-inflicted injury, regardless if 
the person is incompetent or suffers from a 
mental illness; or 
b. To any insured 81 years of age or older on 
the date of occurrence; or 
c. Caused by heart attack, heart failure, stroke, 
Page 41 of 45 
!. 
63
any illness, disease, or physical ailment. 
2. Notice and Proof of Claim. Upon notice of claim, 
we will provide a fonn for filing a proof of loss. 
Payment under this coverage will be made as 
follows: 
a. In the case of death to a named Insured, to 
the surviving spouse; 
b. In the case of death to a qualifyfng child, to 
you; or 
c. If the beneficiary is deceased, to the estate of 
the decedent. 
1269 (0108} Limited Employerrs Liability Endorse-
ment. Coverages F-1 and F-2 are extended to apply 
to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and 
sustained by a person performing labor for you in 
your farming operation, but only if you are not 
required by law to provide workerrs compensation 
benefits or coverage for this bodily injury. Coverage 
F-2 does not apply to a person or their employees 
while they conduct their business on the insured 
location. 
1282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under 
Coverage F-1, we cover personal injury. Personal 
injury means injury other than bodily Injury arising 
out of one or more of the following offenses: 
1. False arrest, detention or Imprisonment, or 
malicious prosecution; 
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or 
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful 
entry. 
Exclusions. SECTION II EXCLUSIONS do not apply 
to this endorsement. This endorsement does not 
cover: 
1. Liability arising out of any contract or agreement; 
2. Injury caused by a violation of a criminal law or 
ordinance; 
3. Injury arising out of the oral or written publication 
of materials if done by or at the direction of an 
Insured with the knowledge that it Is false; 
4. Injury arising out of an oral or written publication 
that was first published before the beginning of 
the policy period; 
5. Injury caused by or at the direction of an insured 
with the knowledge that the insured would violate 
the rights of another and would inflict injury; 
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6. Injury sustained by any person as a result of an 
offense directly or indirectly related to the 
employment of this person by the insured; 
7. Injury sustained by an Insured; 
8. Injury arising out of the business pursuits of an 
Insured; 
9. Civic or public activities performed for pay by an 
Insured; 
10. Injury arising out of the molestation, corporal 
punishment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or 
mental abuse of any person; 
11. Injury arising out of the posting of any 
information, opinion, statement, or material of any 
kind on the Internet by an insured, including 
postings on chat rooms, bulletin boards, social 
media, biogs, or gripe sites; 
12. Injury arising out of any material in an e-mail or 
text message sent by an Insured; or 
13. Injury arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease, or escape of any pollutants. 
Additional Condition. Our applicable per occur-
rence limit of liability shown in the Declarations is 
also the most we will pay for all damages from all 
occurrences during the policy period. 
SECTION Ill ENDORSEMENTS 
1309 (1014) Employerrs Nonownership Liability 
Endorsement. Coverages N and O cover your 
liability and the liability of your executive officers 
arising out of the use of a nonowned motor vehicle 
In your farming or household activities by any person 
other than you. · 
1. Definition. In this endorsement, nonowned 
motor vehicle means a motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semi-trailer not owned by, registered in the 
name of, hired by, leased by, or loaned to you or 
your executive officers. 
2. Application of Insurance. 
a. This endorsement does not apply to any 
motor vehicle owned by any of your 
executive officers or their spouses. 
b. This insurance does not apply to any motor 
vehicle owned by or registered in the name 
of a partner if your business is in the form of 
a partnership. 




Death Benefit. We agree to pay $10,000 if an 
Insured dies solely as the result of bodily Injury 
caused by an occurrence while occupying or if 
struck by a motor vehicle. Death of the insured 
must occur within one year after the date of the 
occurrence. 
Exclusions. The following additional exclusions apply 
to this endorsement. This endorsement does not 
cover: 
1. Death caused by or resulting from disease, 
except infection resulting from bodily injury to 
which this insurance applies; 
2. Bodily injury sustained by an insured engaged 
in the maintenance or repair of a motor vehicle; 
3. Bodily injury to an Insured arising out of the 
business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or 
parking motor vehicles, including road testing or 
delivery; 
4. Bodily injury to an insured arising out of the 
operation, loading, unloading, or occupying of a 
public or commercial motor vehicle; 
5. Bodily injury to an insured while occupying a 
motor vehicle without the permission of the 
owners; or 
6. Bodily injury to an Insured while occupying a 
motor vehicle owned by or available for the 
regular use of any insured which is not an 
insured vehicle. 
Conditions. The following additional conditions apply 
to this endorsement: 
1. Insured means only those persons listed in the 
Declarations as persons to whom this endorse-
ment applies. 
2. Notice of Claim. The insured!S spouse or some-
one acting on behalf of the insured!s heirs shall: 
a. Give us a signed, written proof of loss 
containing the information we request, under 
oath if required, as soon as practical; and 
b. Execute authorization to allow us to obtain 
copies of medical reports and records. 
3. Payment of Death Beneflto Autopsy. 
a. If the insured decedent is survived by a 
spouse who is a resident of the same 
household at the time of the occurrence, the 
death benefit Is payable to the decedent!S 
spouse. If the insured decedent was a minor, 
the death benefit is payable to any parent 
who was a resident of the same household at 
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the time of the occurrence; otherwise, the 
death benefit is payable to the insured 
decedentts estate. 
b. We shall have the right to have an autopsy 
performed where it is not forbidden by law. 
The paragraphs titled Nondupllcation of Insurance 
Benefits, Subrogatlono Our Right to Recover 
Payment, and Other Insurance, do not apply to this 
endorsement. 
1313 (1014) Combined Single Limit Endorsement-
Coverages P and P-1 (Uninsured and 
Underinsured Motorist). The limits of !!ability 
paragraph pertaining to Coverages P and P-1 under 
Additional Conditions applicable to Coverages P 
and P-1 is changed to read as follows: 
1. Limit of Liability. Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds or vehicles insured under this 
policy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining bodily 
injury; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence is subject to the 
following limitation: Our total combined single limit 
of liability under Coverages P and P-1 for all 
bodily Injury resulting from one occurrence 
shall not exceed the applicable limit of liability 
stated in the Declarations. 
Separate Limits Requirements. We will apply the 
combined single limit to provide any separate limits 
required by law for bodily Injury. This provision, 
however, will not Increase our total limit of liability. 
1320 (1014) Combined Single Limit Endorsement• 
Coverages N and 0. The limits of liability paragraph 
pertaining to Coverages N and O under Section Ill 
Conditions is changed to read as follows: 
10. Limit of Liability. Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds or vehicles insured under this 
policy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining bodily 
Injury or property damage; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence Is subject to the 
following limitation: 
Our total combined single limit of liability under 
Coverages N and O for all bodily Injury and 
property damage resulting from one occurrence 
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shall not exceed the applicable limit of liability 
stated in the Declarations. 
Separate Limits Requirements. We will apply 
the combined single limit to provide any separate 
limits required by law for bodily Injury and 
property damage. This provision, however, will 
not increase our total limit of liability. 
1324 (1014) New Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorse-
ment. For each Insured vehicle to which this 
endorsement applies, our limit of liability for a covered 
total loss shall be increased to cover the interest of a 
lienholder in the vehicle which exceeds the actual 
cash value of the vehicle subject to the following: 
1. The llenholder must be listed in the Declarations; 
2. The lienholder must be a financial institution 
licensed or chartered under state or federal law; 
and 
3. Our maximum ffmit of liability is an additional 20% 
of the actual cash value of the insured vehicle at 
the time of loss. 
Additional Provisions. 
1. Total loss in thfs endorsement means that the 
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of 
the Insured vehicle less salvage value. 
2. We do not pay any amount of a lien: 
a. Resulting from overdue payments; 
b. Resulting from the cost of an extended 
warranty, credit life or other insurance; or 
c. Resulting from carry-over balances from 
previous loans. 
3. This endorsement applies only to an Insured 
vehicle that: 
a. You purchased new from a new car dealer 
and it had mlleage of less than 1,000 miles 
on the date of purchase; 
b. Is financed under an original purchase lien; 
c. Is covered under Coverages S (Compre-
hensive) and T (Collision}; and 
d. Is a private passenger car or van, or a pickup. 
4. This endorsement does not apply to any loss for 
which you make claim under 1326 (0108) (New 
Vehicle Additional Coverage Endorsement). 
1326 (1014) New Vehicle Additional Coverage En-
dorsement. For each Insured vehicle to which this 
10-CQ-02-01{1014) 
endorsement applies, for a total loss we shall pay the 
cost to replace the Insured vehicle without deduction 
for depreciation. Our limit of liability under this 
coverage will not exceed the lesser of: 
1. The cost of a new vehicle of the same make, 
model, size, class, body type, and equipment as 
your insured vehicle; or 
2. The amount you paid the dealer for the vehicle 
when It was purchased. 
Additional Exclusions. This endorsement does not 
cover: 
1. An Insured vehicle that is damaged or stolen 
more than one year past the date you bought it; 
2. A motor vehicle that you lease or you do not 
own; or 
3. An insured vehicle that has been driven more 
than 20,000 miles. 
Additional Provisions. 
1. This endorsement does not apply unless you 
replace within 60 days of the date of the loss, the 
insured vehicle that is damaged or stolen. 
2. If a replacement vehicle of the same make, 
model, size, class, body type, and equipment is 
not available, we may require that you replace the 
vehicle with one that is similar in size, class, body 
type, and equipment as we may determine. 
3. Total loss in this endorsement means that the 
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of 
the insured vehicle less salvage value. 
4. This endorsement applies only to an insured 
vehicle: 
a. That is covered under Coverages S 
(Comprehensive) and T (Collision); 
b. That you purchased new from a new car 
dealer and it had mileage of less than 1,000 
miles on the date of purchase; and 
c. That is a private passenger car or van, or a 
pickup. 
5. This endorsement does not apply to any loss for 
which you make claim under 1324 (0108) (New 
Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorsement}. 
1334 (1014) Roadside Assistance Endorsement. 
We will pay for reasonable and necessary roadside 
assistance expense caused by the disablement of 
your Insured vehicle and incurred at the place of 
Page 44 of 45 
66
disablement. Roadside assistance includes only the 
following: 
1. Unlocking the Insured vehlcle if the keys have 
been locked inside the vehicle or If the keys have 
been fost; 
2. Battery jump and flat tire repair; 
3. Labor for on-site mechanical repairs; 
4. Towing or winch-out service; or 
5. Delivery of up to 3 gallons of gasoline, antifreeze, 
or other motor vehlcle fluids. 
If you are pulling a trailer with your insured vehicle, 
items 2, 3, and 4 above also apply to the trailer If It or 
your Insured vehicle Is disabled. 
The limit applicable to this coverage Is indicated in the 
Declarations. No deductible applies to this coverage. 
The limit for this coverage is not increased if both 
your Insured vehicle and the trailer it is pulling are 
disabled. 
1368 (1014) Car Rental Reimbursement Endorse-
ment. If a loss exceeds the applicable deductible to 
the insured vehicle under Coverages S or T, we 
agree to reimburse you for: 
1. The expense incurred by you for the rental fee 
(excluding all other charges) of a substitute auto-
mobile from a car rental agency or garage; or 
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2. The expense incurred by you for taxicabs. 
When Coverage Begins and Ends. Coverage 
applies during a period starting on: 
1. The date of loss if as a direct result of this fess 
the insured vehicle cannot be operated under its 
own power; or 
2. If the insured vehicle is operable, the date you 
authorize repairs and deliver the vehicle to the 
repair shop. 
Regardless of the polfcy period, our liability for taxicab 
or rental fees shall end on the earliest of the following: 
1. Upon completion of repair or replacement of 
property lost or damaged; or 
2. Upon such date as we make or tender settlement 
for the loss or damage. 
Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability per day and per 
accident for this coverage are shown In the 
Declarations. 
Other Coverage. This coverage shall not apply in the 
event of a theft of the insured vehicle for which 
reimbursement of transportation expense is provided 
elsewhere in this policy. 




IIIIFamt Bu.reaw111utual I11s11rmu:e Co111pm1y ef ltlalto 
P.O. Box 4848 • Pocatello, Idaho• 83205-4848 
March 2, 2016 
Edgar Cook 
491476 Hwy 95 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
RE: Insured: Edgar and Laurie Cook 
Claimant: Joseph Stanczak 
Policy No. Ol-A-028872-01 
Date of Loss: 06/28/15 
Claim No. 01038872012015062801 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
Sent Certified Mail 
Fax: (800) 574-5066 
Late last week, I sent to you Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's ("Farm Bureau's") coverage opinion 
regarding the above-referenced matter in a letter dated February 23, 2016. That coverage opinion needed to be 
updated with an analysis of the actual claim and settlement proposal that was submitted by Joseph Stanczak's 
lawyer by his letter dated February 1, 2016 ("Settlement Proposal"), a copy of which I have attached to this 
amended coverage opinion. 
As such, please consider this letter Farm Bureau's amended coverage opinion and reservation of rights regarding 
a claim that has been made against you by Joseph Stanczak with respect to a shooting that occurred at your 
property located at Bloom Lake, Idaho, on June 28, 2015. 
Last fall you advised us of this potential claim and provided us with communications from Mr. Stanczak' s 
attorney indicating that he had been retained and would be in touch. However, we heard nothing further from Mr. 
Stanczak or your on this potential claim, until recently when Farm Bureau received the Settlement Proposal from 
Mr. Stanczak's counsel which will be summarized below. Farm Bureau has now reviewed the Settlement 
Proposal, Edgar Cook's verbal statement previously given in this matter, and other relevant documents and 
information in making its coverage decision on this matter. 
Now that an official claim has been made, we have evaluated this claim in light of the insurance policy you have 
with Farm Bureau, specifically Country Squire Insurance Policy Ol-A-038872-01 (the "Policy") with the Policy 
period of January 26, 2015 - January 26, 2016. After reviewing the Policy and the information provided to date, 
including your recorded statement, please be advised that there does not appear to be any insurance coverage 
under the Policy for the injuries/damages that are being claimed by Mr. Stanczak, and given the questions raised 
regarding coverage under the Policy, Farm Bureau hereby issues this reservation of rights notice to you. Granted 
our investigation is ongoing and we are happy to review any additional information you may provide us relative 
to this claim, but at this point, please be advised that there likely is no coverage under the Policy for 
Mr. Stanczak's claims. 
BACKGROUND 
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook are the owners of real property located in Bonner County, 
Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, a lake called Bloom Lake, and a small cabin. It is our understanding 
that neither you nor your wife reside in the cabin located on this property, and in fact, in your sworn statement 
you indicated that the cabin and surrounding property are not close to where you actually reside and you only get 
up to this property every couple of years. 
It does appear, however, that you do operate some sort of a campground on the real property near Bloom Lake. It 
is our understanding that you do not charge an up-front fee for campers to use this campground and lake, but you 
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do solicit voluntary financial donations from campers and that campers can leave in a donation box located at the 
campground. You have indicated that the donations are just enough to pay the infrastructure costs for the 
campground. 
For the past seventeen (17) years, you have allowed one Michael Jessie Chisholm ("Chisholm") to reside in the 
cabin on the real property in exchange for taking care of your property, including the lake, the cabin, and the 
campground. It is unclear how Chisholm initially came into contact with you some seventeen (17) years ago or 
how you got to know him. However, Chisholm has never and does not now receive any monetary remuneration 
for his maintenance activities, that is, you have not and do not pay him a wage or salary of any sort. 
There are no public utilities for the cabin and Chisholm pays for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for 
heating or maintenance of the cabin and camp ground areas. You indicated that Chisolm' s main responsibilities 
include keeping the "lake up to specs"; keeping the weeds down; taking out the trash accumulated by the campers 
using the property; and maintaining the road. You indicated that you also provide some equipment to Chisholm 
in order to maintain the real property, including a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator. You have stated 
that you do not believe there is an employment relationship between Chisholm and you, the owners of this 
property. 
On June 28, 2015, Chisholm was involved in an altercation with Joseph Stanczak. Mr. Stanczak was apparently 
camping at the campground when he and Chisholm had an argument and a physical altercation. From news 
reports, the men may have eventually entered the cabin located on the real property. At some point, Chisholm 
fired multiple shots from a .45-caliber automatic pistol at or in the direction of Mr. Stanczak and some of those 
bullets struck Mr. Stanczak. 
The Settlement Proposal contains Mr. Stanczak's version of the events. Mr. Stanczak alleges that on the evening 
of June 28, 2015 Chisholm and his friend, Sarah Johns, were spending time with Mr. Stanczak and his girlfriend, 
Susan Jackson, at the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm became intoxicated. Mr. 
Stanczak was also intoxicated as his medical records indicate that his blood alcohol level was 0.24. At some point 
in the evening, Chisholm invited Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jackson into a cabin located at the campground because 
Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jackson claimed to be having trouble fighting off the mosquitoes. Mr. Stanczak alleges 
that sometime after arriving at the cabin (its unclear how much time had passed) Chisholm began acting 
belligerently and inappropriately towards Susan Jackson. An argument ensued, and Mr. Stanczak left the cabin 
and started walking towards Susan Jackson's pickup. As he was walking, Chisholm apparently exited the cabin 
and pulled out a .45 caliber handgun and shot Mr. Stanczak twice, once in the back and once in the left arm. 
Chisholm then jumped into his truck and drove away from the scene. He crashed his truck and tried to hide in the 
woods, but was later apprehended by the police and taken into custody. 
Chisholm was subsequently charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and use of a deadly weapon in 
commission of a felony. In reviewing the repository for the pending criminal case, it appears Mr. Chisholm 
bonded out of jail in late August 2015. Trial was set for January 11, 2016, but on January 5, 2016 Chisholm 
entered an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, which the Judge 
accepted. The use of a deadly weapon in commission of a felony charge was apparently dropped. Chisholm's 
sentencing is currently set for March 8, 2016. 
Mr. Stanczak survived the shooting, but was hospitalized for a period of time. Back in July, Mr. Stanczak 
retained counsel who have advised you that they may be making a claim against you and have asked that you to 
report this potential claim to Farm Bureau. Again, you have previously provided Farm Bureau with that Jetter. 
Mr. Stanczak's Settlement Proposal contains additional information regarding his injuries and claimed damages 
against you because of Chisholm's actions. Mr. Stanczak's claim.<; against you allege negligence based upon the 
condition of your premises, namely the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak also alleges a theory of recovery 
based upon agency, i.e., that you are responsible for the actions of Chisholm. 
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Mr. Stanczak alleges that he incurred just over $80,000 in medical expenses arising from the shooting. The lion's 
share of these expenses relate to $30,000 for the life flight and $41,000 for expenses relating to his hospital stay at 
Kootenai Medical Center from June 28-30, 2015. The other expenses relate to follow-up treatment, imaging, 
medical and anesthesia services, and follow-up visits. Mr. Stanczak also alleges that he will require $10,000 in 
future medical care for physical therapy services and pain medication. 
Apparently, one of the bullets is still lodged in Mr. Stanczak' s pelvic bone and cannot be removed because of its 
proximity to an artery. The bullet apparently causes Mr. Stanczak regular pain. Mr. Stanczak claims to have 
previously worked as a welder but alleged in the letter that he can no longer work as a welder because of his 
injuries. Mr. Stanczak alleges that he made nearly $50,000 a year as a welder and that he has past lost wages in 
the amount of nearly $30,000 and a potential loss of future earning capacity of $840,000 based upon his 21 years 
until retirement age. In the Settlement Proposal, Mr. Stanczak also notes that he has a claim for pain and 
suffering between the range of $500,000 to $3,000,000. 
Mr. Stanczak concludes his Settlement Proposal by making a settlement offer in the amount of $950,000. 
You have previously inquired whether there is any coverage under the Policy and whether Farm Bureau will be 
defending you against any claim that Mr. Stanczak may make against you and your wife. To be clear, the only 
issue this coverage opinion addresses is whether this potential claim by Mr. Stanczak will be covered under your 
Farm Bureau insurance policy. We are not analyzing and offer no opinion as to whether Mr. Stanczak has any 
direct valid legal claim against you and your wife, whether Chisholm was your employee, whether you and your 
wife would have vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondent superior etc. We seriously doubt whether 
Mr. Stanczak can make such a claim against you, but in the event that he does, there does not appear to be any 
insurance coverage for that claim. 
THE POLICY 
The Policy has three separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III 
(Automobile). (In case you do not have your copy handy, I am enclosing another copy of the certified Policy and 
Declaration sheets.) As this claim does not relate to a property or auto loss, only Section II is implicated and will 
be addressed. 
The Policy Declarations list only the individuals Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook as the 
"Insureds." There is no business or other entity insured by this Policy. The Policy Declarations also note that the 
Policy period is 1/26/2015 - 1/26/2016. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability Coverage include 
coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (coverage Fl) and for Premises Medical Coverage (coverage F2). The Policy 
Declarations also note that premises under Section II includes "Location 02," one residence and 200 acres, which 
is the Bloom Lake location and cabin. Finally, the Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to 
four endorsements, including: Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Limits), Endorsement 1269 
(Limited Employer's Liability Endorsement), Endorsement I282 (Personal Injury Endorsement), and 
Endorsement 1287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement). 
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the following: 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity, 
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming .... 
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or 
keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small 
mammals for fur production .... 
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Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The following are 
also insureds: 
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your household, your 
spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives .... 
Insured location means: 
1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a form or residence, 
including private approaches; 
Insured location does not include property where a business is conducted. 
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the 
same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or property 
damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage 
resulting from a common cause wil1 be considered the result of one occurrence. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is a 
resident of your household, include a ward or foster child. This definition applies 
only if you are a person. 
Residence employees means someone employed by you who performs duties in 
connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises. This . 
includes a person who performs duties for you elsewhere of a similar nature not 
in connection with your business or farming. 
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a dwelling that is 
your principal residence, including its grounds and private garages, or (b) that 
part of any other building where you reside. A residence premises does not 
include any part of a building used for business. 
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages, Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) and F2 (Premises 
Medical Coverage). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) allows for the following coverage: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because 
of bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this 
coverage applies, we will: 
1. Pay up 'to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is 
legally liable (damages includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice .... 
The Policy provides coverage under Coverage F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) as follows : 
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Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable and necessary medical and 
funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as 
described below. This coverage does not apply to you or residents of your 
household other than residence employees. This coverage applies only: 
1. To a person on the insured location with the permission of any insured . . .. 
Both of the above-described coverages are subject to several exclusions, including the following: 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II . . . . Section Il 
does not cover bodily injury or property damage: 
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any professional service; 
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply 
to the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property. 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law ... if committed by any insured. 
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the following: 
I269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-2 
are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and sustained by 
a person performing labor for you in your farming operation . ... 
I282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, we cover 
personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than bodily injury arising 
out of one or more of the following offenses: 
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution; 
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or 
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry. 
(Bold emphasis in original.) 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF IDAHO LAW REGARDING 
CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
The Idaho courts have set forth certain rules for determining whether a claim is covered by an insurance policy. 
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured and must be construed the same way as any 
other contract. See Auto Club Ins. Co., Inc. v. Tyrer, 560 F. Supp. 755 (D. Idaho 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 20 (9th 
Cir. 1984); see also Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875,655 P.2d 82 (1982). Like any other contract, an 
insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, the court looking to the plain and ordinary sense of the words used 
in the policy. See Miller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 702 P.2d 1356 (1985); see also Juker v. 
Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 637 P.2d 792 (1981); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 
P.2d 1387 (1979). Absent ambiguity, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. See 
Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985). Where the language of the insurance 
policy is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction thereof and coverage must be determined 
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according to the plain meaning of the words employed. See Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.), 110 Idaho 549, 716 
P.2d 1321 (1986). 
Where the language of the insurance policy is susceptible to only one meaning, that meaning will be given effect. 
See Burgess Famis v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 108 Idaho 831, 702 P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1985). Where a word or 
phrase in an insurance policy has a settled legal meaning or interpretation, that meaning will be given effect even 
though other interpretations are possible. See Nielsen v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 596 
P.2d 95 (1979); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cook, 92 Idaho 7, 435 P.2d 364 (1967). See also Mut. of 
Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992). However, not every word and phrase in an insurance 
contract needs to be defined. See id.; see also State Fann Fire & Cas. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 
(1997). 
COVERAGE ANALYSIS 
Referring to the Policy language above, your Policy only applies to "bodily injury" caused by an "occurrence" for 
which coverage applies. The plain and unambiguous provisions of the Policy cited above preclude coverage for 
the purposeful and intentional shooting of Mr. Stanczak by Chisholm. There is no coverage for the damage or 
injuries suffered by Mr. Stanczak as a result of the referenced shooting under the Policy under either Section II Fl 
(Bodily Injury Liability) or F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). There also is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's 
claimed injuries under any other coverages provided for in your Policy. 
A. Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability). 
Again, Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) provides coverage to an Insured if a claim is made or a suit is 
brought against the Insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence. Chisholm is not 
covered for his actions under Section II F 1. First, Chisholm is not a named Insured under the Policy. The Policy 
was issued just to you and your wife, and the Policy Declarations only list the two of you as the named Insureds. 
There is no business or other entity listed as an Insured. Chisholm is not a "relative" who might be considered an 
additional insured under the Policy. There is no definition or other provision under the Policy that would include 
Chisolm as an Insured. Because he is not an Insured, Chisolm is not entitled to coverage under the Policy. To the 
extent you had a "business" related to your Bloom Lake property, no such business is insured under the Policy 
and no employees of that business are insured by the Policy. 
Second, even if Chisholm was somehow an Insured under the Policy no occurrence occurred under Coverages F 1 
or F2. Again, an occurrence is "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful 
conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury .... " Webster's Online Dictionary defines "accident" as a 
"sudden event ... that is not planned or intended and that causes damage or injury." The shooting in question 
was not an accident because it was not a sudden event that was not intended. Rather, if Chisholm shot Mr. 
Stanczak multiple times as reported, his actions were most likely intended to cause injury. Likewise, the shooting 
did not cause unexpected bodily injury. The shooting caused bullet wounds to Mr. Stanczak, which is the 
expected injury when pointing and shooting a gun at another man. 
Courts agree with this interpretation. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Famz Bureau Underwriters v. 
Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 926-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) recently confrrmed the majority view and found no 
coverage under an insurance policy for a shooting because it was not an accident nor did it cause unexpected 
injuries. See also Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Chammus, Case No. 299412, slip op. at 2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 304 Ga. App. 267, 268-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. App. 2000) (shooting was clearly not an accident, intent to harm inferred from 
nature of act of pointing and shooting gun at victim.); Norman v. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (Va. 1978); 
Harris v. Richard~, 867 P.2d 325 (Kan. 1994) (intent to injure inferred since serious bodily injury was natural 
consequence of shooting gun into back of occupied truck); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 1988) (intentional act exclusion barred coverage under policy for shooting through a door knowing someone 
was on other side); Allstate v. Peasley, 80 Wn. App. 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal act exclusion applied in 
shooting case as exclusion meant an act for which a criminal conviction may result). 
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You also reported that Mr. Chisholm may allege that he did not intentionally aim and shoot at Mr. Stanczak, but 
rather, he only intended to fire warning shots at Mr. Stanczak which accidently did, in fact, hit Mr. Stanczak and 
cause injury to him. Even if that is the case and the evidence comes out which supports this assertion by Mr. 
Chisholm, it is doubtful that said fact will change the coverage analysis under your Policy. While there does not 
appear to be any Idaho law on this point, other courts have stjlJ found that in this situation there is no 
"occurrence" under an insurance policy because there still was an intentional act of firing a gun irrespective of 
whether the gun was aimed at the shooting victim and regardless of whether the shooter intended to actually cause 
physical harm to the shooting victim. The injury suffered by the victim was still the natural consequence of the 
intentional acts of picking up a loaded gun, aiming in the direction of the victim, and pulling the trigger. Berry v. 
McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no occurrence under policy even though shooter only fired warning 
shots; intentional act of firing weapon sufficed to find no coverage); Allstate v. Cannon, 44 F.Supp. 31 (E.D. 
Mish. 1986) (fact that rifle was discharged intentionally resulting in finding of no occurrence under the policy and 
no coverage despite fact shooter meant to only fire warning shots). 
In light of the foregoing, Mr. Stanczak' s claims related to his injuries and damages do not describe an 
"occurrence," and without an occurrence under the Policy, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's injuries or 
damages. 
Third, even if Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an occurrence occurred under the Policy, there are 
specific Policy exclusions that would also bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims. Mr. Stanczak has argued that 
the operation of the campground was a business activity of yours because you invited or licensed campers to 
come on to your property for a voluntary donation. They will further argue that Chisholm was your employee, 
because even though he was not paid a wage or salary he was paid to do work on your property by viltue of the 
fact that you allowed him to reside in your cabin on this property without paying rent. If Chisholm was somehow 
your employee (ignoring that he would likely still not be performing duties within the scope of his employment) 
given that you had some business related to the operation of Bloom Lake and the campground, then Mr. 
Stanczak' s claims would still be specifically excluded under Section II Exclusion Number 1 because you have no 
insurance coverage under this Policy arising out of any of your "business activities." This would be the case 
even, if as you have indicated, your operation of the campground and lake was only a break even proposition as 
best given the fee collections generated from campers. 
In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically look at: whether the activity is 
customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and purpose of the activity are commercial in nature, 
and in furtherance of the business, or the means of livelihood. Blacks v. Fireman's Fund American Ins., 115 
Idaho 449 (Ct.App. 1989). Applying these factors, your activity of offering up campground sites in exchange for 
a voluntary fee, may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be deemed to be commercial in nature. 
And it does not appear to matter whether you made a profit on this activity for it to be considered a business 
pursuit which would then bar any coverage for that activity under your Policy. 
Similarly, Section II Exclusion Number 3 excludes bodily injury intentionally caused by an Insured. Thus, even 
if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the Policy-which he is not-his intentional act of 
shooting Mr. Stanczak would be excluded. Again, Chisolm may say that he did not intentionally cause bodily 
injury to Mr. Stanczak, but that he was shooting warning shots. The intentional act of shooting a gun near a 
person is sufficient grounds to deny coverage under Section II Exclusion Number 3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herman, 
551 N .E.2d 844 (Ind. 1990) (Intentionally firing gun into a fleeing crowd is an egregious act and intent to injure 
may be inferred as a matter of law). 
Finally, Section II Exclusion Number 14 excludes bodily injury that arises out of the violation of a criminal law 
by an Insured. As noted above, Chisolm has entered a guilty plea for the charge of aggravated battery with a 
deadly weapon. The type of guilty plea entered by Chisolm is called an Alford plea. Under Idaho law, an Alford 
plea occurs where a defendant enters a plea of guilty, but asserts that he or she is innocent. Irrespective, an Alford 
plea is a guilty plea. State v. Salisbury, 143 Idaho 476, 147 P.3d 108 (2006). A judge has discretion to accept an 
Alford plea and will do so only where there is sufficient evidence that that the prosecution would likely be able to 
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persuade a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, it sounds like the judge 
presiding over the criminal case has accepted Chisholm's Alford plea, thus fmding that the prosecution would 
likely be able to convict Mr. Chisholm of this crime if it moved forward. 
In this situation, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admits to violating criminal law. Chisholm 
gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by entering into the Alford plea. He and others are bound by his 
admission and abandonment of his defenses. One court has noted the following: 
Under an Alford plea, a defendant maintains innocence while entering a plea of 
guilty because the defendant concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty 
plea and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt. A 
guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of the criminal charge. Guilty pleas 
must be rooted in fact before they may be accepted. Accordingly, courts treat 
Alford pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a guilty plea. The collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea may not be avoided by the simultaneous assertion 
of innocence. 
Cortese v. Black, 838 F.Supp. 485, 492 (D. Colo. 1993). See also, Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98 
A.D.2d 495, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.App.Div. 1984) (with Alford type plea, the issues representing the essential 
elements of the crime have necessarily been judicially determined by the acceptance of the plea); State Fann Fire 
& Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 140 Ore. App. 89, 914 P.2d 697 (Or.Ct.App. 1996) (acceptance of plea is the equivalent of a 
judicial determination of each of the material elements of the crime). 
Chisholm admits to violating a criminal law. So, even if Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an 
occurrence did occur, it arose out of a violation of Idaho criminal law and the intentional act exclusion of the 
Policy is therefore implicated. Therefore, there is no coverage. See Colorado Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909 (Colo. Ct.App. 1997) (guilty plea to intentional criminal act precluded coverage under 
homeowners insurance policy; no duty to defend or indemnify; intent cannot be relitigated so as to avoid the 
intentional act exclusion of an insurance policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Groshek, 161 Mich.App. 703, 
411 N.W.2d 480 (Mich.Ct.App. 1987) (defendant's guilty plea established the necessary intent to make the 
insurance policy's exclusionary clause applicable). 
Bottom line, under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) of the Policy, there does not appear to be any coverage 
for the injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may claim arising out of being shot by Chisholm. 
B. Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). 
For all the same reasons, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's potentially claimed medical expenses under 
Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. This section does not require that the actors be insured. 
Rather, it gives coverage for medical costs for those who suffer bodily injury caused by an occurrence to those 
who are on the insured location with permission of an Insured. From what we understand, there may be no 
dispute that Mr. Stanczak was on the insured location with permission, if he in fact was camping at the 
campground on your property. 
However, there was still no occurrence as that term is defined in the Policy. As outlined above, shooting 
someone is not an accident and does not caused unexpected injuries. Without an occurrence causing bodily 
injury, there is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy for Mr. Stanczak's 
potentially claimed medical expenses. 
Even if there was an argument that there was an occurrence under the Policy, the same exclusions, specifically 
Exclusion Nos. 1, 3 and 14 identified and discussed above, would preclude coverage for any medical expenses 
claim by Mr. Stanczak arising out of the shooting. 
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As such, there is no coverage for any claimed medical expenses of Mr. Stanczak under Section II F2 (Premises 
Medical Coverage) of the Policy. 
C. Other Language of the Policy. 
Someone may argue that Chisholm somehow is a "residence employee" under the Policy and that as result 
thereof, coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims exists. As outlined above, the Policy does define a residence 
employee as someone who performs duties in connection with the maintenance or use of a "residence premises." 
Certain coverages are then provided for those residence employees, for example, to the extent they are hurt on an 
insured premise or insured location. However, Chisholm is not a residence employee as that term is defined in the 
Policy. The maintenance that employee performs must be in connection with the "residence premises," which is 
also a defined term in the Policy. That term is limited to a dwelling that is the insured's principal residence or 
part of any other building where the insured resides. You have made it clear in your statement that neither you 
nor your wife reside in the cabin or at Bloom Lake. In addition, the Policy only affords coverage for the actions 
of residence employees that occur off an insured location and are caused by activities within the residence 
employee's course and scope of the employment by you, the Insured. Neither of these requirements is satisfied 
here because the shooting allegedly occurred on an insured location and Chisholm was not acting in the course 
and scope of his employment by you. 
In addition, the same exclusions under Section II would bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims even if Chisholm 
was somehow found to be a "residence employee" as that term is defined in the Policy. 
We have also confirmed that none of the Policy "endorsements" provide or contemplate any additional coverage 
that would cover Mr. Stanczak' s claims. None of the endorsements provided on the declaration sheet for this 
Policy are applicable. For example, Endorsement 1269 (0108), the Limited Employers Liability Endorsement, 
only contemplates coverage for someone injured while engaging in farming activities. Chisholm did not engage 
in farming activities as contemplated by the Policy definition. Similarly, Endorsement 1282 (1014), the Personal 
Injury Endorsement, does not contemplate coverage for injuries arising from an intentional shooting but rather 
deal with personal injury resulting from specific offenses like false arrest, libel and slander, and invasion of 
privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing analysis and our investigation to date, there does not appear to be coverage for the 
injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may assert. As such, Farm Bureau is hereby reserving any rights and 
defenses which may now exist and all rights and defenses which it may later have under all the termc,, conditions, 
provisions and exclusions of your insurance Policy with Farm Bureau This letter is intended to provide you with 
an explanation of Parm Bureau's cmrent position in relation to the investigation of Mr. Stanczak's potential claim 
and the lack of coverage for that claim under the terms of the Policy. This letter does not alter in any way or 
amend the terms of the Policy, nor is this letter intended to provide an exhaustive recitation of Farm Bureau's 
coverage position on all matters discussed herein. Fann Bureau reserves all rights and tlefe,,ses which may 
110w exist and all riglzts a11d defe11ses which it may hereafter have under any or all ofthe terms, conditio11s, 
provu;ions, endorsements, and exclusions o{the Policy whether or not they are referenced ill this letter. Farm 
Bureau specifically reserves its rights to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify or amend this 
coverage position based upon further investigation of the facts and circumstances pertaining to this matter or 
based upon any additional information you or anyone else may provide. Farm Bureau also reserves the right to 
seek a judicial determination of its rights and obligations, if any, under the Policy. 
To the extent additional information is provided or a specific claims is made, Fann Bureau will certainly continue 
to investigate this claim even though it does not appear any coverage would exist under the Policy for Mr. 
Stanczak's claims. However, no act of any Farm Bureau representative while investigating this claim shall be 
construed as waiving any company rights. Farm Bureau reserves the right, under the Policy, to continue to deny 
coverage to anyone claiming coverage under the Policy related to the shooting that is the subject of this coverage 
opinion. 
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Farm Bureau also reserves the right to supplement or update this letter. No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm 
Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under 
the Policy that is at issue. 
In addition, please be aware of your continuing obligation to fully and completely cooperate in connection with 
this matter, together with your obligation to keep Farm Bureau fully informed and apprised of developments as 
they proceed. Again, it is our understanding that no lawsuit has yet been filed against you by Mr. Stanczak. In 
the event you are served with any other demand or lawsuit, please notify me immediately and forward copies of 
all documents served on you to my attention so that I can continue my coverage review. 
If you have any questions as to the content of this coverage position letter, please feel free to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
P,::;0)1-
Sr. Regional Claims Manager 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co 








James L. Martin 
{208) 385-5303 
jlm@moffatt.com 
March 22, 2016 
via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Edgar and Laurie Cook 
c/o Elmira Store & Cafe 
490870 Highway 95 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Re: Claim No. 01038872012015062801 
Claim by Joseph Stanczak 
Policy No. 01-A-028872-01 
Date of Loss: June 28, 2015 
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
MOFFATT 
THOMAS 
Attorneys at Law 
MAILING ADDRESS: PHYSICAL ADDRESS: 
PO Box 829 101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl 
Boise ID 83701-0829 Boise ID 83702-7710 
ww,u. moffan.com 208.345.2000 MAIN 
800.422.2889 TOLJ.,,FREE 
208.385.5384 FAX 
Our firm has been assisting your insurance company, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
("Farm Bureau") with its investigation and coverage determinations regarding the claim being 
made by Joseph Stanczak for the injuries that he sustained at your north Idaho property at 
Bloom Lake when he was allegedly shot by Michael Chisholm on June 28, 2015. We 
understand that Farm Bureau has previously provided you with two separate reservation of 
rights notices ("ROR Notices") wherein it indicated to you that there did not appear to be any 
coverage under your Farm Bureau policy for the claims of Mr. Stanczak, but that it was 
continuing with its investigation and reserving all rights in the meantime. 
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that Farm Bureau has now completed its 
investigation. We are not aware of any additional information that has been provided to Farm 
Bureau by you or Mr. Stanczak's attorney since Farm Bureau sent out its prior ROR Notices. 
Nor are we are aware of any information that would otherwise change the coverage analysis 
contained within those prior ROR Notices. 
As such, Farm Bureau has concluded that there is no coverage under your Farm Bureau 
insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that occurred on your property on June 
28, 2015 involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael Chisholm. As such, Farm Bureau will not be 
able to provide you with a defense for any claim or resulting lawsuit filed by Mr. Stanczak. Nor 






Edgar and Laurie Cook 
March 22, 2016 
Page2 
will Fann Bureau be able to indemnify you for any resulting judgment arising from any such 
lawsuit or this claim. By separate letter, a copy of which is enclosed, we have advised Mr. 
Stariczak's attorney of this coverage determination. 
Farm Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the policy's insuring agreement, as well as other 
coverage provisions and limitations set forth in the policy and which were described to you in 
detail in the prior ROR Notices which are incorporated herein by reference. Farm Bureau 
reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage and does not admit any 
obligations under the policy. Certainly, if Farm Bureau is provided additional information from 
you or others regarding Mr. Stanczak's claim or the subject incident, then Farm Bureau reserves 
the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the extent that additional 
information is determined to be relevant to this coverage determination. 
Farm Bureau continues to fully and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now 
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the terms, 
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as well as all endorsements thereto, 
irrespective of whether or not they are referenced in its prior ROR Notices. Farm Bureau 
specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and amend 
its coverage determination based upon further investigation of the fact or circumstances 
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it. 
No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute 
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the subject Farm Bureau policy. 









James L. Martin, ISB No. 4226 
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB No. 6632 
Benjamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK& 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
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(0 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
c...r:: OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
0 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
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Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho ("Farm Bureau"), by 
and through undersigned counsel, hereby complains and alleges as follows against Edgar 
Wilkins Cook, Jr., Laurie Frances Cook, and Joseph Stanczak. 
1. This is a claim for declaratory judgment regarding whether there is 
coverage for certain claims under an insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau. 
2. Farm Bureau is an Idaho Domestic Insurance Company authorized to do 
business in the state ofldaho, with its principal place of business in Pocatello, Bannock County, 
Idaho, whose business includes entering into insurance contracts, including automobile insurance 
policies and homeowner' s insurance policies. 
3. Upon information and belief, Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances 
Cook (the "Cooks") are husband and wife and are residents of Bonner County. 
4. Upon information and belief, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") is a resident 
of Boundary County, Idaho. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12 of 
the Idaho Code, the Court is vested with the jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal 
relationships of the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment. A controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cooks' 
Farm Bureau insurance policy for some or all of the claims that Stanczak has or will make 
against the Cooks. In order to determine and end that controversy, it is necessary that a 
declaration be made as to the rights and obligations that Farm Bureau owes or does not owe 
related to claims asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks. 
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6. While Stanczak is not a named insured under the insurance policy at issue, 
he is properly included as a defendant in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code Section 10-1211, because he claims an 
interest in and has made demands against the Farm Bureau insurance policy which will be 
affected by the Court's declaration. 
7. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-404 because 
some of the defendants reside in Bonner County, Idaho. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
The Insurance Policy and the Bloom Lake Property 
8. Farm Bureau issued to Idaho residents and policy holders the Cooks a 
Farm Bureau Country Squire Policy No. 01-A-038872-01 ("the Cook Policy") with a policy 
period of January 26, 2015 to January 26, 2016. A true and correct copy of the Cook Policy and 
Declaration Sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference is made a part hereof. 
9. The Cook Policy has a number of provisions and exclusions that are 
implicated and applicable to this dispute. 
10. The Cook Policy insures, among other things, a number of properties 
owned by the Cooks, including certain real property owned by the Cooks located near Bloom 
Lake, Bonner County, Idaho ("the Bloom Lake Property"). 
11. The Bloom Lake Property consists of200 acres, Bloom Lake, and a small 
cabin. 
12. For the past seventeen years and up and until approximately June 28, 
2015, the Cooks have allowed an individual by the name of Michael Jessie Chisholm a/k/a 
Michael Allen Pederson ("Chisholm"), to reside in the cabin at the Bloom Lake Property in 
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exchange for taking care of the Bloom Lake Property, including the lake, the cabin, and a small 
campground that apparently is located on the Bloom Lake Property. 
13. The Cooks have indicated that Chisholm's maintenance activities included 
weed management, trash removal, and road and lake maintenance. 
14. The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm did not receive any 
monetary compensation for his maintenance activities. 
15. The Cooks have further indicated that Chisholm paid for gas, propane, and 
other supplies used for heating and maintaining the Bloom Lake Property and that they provided 
a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator to Chisholm. 
16. The Cooks have maintained that there is not and never was an 
employment relationship between the Cooks and Chisholm. 
The Shooting 
17. On June 28, 2015 Stanczak and his girlfriend Susan Jackson were camping 
at the Bloom Lake Property. 
18. Chisholm invited Stanczak and Susan Jackson into the cabin. 
19. A dispute arose between Chisholm and Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin 
and Chisolm followed. Chisolm had a .45 caliber handgun and shot Stanczak twice, once in the 
arm and once in the back. 
20. Chisholm left the scene, but was later apprehended by local authorities and 
Chisholm was later charged in Bonner County, Idaho with Aggravated Battery and Use of a 
Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony. Chisholm ultimately entered an Alford Plea in the 
criminal case and was found guilty of aggravated battery against Stanczak. Chisholm is 
currently incarcerated. 
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21. Stanczak survived the shooting, but sustained various injuries. 
The Insurance Claim and Original Denial 
22. Stanczak has retained counsel and made a claim against the Cooks for the 
injuries he sustained at the hands of Chisholm (the "Stanczak Claim"). 
23. The Cooks have tendered the Stanczak Claim to Farm Bureau under the 
Cook Policy seeking confirmation of whether Farm Bureau would defend or indemnify the 
Cooks for this claim. 
24. After conducting an investigation of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the Stanczak Claim made against the Cooks and the resulting tender, Farm Bureau 
advised the Cooks that based upon the evidence, the facts, and the language of the Cook Policy, 
that there was no coverage under the Cook Policy for Chisholm's actions or Stanczak's injuries 
and therefore, Farm Bureau has neither a duty to defend or to indemnify the Cooks related to the 
Stanczak Claim. 
25. Farm Bureau's conclusions regarding its coverage position are contained 
in three letters directed to the Cooks: one dated March 2, 2016-Farm Bureau's initial 
reservation of rights; one dated March 22, 2016-Farm Bureau's denial of coverage and one 
dated June 2, 2016-Farm Bureau's second denial of coverage. Those three letters are attached 
hereto as Exhibits "B", "C" and "D" respectively. 
The Complaint for Damages and Subsequent Denial 
26. On May 12, 2016 Stanczak filed a Complaint for Damages in Bonner 
County against the Cooks individually and doing business as the Bloom Lake Campground and 
Chisolm, Bonner County Case Number CV-2016-679 (hereinafter referred to as the "Stanczak 
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Complaint" or "Stanczak Lawsuit"). A true and correct copy of the Stanczak Complaint is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "E". 
27. The Stanczak Complaint contains four causes of action: 1) Premises 
Liability against the Cooks and the Bloom Lake Campground; 2) Negligent Supervision of 
Chisholm against the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground; 3) Strict Liability against Chisholm; 
and 4) Negligent, Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct against Chisholm. 
28. The Stanczak Complaint alleges that on June 28, 2015 Stanczak was 
camping at the Bloom Lake Property with his girlfriend, Susan Jackson. Chisholm invited 
Stanczak and Susan Jackson into a cabin located at the Bloom Lake Property to stay the night. 
Chisholm allegedly became intoxicated and an argument ensued between Chisholm and 
Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin, and as he did, Chisholm fired a .45 caliber handgun at him. 
Two bullets struck Stanczak, one in the arm and one in the back. Stanczak sustained serious 
injuries. Chisholm left the scene and was later apprehended by law enforcement. Law 
enforcement found several other firearms at the cabin at the Bloom Lake Property. 
29. The Stanczak Complaint was submitted to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau has 
reviewed the Stanczak Complaint and determined that there is no coverage under the Policy for 
the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint and has advised the Cooks of this decision. 
See Ex. D, hereto. 
COUNT 1 - DECLARATORY RELIEF 
30. Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and Title 10, Chapter 12, 
Idaho Code, this Court is vested with jurisdiction to declare the rights and legal relationships of 
the parties of the contract of insurance referred to in this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. A 
controversy exists as to whether there is coverage under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim 
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against the Cooks or the Stanczak Complaint. In order to determine and end that controversy it 
is necessary that a declaration be made as to the rights and obligations under the Cook Policy 
related to the Stanczak Claim and Stanczak Complaint and whether Farm Bureau has a duty to 
defend or indemnify the Cooks related to the claim and/or lawsuit. 
31. Because Farm Bureau has taken the position that there is no coverage 
under the Cook Policy for the Stanczak Claim and Stanczak Lawsuit, and the fact that the parties 
hereto have different positions as to that coverage position, a justiciable controversy, as 
contemplated by Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code §10-1202, 
et.seq. exists between Farm Bureau, the Cooks, and Stanczak concerning whether there is any 
coverage under the Cook Policy for Stanczak's injuries and claimed damages. 
32. Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1201, et.seq., Farm Bureau is entitled to a 
determination of its rights, status, and/or other legal relations under the Cook Policy. 
33. Specifically, Farm Bureau is entitled to a determination by this Court that 
there is no coverage under the Cook Policy for Stanczak's claimed injuries or damages sustained 
when Chisholm shot Stanczak at the Bloom Lake Property on June 28, 2015, as outlined in the 
Stanczak Claim and Stanczak Lawsuit. 
34. Farm Bureau is further entitled to a determination by this Court that Farm 
Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks relating to the Stanczak Claim or Stanczak 
Lawsuit. 
35. Farm Bureau has been required to retain the services of an attorney in 
order to prosecute this action and is entitled to an award of its reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs of this suit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54, and Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 10-1210. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Farm Bureau prays for relief as follows: 
1. For declaratory judgment finding that: (a) Farm Bureau does not owe 
under any contract of insurance either a duty to defend the Cooks in the Stanczak Lawsuit or the 
duty to indemnify the Cooks for any adverse judgment or settlement that may arise out of the 
Stanczak Lawsit and claims, and (2) there is no insurance coverage under the Cook Policy for the 
claims or damages asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks arising out of the shooting incident 
that occurred on the Cook's Bloom Lake Property on or about June 28, 2015. 
2. For an award of costs, and its reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the 
prosecution of this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 10-1210, 12-121, 12-123, and 41-1839, Rule 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and other applicable law; and 
3. For judgment against the Cooks and Stanczak and in favor of Farm 
Bureau, granting such other and further relief to Farm Bureau as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016. 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
art.in- Of the Firm 
meys for Plaintiff 






90 .... .,, •. FARM.BUREAU llJTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VlSTA OR PO BOX 484B 
POCATELLO IO 83205-4848 
COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
FarmBureau 
· DECLARATIONS 
THE INSURANCE PROVIDED AS INDICATED BY THESE DECLARATIONS SUPERSEDES 
AND REPLACES ALL INSURANCE PREVIOUSLY AFFORDED BY THIS POLICY. 
INSURED: EDGAR HILKINS COOK JR POLICY NUMB ER: Ol-A-038872-01 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK POLICY PERIOD: 01-26-2015 UNTIL 01-26-2016 
491476 HIGHHAY 95 AT 12:01 AK STANDARD TIKE 
SANDPOINT ID 83864-8153 COUNTY: BOHNER 
ACENCY: ZEMAITIS AGEl!CY 
AGENT: DIHHIHG HALTER 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015 
ISSUE DATE: 03-31-2015 
S~CTJOH I - PROPERTY 
LIIUTS OF APPLICABLE APPLICABLE ANNUAL 
llABllllY COVERAGE PERILS ENDORSEMENTS PREMIUM 
260000 A RESIDENCE PREMISE FRAME 1-19 $1,697.00 
BUILDING HUMBER: 002 LOCATION: 02 
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25i) •Il83 f 10141 
HAIYE DEDUCTIBLE ON GLASS •ll71 0108 
26000 DETACHED GARAGESE STORAGE SHEDS(MAX. 200 SQ FT} 
13000 LIMITED FUNGI HT OR ORY ROT, OR BACTERIA ,e,J13J 11014) 
SMOKE. ALARM~ 6EAO BOLT LOCKS, AND NONSHOKER 
DISCOUNTS A PLIED 
52000 8 LOSS OF USE 
130000 C PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-19 
REPLACEMENT COST •1111 (1014) 
750 REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS 
215000 A DHELLIHG PREHISE FRAME 1-19 $1,170.00 
BUILDING HUHBER: 004 LOCATION: 04 
INCREASED REPLACEMENT COST (25,) •1183 pol4! HAIVE DEOUCTlBLE DH GLASS •1171 0108 
21500 DETACHED GARAGESE STORAGE SHEDS(HAX. 200 sq FT) 
10750 llKITEO FUNGI HT DR ORV ROT, OR BACTERIA •1133 (1014) 
SHOKE ALARH~ 6EAD BOLT LOCKS, AHO NONSMOKER 
DISCOUNTS A PLIED 
43000 8 LOSS OF USE 
53750 C PERSOHAl PROPERTY 1-19 
REPLACEHEHT COST •llll (1014) 
750 REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS 
35000 E BARN FRAME 4000SQF 1-9 . $173.00 
BUILDING NUHBER: 011 LOCATION: 02 
16000 E DREllING PREMISE MOBILE H/0 FOUND 868SQFT 
BUILDING NUMBER: 012 LOCATION: 02 
1-9 1161} (O~OS} $166.00 
40000 E DHELLIHG PREMISE FRAME lOBOSQF 
BUJLDIHG NUMBER: 014 LOCATION: 03 
1-9 $221.00 




1000 TONS PER STACK LIMIT 
500 FIRE DEPARTMENT SERVICE CHARGE 
1000 DEDUCTIBLE APPLIES TD EACH SECTION I LOSS 
TOTAL SECTION I ANNUAL PREMIUM $3,708.00 
• EJIDORSEMEllT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET 




FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE CO!IPANY Of IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848 
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
SECTION I IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOHlHG ADDITIORAL EHDDRSEHEHTS: 
ENOORSEHENT 1116 (1014) - COSMETIC ROOF DAMAGE ENOORSEHENT (PRINTED IH THE POLICY BOOKLET} 
SECTION II - LIABILITY 
LIMITS OF 
LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Fl BODILY INJURY 
G PROPERTY DAMAGE 
500000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
1000000 FARHIHG ACTIVITIES ANNUAL AGGREGATE 
F2 PREMISES MEDICAL 
25000 EACH PERSOH 
125000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
H DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF OTHERS 
1000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH 
1000 EACH PERSON 




• 1259 11014) 
02 2 RES 135 ACRES 491476 HIGHKAY 95 SANDPOINT ID 83864 
02 SECTI0N=03 TOHNSHJP=59H RANGEaOlH BONNER COUNTY 
03 1 RES 200 ACRES SECTIOH=Ol TOHNSHIP=59N RANGE=OlH·BON!IER COUKTY 
04 1 RES 7 ACRES 49083 HKY 95 SANDPOINT ID 83864 
04 SECTION=03 TOWHSHIP=59N RANGEDOlH BONNER COUNTY 
......-----,~~~~~~-, 90 
COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
DECLARATIONS 
G 2 
POLICY NUH8ER: 01-A-038B72-0l 




TOTAL SECTION II ANNUAL PREMIUM $548.00 
SECTION II IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLDMIHG ADDITIONAL ENOORSEHENTS: 
~~~~~i~~~~f Iii~ 11t~J; : ~~~,f~ti0e~Jr~9~R~i"tIIerr1f~V~~~iiE~lATG1 (~~rH~ED(flif~l0Pi~I~EB~~[~)BOOKLET) 
EHOORSEMEHJ 1282 1014 - • PERSONAL IHJURY ENDORSEMENT (PRINTED IH THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEHEHT I287 0208 - LIMITED POLLUTION COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT 
SECTION III - AUTOHOBILE 
LIHITS OF 
LIABILITY COVERAGE 
N BODILY INJURY 
0 PROPERTY DAMAGE 
500000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
P UNINSURED MOTORIST 
500000 EACH OCCURRBICE 
Pl UHDERINSURED HOTOR[ST 
500000 EACH OCCURRENCE 
Q MEDICAL 
25000 EACH PERSCH 
s 100 CO!IPREHEHSIVE DEDUCTIBLE 
T 250 COLLISION DEOUCTIDLE 
ROADSIDE ASSISTANCE 
100 EACH OCCURRENCE 
CAR RENTAL REIHBURSEHENT 
25 PER DAY 






SECTION III - AUTOMOBILE 
LIMITS OF 
LIA8JLITY COVERAGE 
LOSS OF USE BY THEFT 
25 PER DAY 





FARH BUREAU HUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 
275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO eox 4848 
POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
APPLICABLE 
EMDORSEHENTS 
03-490 1992 CHEV PU 1GCGK24F7NE173320 
fARH - AGE 70-74 
APPLICABLE COVERAGES 
N O P Pl,O 
R6A6sfoE ASSISTAHCE • 1334 (1014) 
03-190-X 
LIABILITY PREHIUH $308.00 
i~~ ~H~lET~ij~7iC4GP54L55RZ9l443 ~oio~t~i·i~~ilTANCE •1334 f1014l 
LIABILITY PREMIUM $390.00 CAR RENTAL REIHBURSEHENT •1368 1014 
COHP / COLL PREHIUK $397. 00 
,------,.,,,.,,-~~~~~--. 90 
COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
DECLARATIONS 
AGE 3 
POLICY HUMBER: Ol-A-038872-01 







TOTAL SECTION III ANNUAL PREHIUM $1,095.00 
• ENDORSEMENT PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET 
SECTION III IS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLDHIKG ADDITIONAL EHDDRSEHENTS: 
EIIDORSEHENT !313 (1014) - COMBINED SINGLE lIHlT ENDORSEHEHT - COVERAGE P AHO P-1 (PRll!TEO IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
ENDORSEMENT 132011014) - COMBINED SINGLE LIHIT £HD0RSEHENT - COVERAGES N ANDO (PRI. NTED IN 7HE POLICY BOOKLET) 
EHDORSEHEMT 1324 1014} - HEW VE\IICLE LOAN COVERAGE EHDORSEHEKT (PRINTED Ill TIIE POLICY BOllKLETl 
ENDORSEHENT 1326 1014) - HEH VEHICLE ADDITIONAL COVERAGE ENDORSEHENT !PRINTED IN THE POLICY BOOKLET) 
SECTION IV - INLAND KARINE 
HO COVERAGE 
THIS POLICY lS SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOKING FORKS AND ADDITIONAL ENDORSEMENTS: 
POLICY BOOKLET ID-CQ-02-01(1014) - COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY ARE SHOHH IN HHOLE DOLLARS 
HO CONTIHGEHT LIABILITY. TH£ POLICY IS HITHOUT CONTINGENT LIABILITY AHO IS NONASSESSABLE. 
EijDORSEHENTS 
TOTAL ANNUAL PREKIUH $5,351.00 
•• .. THIS IS NOT A BILLING .... 
THIS IS THE DECLARATIONS FOR YOUR HEN OR REHEHAL POLICY. INCLUDED ARE COPIES OF ANY ENDORSEMENTS THAT PERTAIN TO IT THAT ARE 
NOT IH YOUR POLICY BOOKLET. IF YOU HAKE AHY HODIFICATJOHS TO THE POL(CY DURING lllE POLICY PERIOD HE HILL SEHD YOU A 
REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS SHOHING THESE CHANGES. THE REPLACEMENT DECLARATIONS HILL CONTINUE TO SHO!f HHICH ENDORSEKENTS APPLV, 
BUT HE HILL HOT SEND YOU HEl4 COPIES OF THESE ENDORSEHEHTS. HE HILL SEND YOU A COPY OF AIIY HEH EHOORSEHEHT THAT H~S BEEN 
ADDED OR OF ANY EKDORSEHEHT THAT HAS BEEN CHANGED. 
FEDERATION HEHBERSHIP 
THIS INSURANCE IS ONE OF THE BENEFITS OF THE IDAHO FARH BUREAU FEDERATION AND IS OFFERED ONLY TO ITS HEKBERS. HHILE THIS 
POLICY IS IN FORCE YOU HUST HAIHTAIH HEHBERSHIP IN THE IDAHO FARH BUREAU FEDERATIONi INC AND AH AFFILIATED COUNTY FAAH 
BUREAU, IF YOU DO HOT HAINTAIH THIS HEHBERSHIP YOU HILL NOT BE ELIGIBLE FOR THIS HEnBER SERYlCE BENEFIT AND HE HILL BE 
REQUIRED TO CANCEL THIS INSURANCE. 
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-· FarmBureau FARH BUREAU HUTUAL INSURAHCE COMPANY OF IDAHO 275 TIERRA VISTA DR PO BOX 4848 POCATELLO ID 83205-4848 
NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING 
COUNTRY SQUIRE POLICY 
DECLARATIONS 
· GE 4 
POLICY NUHBER: Ol-A-0~872-01 
EFFECTIVE DATE: 01-26-2015 
THE ANNUAL KEETIHG OF THE HEllBERS HILL BE HELO AT THE HOHE OFFICE AT 275 TIERRA VISTA DRIYE1 POCATELLO.~ IDAHO AT 10 A.H. OH lffE FIRST FRIDAY OF FEBRUARY UNLESS THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHOOSES A DIFFERENT TIHE OR PLACE. THIS HILL BE YOUR ONLY 
NOTICE Of THIS MEETING UHLESS THE TIHE DR PLACE IS CHANCED. NOTICE OF ANY CHANGE HILL DE SENT TO YOU HOT KORE THAN 60 om 
NOR LESS THAN 10 DAYS PRIOR TO THE HEETIHG. THE HEETIIIG SHALL BE HELD FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTING DIRECTORS AND THE 
TRANSACTION OF SUCH OTHER BUSINESS AS HAY PROPERLY CONE BEFORE SUCH HEETING. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VOTE IH PERSON OR BY PROXY 
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1. We will provide lhe Insurance described In this 
policy and the Declarations If you have paid the 
premium and have complied with the policy 
proVislons and conditions. This policy Is divided 
into four sectJons, some wllh multiple coverages. 
You have only the coverages for which you have 
paid premium. These coverages are indicated In 
the Declaratfons and are subject to the Indicated 
limlts of insurance. 
2. The Insured first named In the Declarations, or 
that person~ spouse if also named, Is authorized 
to act on behalf of all insureds with respect to 
giving or receiving notices, receiving refunds, or 
agreeing lo or making any changes In this policy. 
3. By acceptance of lhls policy, you agree that the 
Declarations Indicate the coverages you pur-
chased. No agreement in conflict with, 
modifying, or extending this policy Is valid 
unless in writlng and made a part of the policy. 
4. This policy booklet, the DeclaraUons, and 
appl!cable endorsements constllute your 
policy. The Declaratlons references covera~s 
and endorsements that are Included In your 
pollcy. Upon renewal or change of your policy 
you will receive an updated Declarations but 
no new policy booklet unless the policy booklet 
changes. 
5. This policy wlll be governed by the laws of the 
state of Idaho. 
READ THE DECLARATIONS TO DETERMINE 
WHICH COVERAGES PERTAIN TO YOU. 
DEFINITIONS 
Throughout this policy, we, us, and our, mean Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho. You 
and your mean a person named In the Declarations 
as an Insured and that person!§ spouse if a resident 
of the same household. You and your also refer to a 
partnership, corporation, llmlted llablllty company, or 
trust, named In the Declarations as an Insured. You 
and your do not Include an additional insured such 
as a lessor, trustee, or landlord. The followlng 
defined words appear In bold print In the policy. 
DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTIONS I 
(Property Insurance), II (Llablllty Insurance), AND 
IV (Inland Marine Insurance) 
The following definitions apply to Sections I, II, and 
IV. They do not apply to Section Ill (Automobile 
Insurance). 
Bodily Injury means physical Injury to, or sickness, 
disease, or death of, a person. Bodily Injury does 
not Include: 
1. Any sexually transmitted disease. 
2. Any emotional, psychologlcal, or mental injury or 
effect, unless It arises out of actual physical 
Injury to a person. 
lD-CQ-02-01(1014) 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, 
profession, occupation, or activity, engaged ln for 
compensation, other than farming or custom 
farming. Business Includes rental of all or any part 
of an Insured location to others, or held for rental by 
you, other than: 
1. Your residence premises If rented occaslonally; 
2. Garages, If not more than three car spaces are 
rented; 
3. One-, two-, three-, or four-family dwelllngs 
described In the Declarations; or 
4. Yourfarm. 
Business does not include: 
1. The operation of roadside stands principally for 
the sale of produce raised on the Insured 
locatton; 
2. Newspaper delivery, lawn care, or other 
acllvllles, performed by a self-employed minor 
on a parMime basis; or 
3. Childcare services provided by any Insured If 
the number of children Is six or fewer and then 
Page 1 of45 
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only If care is provided for fewer than a total of 
31 days during your policy period. Part-time chltd 
care services provided by any insured who Is a 
minor Is not considered a business. 
Custom farming means an lnsuredi:A use of a draft 
animal or mobile agricultural machinery to perform 
farming operations for others for a charge or other 
benefit. 
Owetllng means a one-, two·, three-, or four-famlly 
residence. 
Dwelling premises means a dwelling listed In the 
Declarations, Including its grounds and private 
garages. A dwelling premise& Includes a residence 
premises. 
Farm employee means someone employed by you 
whose duties are In connection with the maintenance 
or use of the Insured location as a farm, Including 
the maintenance or use of your farm equipment. 
Farm employee does not Include you or your minor 
child, but Includes exchange labor. 
Farm personal property means your personal 
property which ls usual to the operation of a fann and 
Is used on your farm. It Includes livestock, mobile 
agricultural machinery, tools, supplies, equipment, 
and harvested crops, used in or resulting from your 
fanning operation. It Includes property you are 
purchasing under an installment plan whether or not 
you have title to the property. 
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or ffeld 
crops, or the raising or keeping of livestock, fish, or 
bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or slmllar small 
mammals prlmarlly for fur production. It Includes 
wholesale but not retail sales, except Incidental retail 
sales of your unprocessed farm products with the 
resulting gross Income being less than 25% of your 
combined fanning gross Income. 
Insured means you or the entity named fn the 
Declarations. The following are also Insureds: 
1. If you are a person, Insured also means, if 
resld?nls of your household, your spouse, your 
relatives, and minors in the care of you or your 
relatives. Insured does not Include a relatlve 
age 25 or over who Is a student and lives away 
from your residence premises while attending 
school. 
2. If you are a partnership, Insured also means 
your members and your partners, but only with 
respect to their duties in the partnership. 
3. If you are a limited llablllty company, Insured 
also means your members and managers, but 
ID-CQ-02-01(1014) 
only with respect to their duties as members or 
managers. 
4. If you are a trust, Insured also means the 
trustees, but only with respect to their duties as a 
trustee. 
5. If you are an organization other than a type listed 
above, Insured also means your executive 
officers and directors, but only with respect to 
their duties as your officers or directors. Your 
stockholders are also Insureds with respect to 
their liabl11ty as stockholders. 
6. Under Section II, Insured means a person 
operating your watercraft or recreatlonal motor 
vehlcle within the scope of your pennission; or a 
person operating your mobile agricultural 
m~chlnery within the scope of your permission 
in your farming operation covered by this policy. 
7. Under Section II, Insured means a person In 
charge of your domestic animals, Including 
livestock: (a) to which Section II applles, (b) with 
your permission, and (c) In your acllvities 
covered by this policy. 
Insured location means: 
1. A locatlon listed In the Declarations where you 
maintain a farm or residence, Including private 
approaches; 
2. A location acquired by you during the policy 
period where you maintain a farm or residence, 
Including private approaches. This does not 
Include a location purchased by you that Is 
outside the state of Idaho; 
3. Your cemetery plots or burial vaults; 
4. A locatlon you do not own where you temporarily 
reside; and 
5. Vacant land owned by you and listed In the 
Declarations, or vacant land In the state of Idaho 
acquired by you during the policy period. 
Insured location does not Include properly where a 
business Is conducted. 
Livestock means cattle, horses, llamas, alpacas, 
mules, swine, poultry, donkeys, goats, or sheep. 
Mobile agricultural machinery means a land 
vehicle, Including any machinery or attached 
apparatus, whether or not self-propelled, usual to the 
operation of a ram,, used primarily for agricultural 
purposes, not subject to licensing, and designed for 
use prlnclpally off public roads. 




Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle, 
traHer, or seml-lraller (Including any attached 
machinery or apparatus), designed principally for 
travel on public roads. The following are not 
considered motor vehicles unless they are being 
towed by or carried on a motor vehicle: 
1. Utility, boat, camping, or travel trailers; 
2. Mobile agricultural machinery; 
3. Recreational motor vehicles; or 
4. Any equipment which Is designed for use princi-
pally off public roads. 
Occurrence means an accident, Including contin-
uous or repeated exposure to the same harmful 
conditions, which results In unexpected bodily Injury 
or property damage during the policy period. All 
bodily Injury and property damage resulting from a 
common cause wlll be considered the result of one 
occurrence. 
Personal property means personal property usual 
to the use of the dwetnng premises as a dwelling. 
Pollutants means any solld, liquid, gaseous, or 
thermal Irritant or contaminant, Including but not 
llmlted to, smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals, petroleum products, waste, lead, 
asbestos, or anything defined by federal or state law 
as a pollutant. Waste Includes materials to be 
recycled, reconditioned, or reclalmad. 
Property damage means injury to or destruction of 
tanglble property, Including resulting loss of use. 
Recreatlonal motor vehicle means any motorized 
vehicle designed for recreational use off public 
roads, including but not limited to, golf carts, 
snowmobiles, trail bikes, mopeds, dune buggies, 
motorcycles, or all-terrain vehicles. It does not 
Include motorcycles that are licensable for road use. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, who Is a resident of your 
household, including a ward or foster child. Thls 
definition applies only If you are a parson. 
Residence employee means someone employed by 
you who performs duties In connection with the 
maintenance or use of the residence premises. 
This Includes a person who performs duties for you 
elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with 
your business or farming. 
Residence premises means, if shown in the 
Declarations: (a) a dwefllng that Is your principal 
residence, Including Its grounds and private garages, 
or (b) that part of any other building where you 
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reside. A residence premises does not Include any 
part of a building used for business. 
DEFINITIONS APPLICABLE TO SECTION Ill 
(Automobile Insurance) 
Bodily Injury means physlcal injury to a person and 
any resulting sickness, disease, or death. 
Business and Farming have the same definitions 
under Section Ill as under DEFINITIONS APPLI• 
CABLE TO SECTIONS I (Property Insurance), II 
(Llablllty Insurance), AND IV (fnland Marine 
Insurance). 
Insured means: 
1. Under Coverages N, 0, R, S, and T, with respect 
to an Insured vehicle: 
a. You or any relative; or 
b. Anyone using an Insured vehicle within the 
scope of your permission or within the scope 
of permission of your adult relative. This 
does not Include a passenger. 
2. Under Coverages N and O with respect to a 
nonowned vehicle, you or your relatives when 
operating a nonowned vehlcle. This does not 
Include a r&latlve who owns a licensed motor 
vehicle not Insured by this policy. 
Insured does not Include the United States Govern-
ment, Its agencies, or any person when acting as an 
employee of the United States Government when the 
Federal Tort Claim Act applies. 
Insured vehicle means: 
1. Any vehicle owned by you and described In the 
Declarations; 
2. Any vehicle In your care, custody, or conlrol, that 
you drive on a regular basis, and that is 
described in the Declaratlons; 
3. A temporary substitute vehicle. The same 
coverages apply to the temporary substitute 
vehicle as apply to the Insured vehicle for 
which it Is being substituted; 
4. Under Coverages N and O only, any tralfer while 
attached to a motor vehicle to which these 
coverages apply; 
5. Under Coverages R, S, and T, any camper, 
camper shell, topper, or other shell, described In 
the Declarations; 







6. Under Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q, any 
lfcensed private passenger aulomoblle, pickup, 
SUV, farm lruck, passenger van, motorcycle, or 
motor home, ownership of which is acquired by 
you during the policy period; 
7. Under Coverages S and T, any licensed private 
passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, fami truck, 
trailer, passenger van, motorcycle, or motor 
home, ownership of which Is acquired by you 
during the policy period; and 
B. Under Coverages Sand T, any camper, camper 
shell, topper, or similar shell, ownership of which 
is acquired by you during the policy period. 
The newly acquired vehicles or equipment In 
paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 above are not insured 
vehicles unless we Insure all of your Insured 
vehicles and you ask us to Insure the newly acquired 
vehicle or equipment during the policy period or 
within 30 days of Its acquisition, whichever Is shorter. 
The separate Coverages described In paragraphs 6, 
7, and 8, above do not apply to a newly acquired 
vehicle unless that Coverage applies to at least one 
Insured vehicle described In the Declarations. 
A newly acquired vehicle Includes a vehicle that 
replaces one shown In the Declarations. Ownership 
Includes your written lease of a motor vehicle for 
more than 6 continuous months. 
Motor vehicle means a motorized land vehicle 
designed principally for travel on public roads. The 
tenn motor vehlcle does not Include a traller. 
Nonowned vehicle means a trailer or motor 
vehicle with a gross vehicle rating of 26,000 lbs. or 
less, as Indicated by the manufacturer, operated by 
you or your relatives, or In the custody of you or 
your relatives, provided the actual use is within the 
scope of the permission of the owner. 
A nonowned vehicle does not Include: 
1. A vehicle owned by you or your relatives or that 
Is available for regular use by you or your 
relatives. This limitation does not apply to a 
motor vehicle owned by you or your relatives, 
that Is driven by you, and Is described as an 
Insured vehicle in the Declarations of another 
policy Issued by us or Western Community 
Insurance Company, If it otherwise qualifies as a 
nonowned vehicle. 
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2. Any pickup, truck, van, or traller, used for any 
business purpose. This limitation does not apply 
to a pickup or passenger van that otherwise 
qualifies as a nonowned vehicle if we Insure a 
pickup or van shown In the Declarations for 
which premium Is charged based on a business 
use class. 
3. A motor vehlcle rented to an Insured for more 
than three weeks. 
Occupying means In, upon, or getting Into or getting 
out of. 
Occurrence means an accident arising out of the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehlcle, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to the 
same harmful conditions, which results In unex-
pected bodily injury or property damage during the 
policy period. All bodily Injury and property 
damage resulting from a common cause will be 
considered Iha result of one occurrence. 
Property damage means injury to or destruction of 
tangible property, lncludlng resulting loss of use. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, 
marriage, or adoption, who Is a resident of your 
household, including a ward or foster child. This 
definition applies only if you are a person. 
Temporary substitute vehicle, means a motor 
vehicle or trailer you do not own while temporarily 
used as a substitute for a vehicle described In the 
Declarations when that vehicle cannot be used 
because of breakdown or servicing. 
Trailer means a vehicle designed to be towed by a 
private passenger automobile, pickup, SUV, van, or 
farm truck. ft also Includes a farm wagon, farm semi-
trailer, or fann Implement, while being towed by an 
Insured vehicle. Trailer does not Include any 
vehicles being used: 
1. To haul passengers; 
2. As an office, store, or for display purposes; or 












GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THIS POLICY 
Unless otherwise Indicated, the followlng conditions 
are appllcable to this policy. 
1. Abandonment of Property. We are not obligated 
to pay for or accept any property abandoned by 
an insured. 
2. Arbitration. This paragraph does not apply to 
llablllty coverages, or uninsured or underinsured 
motorist coverages. An Insured or we may make 
a written demand for arbitration to determine all 
disputed Issues as to (1) whether an Insured Is 
entitled under the pollcy to coverage for a toss, or 
(2) the value of a loss to real or personal property 
where coverage is not disputed. Each party will 
select a competent, lmpartlal arbitrator within 20 
days of receipt of the written demand. The two 
arbitrators will select a third arbitrator. If they 
cannot agree upon a third arbitrator within 1 O 
days, either may request that a Judge of a court 
having jurlsdlctlon selects a third arbitrator. Both 
parties shall make disclosure to each other of all 
lnformallon as required by the arbltrator(s) ln the 
schedulfng and discovery order. Each party will 
pay the expenses It Incurs, lncludlng attorney fees 
and related costs, and bear the expenses of the 
third arbllrator equally. Arbitration will take place 
tn Idaho In the county where the policy was 
Issued unless both parties agree otherwise. Local 
rules of law as to arbitration procedure and 
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two 
of the arbitrators will be binding. 
3. Assignment. No assignment or transfer of this 
policy to another person or enuty will be valld. 
4. Premium. The premium slated In the Declara-
tions will be computed according to our rules and 
rating plans. The premium is for Insurance from 
the policy Inception date to its expiration date. 
5. Bankruptcy of An Insured. Bankruptcy or 
Insolvency of an Insured wlll not relieve us of our 
obligations under this policy. 
6. Cancellatlon. Our cancellatlon rights are limited 
by state Insurance law. 
a. You may cancel this entire policy by malling 
to us written notice stating the future date this 
cancellation will be effeclive. 
b. We may cancel all or part of Sections I, II, or 
IV, by malling notice to the first named In-
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sured in the Declarations at least 30 days 
before lhe cancellation date. If cancellation is 
because you d[d not pay the premium we 
may cancel by malllng notice to you at least 
15 days before the cancellation date. 
c. When allowed by state law, we may cancel all 
or part of Section Ill of this policy by mailing 
notice to you: 
(1) At least 10 days before the cancellation 
date If the policy has not been In force for 
60 days or Jr the cancellation Is because 
you did not pay the premium. Under this 
paragraph, if the notice is malled, lhe 10 
day period begrns 5 days after the date 
our notice Is postmarked; 
(2) At least 30 days before the cancellation 
dale if the cancellation pertains to a 
commercial vehicle, unless cancellatlon Is 
because of non-payment of premium; we 
will then give you notice at least 1 O days 
before cancellation; or 
(3) At least 20 days before the cancellation 
dale If the cancellation Is for any other 
reason. 
d. Payment or tender of unearned premium Is 
not a condition of cancellatlon. We will mail 
any notice of cancellaUon to you at the 
address shown in the Declarations. Our proof 
of malling wlll be sufficient proof of the 
maillng of notice. The effective date and hour 
of cancellation stated In the notice wlll 
become the end of the policy period. Our 
hand delfvery of this written notice will be 
equivalent to malling. 
e. If you or we cancel, earned premiums wm be 
computed pro rata based on the effective 
date of cancellation. Premium adjustment 
may be made at this time or as soon after as 
Is practical. Our check malled or delivered will 
be sufficient tender of any refund of premium. 
7. Changes. We reserve the right to adjust the 
amount of your premiums if there is a change in 
the Information used to calculate your policy 
premiums. 
8. Concealment or Fraud. We wlll not provide 
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cealed or misrepresented any material fact or 
circumstance relating to lhls Insurance. 
9, Cooperation of Insured. If any Insured falls to 
cooperate with us or send us legal papers as 
required, we have the right to refuse any further 
coverage for the occurrence or loss. 
10. Death. Upon your death, we wlll continue through 
the current pollcy period to Insure any member of 
your household who is an insured at the time of 
your death. We will also Insure: 
a . With respect to your property, the person 
having proper temporary custody of the 
property until appointment and quallflcatlon of 
a legal representa11ve; or 
b. Your legal representative, but only with 
respect to: 
(1) Your property that we covered at the time 
of your death; and 
(2} Your legal liablHty covered by this policy. 
11. Deductible Clause. Loss from each occurrence 
wlll be adjusted separately. We will not pay for 
any covered loss until the amount of loss exceeds 
the applicable deductible shown in the Declara-
tions. We do not cover the deductible portion of a 
loss. We wlll apply only one deductible (the 
highest one applicable) to a loss to which more 
than one section of this pol!cy applles, or If two or 
more Insured vehicles or other covered items 
are damaged In a slngle occurrence. 
12. Dividends or Credits. Any obllgatlon of ours for 
dividend or credit will not In any way exlend or 
change the policy period. 
13. Inspection and Audit. You must pennlt us to 
inspect and audit your insured property and 
operation at any reasonable time. The purpose Is 
to determine lnsurablllly and the appropriate 
premium charge. We are not obligated to conduct 
Inspections. We are not obllgated to give you a 
copy of any Inspection or audit report. Any 
Inspection or audit wlll not be considered a 
representation that the operation or property is 
safe or compiles with any legal requirements. 
14. lnsuredls Interest and Limit of Liability. If more 
than one person has an Insurable Interest In the 
property covered by this policy, we wlll not be 
liable to the Insured for an amount greater than 
the Insured~ Interest, subject to the applicable 
limit of llablllty. 
15. Liberalization Clause. lf within 60 days prior to 
or during the policy period we adopt any revision 
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that broadens the coverage under this policy 
wiOlout payment of additional premium, the 
broadened coverage will apply lo this policy. This 
clause does not apply to changes implemented 
through introduction of a new edition of our policy. 
16. Loss Payment. This paragraph does not apply to 
liability coverages. We will adjust ail losses with 
you unless someone else Is entitled lo payment 
under this pollcy. Payment for loss wlll be made 
within 60 days after we receive and accept as 
complete your signed, sworn proof of loss, and 
ascertainment of the loss ls made by: (a) 
agreement with you; (b} entry of a flnal Judgment; 
or (c) the filing of an arbitration award with us. 
17. Loss Payable Clause (Appllcable to Coverage 
D-Farm Personal Property and Section IV). This 
clause is applicable If a loss payee Is named In 
the Oeclaratlons. A loss payee Includes a 
llenholder. 
a. If a payable loss ls for the value of the 
covered property, we wlll pay you and the 
loss payee. If a payable loss is under $10,000 
and is for repairs, payment may be made to 
you only. At our option we may pay you and 
the loss payee for any loss. 
b. We may cancel the pollcy during the policy 
period. We wnr mail notice of canceltatlon to 
the lienholder at least 10 days before the data 
the canoellatlon takes effect. 
c. If we make any payment to the loss payee, 
we will obtain their rights against any other 
party. 
d. We will pay the loss payee for their Interest 
dlrectly if the covered property has been 
repossessed. 
e. If we deny your claim, that denlal wlll not 
apply to a valid claim of the loss payee, if the 
loss payee: 
(1) Notlfles us of any change In ownership, 
occupancy, or substantial change In risk 
of which the loss payee Is aware; 
(2) Pays any premium due under this pollcy 
on demand If you have neglected to pay 
the premium; and 
(3) Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss 
wlthin 60 days after receiving notice from 
us of your failure to do so. 
f. If we pay the loss payee for any loss and 
deny payment to you: 
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(1) We are subrogated to all the rights of the 
loss payee granted under their lien on the 
property; or 
(2) At our option, we may pay to the loss 
payee the whole principal on their lien 
plus any accrued interest. In this event, 
we have the right to receive a full 
assignment and transfer. 
g. Subrogation will not impair the right of the 
loss payee lo recover the full amount of lhetr 
claim. 
h. Policy conditions relating to Arbitration, Suit 
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the 
toss payee. 
18. No Benefit to Bailee. We will not recognize any 
assignment or grant any coverage for the benefit 
of any person or organization holdlng, storing, or 
transporting property for a fee regardless of any 
other provision of this poUcy. 
19. Nonduplicatlon of Insurance Benefits. No 
person entitled to any payment or benefit under 
any coverage of this pollcy is entllled to recover 
any duplicate payment or benefit for the same 
elements of loss under any other coverage of this 
policy, lnclud!ng llablllty coverages, or any other 
poflcy. 
20. Our Option. ff we give you notice within 30 days 
after we receive and accept your signed, sworn 
proof of loss, we may: 
a. Take all or any part of the property at the 
agreed or appraised value. If we exercise this 
option, you must sign any papers we require 
for transfer of tl!le; or 
b, Repair, rebuild, or replace any part of the 
property with equivalent property. We will not 
be Hable for any loss resulUng from delay In 
repair or choice of repairmen. 
21. Polley Period. The pollcy period Is shown In the 
Declara1ions and Is subject to cancellation as 
stated In the policy. This poflcy applies only to 
occurrences which take place during the policy 
period. Losses to your Insured property are 
covered only If the peril originates and causes 
loss during the poflcy period. The time shown in 
the Declarations Is standard time at your primary 
residence. To the extent that this poflcy replaces 
another policy or coyeraga that terminates at a 
different hour on the effective date of this pollcy, 
this policy is not effective until the other policy 
tenninates. 
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22. Policy Renewals. 
a. Subject to our consent. you may renew this 
policy for successive periods by payment to 
us of the premium we require to renew the 
policy. If we are willlng to renew this policy we 
will give you notice of the amount of premium 
or estimated premium to be paid at feast 20 
days before it is due. Premium payment for 
any renewal period wlU be due before the 
expiration of the preceding policy period. We 
may change the terms of your policy at 
renewal. We wlll give you notice of any 
change resulting In a decrease in coverage at 
least 30 days before It becomes effective. 
b. We wlff give you notice or our Intent to non-
renew all or part of any commercial coverage 
under this policy at least 45 days before the 
end of the policy period. 
c. We wfll give you notice of our Intent to non-
renew all or part of any noncommercial 
coverage under this policy at least 30 days 
before the end of the policy period. 
23. Polley Termination. If you fall to pay the renewal 
premium when due, this policy wlll terminate on 
Its expiration date wllhout any notice or action by 
us. If you purchase another policy to replace this 
one, this policy terminates on the Inception of 
such pollcy without notice by you or us. 
24. Premium Waiver. If this pollcy is cancelled, 
lapses, or Is nonrenewed, any premium you owe 
us lhat Is less than $10 or any premium we owe 
you that Is less than $5, ls waived. 
25. Recovered Property. If an Insured or we 
recover any property for which we have made 
payment under this pollcy, the lnsul'ed or we wllf 
notify the other of the recovery. We are the owner 
of this property. At our option, we wlll retum the 
property to the Insured upon lnsuredls payment 
of the amount we, in our discretion, may agree lo. 
26. Subrogation oour Right to Recover Payment. 
a. If we make payment under this policy and the 
person to or for whom payment was made 
has a right to recover damages, we wlll be 
subrogated to that right (have that right 
transferred to us). That person must do 
whatever is necessary to enable us to 
exercise our rights and must do nothing after 
the loss to prejudice our rights. An Insured 
must not pursue our subrogated Interest 
without our written permission. 




b. If we make a payment under this policy, and 
the person to or for whom payment was 
made recovers damages from anolher, that 
person must reimburse us to the extent of our 
payment. · 
c. We may prosecute in the name of any 
Insured for the recovery of these payments. 
We may use any documents in our files to 
pursue our subrogation claim. 
27. Speclal or Lower Limit, or Additional Cover-
ages o Section I. Under some Section I 
coverages there may be a special or tower limit or 
an additional coverage for a particular type of 
property or loss. Unless the policy specifically 
states otherwise, such llmlt Is Included within and 
does not Increase the applicable coverage llmit. 
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28. Sult Against Us. No actlon Is to be brought 
against us unless there has been compliance with 
the potlcy provisions. No one has any right to join 
us as a party to any action against an Insured. 
No action with respect to tlabllity coverages Is to 
be brought against us until the obligation of the 
Insured has been determined by final Judgment 
or agreement signed by us. 
29. Tenns of Polley to Conform to Statute. If any of 
the terms of this pollcy are In conflict with the 
statutes of the state of Idaho, they are hereby 
amended lo conform to such statutes. 
30. Waiver or Change of Policy Provisions. A 
waiver or change of any provision of this policy 
must be In wrillng by us to be valld. 









SECTION I D PROPERTY INSURANCE 
We cover the property insured under Sectton I for 
direct physical Joss only, caused by specified perils. 
For most coverages, the applicable perils, limit of 
llabiflty, and deductible, are Indicated in the Declara-
tions; for some coverages, one or more of these may 
be indicated In the policy booklet or an applicable 
endorsement. 
COVERAGE A D DWELLINGS 
We cover the following: 
1. The dwelling on the residence premises 
described In the Declarallons used principally as 
your private residence, Including: 
a. Structures attached to the dwelllng; 
b. Permanently Installed outdoor equipment 
pertaining to the dwelling; and 
c. Materlals and supplies located on the 
residence premises for use in the con-
struction, alteratlon, or repair of the dwelling 
or its private garage. 
2. The dwelllng(s) shown in the Declarations, other 
than the dwelling on the residence premises, 
used principally as a private residence, including: 
a. Structures attached to the dwelllng(s); 
b. Permanently Installed outdoor equipment 
pertaining to the dwelllng(s); and 
c. Materials and supplies on these dwelllng 
premises for use In the construcllon, 
alteration, or repair of the dwelllng(s) or Its 
private garage. 
We cover detached private garages, swimming pools, 
and storage sheds, on t~e dwelllng premises 
pertaining to the above dwelllng(s). Our aggregate 
llmlt of liablUty for these structures Is Indicated In the 
Declarations and Is a separate limit. We do not cover 
these structures If used for any business, profession-
al, or farming purposes. We do not cover any garage 
or storage shed rented to someone other than a 
tenant of the dwelllng. Under this coverage a storage 
shed means a structure for storage of your personal 
property, with exterior dimensions no greater than 
200 square feet. A garage means a carport, or a fully 
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enclosed building, designed to house one or more 
motor vehicles. We do not cover field, corral, or 
pasture fences, even If attached to a dwelllng. We do 
not cover bridges designed to be used by motor 
vehicles or boat docks. 
COVERAGE B D LOSS OF USE 
1. Additional Living Expense. If a loss covered 
under Coverage A makes your covered dwelling 
unlnhabltable, we will pay any reasonable and 
necessary increase in living expenses Incurred by 
you so that your family can maintain Its nonnal 
standard of llvlng. Payment will be for the shortest 
time required to repair or replace the premises, or 
If you permanently relocate, the shortest lime 
required for your household to settle elsewhere. 
This period of time Is not limited by expiration of 
this pollcy. We will not pay for any increase in 
living expenses resulting from your rental or use 
of any real property that is more than 150 miles 
from the covered dwelllng. 
2. Fair Rental Value. If a loss under Coverage A 
causes your covered dwelling rented to others to 
become uninhabitable, we will pay the fair rental 
value of the dwelling premises. Payment will be 
for the shortest time required to repair or replace 
the part of the premises rented or held for rental. 
This period of time Is not llmlted by expiration of 
this policy. Fair rental value does not include any 
expenses that do not continue whlle part of the 
dwelllng premises rented or held for rental Is 
uninhabitable. 
3. Prohibited Use. If a civil authority prohibits you 
from use of the dwelllng premises as a result of 
direct damage to neighboring premises by a peril 
Insured against In this po!fcy, we cover any 
resulting additional living expenses or fair rental 
value loss Incurred by you for a period no! 
exceeding two weeks during which use Is 
prohibited. 
We do not cover loss or expense due to cancellation 
of a lease or agreement. 
COVERAGE C D PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We cover personal property owned or used by an 
Insured while it Is anywhere In the world. At your 
request, we wlll cover uninsured personal property 





the residence premises occupied exclusively by an 
Insured. Coverage C is subject to the followlng 
limitations and exclusions. 
1. Newly Acquired Residence. We cover your 
personal property at a newly acquired principal 
residence for 30 days Immediately after you begin 
to move the property there. If your personal 
property Is distributed between your residence 
premises and this newly acquired principal 
residence, the limit of liability applies at each 
location In the proportion that Iha value al each 
location bears to the total value of all property 
distributed between the two locations. 
2. Multiple Insured Dwelling Premises. If you 
have more than one dwelllng premises Insured 
under Section I, a different Coverage C limit of 
liabllity applies to each dwelllng premises. 
These limits are stated in the Declarations. The 
limit applicable to one Insured dwelling premises 
cannot be applied to a loss at another insured 
dweJllng premises. 
3. Special Limits of Liability. Special llrnlts of 
Uabillly apply to the following categories of 
property. If an Item of property Is subject to more 
than one category, only the category with the 
lowest limit applies. The special limit for each 
following category Is the total aggregate limit for 
each loss for all property In that category: 
a. $250 on money, bank notes, numismatic 
property, bull!on, gold other than goldware, 
silver other lhan silverware, platinum, coins, 
medals, gift cards or certificates, scrip, smart 
cards, or stored value cards; 
b. $1,000 on securities, accounts, deeds, 
evidences of debt, letters of credit, notes 
other than bank notes, manuscripts, personal 
records, passports, tickets, sports colleclion 
cards, and stamps. This limit appll_es 
regardless of the medium (such as paper or 
computer software) on which the material 
exists. This limit Includes the cost to 
research, replace, or restore the lnformallon 
from the lost or damaged material; 
c. $1,600 on watercraft, Including their !railers, 
attached equipment, and outboard motors. 
We do not cover any loss by windstorm or 
hall to this property unless It Is Inside a fully 
enclosed building; 
d. $1,500 on trailers, not Including trailers used 
with any watercraft; 
a. $2,000 on any one article and $4,000 in the 
aggregate for loss by theft of jewelry, 
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watches, furs, and precious and semi-
precious stones; 
f. $4,000 for loss by theft of firearms, firearm 
opllcs, and firearm attachments; 
g. $3,500 for loss by theft of silverware, sllver-
plated ware, goldwara, gold-plated ware, and 
pewterware; 
h. $4,000 on property on the residence 
premises used at any time for any business 
purpose and $2,000 for such property away 
from the residence premises. This includes 
computers, blank electronic storage ·media, 
and pre-recorded computer programs 
available to the publlc. We do no! cover cash, 
secur!Hes, books of account, drawings, other 
paper or eiectronlc records, CD-ROM, 
electronic data processing tapes, DVDs, 
disks, or other software media; 
I. $1,500 on DVD players, GPS devices, cell or 
mobile phones, televisions, computers, and 
other electronic data processing equipment, 
while this property Is In or upon a motor 
vehicle. This limitaUon applies to portable 
equipment that Is capable of being operated 
by the motor vehicle ts electrical syslem; 
j. $5,000 on any one article and $10,000 in the 
aggregate for loss by theft of any rug, carpet, 
tapestry, wall hanging, or other similar article; 
k. $5,000 on your personal property which Is 
usually located at your residence premises 
while this property Is at any other dwelllng 
owned by you and Insured by us; 
I. $8,000 on hand, eleclrontc., power, and 
similar tools that can be used for carpentry, 
building construction, or dwelling or vehicle 
maintenance or repair; and 
m. $3,000 on saddles and tack. 
If you have purchased addltronal coverage for any 
of the above special llmlts, this is shown In the 
Declarations and replaces the applicable llmft(s) 
shown above. 
4. Exclusions. Section I Exclusions and the 
following additional exclusions apply to Coverage 
C. Coverage C does not cover: 
a. Farm personal property; 
b. Animals, livestock, birds, fish, or pets; 
c. Mobile agricultural machinery, motorized 
land vehicles, and their parts, except vehicles 





designed for assisting the handicapped and 
vehicles used solely to service your dwellfng, 
provided they cannot be licensed for road 
use; 
d. Aircraft and !heir parts; 
e. Property of roomers, tenants, and boarders, 
not related to an Insured; 
f. Recreational motor vehicles, trailer homes, 
camper shells, tent trallers, and campers, and 
their parts; 
g. Any personal property located at any 
dwellJng, Its grounds, garages, or sheds, 
which are owned by you and not Insured 
under Section I or by Western Community 
Insurance Company; 
h. Articles separately Insured by this or other 
Insurance; 
r. Materials and supplles on any dwelllng 
premises for the construction, alteratlon, or 
repair of the dwelllng premises or Its private 
garages; or 
J. Personal property owned and insured by 
someone who is not an Insured. 
Addltlonal Coverages. Subject to any speclal limits, 
Coverage C Includes the followlng additional 
coverages: 
1. We cover loss to property Insured under 
Coverage C while a11he Insured location due to 
change In temperature as a result of physical 
damage to the building or Its equipment caused 
by a peril Insured against. 
2. Credit Card, Bank Transfer Card, Counterfeit 
Currency, and Forgery. We wlll pay up to 
$1,000for: 
a. The legal obligation of an Insured to pay 
because of the theft or unauthorized use of 
credit cards or bank debit cards Issued to or 
registered In any lnsuredia name. We do not 
cover credit card or bank debit card use if any 
Insured has not complied with all terms and 
conditions under which Iha card was issued; 
b. Loss suffered by an Insured caused by 
forgery or alteration of any check or 
negotlable Instrument; or 
c. Loss suffered by an Insured through 
acceptance In good failh of counterfeit United 
States or Canadian paper currency. 
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Our annual aggregate llmlt for this coverage is 
$2,000. We do not cover losses resulting from 
business pursuits or dishonesty of any Insured. 
COVERAGE D DFARM PERSONAL PROPERTY 
We cover your farm personal property on the 
Insured location. We also cover your farm personal 
property away from the Insured locatlon except 
while: 
a. Stored In or being processed in manufac-
turing plants, publlc elevators, warehouses, 
seed houses, or drying plants; 
b. In transit by common or contract carrier; or 
c. In public sales barns or sales yards. 
1. Coverage Limitations. 
a. Leased Property. We cover farm personal 
property leased by you for the conduct of 
your farming operation only If this property is 
added to Coverage D by endorsement Our 
coverage on leased farm personal property 
Is excess over any other valid and collectlbfe 
insurance available to the owner. 
b. Livestock Coverage. Except for the perll of 
theft, we cover your livestock only if the 
spec!fled per/I causes death. Our lfmlt of 
llablllty will not exceed the actual cash value 
of the livestock subject to the maximum per 
head llmlt stated In the Declarations. Death 
must result wilhln 30 days from the date of 
occurrence. 
c. Crop Coverage. Woodchips, sawdust, and 
the following harvested props: grain, seed, 
sllage, fodder, peas, beans, hay, and straw, 
are covered for loss caused by peril 1 (fire or 
lightning) only. Our limit of llabillty for any one 
stack of hay or straw, whether free standing 
or In a building, wlll not exceed the number of 
tons per stack stated in the Declaratlons. If a 
stack or building Is exposed within 125 feet of 
another stack or building, the applicable per 
slack tonnage limit will apply to the aggregate 
of all such exposed stacks or buildings. For 
example, If stack Y rs 100 feet from stack X 
and stack Z Is 100 feet from stack Y and 200 
feet from stack X, the aggregate limit 
applicable to stacks X, Y, and Z Is the per 
stack tonnage llmlt stated in the Declarations. 
d. Computers. Peril 18 (sudden and accfdental 
damage from artiflclaffy generated eleclrlcal 
current) also applies to your laptop or desktop 
computers that qualify as farm personal 
property. 




e. Records and Electronlc Data Processing 
Property. Our lfability for loss to any records, 
software programs, electronic data, or olher 
information, however stored or recorded, will 
not exceed the cost of pre-recorded computer 
programs available to the public, or of blank 
media or material, plus the cost Incurred by 
you for transcribing, copying, reentering, or 
recreating such data or software. 
Our lfmlt of liability for this coverage is $2,500 
for all loss sustained in a policy period. 
2. Coinsurance. You must maintain insurance on 
your farm personal property insured under 
Coverage D to the extent of at least 80% of the 
actual cash value at the time of any loss. For 
example, if at the tlme of a loss your covered 
farm personal property Is worth $100,000, then 
the amount of insurance must be at least 
$80,000. If you fall to keep this percentage of 
coverage, you wlll share in each loss in addition 
to the deductible. We wlfl pay the proportion of 
each loss represented by the amount you did 
Insure at the time of loss divided by the amount 
you should have Insured, less any applicable 
deductible. If you purchase mobile agricultural 
machinery during the policy period, we will not 
apply this coinsurance clause to any loss to that 
equipment that occurs within 30 days of Its 
purchase. 
If the aggregate clalm for any loss under this 
coverage Is less than 2% of the total amount of 
Insurance under Coverage D, you will not be 
required to furnish an inventory of 1he undamaged 
property. This does not mean we waive any of our 
rights concerning coinsurance. 
3. Exclusions. Section t Exclusions and the 
following additional exclusions apply to Coverage 
D. We do not Insure under Coverage D: 
a. Personal property; 
b. Animals, other than livestock; 
c. Accounts, bills, currency, deeds, evidences of 
debt, money, or securities; 
d. Irrigation equipment, including irrigation 
pumps, burled waler llnes, electric pump 
motors, pane[s, wiring, transformers, or 
permanently Installed or portable sprinkler 
lines and sprinkler equipment (including any 
sprlnklerls electric equipment); 
a. Fences, sawmill equipment, windmflls, wind 
chargers, towers, power poles, light poles, 
telephone poles, or radio and television 
towers and antennas; 
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f. Vehicles primarily designed and licensed for 
road use other than wagons and trailers 
designed for farming purposes and used 
prlnclpally on the Insured location; 
g. Motor vehicles, house trailers, motorcycles, 
watercraft, recreational motor vehicles, 
ATVs, mini trucks, aircraft, or their parts or 
accessories; 
h. Unharvested or unthreshed crops or stubble; 
I. Any harvested crops, Including root crops, 
bulbs, or fruils, except to the extent lhey are 
covered under the Crop Coverage above; 
J. Structures and buildings except portable 
bulklings on skids in an amount ncit to exceed 
$1,000 per building; 
k. Any damage arising from wear and !ear, 
freezing, or mechanical breakdown or tanure. 
This exclusion does not apply to loss covered 
by peril 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), peril 8 
(smoke), or perll 20 (collision wllh another 
object or overturn); 
I. Under peril 20 (colllslon or overturn 
coverage), damage to tires, unless damaged 
by the same cause as other loss covered 
under Coverage D; 
m. Bees, their larvae, bee boards, beehives, or 
any other bee nesting or housing enclosure; 
n. loss to livestock caused by the direct or 
indirect result of fright, freezing, running Into 
fences or other objects, running Into streams 
or ditches, or smothering, whether an Insured 
peril is Involved or not; or 
o. Property which is separately described and 
spaclflcally Insured In whole or In part by this 
or any other Insurance. 
C<;)VERAGE E DADOITIONAL BUILDINGS 
The Declarations describe your dwelllngs, buildings, 
fences. and structures that we cover under Coverage 
E. Coverage A does not apply to any property Insured 
under Coverage E. 
1. Bulldlngs. Coverage on buildings includes their 
permanent foduras and attached sheds, but 
excludes fences. 
2. Materials and Supplies. Coverage on a building 
or structure is extended to cover all materials and 
supplies on the premises intended to be used In 
the construction, alteration, or repair of such 







3. Utlllty Poles. Coverage on private utility poles 
Includes attached switch boxes, fuse boxes, and 
other electrical equipment mounted on the poles. 
4. Fences and Similar Structures. For fences, 
corrals, and similar structures, we wlll be liable for 
no greater portion of any loss than lhe amount of 
Insurance bears to 100% of the actual cash value 
of the property at the time of the loss. 
5. Antennas, Aerials, and Receivers. Coverage on 
outdoor radio and television antennas, aerials. 
and satellite receivers, Including their lead-In 
wiring, masts, and towers, Is subject to a 
maximum payment of $250, unless this 
equipment Is speclflcally Insured for a greater 
amount. No deductible applies to this coverage. 
SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
Section I Includes the following additional coverages. 
t. Debris Removal. This coverage does not Include 
the expense of removing pollutants. 
a. We wlll pay the reasonable expense Incurred 
by you for the removal of debris of covered 
property provided coverage Is afforded for the 
perll causing Iha loss. This Includes the cost 
to remove from a bulldlng or from personal 
property In a building, ash, dust, or particles, 
resulting from a covered loss caused by peril 
19 (volcanic eruption). Debris removal 
expense is Included in the limit of llablllty 
applying to the damaged property. 
b. When the amount payable under Coverage A 
for the actual damage to the property plus the 
expense for debris removal exceeds the 
Coverage A limit of liability for the damaged 
property. an additional 5% of that limit of 
liability wlll be available to cover debris 
removal expense. This addllional limit does 
not apply to paragraph 7 below (Trees, 
Shrubs, and Other Plants). 
2. Fallen Tree Removal. We will pay up to $1,000 
for the reasonable cost for removal from the 
residence premises of: 
a. Your tree(s) felled by perll 3 (windstorm or 
hail); 
b. Your tree(s) felled by peril 12 (weight of Ice, 
snow, or sleet); or 
c. A nelghboris tree{s) felled by perils 1 through 
19; 
provided the lree(s) damages a covered structure 
or blocks your driveway or sidewalk. The $1,000 
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limit Is the most we will pay In any one loss 
regardless of the number of fallen trees. 
3. Pollutants. If a loss under Coverage A is caused 
by perlls 1 through 18, or peril 27, and that Joss 
results in pollutants contaminating land or water 
on the dwelllng premises, and you are required 
by law to extract these pollutants, we will pay for 
that extraction, provided you report the 
contamination within 180 days of the date of tha 
peril causing the loss. Our limit of llablllty for this 
coverage is $10,000. This Umlt ls in addition to the 
Coverage A limit of llablllty. This additional 
coverage includes the cost of necessary testing 
for, monitoring, or assessing pollutants as a part 
of extraction from land or water. 
4. Reasonable Repairs. We will pay the reasonable 
costs Incurred by you for necessary repairs made 
solely to protect covered property from further 
damage provided coverage Is afforded for the 
perJI causing the loss. 
5. Door Locks. We will pay up to $200 for the cost 
of re-keying or replacing locks to exterior doors 
on the residence premises if your keys have 
been stolen during the policy period. No deduct· 
Ible applles to this coverage. 
6. Headstones. We will pay up to $5,000 for loss 
caused by perils 1 through 19 to a headstone for 
your spouse, parent, or child. 
7. Trees, Shrubs, and Other Plants. We cover 
trees, shrubs, plants, lawns, and decorative bark, 
on a dwelllng premises Insured under Coverage 
A for loss caused by perll 1 (flre or lightning), peril 
4 (explosion), perll 5 (riot or civil commotion), pert! 
6 {aircraft), peril 7 (vehicles), perll 9 (vandalism or 
malicious mischief), or perll 10 (theft). The limit of 
liability for all loss under this coverage (Including 
debris removal) shall not e>Cceed 5% of the limit of 
llablllty specified for the Coverage A dwelling at 
the same dwelllng premises. Our limit of liability, 
including debris removal, for any one tree, shrub, 
or plant Is $500, and $750 for decorative bark. 
We do not cover property grown for business or 
farming purposes. We do not cover any property 
located farther than 100 feet from the covered 
dwelling. 
8. Refrigerated Products. If Coverage C applies to 
your policy, we will pay an amount not to exceed 
the llmlt of liability stated in the Declarations for 
loss to contents of a freezer or refligerator at the 
residence premises. This coverage does not 
apply to rann personal property. The Joss or 
damage must be caused by a change In 
temperature resulting from: 




a. Interruption of electrlcal service to refriger-
ation equipment caused by damage to the 
generating or transmission equipment which 
results In a shutdown of the system; 
b. Mechanical or electrical breakdown of the 
refrigeration system; or 
c. A tripped breaker or blown fuse. 
You must exercise diligence In Jnspecllng and 
maintaining refrigeration equipment in proper 
working condition. If Interruption of electrical 
service or mechanical or electrical breakdown is 
known, you must exercise all reasonable means 
to protect the insured property from further 
damage. 
9. Fire Department Service Charge. We will pay 
up to the amount shown In the Declarations for 
your liability assumed by contract or required by 
law for fire department charges Incurred when the 
fire department Is called to save or protect your 
covered property from a peril Insured against. No 
deductible applles to this coverage. 
10. Sinking or Swamping of a Boat. If you have 
Coverage C, we will pay up to $2,500 for the loss 
of an insuredls personal property In a boat and 
caused by the sinking or swamping of the boat. 
Thfs coverage does not apply to the boat, Its 
attached equipment and motors, to money, or 
Jewelry. Our limit of llabillty Is the total aggregate 
limit for each loss for all covered property. 
11. Leaking Main Water Line. tf Coverage A applies 
to your residence premises, we wlll pay up to 
$2,600 of the cost to excavate Its main water line 
If It Is leaking. 
12. Building Ordinance or Law Coverage. When 
Your dwelling Insured under Coverage A sustains 
a covered loss, we will pay for the increased cost 
to repair or rebuild your dwelllng required by the 
enforcement of a building, zoning, or land use 
ordinance or law. If the enforcement Is because of 
repairs to the covered damages and the 
requirement Is In effect at the time the loss 
occurs. This coverage Includes legally required 
changes to the undamaged portion of your 
· dwelling if the enforcement of a building, zoning, 
or land use ordinance or law, Is directly related to 
the same covered loss and the requirement Is In 
effect at the time the covered loss occurs. This 
coverage does not Include the cost to remove, 
neutralize, treat, monitor, or test for pollutants. 
Subject to the applicable limit of liablllty, the 
foltowlng llmltatlons apply to this coverage: 
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a. We will not pay more for a covered upgrade 
to the undamaged portion of your dwelling 
than the depreciated value of the undamaged 
portion of the dwelling. 
b. We will not pay more for a covered loss than 
the amount you actually spend to make 
necessary upgrades or repairs your dwelllng. 
c. We will not pay for any upgrade for any part 
of your dwelllng that did not comply with 
code or ordinance requirements at the time it 
was constructed. 
d. The Loss Settlement paragraph under 
SECTION I CONDITIONS that applies to 
dwellings Insured under Coverage A also 
applies to this coverage. 
Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability under this 
coverage for all losses is 10% of the Coverage A 
limit of liability for the dwelllng that sustains the 
loss. This limit Is Included within and does not 
increase the limit of liability for the dwelling. 
SECTION I PERILS INSURED AGAINST 
We cover for direct physical loss to property insured 
caused by the followlng perils If shown In the 
Declarations: 
1. Fire or lightning. 
2. Removal. When property Is removed because lt 
Is endangered by other Insured perils, we pay for 
direct accidental loss from any cause to that 
property while It Is being removed and for 30 
days after removal to a safe place. 
3. Windstorm or hall. 
a. This peril does not Include loss to the Interior 
or contents of a building caused by rain, 
snow, sleet, sand, or dust, unless the direct 
force of wind or hail damages the building 
causing an opening in a roof or wall through 
which the raln, snow, sleet, sand, or dust 
enters. 
b. This peril does not Include loss caused 
directly or indirectly by frost, cold weather, Ice 
(other than hall), snowstorm, or sleet, all 
whether driven by wind or not. 
c. This pern does not apply to a structure with a 
roof or outer wall made In whole or part of 
fabric or to personal property In this structure. 
4. Explosion. This peril does not Include rupture or 
bursting of steam boilers, steam pipes, steam 
turbines, steam engines, or water pipes, if 
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owned by, leased, or operated under the control 
of an insured. 
5. Riot or clvil commotion. 
6. Aircraft, including self-propelled missiles and 
spacecraft. We cover only direct loss caused by 
physical contact of the covered property with an 
aircraft. 
7. Vehicles, meaning direct loss caused by a 
collislon between the covered property and a 
vehicle, or an object thrown up by a vehicle. We 
also cover an lnsured1:a personal property 
while It is In or on a land vehicle, for loss caused 
by rollover of the vehlcle or colllslon of the 
vehicle or the personal property with another 
vehicle, an object, animal, or structure. 
B. Smoke, meaning sudden and accidental 
damage from smoke. This peril Includes a puff 
back of smoke from a furnace. This peril does 
not Include loss caused by smoke from 
agricultural smudging or industrial operations. 
9. Vandalism or malicious mischief, meaning the 
wlllful and malicious damage to or destruction of 
the covered property by someone other than an 
Insured. We do not cover: 
a. Loss If the dwelling has been vacant or 
unoccupied for more than 60 consecutive 
days Immediately before the loss. Any 
ensuing loss caused by the vandalism or 
mallclou$ mischief ls also not covered. A 
dwelllng being constructed Is not considered 
vacant or unoccupied; or 
b. Vandalism or malicious mischief by your 
tenants or members of their household. 
10. Theft, including attempted theft. 
Proof of theft must be based on evidence that 
confirms the property more likely than not has 
been stolen. The tenn theft does not include 
escape, Inventory shortage, wrongful conversion, 
or embezzlement. 
Property of a student who Is an Insured is 
covered while at the sludentls temporary 
residence away from the residence premises 
only If the student has been there at any time 
during lhe 45 days Immediately before the loss. 
We do not cover loss: 
a. Caused by any Insured or any person 
residing at any dwelling premises; 
b. In orto a bulldlng under construction; 
lD-CQ-02-01 ( 1014) 
c. Of materials, tools, or supplles, for use in the 
construction of a building until It is completed 
and occupied; 
d. To property of others from any part of a 
residence premises rented by an insured to 
other than an Insured; 
e. Of property while in the custody of the postal 
service or similar government or private 
business; 
f. Caused by any of your tenants, members of 
their households, or your employees; or 
g. Caused by someone to whom an insured 
has entrusted or voluntarily given possession 
of the property. 
11. Breakage of glass or safety glazing material 
that Is part of the covered building. This 
coverage extends to storm doors and storm 
windows In summer storage. This peril does not 
Include loss if the building has been vacant more 
than 30 consecutive days immediately before the 
loss. A bulldlng being constructed ts not 
considered vacant. This peril does not Include 
loss to window framing or other materials that 
are not glass. 
12. Weight of Ice, snow, or sleet, which causes 
damage to a building or property contained ln a 
building. This perll does not Include loss to an 
awning, fence, patio, pavement, swimming pool, 
foundation, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf, 
or dock. 
13, Collapse of a building or any part of a bullding. 
Collapse means the abrupt falling down or 
caving In of all or part of a building resulting in 
the building being unfd for occupancy and Its 
Intended use. A building that Is In danger of 
falllng down or caving In Is not in a state of 
collapse. A bulldlng that Is standing is not In a 
state of collapse even If It Is cracking, bulging, 
sagging, bending, leaning, settling, shrinking, or 
expanding. 
We cover collapse only If caused by one or more 
of the following: 
a. Perils 1 through 12 or 14 through 17; 
b. Hidden decay if unknown to the Insured prior 
to the collapse; 
c. Hidden Insect or vermin damage If unknown 
to the Insured prior to lhe collapse; 
d. Weight of contents, equipment, animals, or 
people; 
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e. Weight of rain which collects on a roof; or 
f. Use of defective material or methods in 
construction, remodeling, or renovation, but 
only If the collapse occurs during the course 
of the construction, remodeling, or renova-
tion. 
We do not cover loss to an awning, structure 
adjacent to the building, fence, patio, pavement, 
outdoor equipment, swimming pool, underground 
pipe. flue, drain, cesspool, septic tank, founda-
tion, retaining wall, bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock, 
under items b through f unless the loss is a direct 
result of the collapse of a building. 
14. Accidental discharge or overtlow of water or 
sleam from within a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning, or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system, or from within a household 
appllance. We also pay for tearing out and 
replacing any part of the building on the 
dwelllng premises necessary to repair the 
system or appliance from which the water or 
steam escaped. 
We do not cover loss: 
a. On the dwelling premises If the dwelling 
has been vacant for more than 30 
consecutive days Immediately before the 
loss. A dwellfng belng constructed Is not 
considered vacant; 
b. Caused by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria; 
c. To the system or appliance from which 1he 
water or steam escaped; 
d. Caused by or resulting from freezing, except 
-as provided in perll 17 {freezing); or 
e. On the dweJJlng premises caused by 
accidental discharge or overflow which 
occurs off the dwelllng premise. 
In this peril, a plumbing system does not Include a 
septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain, 
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or 
related equipment. 
15. Sudden or accldental tearing apart, cra~king, 
burning, or bulging of a steam or water heating 
system, an air conditioning system, or an 
appliance for heating water. We do not cover loss 
caused by or resulting from freezing under this 
peril. 
16. Falllng objects. This peril does not Include loss 
to the Interior of a building or property contained 
In the building unless the roof or an exterior wall 
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of the building is first damaged by a falling 
object. 'fVe do not cover loss to outdoor 
equipment, awnings, fences, and retaining walls. 
We do not cover damage to the falling object 
itself. 
17. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air con-
ditioning, or automatic fire protective sprink-
ler system, or of a household appliance, but 
only If you have used reasonable care to: 
a. Maintain heat In the building; or 
b. Have shut off the water supply and drained 
the systems and appliances of water. 
We do not cover under" this peril: 
c. Loss to an outdoor hot tub, spa, or swimming 
pool, including any related plumbing; or 
d. Loss to sidewalks, driveways, patios, or other 
outdoor property. 
tn this peril, a plumblng system does not include 
a septic system, sump, sump pump, roof drain, 
gutter, downspout, outside drainage system, or 
related equipment. 
18. Sudden and accidental damage from 
artlflclally generated electrical current. This 
pert! does not include loss to a tube, transistor, 
Integrated circuit, or similar electronic com-
ponent unless caused by a sudden and 
acclden1al Increase or decrease of artlficlally 
generated electrical current. Our llmll of llablllty 
under this peril is $2,500 for each damaged item 
of personal property wllh a per occurrence 
limit for all damaged Items of $5,000. 
19. Volcanic eruptlon, meaning direct loss by 
volcanic eruption, including volcanic blast, air 
born shock wave, lava flow, and volcanic fallout, 
except as to trees, shrubs, lawns, plants, and 
grounds. 
We do not cover loss caused directly or Indirectly 
by earthquake, land shock wave, landslide, mud 
flow, Ilda! wave, flooding, or earth sinking, rising, 
or shifting, resulting from volcanic eruption, 
except for direct loss by fire, theft, or breakage of 
glass. 
One or more volcanic eruptions that occur within 
a 72-hour period wlll constitute a single volcanic 
eruption. 
20. Collision with another object or overturn. 
This peril does not apply to livestock. Impact 
with the ground or roadbed is not considered a 
collision. 
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21. Electrocution. This peril applies only to llve-
stock. 
22. A direct attack by dogs or wild animals 
causing mortal wounds. This perll applies only 
to livestock. It does not include attack by dogs 
owned by you or any person residing on the 
insured location. 
23. Accidental shootfng. This peril applies only to 
livestock. This peril does not Include loss 
caused by any Insured, employee of an 
Insured, or person residing on the Insured 
location. 
24. Loading, unloading, colllslon with another 
object, or overturn whlle In transit. This perll 
applies only to livestock and mobile 
agricultural machinery. In transit means being 
carried by vehicle. 
25. Drowning. This peril applies only to livestock. 
26. Collapse of a building onto mobile 
agricultural machinery, meaning a building 
collapse that would qualify for coverage under 
peril 13 (collapse) that causes damage to your 
mobile agricultural machinery. This peril 
applies only to mobile agricultural machinery. 
27. Special form. We insure for direct physical loss 
to the property insured, except for any loss 
excluded below. Under items a through m below, 
any ensuing loss not excluded by any other 
pollcy provision Is covered. We also cover under 
peril 27 any loss which would have been 
covered had perils 1 through 19 applied to your 
covered property. We do not cover under thls 
peril any loss excluded under SECTION f 
EXCLUSIONS. 
Exclusions Applicable to Perll 27 
The followlng additional exclusions apply. We do 
not cover under peril 27 any loss caused directly 
or Indirectly by: 
a. Theft, except as provided in peril 10; 
b. Collapse, except as provided In peril 13; 
c. Accidental discharge or overflow of water or 
steam from within a plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning, or automatic fire protective 
sprinkler system, or from a household 
appliance, except as provided In peril 14; 
d. Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air condition-
ing, or automatic ftre protective sprinkler 
system, or household appliance, except as 
provided In perll 17; 
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e. Freezing, thawing, pressure, or weight of 
water or ice, whether driven by wind or not, to 
an awning, fence, concrete, pavement, patio, 
swimming pool, foundation, retaining wall, 
bulkhead, pier, wharf, or dock; 
f. Vandalism, malicious mischief, or breakage 
of glass and safety-glazing materials, if the 
building has been vacant or unoccupied for 
more than 60 consecutive days Immediately 
before the loss. A building being constructed 
is not considered vacant or unoccupied; 
g. Wear and tear, marring, scratching, 
deterioration, inherent vice, hidden or latent 
defect, or mechanical breakdown or failure; 
h. Mold, fungus, rust, electrolysis, wet or dry rot, 
bacteria, or any other corrosion; 
I. Smog or contamination; 
j. Smoke from agricultural smudging or indus-
lrial operations; 
k. Settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging, or ex· 
panslon of pavements, patios, foundations, 
walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings; 
f. Birds, vennin, rodents, Insects, or domestic 
animals. Hidden Insect or vennln damage 
causing collapse, however, Is covered but 
only as provided in peril 13 (collapse). The 
word vennln, includes but is not limited to, 
bats, beavers, coyotes, mice, porcupines, 
raccoons, rats, skunks, snails, snakes, slugs, 
or squirrels; 
m. Pressure from or presence of tree, plant, or 
shrub roots; or 
n. Any pollutlon, contamination, or environ-
mental impairment, unless the loss or 
damage follows immediately as a result of a 
loss caused directly by perils 1 through 10, 
and then only to the extent of such direct 
loss. 
If peril 27 applies to Coverage C, the following 
addltlonal exclusions also apply. We do not cover 
any loss caused directly or indirectly by: 
o. Breakage of eyeglasses, glassware, statuary, 
bric-a-brac, porcelains, and slmllar fragile 
articles, other than Jewelry, watches, bronzes, 
cameras, and pho1ographic lenses. These 
items are covered only if breakage results 
from perils 1 through 10 or 12 through 19; 
p. Dampness or dryness of atmosphere or 
extremes of temperature; 
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q. Refinishing, renovating, or repairing property 
other than watches, Jewelry, and furs; 
r. Any malicious or harmful computer code, 
Including but not limited to, computer virus, 
trojan, worm, or spyware; 
s. Rain, snow, or sleet to personal property 
that rs outdoors; 
t. Collislon, other than collision of the Insured 
property with a land vehicle; or 
u. Sinking, swamping, or stranding of watercraft, 
includlng their trailers, attached equipment, or 
motors. 
SECTION I EXCLUSIONS 
We do not cover loss under Section I resulting directly 
or Indirectly from the following. Such loss Is excluded 
regardless of any other cause or event contributing 
concurrently or In any sequence to the loss. 
1. Ordinance or law, meaning If because of any 
loss caused by any covered perll you are required 
during repairs or replacement to comply wllh any 
ordinance or law regulating the construction, 
repair, or demolltlon of your insured property 
which Increases the cost of repairs or replace-
ment beyond our obligation to repair or replace 
with llke kind and quality, we do not cover !hat 
increased cost. This exclusion Includes any 
requirement that you test for, monitor, clean up, 
remove, or respond In any way to pollutants. 
Limited pollullon or ordinance or law coverage, 
however, may apply to a Coverage A dwelllng 
under SECTION I ADDITIONAL COVERAGES. 
2. Earth movement, Including but not llmlted to, 
earthquake, ·landslide, mine subsidence, mudflow, 
earth sinking, rising, or shifting. Direct loss by 
perll 1 (fire), perll 4 (explosion), perll 10 {theft), or 
. peril 11 (breakage of glass or safety glazing 
materials), resulting from earth movement Is 
covered if these perils apply to your covered 
property. 
3. Water damage, meaning: 
a. Flood, surface water, ice flow, waves, tidal 
water, storm surge, tsunami, selche, overflow 
of a body of water, or spray from any of 
these, whether or not driven by wind. This 
exctuslon applies even If an excluded peril Is 
caused In whole or In part by man, the failure 
of a man-made structure, or other non-natural 
means; 
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b. Rain or other natural precipllation that seeps 
or enters through or around doors, windows, 
or other openings; 
c. Water or sewage that backs up or overflows 
from a sewage, septic, or drainage system, a 
drain, sump, sump pump, or related 
equipment. A blockage on the dwelllng 
premises In a sewer or septic drain caused 
by solid material that stops the flow of water 
from a plumbing system In the dwelllng Is not 
considered a backup or overflow. We do not, 
however, cover any loss caused by a septic 
tank that Is full or In need of servicing. We do 
not cover the cosl to service, clear, or repair 
your drains, sewer or septic system; or 
d. Water below the surface of the ground, 
Including water that exerts pressure on, or 
seeps or leaks through a bulldlng, sidewalk, 
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming 
pool, or other structure. This includes water 
from a drain or plumbing system. 
Direct loss by perll 1 (fire), peril 4 (explosion), or 
perll 10 (U,eft}, resulting from water damage Is 
covered if these perlls apply to your covered 
property. 
4. Neglect, meaning neglect of an Insured to use 
all reasonable means to save and preserve 
property at and after the lime of loss, or when 
property Is endangered by a peril Insured against. 
5. War, including undeclared war, civil war, 
Insurrection, rebellion, revolution, warllke act by 
mllllary force or military personnel, destruction or 
seizure of property for use for any military 
purpose, and Including any consequence of any 
of these. Discharge of a nuclear weapon will be 
deemed a warlike act even if accidental. 
6. Power, heating, or coolJng failure, unless the 
fallure results from physlcar damage to power, 
heating, or cooling equipment situated on the 
dwelllng premises where the loss occurs. This 
failure must be caused by a perll Insured against. 
7. Depreclatlont decay, deterioration, change In 
temperature or humidity, loss of market, or 
from any other consequential or Indirect loss of 
any kind. 
8. Nuclear hazard, meaning any nuclear reaction, 
radiation, or radioactive contamination, whether 
controlled or uncontrolled or however caused, or 
any consequence of any of these. Loss caused 
by the nuclear hazard is not considered to be loss 
caused by fire, explosion, or smoke, whether 
these perils are speclffcally named or otherwise 
Included within the perils insured against In 
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Section I. If nuclear reacUon or radiation result In 
fire, however, we witl pay for loss or damage 
caused by that fire if otherwise covered by this 
pollcy. 
9. Weather conditions, meaning any weather 
condition which results in: 
a. Landslide, mudflow, or earth sinking, rising, 
or shifting; 
b. Flood, surface water, fee flow, waves, tidal 
water, storm surge, tsunami, seiche, overflow 
of a body of water, or spray from any of 
these, whether or not driven by wind; 
c. Water or sewage backing up through sewers, 
drains, or a septic system; or 
d. Water below the surface of the ground, 
including water that exerts pressure on, or 
seeps or leaks through a bullding, sidewalk, 
pavement, driveway, foundation, swimming 
pool, or other structure. 
Direct loss by peril 1 (fire), perll 4 (explosion), or 
peril 1 O (theft), resultlng from weather conditions 
is covered if these perils apply to your covered 
property. 
Section I also does nof cover the following: 
10. Any loss where one or more of the following at 
any time directly or indirectly cause, contribute to, 
or aggravate the loss: 
a. Any conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of 
any person, organization, or governmental 
entity, whether intentional, wrongfur, negli-
gent, or without fault; 
b. Any faulty. Inadequate, or defective compac-
tion, design, development, grading, planning, 
siting, specifications, surveying, workman-
ship, or zoning; 
c. Any faulty, inadequate, or defective construc-
tion, remodeling, renovation, repair, work-
manship, or materials, except as is specif-
lcally covered under paragraph f of peril 13 
(collapse); or 
d. Any maintenance of all or any part of any 
property whether on or off the insured loca-
tion. 
Any ensuing loss not excluded by any other policy 
provision, however, is covered if the loss is 
caused by perlls 1 through 18, and they apply to 
the loss. 
ID-CQ-02-01(1014) 
11. Any CD player, MP3 player, satelute radio 
receiver, citizens band radio, scanning monitor, or 
radar detector, whlle such device is in or upon 
any motorized vehicle if the device is used 
primarily in a vehicle. Such device is covered, 
however, if it Is factory Installed In mobile agri-
cultural machinery insured under Coverage D. 
12. Any disc, CD, DVD, or other medium, including 
downloaded media, while such items are in a 
motorized vehlcre. This exclusion does not apply 
to a prerecord~d software program avallable to 
the public and purch86ed for use in a laptop or 
desktop computer. 
13. Any loss caused Intentionally by or at the 
direction of any Insured. 
14. Any loss caused by the possession or manu-
facturrng of a controlled substance. 
15. Any loss caused by the intentional dispersal or 
applfcatlon by anyone of pathogenic, poisonous, 
bfotoglcal, or chemical materials. 
16. Any land or water. 
SECTION I CONDITIONS 
1. Dwelling Not Owned by You. If we choose to 
Insure a dwelllng premises under Section I not 
owned by you, the Insured and appllcable 
coverages are shown in the Declarations. 
2. Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this 
Insurance may apply, the Insured must see that 
the following duties are performed: 
a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and 
also to the police if the loss is suspected to 
be caused by someonem violation of law. In 
case of loss under the credit or bank card 
coverage, also notify the issuing card 
company; 
b. Protect the property from further damage, 
make reasonable and necessary repairs 
required to protect the property, and keep an 
accurate record of repair expenditures; 
c. Prepare an inventory of damaged or stolen 
property showing in detail the quantity, 
description, actual cash value, and amount of 
loss. Attach to the Inventory all bills, receipts, 
and related documents, that substantiate the 
figures and ownership of property In the 
Inventory; 
d. As often as we may reasonably require: 
show us your property: provide us with 
records and documents we request and allow 











us to make copies; and submit to examination 
under oath while not in the presence of any 
other Insured and sign the same; and 
e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us 
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth 
the followlng information to the best of the 
lnsuredls knowledge and bellef: 
(1} The time and cause of loss; 
(2} The interest of the Insured and all others 
In the property involved and all encum-
brances on the property; 
(3) Other insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4} Changes In title or occupancy of the 
property during the term of the policy; 
(5) Specifications of any damaged property 
and detailed estimates for repair of the 
damage; 
(6) An Inventory of damaged or stolen 
property as described above; 
(7) Receipts for additional Uvlng expenses 
Incurred and records supporting any fair 
rental value loss; 
(8) Evidence or affidavit supporting a claim 
under the credit card coverage stating the 
amount and cause of loss; and 
(9) Such other lnfonnatlon that we may 
reasonably request. 
3. Limit of Liability. Subject to the provisions of this 
pollcy, the most we will pay for loss or damage 
from any occurrence Is the appllcable llmlt of 
llablllty stated In the Declarations, In the policy 
booklet, or In any appllcable endorsement. 
4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the applicable limits 
stated In the Declarations, In the policy booklet, or 
In any applicable endorsement, covered property 
losses are settled as follows: 
a. We cover personal property, structures that 
are not buildings, farm personal property, 
and buildings Insured under Coverage E, for 
actual cash value at the time of loss but not 
exceeding the amount necessary to repair or 
replace. If . repair or replacement results in 
better than like kind or quality, the Insured 
must pay for the amount of the betterment. 
b. We cover floor coverings, domestic 
appliances, awnings, outdoor antennas, and 
ID-CQ-02-01{1014) 
outdoor equipment, whether or not attached 
to the buildings, for actual cash value at the 
time of loss but not exceeding the amount 
necessary to repair or replace. 
c. We cover buildings Insured under Coverage 
A, except for property described In paragraph 
4 b above, as follows: 
(1) When the full cost of repair or 
replacement for loss to a building under 
Coverage A Is less than $5,000, we wlfl 
pay the full cost of repair or replacement 
without deduction for depreciation. 
(2) If the llmlt of llablllty on the damaged 
bulldlng Is less than 80% of its replace-
ment cosl at the time of the loss, we wlll 
pay the larger of the following: 
I. Actuat cash value of the damaged 
part of the buildings; or 
ii. That proportion of the replacement 
cost of the damaged part which our 
llmit of liability on the building bears 
to 80% of the full replacement cost of 
the building. 
(3) If the limit of llabllity on the damaged 
building ls at least 80% of its replacement 
cost at the time of loss, we wlll pay the 
full cost of repair or replacement of the 
damaged part without deduction for 
depreciation, but not more than the 
smallest of the following amounts: 
i. The limit of llablllly appllcable to the 
building; 
Ji. Th& cost to repair or replace the 
damage on the same premises using 
materfals of equivalent kind and 
quality to the extent practicable; or 
m. The amount actually and necessarily 
spent to repair or replace the 
damage, 
(4) When the cost to repair or replace 
exceeds 5% of the appltcable llmll of 
llablllty on the damaged building, we are 
not liable for more than the actual cash 
value of the loss until actual repair or 
replacement Is completed. Such repairs 
or rebuilding must be made at the same 
location as where the loss occurred. Any 
replacement structure must be of a 
similar type and use. 
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(5) You may make a clalm for the actual 
cash value amount of the loss before 
repairs are made. A claim for any 
additional amount payable under this 
provision must be made and construction 
started within one year after the loss. 
d. We do not cover any reducUon In value to 
your Insured property after repairs are 
completed. 
5. Loss to a Panel, Section, Pair, or Set. In case 
of a loss to a panel, section, side, pair, set, or 
part, Including a loss to cabinets, siding, roofing, 
or carpet, we may elect to: 
a. Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section, 
side, pair, set, or part, to Its value before the 
loss; 
b. Pay the difference between the actual cash 
value of the property before and after the 
loss; or 
o. Pay the reasonable cost of providing a 
substitute to match as closely as practlcable 
the remainder of the outer covering, panel, 
section, side, pair, or set. 
We do not guarantee the availability of parts or 
replacements. We are not obligated to repair, 
match, or replace the entire pair, set, series of 
objects, outer covering, or panel, when a section, 
side, set, or part, Is lost or damaged. 
6. Glass Replacement. Covered loss for breakage 
of glass wlll be settled on the basis of 
replacement with safety 9lazlng materials when 
required by ordinance or law. 
7. Waiver of Subrogation. You may waive in 
writing before a loss all right of recovery against 
any person. If not waived, we may require an 
assignment of rights for a loss to the extent that 
payment Is made by us. 
B. Other Insurance. If you have other Insurance on 
the property to which this policy app!tes, we will 
not be Hable for a greater porlkln of any loss than 
our pro rata share In excess of any deductible. 
Our coverage Is excess, however, over any 
restoration plan, home warranty, or simllar 
coverage, whether or not It Is characterized as 
Insurance. 
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9. Mortgagee Clause. The word mnortgageeo 
Includes a trustee of a deed of trust. If a 
mortgagee Is named In this policy, any loss 
payable will be paid to the mortgagee and you, as 
interests appear. If a payable loss is under 
$10,000 and Is for repairs, however, payment 
may, at our discretion, be made to you only. 1r 
more than one mortgagee Is named, the order of 
payment will be the same as the order or 
precedence of the mortgages. 
if we deny your clalm, that denial wlll not apply to 
a valid claim of the mortgagee, If the mortgagee: 
a. Notifies us of any change ln ownership, 
occupancy, or substantial change in risk of 
which the mortgagee Is aware; 
b. Pays any premium due under this poUcy on 
demand If you have neglected to pay the 
premium; and 
c. Submits a signed, sworn proof of loss within 
60 days after recetvlng notice from us of your 
failure to do so. 
Polley conditions relating to Arbitration, Sutt 
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the 
mortgagee, 
If this policy Is canceled by us, notice will be 
mailed to the mortgagee at least 10 days before 
the date cancellation 1akes effect. 
If we pay the mortgagee for any loss and deny 
payment to you: 
a. We are subrogated to all the rights of the 
mortgagee granted under 1he mortgage on 
the property; or 
b. At our option, we may pay to the mortgagee 
the whoJe principal on the mortgage plus any 
accrued Interest. In this event, we have the 
right to.receive a full assignment and transfer. 
c. Subrogation wlll not Impair the right of the 
mortgagee to recover the full amount of the 
mortgagee~ claim. 
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SECTION II O LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE F-1 D BODILY INJURY LIABILITY and 
COVERAGE G D PROPERTY DAMAGE LfABILITY 
If a claim Is made or a suit is brought against any 
Insured for damages because of bodlly Injury or 
property damage, caused by an occurrence lo 
which this coverage applies, we will: 
1. Pay up to our limit of Uablllty for U,e damages for 
which lhe Insured is legally llable (damages 
Includes any awarded prejudgment Interest}; and 
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of 
our cholce. We may Investigate and settle any 
claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our 
obligation to defend any suit or claim ends when 
our llmlt of llabillty Is paid In settlements or 
Judgments. 
Additional Payments. Under Coverages F-1 and G, 
we wlll pay the following expenses In addition to our 
llmlt of llabillty, but our obligatlon for these payments 
ceases when our obllgation to defend ends: 
1. Expenses for first ald to others Incurred by any 
Insured for. bodily Injury covered under this 
policy. We will not pay for first aid to you or any 
other Insured; 
2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against 
any Insured In any suit we defend. We do not 
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an 
Insured that are associated with any part of a 
judgment not covered by this policy; 
3. Premiums on bonds required In a suit defended 
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the 
llmlt of llablllty provided by Section II of this policy. 
We are not obligated to apply for or furnish any 
bond; 
4. Reasonable expenses incurred by any Insured at 
our request, Including actual loss of earnings (but 
not loss of other Income) up to $250 per day for 
assisting us In the investigation or defense of any 
claim or suH; and 
5. Interest_ on the entire judgment which accrues 
after entry of the Judgment In any suH we defend 
and before we pay, tender, or deposit In court that 
part of the judgment which we cover and which 
does not exceed the appllcable llmlt of llablllty. 
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COVERAGE F-2 D PREMISES MEDICAL 
Subject to the limit of liabllfty, we will pay reasonable 
and necessary medical and funeral expenses 
resulting from bodily Injury caused by an 
occurrence as described below. This coverage does 
not apply to you or residents of your household other 
than residence employees. This coverage applies 
only; 
1. To a person on the Insured locatlon with the 
permission of any Insured; or 
2. To a person off the Insured locatlon, If the 
bodily injury: 
a. Arises out of a condition In the insured 
location or the roads or walkways 
immediately adjoining; 
b. Is caused by the actlvlttes of any Insured; 
c. Is caused by the activities of a farm or 
residence employee In the course of 
employment by any Insured; 
d. Is caused by an animal owned by or In the 
care of any insured; or 
e. ls sustained by any residence employee 
and arises out of and In the course of 
employment. 
We cover only expenses Incurred within two years 
from the date of occurrence. Any payment under this 
coverage applies toward settlement of ·any claim for 
. damages against any Insured. We may decflne to 
make a payment under this coverage If you 
disapprove of the payment 
COVERAGEJ DNAMED PERSONS MEDICAL 
Subject to the flmlt of liability, we will pay reasonable 
and necessary medical and funeral expenses 
resulting from bodily Injury caused by an 
occurrence. This coverage applies only to persons 
named in the Declarations for this Coverage J. Any 
payment under this coverage applies toward 
seHlement of any claim for damages against any 
Insured. We cover only expenses Incurred within two 
years from the dale of occurrence. We do not cover 
any expenses resulting from sickness or disease. 





COVERAGE L []CUSTOM FARMING 
Coverages F-1 and G also cover your custom 
farming. 
Additional Excluslons. Section II Excluslons apply 
to Coverage L. The following addillonal exclusions 
apply. Coverage L does not apply to: 
1. Any damage, Injury, or loss of use to the land or 
crops upon which the custom farming is 
performed or Is to be performed, arising from: 
a. The rnixlng or application of fertilizers, 
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or other 
chemical treatment of real property, seeds, or 
crops; 
b. Cleaning of seed; or 
c. Any goods, products, or their containers, 
manufactured, sold, handled, or distributed by 
or on behalf of any Insured. 
2. Damage, Injury, or loss of use resulllng from: 
a. A delay in or lack of performance by or on 
behalf of any Insured of any contract or 
agreement, whether written or oral; or 
b. The failure of any lnsuredls products or work 
performed by or on behalf of any Insured to 
meet the level of performance, qualtty, 
fitness, or result warranted or represented by 
an Insured. 
3. Property damage to an lnsuredts work arising 
out of it or any part of It. An lnsuredr.s work 
Includes operations or work performed by an 
Insured or on the insuredta behalf. It also 
Includes materials, parts, or equipment furnished 
In connection with the lnsuredm work or 
operations. 
4. Property damage to your product arising out of It 
or any part of It. Your product means any goods 
or products manufactured, sold, handled, 
distributed, or disposed of by you In connection 
with your custom farming. 
5. Any custom farming conducted more than 100 
miles outside the borders of the slate of Idaho. 
COVERAGE MD DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OF 
OTHERS 
We wHJ pay for property damage to property of 
others caused by an Insured. 
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Exclusions. Section II Exclusions do not apply to 
Coverage M. The follow ex.cluslons apply. We do not 
cover under Coverage M any property damage: 
1. Caused Intentionally by any Insured who Is 13 
years of age or older; 
2. To property owned by or rented to any Insured, a 
tenant of any Insured, or a resident of any 
lnsuredlS household. This exclusion does not 
apply to a rented golf cart when It Is being used to 
play golf on a golf course; 
3. Arising out of: 
a. Any business; 
b. The ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or 
unloading of a motor vehicle or aircraft; 
c. Theft, mysterious disappearance, or loss of 
use;or 
d. Mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure, 
wear and tear, latent defect, or Inherent vice; 
4. To tires; 
5. Caused by any goods, products, or containers 
manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or 
distributed by an Insured; or 
6. Arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release, or 
escape of any pollutants. 
Additional Conditions. The following addltfooaf 
conditions apply to Coverage M: 
1. Additional Duties. The Insured shall submit to 
us within 60 days after the loss, a signed, sworn 
proof of loss and exhibit the damaged property, if 
within the lnsured[) control. 
2. Application of Section I. If Section I of this 
·policy also applies to a loss covered under 
Coverage M, Section I is primary and Coverage 
M is excess. You must pay any applfcable 
Section I deductible before Coverage M applies. 
3. Limit of Liability. Our limit of liabillty under 
Coverage M for property damage arising out of 
any occurrence wlll not exceed the lesser of: 
a. The actual cash value of the damaged 
property at the time of the Joss; 
b. What It would then cost to repair or replace 
the damaged property Wilh other property of 
Ilka kind and quality; or 
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c. The limit of llablfity stated In the Daclarations 
for Coverage M. 
Our limit of llability is the most we will pay for any 
occurrence regardless of the number of 
insureds under this policy or persons or organ-
izations sustaining property damage. Our llmlt of 
Uabillty Is also the most we will pay for all 
damages arising out of one or more occurrences 
within a 24-hour period. 
4. No Coverage for Defense. We have no 
obligation under Coverage M to provide a 
defense against any claim or suit brought against 
any Insured. 
5. Occurrence. Under Coverage M only. the 
definition of occurrence Includes property 
damage caused Intentionally by an Insured who 
Is under 13 years of age. 
6. Our Settlement Options. At our option. we may 
pay for the loss In money or may repair or replace 
the property. We may settle the claim for loss to 
property either with the owner or with you. At our 
option, any property paid for or replaced will 
become our property. We may Investigate and 
settle any claim or suit we decide Is appropriate. 
SECTION II ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
Section II Includes the followlng additional coverages: 
1. Fire Legal. Coverage G covers property 
damage to a lodging place and Its furnishings 
rented to, occupied by, used by, or In the care of 
an Insured, if such property damage arises out 
of fire, smoke, or explosion. For purposes of this 
fire legal coverage, the term Insured Includes 
only you and those persons listed in paragraph 1 
of the definition of Insured. The care, custody, 
and control exclusion (exclusion 18) does not 
apply to this extension of coverage. 
2. Newly Acquired Locations. Section II applies to 
a newly acquired location If ll qualifles as an 
Insured location. You must notify us of this 
acquisition on or prior to the next renewal date of 
the policy or coverage wlll not apply. You must 
pay any additional premium required. 
SECTION II EXCLUSIONS 
The followlng excluslons apply to all coverages under 
Section II except Coverage M. Section II does not 
cover bodily injury or property damage: 
1. Arising from any lnsuredls business activities or 
any professional service; 
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2. Arising from any location which an Insured owns, 
rents, leases. or controls, other than an Insured 
location. This exclusion does not apply to bodily 
Injury of a residence employee arising out of 
and in the course of employment by an Insured; 
3. Which Is Intentionally caused by any Insured. 
This exclusion does not apply to the use of 
reasonable force by an Insured to protect a 
person or property; 
4. Allslng from the maintenance, operation, use, 
entrustment to others, loading, or unloading of 
any of the following which any Insured owns, 
borrows, rents, leases, or operates: 
a. Any aircraft; 
b. Any motor vehicle; coverage, however, 
app!Jes on the Insured location If the motor 
vehicle is not licensed for road use and Is 
used exclusively on the Insured location; or 
c. Any watercraft 1r 26 feet or more in length. 
This excluslon does not apply to bodlly Injury 
sustained by a residence employee maintaining, 
loading, or unloadlng a motor vehicle In the 
course of employment; it also does not apply to 
Coverage J (Named Persons Medical); 
5. Arising out of the use of any aircraft, watercraft, or 
motorized land vehicle, Including any motor 
vehicle, moblle agricultural machinery, or 
recreational motor vehicle, while being used In 
or following any prearranged or organized racing, 
speed, or stunllng contest or activity, or In 
practice or preparatlon for any such contest or 
actMty; 
6. Which results from liability arising out of -any 
contract or agreement; 
7. Arising out of custom farming unless coverage 
Is Indicated under Coverage L In the Declarations; 
8. Caused directly or Indirectly by war, Including 
undeclared war, clvll war, Insurrection, rebellfon, 
revoluUon, warlike act by a mllitary force or 
military personnel, or destruction or seizure or 
use of property for any mllltary purpose, and 
Including any consequence of these. Discharge of 
a nuclear weapon will be deemed a warlike act 
even ff accidental; 
9. Resulting from any act or omission of a 
re&ldence or farm employee while away from 
the Insured location if the employee is under lhe 
control and direction of some person other than 
an Insured; 







10. Caused by a substance released or discharged 
from an aircraft In connection with dusUng or 
spraying operations; 
11. Arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened 
discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release, 
or escape of any pollutants. This exclusion 
applies only to occurrences arising from farming 
or custom farming; 
12. Caused by any goods, products, or containers 
manufactured, processed, sold, handled, or 
distributed by an Insured, except farming 
products raised on the Insured location. Loss 
arising out of the failure of seed sold by an 
Insured to conform to the variety, type, purpose, 
quaHty, or conditions specified by an Insured, 
however, is not covered. This Includes but Is not 
limited lo loss caused by any viral, fungal, 
bacterial, or any other type of seed disease. The 
term !Beado means seeds, bulbs, plants, roots, 
tubers, cuttings, or other similar means of plant 
propagation; 
13. Sustained by you or any Insured as defined in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 of the definition of 
Insured or by any other resident of your 
residence premises; 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law, Youth 
Rehabllltatlon Act, or similar law, except traffic 
violations, if committed by any insured; 
15. With respect to which any Insured under this 
policy Is also an Insured under a nuclear energy 
liability potrcy Issued by a Nuclear Energy Liablllly 
Insurance Association, Mutual Atomfc Energy 
Liability Underwriters, Nuclear Insurance Associa-
tion of Canada, or any similar organization, or 
would be an Insured under any such policy but for 
Its termination upon exhaustion of Its limits of 
llabllity; 
16. Arising out of the molestation, corporal pu11ish-
ment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or mental 
abuse of any person; or 
17. Arising out of the posting of any lnformaUon, 
opinion, statement, or material of any kind in an 
email, text message, or on the Internet by an 
Insured, including postings on chat rooms, bulle-
tin boards, social media, biogs, or gripe sites. 
Section II also does not cover the following: 
18. Property damage to property owned by, used by, 
rented to, or in the care, custody, or control of any 
Insured or the lnsuredrt employees, or as to 
which any Insured or the insuredli employees 
exercise physical control for any purpose; 
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19. Property damage to work completed by or for an 
Insured, any damage arising out of such work, or 
out of the materials, parts, or equipment furnished 
in connection wfth such work; 
20. Property damage or Injury, or loss In value, to 
livestock, goods, or products, including contain-
ers, which an Insured raises, manufactures, 
sells, handles, or distributes; 
21. Damages claimed for the withdrawal, Inspection, 
repair, replacement, or loss of use of an 
lnsured!A products, or work completed by or for 
an Insured, or for any property of which such 
products or work form a part, If such products, 
work, or property are withdrawn from the market 
or from use because of any known or suspected 
defect or deficiency; 
22. Punitive or exemplary damages; 
23. Bodily Injury to any person ellglble to receive 
any benefits required to be provided or voluntarily 
provided by any Insured under any workerrs 
compensation, non-occupational disease, dlsabll-
lty, or occupational disease law; 
24. Bodily Injury to a farm employee that arises out 
of that e·mployeers work for you. We also do not 
cover any damages that the spouse or any minor 
children of the farm employee may have that 
arise out of a farm employeets bodily Injury. 
Thfs exclusion applies whether you may be liable 
as an employer or In any other capacity; 
25. Property damage to an Insured location arising 
out of the allenallon (for example: sefllng, leasing, 
separating, etc.) of that location; 
26. Bodlly Injury under Coverage F-2 sustained by 
any person residing on. the Insured location 
except a residence employee to whom workerl!I 
compensation does not apply; 
27. Under Coverages F-2 and J: 
a. Bodily Injury Involving hernia or back Injury, 
unless It Is of recent origin, It Is accompanied 
by pain at the time of occurrence, and It did 
not exist prior to the date of the alleged injury; 
b. Any person whne conducting their business 
on the Insured location, Including the 
employees of that person; 
c. Bodily Injury to the extent that any medical 
expenses are paid or payable under the 
provisions of any workerls compensation or 







d. Expenses for any treatment administered by 
anyone not subject to state licensing and any 
expense for the purchase or rental of 
equipment not primarily designed to serve a 
medical purpose; 
28. Under Coverages F-1 and F-2, bodily Injury 
sustained by any farm employee arising out of 
employment; 
29. Bodily Injury or property damage: 
a. Arising out of a rodeo or horse racing, 
Including chariot or harness racing, or from 
practice or preparations for any of these 
actlvilles. This exclusion does not apply to an 
insured~ participation In a riding club~ 
practice, preparation for, or performance in a 
rodeo; 
b. Arising out of the use of any horse rented by 
an Insured to others; 
c. Arising from riding Instruction given by an 
Insured for compensation; 
d. Arising out of the training, care, boarding, 
pasturing, or acl of breeding, of any horse not 
owned by an insured; or 
e. Arising out of the lease of all or part of the 
Insured location for any activity involving 
horses; 
30. Any occurrence covered under Section Ill; or 
31. The transmission of any communicable disease, 
bacteria, virus, or parasite, by an insured. 
SECTION II CONDITIONS 
1. Duties after Loss. In case of an accident or 
occurrence, the insured shall perform the 
followlng duttes to the extent possible: 
a. Give a written notice to us as soon as 
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the 
lnsuredcs knowledge and belief: 
(1) The identity of the policy and Insured: 
(2) Reasonably avaffable Information on the 
time, place, and circumstances of the 
occurrence; 
(3) Names and addresses of any claimants 
and witnesses; and 
(4} Such other Information that we may 
reasonably request; 
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b. Immediately forward to us every notice, 
demand, summons. or other process relatlng 
to the occurrence; and 
c. At our request, assist in: 
(1} Making settlement; 
(2) The enforcement of any right of contri-
bution or indemnity against any person or 
organization who may be liable lo any 
Insured; 
(3) The conduct of suits Including attending 
hearings and trials; and 
(4) Securing and giving evidence and 
obtaining the attendance of witnesses. 
2. Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence 
Involving a potential claim against an Insured, an 
Insured must not, except at the lnsuredi:s own 
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obllga1ion, or Incur any expense other than for 
first aid to others at the time of the bodily Injury. 
3. Dutleso Coverages F·2 and J. The Injured 
person or claimant shall: 
a. Give us a signed, written proof of loss 
containing the Information we request, under 
oath if required, as soon as practicable; 
b. Submit to such medical or other examinations 
or evaluations by peraons selected by us 
when and as often as we may reasonably 
require; 
c. At our request, submit to examination under 
oath as often as we may reasonably require, 
and subscribe the same; and 
d. Execute authorization to allow us to obtain 
copies of any medical or other reports or 
records. 
If a claim is being made because of the death of 
an lnJured person, the person(s) making the claim 
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above. 
4. Payment of Claim. A payment by us or any 
Jnsured ls not an admission of liability. 
5. Limits of LlabllltyD Coverages F-1 and G. 
Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds under this policy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining dam· 
ages, bodily Injury, or property damage; or 







c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence is subject to the 
following !imitations: 
d. Under Coverage F-1, the bodily Injury 
llabllity limit for each person stated In !he 
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will 
pay for all damages arising out of bodily 
Injury sustained by one person resulting from 
an occurrence, including any emotional 
distress or other damages resulting from this 
bodl(y fnJury and sustained by any other 
person. 
Subject to the bodily JnJury llmltatlon for 
each person, the bodffy Injury llablllty limlt 
for each occurrence stated In the Declara-
tions Is 1he maximum amount we wlll pay for 
all damages arising out of bodily Injury 
sustained by two or more persons resulting 
from an occurrence; 
e. Under Coverage G, the property damage 
liability limit for each occurrence stated in 
the Declarations is the maximum amount we 
will pay for all property damage resulting 
from an occurrence; 
f. The per occurrence limit of liability for bodily 
lnJury and the per occurrence limit of Uabillly 
for property damage caused by farm 
products produced on the Insured locatlon 
are each 1he total aggregate llmlt of our 
liability for all such occurrences during the 
policy period; and 
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g. Subject to the above llmltatlons, the 
applicable annual aggregate llmlt of Uability 
shown in the Declarations is the most we will 
pay for all damages from all occurrences 
during 1he policy . period. This limitation 
applies only to occurrences arising from 
your farming activities. 
6. Llmfts of liabllityo Coverages F-2 and J. Our 
limit of llablllty per person tor Coverages F-2 and 
J Is stated In the Declarations. This Is the 
maximum amount we wfll pay for all covered 
expenses incurred by or on behalf of each person 
who sustains bodily Injury resulting from an 
occurrence. This llmlt Is subject to reduction as 
explained below. 
a. Our limit of llabllity in the aggregate for all 
physical therapy, massage therapy, and any 
treatment by or at the direction of a 
chiropractor, per person per occurrence is 
the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of ltabllity 
stated In the Declarations. 
b. Our limit of tiabllity for funeral expenses per 
person Is the lesser of $5,000 or the llmlt of 
liability stated in the Declarations. 
Subject to the limit of liability for each person, our 
total limit of Uablllly for each occurrence for 
bodily Injury sustained by two or more persons 
Is 1he per occurrence limit of liability stated In the 
Declarations. 
7. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section ff 
Is excess over any other valfd and collectible 
Insurance. Coverages F-2 and J, however, are 
primary coverages. 
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SECTION tu DAUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COVERAGE N D BODILY INJURY LIABIUTY and 
COVERAGE O OPROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
If a claim Is made or a suit Is brought against any 
Insured for damages because of bodily Injury or 
property damage, arising out of an occurronce 
Involving an Insured 11ehfcle or a nonowned 
vehlcle, we will: 
1. Pay up to our llmlt of ilabllity for the damages for 
which the Insured is legally liable (damages 
Includes any awarded prejudgment Interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of 
our choice. We may Investigate and setl!e any 
claim or suit that we decide Is appropriate. Our 
obl!gatlon to defend any claim or suit ends when 
our limit of llabfllty Is paid In settlements or 
judgments. 
Additional Paymen1s. Under Coverages N and 0, 
we will pay the followlng In addition to our limit of 
liability, but our obligation for these payments ceases 
when our obllgatlon to defend ends: 
1. Expenses for first aid to others incurred by any 
insured for bodily Injury covered under this 
policy. We wlll not pay for first aid to you or any 
o1her insured; 
2. Expenses incurred by us and costs taxed against 
any Insured in any suit we defend. We do not 
cover attorney fees or costs taxed against an 
Insured that are associated with any part of a 
judgment not covered by this pollcy; 
3. Premiums on bonds required In a suit defended 
by us, but not for bond amounts greater than the 
Hmlt of liability provided by this policy. We will also 
pay up to $250 for the premium of any ball bond 
required of an Insured because of an arrest In 
connection with an accident resulting from the 
use of an Insured vehicle. We are not obligated 
to apply for or furnish any bond; 
4. Reasonable expenses Incurred by any Insured at 
our request, Including actual loss of earnings (but 
not loss of other Income) up to $250 per day for 
assisting us In the Investigation or defense of any 
claim or suit; and 
S. Interest on the entire Judgment which accrues 
after enlry of the Judgment In any suit we defend 
and before we pay, tender, or deposit In court that 
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part of the Judgment which we cover and which 
does not exceed the applicable Umit of liabillty. 
COVERAGE P D UNINSURED MOTORIST 
We will pay damages which an Insured Is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily Injury 
sustained by an Insured and caused by an 
occurrence. The ownerls or operator!£! llablllly for 
these damages must arise from the ownership, main-
tenance, or use of the uninsured motorvehlcle. 
COVERAGE P-1 OUNDERINSURED MOTORIST 
We will pay damages which an Insured is legally 
entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an 
underinsured motor vehicle because of bodlly 
Injury sustained by an Insured and caused by an 
occurrence. The ownerlf! or operatorw llabllity for 
these damages must arise from the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of the underlnsured motor 
vehfcle. 
Additional Definitions. The following additlonal de-
fln111ons apply to Coverages P and P-1: 
1. Insured means: 
a. If you are a person, you and any relative, 
except a relative who owns a licensed motor 
vehlcle not Insured by this policy; 
b. Anyone occupying a nonowned vehlcle 
whlle operated by you or your relative, 
except a relative who owns a licensed motor 
vehicle not Insured by this policy; or 
c. Anyone occupying an insured vehicle. 
2. Uninsured motor vehicle means a motor 
vehicle: 
a. To which a bodily Injury liability bond or 
policy does not apply at the time of the 
occurrence; 
b. For which an Insuring or bonding company 
denies coverage or becomes Insolvent; or 
c. Which Is a hit-and-run motor vehlcle and 
neither the driver nor the owner can be 
Identified. The hit-and-run motor vehicle 




must hit an Insured, an Insured vehicle, cir a 
vehicle that an Insured Is occupying. 
3. Underfnsured motor vehicle means a motor 
vehicle for which the sum of liablllty limits of all 
applicable llablllty bonds or policies at the time of 
an occurrence Is less than the llmlts of this 
coverage. For an occurrence Involving only one 
insured this means the sum of all applicable per 
person limits compared to the per person llmlt of 
this coverage. For an occurrence Involving lwo 
or more Insureds, th!s means the sum of all 
applicable per occurrence limits compared to the 
per occurrence llmlt of this coverage. 
A motor vehicle cannot qualify as both an 
uninsured motor vehicle and an under-
Insured motor vehicle. 
4. An uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle 
does not Include any motor vehicle: 
a. Owned or operated by a self-insured as 
defined by any applicable motor vehicle law; 
b. Owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
c. Used as a residence; 
d. That does not collide with an Insured, an 
Insured vehicle, or a vehfcle that an Insured 
rs occupying, and neither the driver or the 
owner can be lde11trfled; 
e. Owned by or furnished for the regular use of 
you or any relative; or 
f. Which Is an Insured vehicle. 
5. An uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle 
does not Include any motorized vehicle designed 
for recreation use off public roads, Including but 
not limited to, golf carts, snowmobiles, trall bikes, 
mopeds, dune buggies, or all-terrain vehicles. 
Additional Exclusions. Section Ill Exclusions and 
the following additional exclusions apply to 
Coverages P and P-1. Coverages P and P-1 do not 
apply to: 
1. Bodlly Injury sustained by an Insured while 
occupying a motor vehicle or trailer without the 
permission of the owner; 
2. The direct or Indirect benefit of any Insurer or self-
Insured under any workerlfl compensation, 
disability benefits, or slmllar law; 
3. Bodily Injury sustained by an Insured while 
occupying a motor vehicle owned by or 
ava!lable for the regular use of any Insured which 
Is not an Insured vehlcfe. Any Coverage P or 
P-1 under your policy applies to you, however, 
whlle driving a motor vehicle Insured by us that 
is owned by a relative; 
4. Bodily injury sustained by an Insured whlle 
occupying a motor vehicle owned by any 
insured If Coverages P and P-1 do not apply to 
that motor vehicle; 
5. The llablllty of an owner or operator of an insured 
vehicle or nonowned vehicle for bodily Injury 
sustained by a passenger of that vehicle; or 
6. Bodily Injury for which a claim against the owner 
or driver of the uninsured or underlnsured 
motor vehicle is barred by the appllcable statute 
of limitations, unless we received notice of the 
claim before the statute of llmltatlons has explred. 
Additional Conditions. The foilowlng additional con-
ditions apply to Coverages P and P-1; 
1. Limits of Uablllty. Under Coverages P and P-1, 
the bodily Injury llabllity limit for each person 
stated In the Declarations Is the maximum 
amount we will pay for all damages arising out of 
bodily Injury sustained by one person resulting 
from an occurrence, Including any emotional 
distress or other damages resulting from this 
bodily Injury and sustained by any other person. 
Subject to the bodily Injury llmltatlon for each 
person, the bodily Injury llablllty tlmit for each 
occurrence stated In the Declarations Is Iha 
maximum amount we wlll pay for all damages 
arising out of bodily Injury sustained by two or 
more persons resulllng from an occurrence. 
If both Coverages P and P~1 apply to the same 
occurrence, our combined llmlt of Jiablllty for all 
damages payable under both coverages for: (1) 
each person shall be lhe appllcable Coverage P 
llmlt of liability for each person; and (2) each 
occurrence shall be the applicable Coverage P 
Hmft of llablllty for each occurrence. 
2. Nonstacklng of Limits. Regardless of the 
number of Insured vehicles, Insureds, pollcles 
of insurance with us, premium charges, clalms 
made, or vehicles involved in the occurrence, the 
most we will pay for all damages resulUng from 
any occurrence Is the limit of liability shown In 
the Declarations, subject to reduction as outlined 
In the next paragraph. 
3. Reduction of Amounts Payable. The amount 
payable under Coverages P and P-1 shall be the 
lesser of our limit of flablllly stated In the 
Declarations reduced by a and b below, or the 
total damages for bodily Injury reduced by a and 
bbelow: 





a. All sums paid or payable by or on behalf of 
persons or organizations who may be legally 
responsible for the bodily Injury to which this 
coverage applies. This includes all amounts 
paid under the liability coverage of this policy. 
This also includes all applicable liablllty bonds, 
or policies, regardless of whether such bonds 
or policies have been exhausted by judgments 
or payments; and 
b. The sum of all amounls payable under any 
workerrn compensation, disability, or similar 
law. 
Any payment under lhls coverage to or for an 
Insured will reduce any amount that person Is 
entilled to receive under this pollcyls llabllity 
coverages. 
4. Payment of Loss. We wlll pay only after the 
insured has satisfied all duties under Section Ill 
Condltlons, paragraph 6 (Additional Duties of an 
Injured Person o Coverages P, P-1, and Q) and it 
has been determined by agreement, arbilraUon, a 
final judgment, or other method agreed to by us, 
that the damages which the Insured Is legally 
entllled to recover under thfs coverage exceeds 
the limits of all applicable bonds or policies. We 
have the option to pay any amount due under this 
coverage as follows: 
a. To the Insured; 
b. If the Insured rs deceased, to lhe lnsuredm 
surviving spouse; or 
c. To a person authorized by law to receive 
such payment, or to a person who is legally 
entitled to recover the damages that the 
payment represenls. 
5. Persons not entitled to recovery. A person who 
Is not an Insured under Coverage P and P-1 is 
not entllled to recover damages under these 
coverages, !ncludlng damages for wrongful death 
of an Insured. 
6. Hlt•and-Run Accident. At our request, the In-
sured shall make available for inspection any 
motor vehicle or trailer that the Insured 
occupied at the time of a hit-and-run accident. 
The Insured must notify the police within 24 
hours of a hit-and-run accident. 
7. Mediation. After the Insured submits a proof of 
loss with the Information requested by us, either 
the Insured or we may make a written demand 
on the other for mediation to resolve a claim. 
After mediation has been demanded, the parties 
shall attempt to agree on a competent, Impartial 
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mediator. In the event they cannot agree on a 
mediator within 1 O days, either may request that a 
mediator be selected by a judge of a court having 
Jurisdiction. Both parties shall make disclosure to 
each other of all required information at least 20 
days prior to mediation. Each party shall pay one-
half of the cost of the mediator; except if the claim 
Is settled through mediation, we shall pay the 
medlalorrn full cost. A request for mediation can 
be made within 10 days after a request for 
arbitration and supersedes a request for 
arbitration. 
8. Arbitration and Litigation. If we and an Insured 
disagree whelher the Insured is legally entitled to 
recover damages from the owner or driver of an 
uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle or 
disagree as to the amount of damages, either 
party may make a written demand for arbitration. 
Each party will select a competent, Impartial 
arbitrator within 20 days of receipt of the written 
demand. The two arbitrators will select a third 
arbitrator. If they cannot agree upon a third 
arbitrator within 10 days, either may request that 
a Judge of a court having ju risdlctlon select a third 
arbitrator. Both parties shall make disclosure to 
each other of all Information as required by the 
arbitrator(s} in the scheduling and discovery 
order. Each party will pay the expenses it incurs, 
lncludlng attorney fees and related costs, and 
bear the expenses of the third arbilrator equally. 
Arbitration will take place in Idaho in the county 
where the policy was Issued unless both parties 
agree otheiwlse. Local rules of law apply as to 
arbitration procedure and evidence. A decision 
agreed to by two of the arbitrators will be binding. 
At the option of either party, instead of arbitration, 
a dispute as to the amount, if any, of the 
lnsuredts loss owing under this coverage wlll be 
determined ln a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The party selectlng this option must make it in 
writing and mall or hand deliver It to the other 
party. If either party has already asked for 
arbitration, the notice must be made no later than 
20 days after nolice of arbitration was made. 
9. Trust Agreement. If a claim or payment Is made 
under Coverages P or P-1: 
a. We will be entitled to reimbursement of 
payments we have made to an Insured to be 
taken from the proceeds of any judgment or 
settlement. 
b. Paragraph 24 (Our Right to Recover 
Payment) under General Conditions 
Applicable to This Policy applles to our 
recovery rights. 







10. Nonblndlng Judgment. No judgment resulting 
from a suit brought without our wrltlen consent Is . 
binding on us, either In determining the llablllty of 
the uninsured or underlnsured motor vehicle 
operator or owner, or tlie amount of damages to 
which the Insured Is entllled. 
11. Interest. The term dam ages does not Include 
interest. We are not liable for any interest on any 
payment we make under Coverages P or P-1. 
COVERAGE Q D MEDICAL 
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable 
and necessary medical and funeral expenses result-
ing from bodily Injury caused by an occurrence as 
described below. 
The following are Insureds under Coverage Q: 
1. Any person occupying an Insured vehicle with 
your permission or the pennlsslon of an adult 
relaUve, who sustains bodily Injury caused by 
an occurrence resulting from the use of this 
insured vehicle; 
2. You or your relatives who sustains bodily Injury 
caused by an occurrence while occupying an 
Insured vehicle or a motor vehicle not owned 
by any Insured; 
3. Any person who sustains bodily injury caused 
by an occurrence while occupying a nonowned 
vehicle operated by you or a relative; and 
4. If you are an individual, you or your relatives who 
sustains bodily Injury when struck by a motor . 
vehicle or trailer while a pedestrian, an eques-
trian, or while on a bicycle or other vehicle. 
Any payment under this coverage applies toward 
settlement of any claim for damages against any 
insured. We cover only expenses incurred within two 
years from the date of occurrence. No · payment 
under this coverage shall be subject to duplicate 
payment under Coverages P, P·1, or any liability 
coverage of this policy. 
COVERAGE R fJ FIRE AND THEFT ONLY 
We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or 
damage to, your insured vahic1e and its equipment 
caused by: 
1. Fire, lightning, or windstorm; 
2. Smoke or smudge due to a sudden, unusual, and 
faulty operation of any heating equipment serving 
the premises In which the vehicle Is located; 
ID-CQ-02-01(1014) 
3. The stranding, sinking, burning, collls!on, or 
derailment of any conveyance in or upon which 
the vehicle Is being transported; or 
4. Theft. 
COVERAGES oCOMPREHENSIVE 
We will pay for any direct and accidental loss of, or 
damage to, your insured vehicle and its equipment 
not covered by Coverage T. We cover loss or 
damage from missiles, falling objects, theft, collision 
with animals, or accldental glass breakage under this 
coverage. 
COVERAGE Ta COLLISION AND ROLLOVER 
We will pay for direct and accidental loss to your 
Insured vehicle and Its equipment when it is hit by or 
hits another vehicle or object, or rolls over. We will 
waive any applicable deductible if the collision 
Involves Insured vehicles of two or more of our 
policyholders. 
SECTION III ADDITIONAL COVERAGES 
1. Loss to Personal Property. We will pay up to 
$750 for loss to personal property being 
transported by the Insured vehlcle if the loss 
results from an occurrence involving an Insured 
vehicle that is covered under Coverages R, S, or 
T. We do not cover cash or securities under this 
additional coverage. We do not cover loss by theft 
of any personal property unless the loss Is 
caused by the insured vehicle being stolen. 
2. loss of Use by Thefto Reimbursement. 
a. Following a theft of an Insured vehicle 
covered under Coverages R or S, we will 
reimburse you for expenses for the rental of a 
substitute automobile including taxicabs. 
b. Subject to our llmit of liability, our duty to 
reimburse you begins after the theft has been 
reported to us and the police, and terminates, 
regardless of expiration of the polfcy period, 
on 1he date the Insured vehicle is re1umed 
to you, or on such earller date as we make or 
offer settlement for this theft. 
c. Limit of Liability. Our limit of liability per day 
and per loss for this coverage are shown in 
the Declarations. 
3. Rental Car and Test Drive Coverage. If 
Coverages S and T apply to an Insured vehJcfe 
they also apply to a private pa5Senger car, 
pickup, or passenger van that Is rented, or test 
driven by an Insured and quallfies as a 
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nonowned vehicle. Coverage applies only If the 
vehicle Is owned by a new or used automobile 
dealer or rental car company. This coverage does 
not apply to a relative who owns a motor vehicle 
that Is insured by another Insurance company. 
4. Locks. We wlll pay up to $200 for the cost of re-
keying or replacing the locks of an Insured 
vehicle to which Coverage S applfes ff the keys 
to the vehicle have been stolen during the policy 
period. No deductible applies to this coverage. 
5. Loaned traller liability. Coverages N and O 
apply to you or your adult relative for an 
occurrence resulting from the permissive use of 
your trailer by someone else. This does not apply 
to the use of a traller for business purposes. 
SECTION Ill EXCLUSIONS 
Section Ill does not cover: 
1. Damages arising out of the use of a vehicle to 
carry persons for a fee. This exclusion does not 
apply to a share-the-expense car pool; 
2. Any vehicle rented or leased to others; 
3. Damages artslng out of the use of a vehicle In a 
pre-arranged race, speed contest, or other 
competition, or preparation for any of these 
activities; 
4. Damages which are Intentionally caused by any 
Insured; 
5. Any nonowned vehicle while an Insured is 
using It ln the business of selllng, repairing, 
sel'\llclng, storing, or parking motor vehicles, 
including road tesUng and delivery of a motor 
vehicle; 
6. Damages caused by nuclear reaction, radiation, 
or radioactive contamination; 
7. Any radar or similar detection device, or any 
portable GPS or similar eleclronlc device; 
8. Any device or instrument designed for recording, 
reproduction, amplification, receiving, or lrans-
mltllng of sound, radio waves, microwaves, or 
television signals; or tapes, records, CDs, DVDs, 
discs, or other medium, designed for use with this 
equipment. This exclusion does not apply to such 
device or Instrument lf It is permanently installed 
In the dash, trunk, or console opening at the time 
of manufacture or by a dealer when the insured 
vehicle is purchased new; 
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9. Damages caused directly or Indirectly by war, 
Including undeclared war, clvll war, insurrection, 
rebellion, revolution, warlike act by a military force 
or military personnel, or destruction or seizure or 
use of property for any military purpose, and 
including any consequence of these. Discharge of 
a nuclear weapon shall be deemed a warllke act 
even If accidental; 
10. Damages caused by the confiscation of Insured 
property by a duly constituted governmental or 
cfvil authority; 
11. Punitive or exemplary damages; 
12. Bodlly Injury to anyone eligible to receive 
benefits that an Insured either provides or is 
required to provide under any workerm 
compensation or occupational disease law; 
13. Under Coverage 0, damage to property owned 
by an Insured, or transported by, rented to, used 
by, or in the care, custody, or control of an 
Insured. This exclusion does not apply to 
property damage to: 
a. A residence or private garage rented to an 
lnsur.ed; or 
b. A nonownod vehicle if there is no 
comprehensive or colllsion coverage on the 
vehlcle; 
14. Under Coverages N, 0, P, and P-1, llabllity 
arising out of any contract or agreement; 
15. Under Coverage Q: 
a. Bodily Injury sustained while an Insured 
vehlcle Is used as a residence or temporary 
living quarters; 
b. Bodily Injury sustained by a person engaged 
in the maintenance or repair of an Insured 
vehicle; 
c. Bodily Injury to anyone eligible to receive 
benefits under any workerrs compensation or 
similar law; 
d. Any expenses for any treatment administered 
by anyone not subject to state licensing and 
any expense for the purchase or rental of 
equipment not primarily designed to serve a 
medical purpose; or 
e. Bodily injury arising from any lnsured!i use 
of a motor vehicle In the commission of a 
felony; 







16. Under Coverages R. S, and T: 
a. Any loss to a camper, camper shall, topper, 
or other shell, unless llsted in the 
Declaratlons for these coverages, or unless ft 
qualifies for coverage as newly acquired 
equipment under the definition of Insured 
vehlcle; 
b. Any loss to a camper, camper shell, motor 
home, or trailer caused by moisture coming 
through seals, joints, or cracks; or loss from 
mold, fungi, or wet or dry rot; 
c. Any loss by collapse, explosion, or Implosion 
of any tank or container; 
d. Any welder or compressor; 
a. Any equipment or accessories contained In 
an insured motor home, camper unit, or 
trailer, unless the equipment or accessories 
are built in and forin a permanent part of the 
vehicle; 
f. Any loss caused by recall of an Insured 
vehicle; 
g. Loss to tires, unless damaged concurrent 
with other loss covered under Coverages R, 
S, or T. This excluslon does not apply to loss 
caused by vandalism, theft, or fire; 
h. Damages caused by wear and tear, freezing, 
mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure; 
any ensuing damage is covered If caused by 
other loss covered under Coverages R, S, or 
T; 
I. Damages to a11y vehicle caused by any fuel 
or fu~I addltlve not approved by the vehicle!s 
manufacturer; 
J. Any loss resulting from conversion, embez-
zlement, or secretion, by any person pos-
sessing the vehicle under any llen, rental, or 
sales agreement; or 
k. Any loss to an Insured vehlcle caused by 
the possession or manufacturing of a 
controlled substance, including but not limited 
to, methamphetamlnes; or 
17. Under Coverage S, any loss resulting from 
defective tllle or failure to obtain proper trtle. 
SECTION Ill CONDITIONS 
1. Out of State Insurance. lf you have liability 
Insurance under Seclion Ill and if an insured Is 
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traveling outside the state of Idaho in a state or 
province which has a compulsory Insurance, 
flnanclal responslblllty, or similar law applicable to 
nonresidents, we will automatically provide the 
required minimum amounts and types of 
coverages if your pol!cy does not already provide 
these coverages, but only to the extent required 
by law and only with respect to the operation or 
use of the Insured vehicle In that state or 
province. The required coverage, however, will be 
excess over any other valid and collectible 
Insurance. 
2. Attached Trailers. A vehicle and an attached 
trailer will be considered one vehicle under 
Coverages N, 0, P, P-1, and Q, and separate 
vehicles under Coverages R, S, and T. The 
maximum applicable limits of liability in this policy 
shall not be Increased In any way by this 
paragraph. 
3. Other Vehicle Insurance in the Company. If 
this pollcy and any o1her vehicle Insurance policy 
Issued to you or your refatlve by us or Western 
Community Insurance Company apply to the 
same occurrence, the maximum limit of our 
liability under all of the policies shall not exceed 
the highest applicable limit of liabllfty under any 
one policy. This is the most we will pay regardless 
of the number of Insureds, clalms made, Insured 
vehicles, or premium charges. 
4. Payment by an Insured. For any occurrence 
Involving a potential claim against an Insured, the 
insured shall not, except at the insuredls own 
cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any 
obllgatlon, or Incur any expense other than for 
first aid to others at the time of the occurrence. 
5. Duties after loss. In case of an occurrence, the 
Insured shan perform the following duties to the 
extant possible: 
a. Give written notice to us as soon as 
practicable, which sets forth to the best of the 
lnsuredi. knowledge and belief: 
(1) The identity of the policy and the 
Insured; 
(2) Reasonably available information on the 
time, place, and circumstances of the 
occurrence; 
(3) Names and addresses of any claimants 
and available wttnesses; and 
{4) Such other !nfonnatlon that we may 
reasonably request; 










b. Immediately forward to us every notice, 
demand, summons, or other process relating 
to the occurrence; and 
c. At our request, assist in: 
(1) Making settlement; 
(2) The enforcement of any right of contri-
bution or Indemnity against any person or 
organization who may be liable to any 
Insured; 
(3) The conduct of suits, Including attending 
hearings and trials; and 
(4) Securing and giving evidence and 
obtaining the attendance of witnesses. 
6. Addltlonal Duties of an Injured Persono 
Coverages P, P-1, and Q, If Coverage P, P-1, or 
Q applies to a loss, the injured person shall: 
a. Give us a written proof of loss containing the 
lnfonnatlon we request, signed under oath If 
required, as soon as practicable; 
b. Submit lo such medical or other examinations 
or evaluations by persons selected by us 
when and as often as we may reasonably 
require; 
c. At our request, submit to examlnallon under 
oath as often as we may reasonably require, 
and subscribe the same; and 
d. Execute authorization to allow us to obtain 
copies of any medical or other reports and 
records. 
If a claim Is being made because of the death of 
an Injured person, the person(s) making the claim 
shall comply with paragraphs a, c, and d above. 
7. Additional Duties after Losso Coverages R, S, 
and T. If Coverage R, S, or T applies to a loss, 
the Insured shall perform the following duties: 
a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and 
also to the police if the loss is suspected to 
be caused by someone!S violation of law; 
b. Protect the property from further damage, 
make reasonable and necessary repairs 
required to protect the property, and keep an 
accurate record of repair expenditures; 
c. Prepare an Inventory of damaged or stolen 
property showing in detail the quantity, 
descrlplton, actual cash value, and amount of 
loss. Attach to the fnventory all bills, receipts, 
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and related documents, that substantiate the 
figures and ownership of property ln the 
inventory; 
d. As often as we may reasonably require: 
exhibit tha damaged property, provide us with 
records and documents we request and allow 
us to make copies, and submit to examlna!Jon 
under oath while not In the presence of any 
other Insured and subscribe the same; and 
e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us 
a signed, sworn proof of loss which sets forth 
the following information to the best of the 
lnsuredrs knowledge and belief: 
(1) The time and cause of loss; 
(2) The Interest of the Insured and all others 
in the Insured vehicle involved and all 
encumbrances on the Insured vehicle; 
(3) other Insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4) Changes In title of the Insured vehicle 
during the term of the policy; and 
(5) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request. 
8. Territory. This policy applies only to occur-
rences wflhln·the United States of America (USA) 
and Canada. If applicable to your Insured 
vehicle, Coverages R, S, and T only are 
extended for trips Into that part of the Republic of 
Mexico lying not more than 100 miles from the 
boundary llne of the USA. Our llablllty will be 
determined on the basis of cost at the nearest 
USA point. 
WARNING: Automobile accidents In the Republic 
of Mexico are considered a criminal offense, 
rather than a civil matter. The insurance provided 
by this policy wlll not meet Mexico automobile 
insurance requirements. If you are In an 
automobile accident in Mexico and have not 
purchased insurance through a licensed Mexican 
Insurance company, you may be Jailed and may 
have your automobl!e Impounded. 
9. Payment of Claim. Any payment is not an 
admission of liablllty by any Insured or us. 
10. Limits of Liability o Coverages N, 0, and Q. 
Regardless of the number of: 








b, Persons or organizations sustaining dam-
ages, bodily Injury or property damage; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence Is subject to the 
followlng limitations: 
d. Under Coverage N, the bodily Injury liability 
limit for each person stated in the 
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will 
pay for all damages arising out of bodily 
Injury sustained by one person resulting from 
an occurrence, including any emotional 
distress or other damages resulting from this 
bodily Injury and sustained by any other 
person. 
Subject to the bodily Injury llmitatfon for 
each person, the bodily Injury liability limit 
for each occurrence stated in the 
Declarations Is the maximum amount we will 
pay for all damages arising out of bodily 
Injury sustained by two or more persons 
resulting from an occurrence; 
e. Under Coverage 0, the property damage 
liability limit for each occurrence stated in 
the Declarations is Iha maximum amount we 
.will pay for all property damage resulUng 
from an occurrence; and 
f. Under Coverage Q, our llmlt of liabiHty per 
parson Is stated in the Declarations. This Is 
the maximum amount we wlll pay for all 
covered expenses Incurred by or on behalf of 
each person who sustains bodily Injury 
resultlng from an occurrence. This llmtt Is 
subject to reduction as explained below: 
(1) Our limit of llabilily In the aggregate for all 
physical therapy, massage therapy, and 
any treatment by or at the direction of a 
chiropractor, per person per occurrence 
is the lesser of $2,000 or the limit of 
liablllty stated In the Declarations; and 
(2) Our limit of liabllity for funeral expenses 
per person is the lesser of $5,000 or the 
limit of liability stated in the Declarations. 
11. Limit of Liability - Coverages R, S, and T. Our 
lfmlt of llabllity under Coverages R, S, and T Is the 
lesser of: 
a. The actual cash value of the Insured vehicle 
or covered property; or 
b. The cost of repair or replacement using parts 
of like kind and quality. 
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Actual cash value is determined by the market 
value, age, and condition, at the time the loss 
occurred. The cost of repair or replacement is 
based on the cost of repair agreed upon by us or 
an estimate written based upon the prevailing 
competitive price. The prevailing competitive prfce 
means labor rates, and parts and material prices, 
charged by a majority of repair facilities in the 
area where the Insured vehicle is to be repaired. 
We do not cover any reduction In value to your 
Insured vehlcle after repairs are completed. 
12. Non-Original Manufacturer Parts. Under Cover-
ages R, S, and T, we have the right lo base our 
payment on the cost of non-0rlglnal equipment 
manufacturer parts provided they are certified by 
CAP A., or a slmllar independent testing organ-
ization, as being equivalent to or better than 
original equipment. 
13. Betterment. Under Coverages R, S, and T, 
deductions for betterment and replacement will be 
made only for parts normally subject to repair and 
replacement during the useful life of the insured 
vehicle. Such deductions shall be the lesser of: 
a. An amount equal to the proportion that the 
expired life of the part bears to the normal 
useful life of the part; or 
b. The amount which the resale value of the 
vehicle Is increased by the repair or 
replacement. 
14. Loss Payable Clause. This clause applies If a 
lienholder Is named in the Declarations. 
a. If a payable loss Is for repairs only. we will 
pay you. If a payable loss ls for the value of 
the covered property, we wlll pay you and the 
lienholder as their interests may appear. At 
our option we may pay you and the lienholder 
for any loss. 
b. We cover the Interest of the llenholder unless 
the loss Is intentionally caused by you or Is 
the result of fraudulent acts or omissions on 
your part. 
c. We may cancel this pollcy during the policy 
period. We wlll mail notice of cancellatlon to 
the lien holder at least 10 days before the dale 
the cancellation takes effect. 
d. If we make any payment to the lien holder we 
will obtain their rights against any other party. 
e. We will pay the lienholder for their Interest 
directly If the covered property has been 
repossessed. 




f. Policy conditions relaflng to Arbitration, Suit 
Against Us, and Loss Payment apply to the 
llenholder. 
15. Loss Settlement. We have the right to settle a 
loss with you or the owner of the property in one 
of the fol!owlng ways: 
a. Pay up to the actual cash value of the 
property: 
b. Pay to repair or replace the property or part 
wllh like kind and quality. If the repair or 
replacement results in better than like kind 
and quality, you must pay for the amount of 
the betterment; 
c. Return the stolen property and pay for any 
damage due to the theft; or 
d. Take the property at an agreed value, but It 
cannot be abandoned to us. 
16. Other Insurance. The Insurance under Section Ill 
Is excess over any other valid and collectlble 
Insurance. Coverage Q, however, is primary 
coverage. 
17. Vehicle Registration. We insure only motor 
vehicles registered In the state of Idaho. 
SECTION IV D INLAND MARINE INSURANCE 
The coverages under this section apply as Indicated 
by endorsement. Applicable endorsements are llsted 
in the Declarations. All Section IV policy provisions 
apply to these endorsements unless an endorsement 
specifically states otherwise. 
SECTION IV CONDITIONS 
1. Duties after Loss. In case of a loss to which this 
insurance may apply, the Insured must see that 
the following duties are performed: 
a. Give notice as soon as practicable to us, and 
also to the police if lhe loss is suspected to 
be caused by someone!!! violation of law; 
b. Protect the property from further damage, 
make reasonable and necesSl;lry repairs 
required lo protect the property, and keep an 
accurate record of repair expenditures; 
c. Prepare an Inventory of damaged or stolen 
property showing In detail the quantity, 
description, actual cash value, amount of 
loss, and ownership of property. Attach to the 
inventory all bills, receipts, and related 
documents, that substantiate the figures and 
ownership of property In the Inventory; 
d. As often as we may reasonably require: 
exhibit the damaged properly; provide us with 
records and documents we request and allow 
us to make copies; and submit to examination 
under oath while not In the presence of any 
other insured and subscribe the same; and 
e. Within 60 days after our request, submit to us 
the lnsuredts signed, sworn proof of loss 
which sets forth the following lnformalion lo 
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the best of the lnsuredi:s knowledge and 
belief: 
(1) The time and cause of loss; 
(2) The Interest of the Insured and all others 
In the property involved and all encum· 
brances on the property; 
(3) Other Insurance which may cover the 
loss; 
(4) Changes in tltle during the term of the 
policy; 
(5) Specifications of any damaged property 
and detailed estimates for repair of the 
damage; 
(6) An Inventory of damaged property as 
described above; and 
(7) Such other information that we may 
reasonably request. 
2. Loss to a Pair or Set. In case of a loss to a 
panel, section, pair, set, or part, we may elect to: 
a. Repair, replace, or restore, the panel, section, 
side, pair, set, or part, to Its value before the 
loss; 
b. Pay the difference belween the actual cash 
value of the property before and after the 
loss; or 
c. Pay the reasonable cost of providing a 
substitute to match as closely as practlcable 
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the remainder of the outer covering. panel, 
section, side, pair, or sel 
We do not guarantee the availability of parts or 
replacements. We are not obligated to match, 
repalr, or replace the entire pair, set, series of 
objects, outer covering, piece, or panel, when a 
part is lost or damaged. 
3. Limit of Liability. Our applicable limit of liability is 
shown In each endorsement or an accompanying 
schedule. 
4. Loss Settlement. Subject to the limit of llabltity 
stated In the endorsement or schedule, our 
payment for covered losses shall be the lesser of: 
The actual cash value of the property; or 
a. The cost to repair or replace the property or 
part with llke kind and quality. 
If repair or replacement results In better than llke 
kind or quality, you must pay for the amount of 
betterment. We do not cover any reduction In 
value to your covered property after repairs are 
completed. 
5. Other Insurance. The insurance under Section 
IV Is excess over any other valid and collectible 
insurance. 
POLICY ENDORSEMENTS 
The coverage In your policy may be modified by 
endorsement. Each of the following endorsements 
may or may not apply to your policy. An endorsement 
applies only when It is listed In the Declarations. In 
addition to the endorsements In this booklet, other 
endorsements may apply If listed In the Declarations. 
The policy provisions apply to endorsements unless 
an endorsement speclflcally states otherwise. 
SECTION I ENDORSEMENTS 
1104 (1014) Property Coverage Endorsement. Cov-
erage E, and perils 1 through 9, apply to the followlng 
property: 
1. New bulldlngs or structures, or additions to 
property covered under Coverage E, whlle under 
construction on the Insured location: 
2. Permanent buildings at a newly acquired premise 
that qualJfies as an Insured location. We also 
cover bulldlngs under construction, permanent 
structures, fixtures, and fixed equipment, at this 
premise; and 
3. Materials and supplles on the insured location to 
be used in construction of the above covered 
property. 
You must report the new acquisitions on or before the 
next policy renewal date and pay the appropriate 
premium. New dwelllngs that qualify for Coverage A 
are not covered under this endorsement. This 
endorsement does not apply to an Insured location 
outside the state of Idaho. 
Limit of Liability. The total limit of additional Insur-
ance for all properly covered under this endorsement 
shall not exceed $300,000 until you report values of 
the property to us. Additional premium is due and 
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computed from the date of property acquisition. At our 
discretion, the premium may not be bllled until the 
next policy renewal. 
Loss Settlement Clause. Loss covered under this 
endorsement wlll be settled based on actual cash 
value. 
1109 (0108) Irrigation Equipment and Spare Truck 
Parts Endorsement. Coverage D Is amended to 
Include your irrigation equipment, including irrigation 
pumps, burled water lines, electric pump motors, 
panels, wiring, transformers, and permanenUy 
installed or portable sprinkler lines and sprlnkler 
equipment (including any sprlnklerli'I electrical 
equipment). In addltlon to the perils that apply to 
Coverage D, this endorsement covers loss to your 
pivot or wheel llnes caused by collapse If caused by 
elther weight of Ice or snow or by mechanical failure. 
Spare truck parts are Included in this endorsement If 
Indicated In the Declaratrons. 
Our limit of liability for this endorsement is indicated In 
the Declarations. The coinsurance requirement under 
Coverage D applles separately to this endorsement. 
1111 (1014} Replacement Cosm Personal Property 
Endorsement. Losses under Coverage C will be 
settled at replace~ent cost. This endorsement also 
covers domestic appliances, floor coverings, awnings, 
outdoor antennas, and outdoor equipment, pertaining 
to a dwelling Insured under Coverage A. Limitations 
on this coverage are explained below. 
1. Property Not Eligible. Property listed below is 
not ellglble for replacement cost settlement. Ally 
loss to this property wlll be settled at aclual cash 
value at the time of loss but not exceeding the 
amount necessary to repair or replace. 
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a. Antfques, fine arts, paintings, statues, and 
other articles, which by their Inherent nature 
cannot be replaced with new items. 
b. Articles whose age or history contribute 
substantially to their value, including but not 
limited to, memorabilia, souvenirs, and 
collectorsotems. 
c. Personal property of others. 
d. Articles not maintained ln good or workable 
condition. 
e. Artlcles that are outdated or obsolete and are 
stored or not being used. 
2. Limit of Coverage. Subject to the Coverage C 
limit of liablllty, we will not pay more than the 
smallest of the following amounts under this 
endorsement. 
a. Replacement cost at time of loss without 
deduction for depreciation;· 
b. The full cost of repair at time of Joss; 
c. 400% of the actual cash value at lime of loss; 
d. The actual cash value of any property 
purchased or acquired used; or 
e. Any specfal limlt of liability applicable under 
Coverage C. 
Any payment under Coverage C that is not 
subject to replacement cost coverage under this 
endorsement reduces the Coverage C llmil of 
llablllty available under this endorsement for the 
same occurrence. 
3. Addlttonal Provlslons. 
a. When the replacement cost for the entire loss 
under this endorsement e>tceeds $500, we 
will pay no more than the actual cash value 
for the loss or damage until the actual repair 
or replacement is completed. You must 
provide proof of replacement with purchase 
receipts or other proof of purchase. 
b. An Insured may make a claim for loss on an 
actual cash value basis and then make claim 
within one year after the loss for any 
additional amount payable under this 
endorsement. 
c. Under this endorsement, replacement cost 
means the cost at the time of loss of a new 
item Identical to the one for which tha claim is 
made. If an Identical item Is not available, it 
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means the cost of a new article of 
comparable quality and features. 
1114 (1014) Borrowed Equipment Endorsement. 
We cover under Coverage D, loss to moblle 
agricultural machinery In which you have no interest 
and Is not available for your regular use, provided 
such machinery has been borrowed by either you or 
your employees, and Is being used In the conduct of 
your own farming operation. This coverage will apply 
as excess over any Insurance that the owner has on 
this property. Our Umit of liability per occurrence 
under this endorsement is stated In the Declarations. 
I116 (1014) Cosmetic Roof Damage Endorsement. 
Coverages A and E do not cover cosmetic damage to 
roof surfacing caused by wind or hail, meaning 
marring, pitting, or other superflclal damage that 
alters the appearance of the roof surfacing but does 
not prevent it from functioning as a barrier to the 
elements to the same extent as before the cosmetic 
damage occurred. 
1118 (0108) Scheduled Farm Personal Property 
Endorsement. Coverage D is changed to cover only 
the scheduled categories of farm personal property 
listed In the Declarat!ons. The coinsurance clause Is 
changed to apply indlvldually to each category. 
1125 (1014) Sewage or Sump System Backup 
Endorsement. Coverages A, B, and C are amended 
to Include loss caused by water or sewage backup 
into your Insured dwelling, meaning water or sewage 
backup from a sewer, septic or sump system not 
caused by peril 14 (Accidental discharge or 
overflow of water). Section I Exclusions, except 
exclusion 3 c, apply to this endorsement. 
This coverage Is limited to damage to your dwelling 
and personal property in the dwellfng. It does not 
Include service, damage, or repair to a sewage, 
septic; or sump system. The Coverage A and C limits 
for this endorsement are stated in the Declarations. 
Each limit Is the annual aggregate limit for all losses 
during the policy period. 
If a loss covered under this endorsement Is caused by 
a broken sewer line on the resrdence premises, we 
will pay up to $2,500 to excavate that sewer line, but 
not to repair It. Any amount paid for excavation is 
included in the lfmlt applicable to this coverage. 
I130 (0108) Ellmlnatlon of Livestock under Cover-
age D Endorsement. There is no coverage for five-
stock under Coverage D. 
1133 (1014} Limited Fungi, Wet or Dry Rot, or 
Bacteria Coverage Endorsement. 
1. Definition. Fungi means any type or form of 
fungus, including mold, ml!dew, mycotoxins, 





spores, scents, or lheir by-products which they 
produce. 
2. Coverage. Coverage under this endorsement 
applies only to dwellings insured under 
Coverage A (Your Dwelllngs) and personal 
property Insured under Coverage C {Personal 
Property) located In those dwellings. We cover 
direct, physical loss caused by fungi, wet or dry 
rot, or bacteria, but only when such loss is the 
result of perils 1-19 under SECTION I PERILS 
INSURED AGAINST and only if all reasonable 
means were used to save and preserve the 
property from further damage resulting from the 
peril Insured against. SECTION I ADDITIONAL 
COVERAGES • Debris Removal does not apply 
to any loss under this endorsement. The fungi or 
bacterial exclusion In peril 14 (Accident dis-
charge or overflow of water) does not apply to 
coverage under this endorsement. 
3. Additional General Exclusion. Except as indi-
cated above, we do not cover any loss caused 
by fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether an 
insured peril Is Involved or not. This exclusion 
applies to all property Insured under Section I. 
4. Limit of Llablllty. Our limit of liability for this 
coverage for loss to each Coverage A dwelllng 
and the personal property located in that 
dwelllng ls stated In the Declarations. Our limit 
of llablllty Is the most we will pay for: 
a. The total of all loss caused by fungi, wet or 
dry rot, or bacteria; 
b. The cost to remove fungi, wet or dry rot, or 
bacteria from covered property: 
c. The cost to tear out and replace any part of 
the covered property as needed to gain 
access to the fungi, wet or dry rot, or 
bacteria; and 
d. The cost of testing of air or property to 
confirm the absence, presence, or level of 
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria whether 
performed prior to, during, or after removal, 
repair, restoration, or replacement. The cost 
of such testing will be provided only to the 
extent.that there is reason to believe that 
there Is a presence of fungi, wet or dry rot, 
or bacteria. 
Our limit of liability is the most we will pay for the 
total of all loss or costs under this endorsement 
for the covered dwelling and personal property 
located in that dwelling regardless of the 
number of claims made during the pollcy period. 
This limit does not Increase our limit of liability 
under Coverage A or Coverage C. 
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5. Conditions, 
a. This endorsement applies only to perils and 
losses which occur during the policy period. 
b. If there Is any loss to covered property not 
caused in whole or in part by fungi, wet or 
dry rot, or bacteria, our loss payment will not 
be limited by the terms of this endorsement 
except to the extent that fungi, wet or dry 
rot, or bacteria, causes an Increase in the 
loss. Any such Increase In the loss will be 
subject to the tenns of this endorsement 
c. The limitations of coverage under thJs 
endorsement do not apply to loss from 
fungi, wet or dry rot, or bacteria if such loss 
Is a result of fire or llghtning. 
d. The pollcy provisions apply unless this 
endorsement states otherwise. 
1171 {0108) Glass Deductible Waived Endorse-
ment. No deductible applles to glass breakage to the 
building(s) Insured under Coverage A. This endorse-
ment does not apply to window framing or other 
materlals that are not glass. 
1183 (1014) Increased Replacement Cost Endorse-
ment. Our llmlt of liability applicable to a dwelling 
Insured under Coverage A to which this endorsement 
applles will be Increased by the percentage shown in 
the Declarations for this endorsement If: 
1. You Insure your dwelling for 100% of Its 
replacement cost as we estimate based on the 
accuracy of JnformaUon you furnish, and you pay 
the premium we require; 
2. You accept any annual adjustment we make to 
the Jlmit·appllcable to your dwelling and you pay 
the additional premium; and 
3. You notify us within 90 days of the start of any 
additions or other physical changes that Increase 
the value of your dwelling on the dwelllng 
premises by $5,000 or more, and pay the 
additional premium. 
Subject to our limlt of llabillty, losses under this 
endorsement are covered for the cost of repair or 
replacement of the damaged part with new materials 
without deduction for depreciation, but not more than 
the amount spent to repair or replace the damage on 
the same premises using new materlals of equivalent 
kind and quality to the extent practical. 
Paragraphs c (1), (2), and (3) of the Loss Settlement 
paragraph of SECTION I CONDITIONS are deleted. 
This endorsement is void If you fall to comply with its 
provisions. 








Our calculation of the replacement cost of your 
insured dwelling Is our estimate using software 
widely used in the Insurance industry. You are 
responsible to see that the limit that applies is 
adequate to replace your property. 
SECTION II ENDORSEMENTS 
1220 (1014) Combined Single Limit Endorsement-
Coverages F-1 and G. The Limits of Liablllly· 
Coverages F-1 and G paragraph under SECTION II 
CONDITIONS Is changed to read as follows: 
5. Limit of LlabllltyD Coverages F-1 and G. 
Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds under this pollcy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining dam-
ages, bodily Injury, or property damage; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence ls subject to the 
following llmltatlons: 
d. Our total combined single limit of liability 
under Coverages F-1 and G for all bodily 
Injury and property damage resulting from 
one occurrence shall not exceed the 
applicable limit of liability stated in the 
Declarations. 
e. The per occurrence combined single limit of . 
liability for bodily Injury and prope~ 
damage caused by farm products produced 
on the Insured location Is also the total limit 
of our liability for all occurrences during the 
policy period. 
f. Subject to the above limitations, the 
applicable annual aggregate limit of liability 
shown In the Declara1ions Is the most we will 
pay for all damages from all occurrences 
during the policy period arising from your 
fannlng activities. 
1223 (0108) Limited Pollution Coverage Endorse· 
ment basic form. Coverages F-1 (Bodily Injury 
Liability) and G {Property Damage Liability) apply to 
bodily Injury or property damage caused by an 
occurrence and arising out of the actual discharge, 
dispersal, seepage, migration, release, or escape of 
pollutants but only on the following conditions: (a) it 
Is a claim or suit by a non-governmental entity or 
private person and {b) the claim meets all the 
requirements of one of the three following numbered 
paragraphs: 
1. The bodily Injury or property damage arises out 
of heat, smoke, or fumes from a hostile fire. As 
used in this endorsement, a hostile fire means 
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one that becomes uncontrollable or breaks out 
from where ii was Intended lo be. 
2. The bodily Injury or property damage arises 
from the accidental above ground contact with 
herbicides, pesticides, fungicides, or fertilizers, 
caused by the appUcatlon of lhe same to an 
Insured location and provided that: 
a. The contact begins during the policy period; 
b. The contact begins at an established time 
and place; 
c. The contact ends no more than 7 days after 
the beginning of the contact as identified in 
the requirements of 2 b; 
d. The bodily inJury or property damage must 
occur within 12 months of said application; 
and 
e. The application is not from an aircraft. 
3. The bodily Injury or property damage arises out 
of a short-term pollution event. As used in this 
endorsement, a short-term pollutfon event means 
a discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of 
pollutants directly from eilher an Insured 
location or mobile agricultural machinery 
being operated by an Insured which: 
a. Begins during the poHcy period; 
b. Begins at an identified time and place; 
c. Ends at an identified time within 7 days of the 
beginning of the discharge, dispersal, 
release, or escape of the pollutants as 
Identified In the requirements of 3 b, and 
ln~olves no further discharge, dispersal, 
release, or escape of addlUonal amounts of 
the pollutants after the end date; 
d. Is reported to us within 37 days of Its 
beginning; 
e. ls not a repeat or resumption of a previous 
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape of 
!he same pollutants from essentially the 
same source within 14 months of a previous 
discharge, dispersal, release, or escape; 
f. Is not covered under paragraphs 1 or 2 
above; 
g. Does not originate from an underground 
storage tank; and 
h. Is not animal waste, which includes manure, 





(I) Any fanning operation where animals, 
Including fish, are fed and confined In any 
pen, corral, shed, barn, or olher 
enclosure; or 
(ii) Any anlmal waste collection device, 
holding facility, or disposal system. 
Llmlt(s) of Llablllty, Expenses and Defense Costs. 
The llmit{s) of liability applicable to occurrences 
under paragraph 3 Is shown In the Declarations with 
reference to this endorsement. The per occurrence 
limll of llabilily Is also the total aggregate limit of our 
liability for all such occurrences during the policy 
period. The limit(s) of llabillty appllcable to Coverages 
F~"t and Coverage G applies to an occurrence under 
paragraphs 1 and 2 above. 
Claims expense and defense costs, for losses 
covered under paragraph 3, reduce the limit of 
liability, both per occurrence and aggregate limit of 
liability, notwithstanding any other defense provisions 
In the policy. 
Excluslons. We do not cover: 
(a) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any claim for treble 
· damages, punitive damages, fines, penalUes, 
monitoring tests, or slmllar assessments; 
(b) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any c!alm for 
n ulsance or trespass; 
(c) Under paragraph 3, any claim for bodily injury 
which arises from or has as a component of the 
bodlly Injury, asthma, cystic fibrosis, or any 
other aliment caused by or aggravated by smoke 
or any other pollutants that comes from any 
agricultural burning, Including but not Jlmited to, 
the burning of weeds, grasses, fann crops, crop 
residue, or any other plant matter; 
{d) Under paragraphs 1, 2, and 3, any loss, damage, 
cost, or expense, directly or indlrecUy caused by, 
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of 
or In connecUon wltll any act of terrorism 
regardless of any other cause or event contribut-
ing concurrently or in any other sequence to the 
loss; or 
(e) Under para!)raphs 1. 2, and 3, any Joss, damage, 
cost, or expense, directly or indirectly caused by, 
contributed to by, resulting from, or arising out of 
or In connection with any action in controlling, 
preventing, suppressing, retaliating against, or 
responding to any act of terrorism. 
An act of terrorism Includes any act, preparation 
to act, or threat of action: (1) designed to 
influence the government de Jure or de facto of 
any nation or any political division, (2) In pursuit of 
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political, religious, Ideological, or sfmilar 
purposes, or (3) to Intimidate the public or a 
section of the public of any nation, by any 
person(s) whether acting alone or on behalf of or 
in connection with any organization or 
government de jure or de facto, and whlch: 
(I) involves violence against any person; 
(ll) Involves damage to property; 
(Ill) endangers llfe other than that of the person 
committing the action; 
(Iv) creates a rlsk to health or safety of the public 
or a section of the public; or 
{v) Is designed to interfere with or to disrupt an 
electronic system. 
Additional Provisions. 
Except as speclftcally provided in paragraphs 1, 2, 
and 3. and subJect to all condltlons stated in those 
paragraphs, this endorsement does not apply to or 
provide any coverage for any llablllty arising oui of the 
actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, 
seepage, migration, release, or escape of pollutants. 
If Coverage L (Custom Fanning) applles, all 
Coverage L condlUons, llmltations, and exclusions 
also apply to this endorsement. 
Pollutants means any solid, l!quld, gaseous, or 
thermal Irritant or contaminant, Including smoke, 
vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, waste, 
or anything defined by federal or state law as a 
pollutant. Waste Includes materials to be recycled, 
reconditioned, or reclaimed. 
The policy provisions apply unless this endorsement 
states otherwise. 
1259 (1014) Accidental Death Endorsement. If you 
or any of your unmarried children under age 25 who 
qualify as an Insured dies as a result of an 
occurrence, we wlll pay the llmlt of liability for this 
coverage as Indicated In the Declarations. We do not 
cover any death that resulls more than 90 days from 
the date of the occurrence. 
1. Addltlonal Exclusions. Except for exclusion 13, 
Section JI Exclusions pertaining to bodlly Injury 
apply to coverage under this endorsement. The 
following exclusions also apply. We do not cover 
any death: 
a. Caused by suicide, attempted sulcfde, or any 
intentionally self-Inflicted Injury, regardless if 
the person Is Incompetent or suffers from a 
mental Illness; or 
b. To any Insured 81 years of age or older on 
the date of occurrence; or 
c. Caused by heart attack, heart failure, stroke, 












any illness, disease, or physical ailment. 
2. Notice and Proof of Claim. Upon notice of claim, 
wa will provide a form for filing a proof of loss. 
Payment under this coverage will be made as 
follows: 
a. In the case of death to a named Insured, to 
the surviving spouse; 
b. In the case of death to a qualifying chtld, to 
you; or 
c. If the beneficiary is deceased, to the estate of 
the decedent. 
1269 (0108) Limited Employerrs Liability Endorse-
ment. Coverages F-1 and F-2 are extended to apply 
to bodily lnJury caused by an occurrence and 
sustained by a person perfonning labor for you In 
your farming operation, but only if you are not 
required by law to provtde workeris compensation 
benefits or coverage for this bodlly injury. Coverage 
F-2 does not apply to a person or their employees 
whlle they conduct their business on the insured 
location. 
1282 (1014} Personal Injury Endorsement. Under 
Coverage F-1, we cover personal injury. Personal 
Injury means Injury other than bodily Injury arising 
out of one or more of the following offenses: 
1. False arrest, detention or Imprisonment, or 
malicious prosecution; 
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character: or 
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful 
entry, 
Exclusions. SECTION II EXCLUSIONS do not apply 
to this endorsement This endorsement does not 
cover: 
1. liability arising out of any contract or agreement; 
2, Injury caused by a violation of a criminal law or 
ordinance: 
3. Injury arising out of Iha oral or written publication 
of materials lf done by or at the direction of an 
Insured with the knowledge that It Is false: 
4. Injury arising out of an oral or written publ!catlon 
that was first published before the beginning of 
the policy period; 
5. Injury caused by or at the direction of an Insured 
with the knowledge that the Insured would violate 
the rights of another and would Inflict infury; 
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6. Injury sustained by any person as a result of an 
offense directly or Indirectly relatecl to the 
employment of this person by lhe insured; 
7. Injury sustained by an Insured; 
8. Injury arising out of the business pursuits of an 
Insured; 
9. Civic or public activities performecl for pay by an 
Insured; 
10. Injury arising out of the molestation, corpora! 
punishment, or physical, sexual, emotional, or 
mental abuse of any person; 
11. Injury arising out of the posting of any 
Information, opinion, statement, or material of any 
kind on the Internet by an fnsured, including 
postings on chat rooms, bulletin boards, social 
media, biogs, or gripe sites; 
12. Injury arising out of any material in an e-mail or 
text message sent by an Insured; or 
13. Injury arising out of the discharge, dispersal, re-
lease, or escape of any pollutants. 
Additional Condition. Our applicable per occur-
rence limit of liability shown In the Declarations is 
also the most we will pay for all damages from all 
occurrences during the policy period. 
SECTION Ill ENDORSEMENTS 
1309 (1014) Employerrs Nonownershlp Liability 
Endorsement. Coverages N and O cover your 
llabUlty and the liability of your executive officers 
arising out of the use of a nonowned motor vehicle 
In your farming or household activities by any person 
other than you. · 
1. Oeflnltlon. In this endorsement, nonowned 
motor vehicle means a motor vehicle, trailer, 
or semi-trailer not ownad by, registered in the 
name of, hired by, leased by, or loaned to you or 
your executive officers. 
2. Applicatton of Insurance. 
a. This endorsement does not apply to any 
motor vehicle owned by any of your 
executive officers or their spouses. 
b. This insurance does not apply to any motor 
vehicle owned by or registered In the name 
of a partner if your business is in the form of 
a partnership. 




Death Benefit. We agree to pay $10,000 If an 
Insured dies solely as the result of bodily Injury 
caused by an occurrence whlle occupying or tf 
struck by a motor vehicle. Death of the Insured 
must occur within one year after the date of the 
occurrence. 
Exclusions. The following additional exclusions apply 
to this endorsement. This endorsement does not 
cover: 
1. Death caused by or resultlng from disease, 
except infection resulting from bodily Injury to 
which this insurance applies; 
2. Bodlly injury sustained by an Insured engaged 
in the maintenance or repair of a motor vehicle; 
3. Bodily Injury to an Insured arising out of the 
business of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or 
parking motor vehicles, including road testing or 
delivery; 
4. Bodlly Injury to an Insured arising out of the 
operation, loading, unloading, or occupying of a 
publtc or commercial motor vehicle; 
5. Bodlly injury to an Insured while occupying a 
motor vehicle without the permission of the 
owners; or 
6. Bodily Injury to an Insured while occupying a 
motor vehicle owned by or available for the 
regular use of any Insured which is not an 
Insured vehicle. 
Conditions. The following addltlonal oondHlons apply 
to this endorsement: 
1. Insured means only those persons llsted in the 
Declarations as persons to whom this endorse-
ment applies. 
2. Notrce of Claim. The insuredls spouse or some-
one acting on behalf of the lnsuredls heirs shall: 
a. Give us a signed, w,Itten proof of loss 
containing the Information we request, under 
oath If required, as soon as practical; and 
b. Execute authorization to allow us to obtain 
copies of medical reports and records. 
3. Payment of Deatfl BenefltD Autopsy. 
a. If the insured decedent is survived by a 
spouse who is a resident of the same 
household at the time of the occurrence, the 
death benefit Is payable to the decedenlffl 
spouse. If the insured decedent was a minor, 
the death benefit ls payable to any parent 
who was a resident of the same household at 
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the tlme of the occurrence: otherwise, the 
death benefit is payable to the Insured 
decedentlS estate. 
b. We shall have the right to have an autopsy 
performed where it Is not forbidden by law. 
The paragraphs titled Nondupllcatlon of Insurance 
Benefits, Subrogatlono Our Right to Recover 
Payment, and Other Insurance, do not apply to this 
endorsement. 
1313 (1014) Combined Single Limit Endorsement-
Coverages P and P-1 (Uninsured and 
Underlnsured Motorist). The limits of llablllty 
paragraph pertaining to Coverages P and P-1 under 
Additional Conditions applicable to Coverages P 
and P-1 is changed to read as follows: 
1. Limit of Llablllty. Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds or vehicles Insured under this 
policy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining bodily 
Injury; or 
c. Claims made; 
our liability for each occurrence is .subject to the 
following llmltatlon: Our total combined single limit 
of lfablllty under Coverages P and P-1 for all 
bodily Injury resulting from one occurrence 
shalt not exceed the applicable limit of liability 
stated in the Declarations. 
Separate Limits Requirements. We wt!I apply the 
combined single limit to provide any separate ltmlts 
required by law for bodlly Injury. This provision, 
however, wlll not Increase our total limit of liability. 
1320 (1014) Comblned Single Limit Endorsement-
Coverages N and O. The llmits of liability paragraph 
pertaining to Coverages N and O under Section Ill 
Conditions is changed to read as follows: 
10. Limit of Liability. Regardless of the number of: 
a. Insureds or vehicles Insured under this 
pollcy; 
b. Persons or organizations sustaining bodily 
Injury or property damage; or 
c. Claims made: 
our liability for each occurrence Is subject to the 
following llmllatton: 
Our total combined single limit of Dabllity under 
Coverages N and O for all bodlly lnJury and 
property damage resulting from one occurrence 








shall not exceed the applicable limit of liability 
stated In the Declarations. 
Separate Limits Requirements. We wlll apply 
the combined single limit to provide any separate 
limits required by law for bodily Injury and 
property damage. This provision, however, will 
not Increase our total llrnlt of liability. 
1324 (1014) New Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorse-
ment. For each Insured vehicle to which this 
endorsement applies, our ffmit of lfabilltyfor a covered 
total loss shall be increased to cover the interest of a 
lienholder In the vehrcle which exceeds the actual 
cash value of the vehicle subject to the following: 
1. The lfenholder must be fisted In the Declaratfons; 
2. The fienholder must be a financial institution 
licensed or chartered under state or federal law; 
and 
3. Our maximum llmit of llabllity is an additional 20% 
of the actual cash value or the Insured vehicle at 
the time of loss. 
Additional Provisions. 
1. Total loss In this endorsement means thal the 
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of 
the Insured vehicle less salvage value. 
2. We do not pay any amount of a lien: 
a. Resulting from overdue payments; 
b. Resulting from the cost of an extended 
warranty, credit life or other Insurance; or 
c. Resulting from carry-over balances from 
previous loans. 
3. This endorsement applies only to an Insured 
vehicle that: 
a. You purchased new from a new car dealer 
and it had mileage of less than 1,000 miles 
on the date of purchase; 
b, Is financed under an original purchase lien; 
c. Is covered under Coverages S (Compre-
hensive) and T (Colllslon}; and 
d. Is a private passenger car or van, or a pickup. 
4. This endorsement does not apply to any loss for 
which you make claim under 1326 (0108) (New 
Vehicle Additional Coverage Endorsement). 
1326 (1014) New Vehicle Additional Coverage En· 
dorsement. For each Insured vehicle to which this 
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endorsement applies. for a total loss we shall pay the 
cos.I to replace the insured vehicle without deducUon 
for depreciation. Our lfmlt of liability under this 
coverage will not exceed the lesser of: 
1. The cost of a new vehicle of the same make, 
model, size, class, body type, and equipment as 
your insured vehicle; or 
2. The amount you paid the dealer for the vehicle 
when It was purchased. 
Additional Exclusions. This endorsement does not 
cover: 
1. An Insured vehicle that is damaged or stolen 
more than one year past the date you bought It; 
2. A motor vehicle that you lease or you do not 
own; or 
3. An Insured vehicle that has been driven more 
than 20,000 miles. 
Additional Provisions. 
1. This endorsement does not apply unless you 
replace within 60 days of the date of the loss, the 
Insured vehicle that Is damaged or stolen. 
2. If a replacement vehlcle of Iha same make, 
model, size, class, body type, and equipment Is 
not available, we may require that you replace the 
vehlcle with one that is similar in size, class, body 
type, and equipment as we may determine. 
3. Total loss In lhis endorsement means that the 
cost of repairs exceeds the actual cash value of 
the Insured vehJcle less salvage value, 
4. This endorsement. applies only to an insured 
vehicle: 
a. That is covered under Coverages S 
(Comprehensive) and T (Colllslon); 
b. That you purchased new from a new car 
dealer and it had mileage of less than 1,000 
mUes on the date of purchase; and 
c. That is a private passenger car or van, or a 
pickup. 
5. This endorsement does not apply to any loss for 
which you make claim under 1324 (0108) (New 
Vehicle Loan Coverage Endorsement). 
1334 (1014) Roadside Assistance Endorsement. 
We will pay for reasonable and necessary roadside 
assistance expense caused by the dlsablement of 








disablement. Roadside assistance Includes only the 
following: 
1. Unlocking the Insured vehicle If the keys have 
been locked inside the vehlcle or If the keys have 
been lost; 
2. Battery Jump and flat tire repair; 
3. Labor for on-site mechanical repairs; 
4. Towing or winch-out service; or 
5. Denvery of up to 3 gallons of gasoline, antifreeze. 
or other motor vehicle fluids. 
If you are pulling a trailer with your Insured vehicle, 
ltems 2, 3, and 4 above also apply to the tralter if It or 
your Insured vehfcle Is disabled. 
The limit applfcable to lhis coverage Is indicated In the 
Declarations. No deductible applles to this coverage. 
The limit for this coverage- is not Increased if both 
your Insured vehicle and the trailer it is pulflng are 
disabled. 
1368 (1014) Car Rental Reimbursement Endorse-
ment. if a loss exceeds the applicable deductible to 
the Insured vehicle under Coverages S or T, we 
agree to reimburse you for: 
1. The expense Incurred by you for the rental fee 
(excludlrig all other charges) of a substitute auto-
mobile from a car rental agency or garage; or 
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2. The expense Incurred by you for taxicabs. 
When Coverage Begins and Ends. Coverage 
applies during a period starting on: 
1. The date of loss if as a direct result of this loss 
the Insured vehicle cannot be operated under Its 
own power; or 
2. If the insured vehicle is operable, the date you 
authorize repairs and deliver the vehicle to the 
repair shop. 
Regardless of lhe pollcy period, our liabllity for taxicab 
or rental fees shall end on !he earliest of the following: 
1. Upon completron of repair or replacement of 
property lost or damaged; or 
2. Upon such date as we make or tender settlement 
for the loss or damage. 
Limit of Liability. Our limit of lfabillty per day and per 
accident for this coverage are shown In the 
Declarations. 
Other Coverage. This coverage shall not apply In the 
event of a theft of the Insured vehicle for which 
reimbursement of transportation expansa is provided 












llll,Fan11 B11rem,.J1,I11tunl ltunrm,ce Cm,,pmty ef ldnlto 
p_o_ Box 4848 • Pocatello, Idaho • 83205--4848 
March 2, 2016 
Edgar Cook 
491476 Hwy 95 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
RE: Insured: Edgar and Laurie Cook 
Claimant: Joseph Stanczak 
Policy No. Ol-A-028872-01 
Date of Loss: 06n8/15 
Claim No. 01038872012015062801 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
Sent Certified Mail 
Fax: (800} 574-5066 
Late last week, l sent to you Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company's ("Farm Bureau's") coverage opinion 
regarding the above-referenced matter in a letter dated February 23, 2016. That coverage opinion needed to be 
updated with an analysis of the actual claim and settlement proposal that was submitted by Joseph Stanczak's 
lawyer by his Jetter dated February 1, 2016 ("Settlement Proposal"), a copy of which I have attached to this 
amended coverage opinion. · 
As such, please consider this letter Farm Bureau's amended coverage opinion and reservation of rights regarding 
a claim that has been made against you by Joseph Stanczak with respect to a shooting that occurred at your· 
property located at Bloom Lake, Idaho, on June 28, 2015. 
Last fall you advised us of this potential claim and provided us with communications from Mr. Stanczak's 
attorney indicating that he had been retained and would be in touch. However, we heard nothing further from Mr. 
Stanczak or your on this potential claim, until recently when Fann Bureau received the Settlement Proposal from 
Mr. Stanczak's counsel which will be summarized below. Farm Bureau has now reviewed the Settlement 
Proposal, Edgar Cook's verbal statemeI?,t previously given in this matter, and other relevant documents and 
information in making its coverage decision on this matter. 
Now that an official claim has been made, we have evaluated this claim in light of the insurance policy you have 
with Farm Bureau, specifically Country Squire Insurance Policy 01-A-038872-01 (the "Policy") with the Policy 
period of January 26, 2015 - January 26, 2016. After reviewing the Policy and the information provided to date, 
including your recorded statement, please be advised that there does not appear to be any insurance coverage 
under the Policy for the injuries/damages that are being claimed by Mr. Stanczak, and given the questions raised 
regarding coverage under the Policy, Farm Bureau hereby issues this reservation o(J-iglzts 110tice to you. Granted 
our investigation is ongoing and we are happy to review any additional information you may provide us relative 
to this claim, but at this point, please be advised that there likely is no coverage under the Policy for 
Mr. Stanczak's claims. 
BACKGROUND 
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook are the owners of real property located in Bonner County, 
Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, a lake called Bloom Lake, and a small cabin. It is our understanding 
that neither you nor your wife reside in the cabin located on this property, and in fact, in your sworn statement 
you indicated that the cabin and surrounding property are not close to where you actually reside and you only get 
up to thls property every couple of years. 
It does appear, however, that you do operate some sort of a campground on the real property near Bloom Lake. It 
is our understanding that you do not charge an up-front fee for campers to use this campground and lake, but you 
' 1 · 
; 
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do solicit voluntary financial donations from campers and that campers can leave in a donation box located at the 
campground. You have indicated that the donations are just enough to pay the infrastructure costs for the 
campground. 
For the past seventeen (17) years, you have allowed one Michael Jessie Chisholm ("Chisholm") to reside in the 
cabin on the real property in exchange for taking care of your property, including the lake, the cabin, and the 
campground. It is unclear how Chisholm initially came into contact with you some seventeen ( 17) years ago or · 
how you got to know him. However, Chisholm has never and does not now receive any monetary remuneration 
for his maintenance activities, that is, you have not and do not pay him a wage or salary of any sort. 
There are no public utilities for the cabin and Chisholm pays for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for 
heating or maintenance of the cabin and campground areas. You indicated that Chisolm's main responsibilities 
include keeping the "lake up to specs"; keeping the weeds down; taking out the trash accumulated by the campers 
using the property; and maintaining the road. You indicated that you also provide some equipment to Chisholm 
in order to maintain the real property, including a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator. You have stated 
that you do not believe there is an employment relationship between Chisholm and you, the owners of this 
property. 
On June 28, 2015, Chisholm was involved in an altercation with Joseph Stanczak. Mr. Stanczak was apparently 
camping at the campground when he and Chisholm had an argument and a physical altercation. From news 
reports, the men may have eventually entered the cabin located on the real property. At some point, Chisholm 
fired multiple shots from a .45-caliber automatic pistol at or in the direction of Mr. Stanczak and some of those 
buUets struck Mr. Stanczak. 
The Settlement Proposal contains Mr. Stanczak's version of the events. Mr. Stanczak alleges that on the evening 
of June 28, 2015 Chisholm and his friend. Sarah Johns, were spending time with Mr. Stanczak and his girlfriend, 
Susan Jackson, at the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm became intoxicated. Mr. 
Stanczak was aJso intoxicated as his medical records indicate that his blood alcohol level was 0.24. At some point 
in the evening, Chisholm invited Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jackson into a cabin located at the campground because 
Mr. Stanczak and Susan Jack.<ion claimed to be having trouble fighting off the mosquitoes. Mr. Stanczak alleges 
that sometime after arriving at the cabin (its unclear how much time had passed) Chisholm began acting 
belligerently and inappropriately towards Susan Jackson. An argument ensued, and Mr. Stanczak left the cabin 
and started walking towards Susan Jackson's pickup. As he was waJking, Chisholin apparently exited the cabin 
and pulled out a .45 caliber handgun and shot Mr. Stanczak twice, once in the back and once in the left arm. 
Chisholm then jumped into his truck and drove away from the scene. He crashed his truck and tried to hide in the 
woods, but was later apprehended by the police and taken into custody. 
Chisholm was subsequently charged with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and use of a deadly weapon in 
commission of a felony. In reviewing the repository for the pending criminal case, it appears Mr. Chisholm 
bonded out of jail in late August 2015. Trial was set for January 11, 2016, but on January 5, 2016 Chisholm 
entered an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, which the Judge 
accepted. The use of a deadly weapon in commission of a felony charge was apparently dropped. Chisholm's 
sentencing is currently set for March 8, 2016. 
Mr. St.anczak survived the shooting, but was hospitalized for a period of time. Back in July, Mr. Stanczak 
retained counsel who have advised you that they may be making a claim against you and have asked that you to 
report this potential claim to Fann Bureau. Again, you have previously provided Fann Bureau with that letter. 
Mr. Stanczak's Settlement Proposal contains additional information regarding his injuries and claimed damages 
against you because of Chisholm's actions. Mr. Stanczak's claims against you allege negligence based upon the 
condition of your premises, namely the Bloom Lake Campground. Mr. Stanczak: a1so alleges a theory of recovery 






Mr. Stanczak alleges that he incurred just over $80,000 in medical expenses arising from the shooting. The lion's 
share of these expenses relate to $30,000 for the life flight and $41,000 for expenses relating to his hospital stay at 
Kootenai Medical Center from June 28-30, 2015. The other expenses relate to follow-up treatment, imaging, 
medical and anesthesia services, and follow-up visits. Mr. Stanczak also alleges that he will require $10,000 in 
future medical care for physical therapy services and pain medication. 
Apparently, one of the bullets is still lodged in Mr. Stanczak's pelvic bone and cannot be removed because of its 
proximity to an artery. The bullet apparently causes Mr. Stanczak regular pain. Mr. Stanczak claims to have 
previously worked as a welder but alleged in the letter that he can no longer work as a welder because of his 
injuries. Mr. Stanczak alleges that he made nearly $50,000 a year as a welder and that he has past lost wages in 
the amount of nearly $30,000 and a potential loss of future earning capacity of $840,000 based upon his 21 years 
until retirement age. In the Settlement Proposal, Mr. Stanczak also notes that he has a claim for pain and 
suffering between the range of $500,000 to $3,000,000. 
Mr. Stanczak concludes his Settlement Proposal by making a settlement offer in the amount of $950,000. 
You have previously inquired whether there is any coverage under the Policy and whether Farm Bureau will be 
defending you against any claim that Mr. Stanczak may make against you and your wife. To be clear, the only 
issue this coverage opinion addresses is whether this potential claim by Mr. Stanczak will be covered under your 
Farm Bureau insurance policy. We are not analyzing and offer no opinion as to whether Mr. Stanczak has any 
direct valid legal claim against you and your wife, whether Chisholm was your employee, whether you and your 
wife would have vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondent superior etc. We seriously doubt whether 
Mr. Stanczak can make such a claim against you, but in the event that he does, there does not appear to be any 
insurance coverage for that claim. 
THE POLICY 
The Po1icy has three separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III 
(Automobile). (fu case you do not have your copy handy, I am enclosing another copy of the certified Policy and 
Declaration sheets.) As this claim does not relate to a property or auto loss, only Section II is implicated and will 
be addressed. 
The Policy Declarations list only the individuals Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook as the 
"Insureds." Therds no business or other entity insured by this Policy. The Policy Declarations also note that the 
Policy period is 1/26/2015 - 1/26/2016. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability Coverage include 
coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (coverage Fl) and for Premises Medical Coverage (coverage F2). The Policy 
Declarations also note that premises under Section II includes "Location 02," one residence and 200 acres, which 
js the Bloom Lake Jocation and cabin. Finally. the Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to 
four endorsements, including: Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Llmits). Endorsement I269 
(Limited Employer's Liability Endorsement), Endorsement I282 (Personal Injury Endorsement), and 
Endorsement I287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement). 
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the foUowiog: 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity, 
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming .... 
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or 
keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small 
mammals for fur production .... 
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Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The following are 
also insureds: 
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your household, your 
spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives .... 
Insured location means: 
1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a form or residence, 
including private approaches; 
Insured location does not include property where a business is conducted. 
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the 
same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or property 
damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage 
resulting from a common cause wi11 be considered the result of one occurrence. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is a 
resident of your household, include a ward or foster child. This definition applies 
only if you are a person. 
Residence employees means someone employed by you who performs duties in 
connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises. This . 
includes a person who perfonns duties for you elsewhere of a similar nature not 
in connection with your business or farming. 
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a dwelling that is 
your principal residence, including its grounds and private garages, or (b) that 
part of any other building where you reside. A residence premises does not 
include any part of a building used for business. 
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages. Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) and F2 (Premises 
Medical Coverage). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) allows for the following coverage: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because 
of bodi]y injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this 
coverage applies, we will: 
1. Pay up to our Jimit of Jiability for the damages for which the insured is 
legally liable (damages includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice .... 
The Policy provides coverage under Coverage F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) as follows: 
146
Subject to the limit of liability, we wiJl pay reasonable and necessary medical and 
funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as 
described below. This coverage does not apply to you or residents of your 
household other than residence employees. This coverage applies only: 
l. To a person on the insured location with the permission of any insured .... 
Both of the above-described coverages are subject to several exclusions. including the following: 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II . . . . Section II 
does not cover bodily injury or property damage: 
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any professional service; 
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply 
to the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property. 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law ... if committed by any insured. 
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the followfog: 
I269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-2 
are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and sustained by 
a person performing labor for you in your farming operation .... 
I282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, we cover 
personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than bodi1y injury arising 
out of one or more of the following offenses: 
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment. or malicious prosecution; 
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or 
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry. 
(Bold emphasis in original.) 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF IDAHO LAW REGARDING 
CONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
The Idaho courts have set forth certain rules for determining whether a claim is covered by an insurance policy. 
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured and must be construed the same way as any 
other contract. See Auto Club Ins. Co., Inc. v. Tyrer, 560 F. Supp. 755 (D. Idaho 1983), ajf'd, 734 F.2d 20 (9th 
Cir. 1984); see also Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875, 655 P.2d 82 (1982). Like any other contract, an 
insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, the court looking to the plain and ordinary sense of the words used 
in the policy. See Miller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 702 P.2d 1356 (1985); see also Juker v. 
Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 637 P.2d 792 (1981); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 
P.2d 1387 (1979). Absent ambiguity, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. See 
Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 108 Idaho 597, 701 P.2d 217 (1985). Where the language of the insurance 
policy is clear and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction thereof and coverage must be determined 
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according to the plain meaning of the words employed. See Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.), 110 Idaho 549, 716 
P.2d 1321 (1986). 
Where the language of the insurance policy is susceptible to only one meaning, that meaning will be given effect. 
See Burgess Famis v. New Hampshire Ins. Grp., 108 ldaho 831, 702P.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1985). Where a word or 
phrase in an insurance policy has a settled legal meaning or interpretation, that meaning will be given effect even 
though other interpretations are possible. See Nielsen v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 596 
P.2d 95 (1979); Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cook, 92 Idaho 7,435 P.2d 364 (1967). See also Mut. of 
Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992). However, not every word and phrase in an insurance 
contract needs to be defined. See id.; see also State Fann Fire & Cas. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 
(1997). 
COVERAGE ANALYSIS 
Refen-ing to the Policy language above, your Policy only applies to "bodily injury" caused by an "occmTence" for 
which coverage applies. The plain and unambiguous provisions of the Policy cited above preclude coverage for 
the purposeful and intentional shooting of Mr. Stanczak by Chisholm. There is no coverage for the damage or 
injuries suffered by Mr. Stanczak as a result of the referenced shooting under the Policy under either Section ll Fl 
(Bodily Injury Liability) or F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). There also is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's 
claimed injuries under any other coverages provided for in your Policy. 
A. Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability). 
Again, Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) provides coverage to an Insured if a claim is made or a suit is 
brought against the Insured for damages because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence. Chisholm is not 
covered for his actions under Section 11 Fl. First, Chisholm is not a named Insured under the Policy. The Policy 
was issued just to you and your wife, and the Policy Declarations only list the two of you as the named Insureds. 
There is no business or other entity listed as an Insured. Chisholm is not a "relative'' who might be considered an 
additional insured under the Policy. There is no definition or other provision under the Policy that would include 
Chisolm as an Insured. Because he is not an Insured, Chisolm is not entitled to coverage under the Policy. To the 
extent you had a "business" related to your Bloom Lake property, no such business is insured under the Policy 
and no employees of that business are insured by the Policy. 
Secolld, even if Chisholm was somehow an Insured under the Policy no occurrence occurred under Coverages Fl 
or F2. Again, an occunence is "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful 
conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury .... " Webster's Online Dictionary defines "accident" as a 
"sudden event ... that is not planned or intended and that causes damage or injury." The shooting in question 
was not an accident because it was not a sudden event that was not intended. Rather, if Chisholm shot Mr. 
Stanczak multiple times as reported, his actions were most likely intended to cause injury. Likewise, the shooting 
did not cause unexpected bodily injury. The shooting caused bullet wounds to Mr. Stanczak, which is the 
expected injury when pointing and shooting a gun at another man. 
Courts agree with this interpretation. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Farm Bureait Unde,writers v. 
Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 926-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) recently confirmed the majority view and found no 
coverage under an insurance policy for a shooting because it was not an accident nor did it cause unexpected 
injuries. See also Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Chammus, Case No. 299412, slip op. at 2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 304- Ga. App. 267, 268-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mui. 
Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809 (Ky. App. 2000) (shooting was clearly not an accident, intent to harm inferred from 
nature of act of pointing and shooting gun at victim.); Norman v. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 {Va. 1978); 
Harris v. Richards, 867 P.2d 325 (Kan. 1994) (intent to injure inferred since serious bodily injury was natural 
consequence of shooting gun into back of occupied truck); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 3 
Cir. 1988) (intentional act exclusion barred coverage under policy for shooting through a door knowing someone 
was on other side); Allstate v. Peasley, 80 Wn. App. 565 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal act exclusion applied in 
shooting case as exclusion meant an act for which a criminal conviction may result). 
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You also repmted that Mr. Chisholm may allege that he did not intentionally aim and shoot at Mr. Stanczak, but 
rather, he only intended to fire warning shots at Mr. Stanczak which accidently did, in fact, hit Mr. Stanczak and 
cause injury to him. Even if that is the case and the evidence comes out which supports this assertion by Mr. 
Chisholm, it is doubtful that said fact will change the coverage analysis under your Policy. While there does not 
appear to be any Idaho law on this point, other courts have still found that in this situation there is no 
"occurrence" under an insurance policy because there still was an intentional act of firing a gun irrespective of 
whether the gun was aimed at the shooting victim and regardless of whether the shooter intended to actually cause 
physical harm to the shooting victim. The injury suffered by the victim was still the natural consequence of the 
intentional acts of picking up a loaded gun, aiming in the direction of the victim, and pulling the trigger. Berry v. 
McLemore, 795 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no occmTence under policy even though shooter only fired warning 
shots; intentional act of firing weapon sufficed to find no coverage); Allstate v. Cannon, 44 F.Supp. 31 (E.D. 
Mish. 1986) (fact that rifle was discharged intentionally resulting in finding of no occurrence under the policy and 
no coverage despite fact shooter meant to only fire warning shots). 
In Jight of the foregoing, Mr. Stanczak's claims related to his injuries and damages do not descdbe an 
"occurrence," and without an occurrence under the PoJicy, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's injuries or 
damages. 
Third, even jf Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an occurrence occurred under the Policy, there are 
specific Policy exclusions that would also bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims. Mr. Stanczak has argued that 
the operation of the campground was a business activity of yours because you invited or licensed campers to 
come on to your property for a voluntary donation. They will further argue that Chisholm was your employee, 
because even though he was not paid a wage or salary he was paid to do work on your property by vh1ue of the 
fact that you allowed him to reside in your cabin on this property without paying rent. If Chisholm was somehow 
your employee {ignoring that he would likely still not be performing duties within the scope of his employment) 
given that you had some business related to the operation of Bloom Lake and the campground, then Mr. 
Stanczak's claims would still be spedfically excluded under Section II Exclusion Number 1 because you have no 
insurance coverage under this Policy arising out of any of your "business activities." This would be the case 
even, if as you have indicated, your operation of the campground and lake was only a break even proposition as 
best given the fee collections generated from campers. 
In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically look at: whether the activity is 
customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and purpose of the activity are commercial in nature, 
and in furtherance of the business, or the means oflivelihood. Blacks v. Fireman's Fund American Ins., 115 
Idaho 449 (Ct.App. 1989). Applying these factors, your activity of offering up campground sites in exchange for 
a voluntary fee, may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be deemed to be commercial in nature. 
And it does not appear to matter whether you made a profit on this activity for it to be considered a business 
pursuit which would then bar any coverage for that activity under your Po1icy. 
Similarly, Section II Exclusion Number 3 excludes bodily injury intentionally caused by an Insured. Thus, even 
if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the Po1icy-which he is not-his intentional act of 
shooting Mr. Stanczak would be excluded. Again, Chisolm may say that he did not intentionally cause bodily 
injury to Mr. Stanczak, but that he was shooting warning shots. The intentional act of shooting a gun near a 
person is sufficient grounds to deny coverage under Section II Exclusion Number 3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herman, 
551 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. 1990) (Intentionally firing gun into a fleeing crowd is an egregious act and intent to injure 
may be inferred as a matter of law). 
Finally, Section II Exclusion Number 14 excludes bodily injury that arises out of the violation of a criminal Jaw 
by an Insured. As noted above, Chisolm has entered a guilty plea for the charge of aggravated battery with a 
deadly weapon. The type of guilty plea entered by Chisolm is called an Alford plea. Under Idaho law, an Alford 
plea occurs where a defendant enters a plea of guilty, but asserts that he or she is innocent. Irrespective, an Alford 
plea is a guilty plea. State v. Salisbury, 143 Idaho 476, 147 P.3d 108 (2006). A judge has discretion to accept an 
Alford plea and will do so only where there is sufficient evidence that that the prosecution would Jikely be able to 
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persuade a jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, it sounds like the judge 
presiding over the criminal case has accepted Chisholm's Alford plea, thus finding that the prosecution would 
likely be able to convict Mr. Chisholm of this crime if it moved forward. 
In this situation, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admits to violating criminal law. Chisholm 
gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by entering into the Alford plea. He and others are bound by ms 
admission and abandonment of his defenses. One court has noted the following: 
Under an Alford plea, a defendant maintains innocence while entering a plea of 
guilty because the defendant concJudes that his interests require entry of a guilty 
plea and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt. A 
guilty plea is an admissfon of aH the elements of the criminal charge. Guilty pleas 
must be rooted in fact before they may be accepted. Accordingly, courts treat 
Alford pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a guilty plea. The collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea may not be avoided by the simultaneous assertion 
of illllocence. 
Cortese v. Black, 838 F.Supp. 485, 492 (D. Colo. 1993). See also, Merchants Mutual Ins. Co. v. Arzillo, 98 
A.D.2d 495, 472 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y.App.Div. 1984) (with Alford type plea, the issues representing the essential 
elements of the crime have necessarily been judicially determined by the acceptance of the plea); State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 140 Ore. App. 89, 914 P.2d 697 (Or.Ct.App. 1996) (acceptance of plea is the equivalent of a 
judicial determination of each of the material elements of the crime). 
Chisholm admits to violating a criminal law. So, even if Chisholm was an Insured under the Policy and an 
occurrence did occur, it arose out of a violation of Idaho criminal law and the intentional act exclusion of the 
Policy is therefore implicated. Therefore, there is no coverage. See Colorado Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 909 (Colo. Ct.App. 1997) (guilty plea to intentional criminal act precluded coverage under 
homeowners insurance policy; no duty to defend or indemnify; intent cannot be relitigated so as to avoid the 
intentional act exclusion of an insurance policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Groshek, 161 Mich.App. 703, 
411 N.W.2d 480 (Mich.Ct.App. 1987) (defendant's guilty plea established the necessary intent to make the 
insurance policy's exclusionary clause applicable). 
Bottom line, under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) of the Policy, there does not appear to be any coverage 
for the injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may claim arising out of being shot by Chisholm. 
B. Section Il F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). 
For all the same reasons, there is no coverage for Mr. Stanczak's potentially claimed medical expenses under 
Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. This section does not require that the actors be insured. 
Rather, it gives coverage for medical costs for those who suffer bodily injury caused by an occurrence to those 
who are on the fosured location with permission of an Insured. From what we understand, there may be no 
dispute that Mr. Stanczak was on the insured location with permission, if he in fact was camping at the 
campground on your property. 
However, there was still no occurrence as that term is defined in the Policy. As outlined above, shooting 
someone is not an accident and does not caused unexpected injuries. Without an occurrence causing bodily 
injury, there is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy for Mr. Stanczak's 
potentially claimed medical expenses. 
Even if there was an argument that there was an occurrence under the Policy, the same exclusions, specificaJly 
Exclusion Nos. 1, 3 and 14 identified and discussed above, would preclude coverage for any medical expenses 
claim by Mr. Stanczak arising out of the shooting. 
i· 
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As such, there is no coverage for any claimed medical expenses of Mr. Stanczak under Section II F2 (Premises 
Medical Coverage) of the Policy. 
C. Other Language of the Policy. 
Someone mny argue that Chisholm somehow is a "resjdence employee" under the Policy and that as result 
thereof, coverage for Mr. Stanczak' s claims exists. As outlined above, the Policy does define a residence 
employee as someone who performs duties in connection with the maintenance or use of a "residence premises." 
Certain coverages are then provided for those residence employees, for example, to the extent they are hurt on an 
insured premise or insured location. However, Chisholm is not a residence employee as that term is defined in the 
Policy. The maintenance that employee performs must be in connection with the "residence premises," which is 
also a defined term in the Policy. That term is limited to a dwelling that is the insured's principal residence or 
part of any other building where the insured resides. You have made it clear in your statement that neither you 
nor your wife reside in the cabin or at Bloom Lake. In addition, the Policy only affords coverage for the actions 
of residence employees that occur off an insured location and are caused by activities within the residence 
employee's course and scope of the employment by you, the Insured. Neither of these requirements is satisfied 
here because the shooting allegedly occurred on an insured location and Chisholm was not acting in the course 
and scope of his employment by you. 
In addition, the same exclusions under Section II would bar coverage for Mr. Stanczak's claims even if Chisholm 
was somehow found to be a "residence employee" as that term is defined in the Policy. 
We have also confirmed that none of the Policy "endorsements" provide or contemplate any additional coverage 
that would cover Mr. Stanczak's claims. None of the endorsements provided on the declaration sheet for this 
Policy are applicable. For example, Endorsement 1269 (0108), the Limited Employers Liability Endorsement, 
only contemplates coverage for someone injured while engaging in farming activities. Chisholm did not engage 
in farming activities as contemplated by the Policy definition. Similarly, Endorsement 1282 (1014), the Personal 
Injury Endorsement, does not contemplate coverage for injuries arising from an intentional shooting but rather 
deal with personal injury resulting from specific offenses like false arrest, libel and slander, and invasion of 
privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of the foregoing analysis and our investigation to date, there does not appear to be coverage for the 
injuries and damages that Mr. Stanczak may assert. As such, Farm Bureau is hereby reserving any rights and 
defenses which may now exist and all rights and defenses which it may later have under all the term.c,, conditions, 
provisions and exclusions of your insurance Policy with Farm Bureau This letter is intended to provide you with 
an explanation of Parm Bureau's current position in relation to the investigation of Mr. Stancz.ak's potential claim 
and the lack of coverage for that claim under the terms of the Policy. This letter does not alter in any way or 
amend the terms of the Policy, nor is this letter intended to provide an exhaustive recitation of Farm Bureau's 
coverage position on all matters discussed herein. Fann Bureait reserves all rights aud defenses which may 
now exist and all rights and defenses wl,ich it may hereafter have under any or all of the tenns, co1tditio11s, 
provisiom;, e11dorsements1 and exclusions of the Policy whether or ,wt they are referenced in this feller. Fann 
Bureau specifically reserves its rights to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify or amend this 
coverage position based upon further investigation of the facts and circumstances pertaining to this matter or 
based upon any additional information you or anyone else may provide. Farm Bureau also reserves the right to 
seek a judicial determination of its rights and obligations, if any, under the Policy. 
To the extent additional information is provided or a specific claims is made, Farm Bureau wHl certainly continue 
to investigate this claim even though it does not appear any coverage would exist under the Policy for Mr. 
Stanczak's claims. However, no act of any Fann Bureau representative while investigating this claim shall be 
construed as waiving any company rights. Farm Bureau reserves the right, under the Policy, to continue to deny 
coverage to anyone claiming coverage under the Policy related to the shooting that is the subject of this coverage 
opinion. 
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Fann Bureau also reserves the right to supplement or update this Jetter. No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm 
Bureau in connection with this claim sha11 constitute an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under 
the Policy that is at issue. 
In addition, please be aware of your continuing obligation to fu]ly and completely cooperate in connection with 
this matter, together with your obligation to keep Farm Bureau fully informed and apprised of developments as 
they proceed. Again, it is our understanding that no lawsuit has yet been filed against you by Mr. Stanczak. In 
the event you are served with any other demand or lawsuit, please notify me immediately and forward copies of 
all documents served on you to my attention so that I can continue my coverage review. 
If you have any questions as to the content of this coverage position letter, please feel free to contact me. 
Sinc~rely, ~ · 
: 
Steve Johnso' ;. . . . : -
Sr. Regional Claims Manager 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co 









James L. Martin 
(208) 385-5303 
jlm@moffatt.com 
March 22, 2016 
via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
Edgar and Laurie Cook 
c/o Elmira Store & Cafe 
490870 Highway 95 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Re: Claim No. 01038872012015062801 
Claim by Josepla Stanczak 
Policy No. 01-A-028872-01 
Date of Loss: June 28, 2015 
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252 
Dear Mr. Cook: 
MOFFATT 
THOMAS 
Attomeys at Law 
MAILING ADDRESS: 
1'0Bax829 
Boise ID 83"/01.Q829 
Wll'IV. mof/atc.com 
PHYSICAL ADDRESS: 
101 S Capirol Blvd !Od, Fl 




Our firm has been assisting your insurance company, Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
("Fann Bureau") with its investigation and coverage determinations regarding the claim being 
made by Joseph Stanczak for the injuries that he sustained at your north Idaho property at 
Bloom Lake when he was allegedly shot by Michael Chisholm on June 28, 2015. We 
understand that Farm Bureau has previously provided you with two separate reservation of 
rights notices ("ROR Notices") wherein it indicated to you that there did not appear to be any 
coverage under your Farm Bureau policy for the claims of.Mr. Stanczak, but that it was 
continuing with its investigation and reserving all rights in the meantime. 
The purpose of this letter is to advise you that Farm Bureau has now completed its 
investigation. We are not aware of any additional information that has been provided to Farm 
Bureau by you or Mr. Stanczak's attorney since Farm Bureau sent out its prior ROR Notices. 
Nor are we are aware of any information that would otherwise change the coverage analysis 
contained within those prior ROR Notices. 
As such, Farm Bureau has concluded that there is no coverage under your Farm Bureau 
insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that occurred on your property on June 
28, 2015 involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael Chisholm. As such, Fann Bureau will not be 
able to provide you with a defense for any claim or resulting lawsuit filed by Mr. Stanczak. Nor 
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will Farm Bureau be able to indemnify you for any resulting judgment arising from any such 
Jm.ysuit or this claim. By separate letter, a copy of which is enclosed, we have advised Mr. 
Sfanczak's attorney of this coverage determination. 
Fann Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the policy's insuring agreement, as well as other 
coverage provisions and Jimitations set forth in the policy imd which were described to you in 
detail in the prior ROR Notices which are incorporated herein by reference. Farm Bureau 
reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage and does not admit any 
obligations under the policy. Certainly. if Farm Bureau is provided additional information from 
you or others regarding Mr. Stanczak's claim or the subject incident, then Farm Bureau reserves 
the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the extent that additional 
information is detennined to be relevant to this coverage determination. 
Farm Bureau continues to fuJly and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now 
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the terms, 
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as wel1 as all endorsements thereto, 
irrespective of whether or not they are referenced in its prior ROR Notices. Farm Bureau 
specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and amend 
its coverage determination based UP,On :further investigation of the fact or circumstances 
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it. 
No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute 
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the.subject Farm Bureau policy. 















James L. Martin 
(208) 385-5303 
jlm@moffan.com 
June 2, 2016 
via Overnight Delivery 
Edgar and Laurie Cook 
c/o Elmira Store &. Cafe 
490870 Highway 95 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Re: Claim No. 01038872012015062801 
Claim by Joseph Stanczak 
Policy No. 01-A-028872-01 
Date of Loss: June 28, 2015 
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252 
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Cook: 
MOFFATT 
THOMAS 
Attorneys at Law 
MAILING ADDRESS: PHYSICAL ADDRESS: 
PO Box 829 101 S Capitol Blvd 10th Fl 
Boise ID 83701-0829 Boise ID 83702-7710 
www.moffan.com 208.345.2000 MAIN 
800.422.2889 TOLL-FREE 
208.385.5384 FAX 
On May 12, 2016, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") filed a Complaint for Damages in Bonner 
County, Idaho (the "Complaint") against Ed W. Cook and Laurie Cook, as husband and wife, 
and doing business as Bloom Lake Campground and also Jesse Chisholm. That case is now 
pending in Bonner County as Civil Case No. 2016-679. That Complaint was provided to your 
insurance carrier Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ("Farm Bureau"). Farm Bureau 
asked that my law firm evaluate the allegations and claims asserted in that Complaint to see if it 
changes in any manner, Fann Bureau's prior insurance coverage positions where it denied any 
duty to defend or indemnify you for the claims that were or might be asserted against you by 
Stanczak. (See my denial letter to you dated March 22, 2016 and Farm Bureau's initial 
reservation of rights letters that were sent to you dated February 23 , 2016, and March 2, 2016). 
The Complaint seeks damages for Stanczak's injuries when he was shot by Chisholm on June 
28, 2015, at the Bloom Lake Campground, which is owned by Ed and Laurie Cook ("You" or 
"the Cooks"). Stanczak alleges that the Bloom Lake Campground is a "for profit" campground 
owned and operated by You. He also alleges that Chisholm was your employee because he 
acted as caretaker of the Bloom Lake Campground. 
The factual allegations in the Complaint are similar to those alleged in previous correspondence 
from Stanczak's counsel. Stanczak alleges that on June 28, 2015, he was camping at the Bloom 
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Lake Campground with his girlfriend, Sally Johns. Chisholm invited Stanczak and Sally Johns 
into a cabin located at the Bloom Lake Campground to stay the night. Chisholm allegedly 
became intoxicated and an argument ensued between Chisholm and Stanczak. Stanczak left the 
cabin, and as he was walking away from the cabin, Chisholm fired a .45 caliber handgun at him. 
Two bullets struck Stanczak, one in the arm and one in the back. Stanczak sustained serious 
injuries. Chisholm left the scene and was later apprehended by law enforcement. Law 
enforcement found several other firearms at the cabin at the Bloom Lake Campground. 
Stanczak has alleged four causes of action in his Complaint: (1) Premises Liability against the 
Cooks and the Bloom Lake Campground; (2) Negligent Supervision of Chisholm against the 
Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground; (3) Strict Liability against Chisholm; and (4) Negligent, 
Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct against Chisholm. 
This letter does not analyze the legal viability of each of these causes of action that have been 
a-sserted against You and Chisholm by Stanczak. Rather, we have simply analyzed whether the 
allegations and claims contained in the Complaint trigger any insurance coverage under your 
Farm Bureau insurance policy ("Policy") that was not previously reviewed and discussed in 
Farm Bureau's prior coverage opinions that You have been provided. After conducting a 
review of this newly filed Complaint, Farm Bureau is still of the opinion that there is no 
coverage under your Farm Bureau insurance policy for the allegations and claims asserted by 
Stanczak. 
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR THE ALLEGATIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT 
As you know, Farm Bureau has previously advised You that there is no coverage under your 
Farm Bureau Policy for the claims Stanczak has made against You. 
Section I (Property) and Section II (Liability) are the two sections of the Policy that are 
implicated. Farm Bureau originally denied coverage for the shooting incident under Section II 
on the following grounds: First, Chisholm is not an insured under the policy. Second, no 
"occurrence" occurred under the Policy because the intentional shooting of a firearm does not 
fall within the definition of "occurrence" under the Policy. In short, the intentional shooting of 
a firearm was not an accident. Third, there is an exclusion under the Policy that precludes 
coverage for claims arising from business activities. Stanczak argued previously that the 
Bloom Lake Campground was a business. Farm Bureau denied coverage on the grounds that 
the claim appeared to be related to a business activity. Fourth, there is an exclusion under the 
Policy for claims arising from intentional acts of an insured. Farm Bureau denied coverage to 
Stanczak's claim because the act of shooting a gun by Chisholm was intentional, to the extent 
that Chisholm was somehow considered an insured under the Policy. Fifth, the Policy contains 
an exclusion for claims that arise out of the violation of a criminal law by an insured. Chisholm 
has pied guilty, via an Alford plea, to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon and is currently 
incarcerated and serving his time in prison for this incident. Thus, Farm Bureau denied 
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coverage based upon the criminal law exclusion and Chisholm's guilty plea, to the extent that 
Chisholm was an insured under the policy. 
Farm Bureau also previously denied coverage under Section I (Property) of the Policy for 
reasons 2-5 above. Farm Bureau also looked at and considered other portions of the Policy and 
the endorsements and was unable to identify any other provisions or endorsements which would . 
give rise to any coverage for Stanczak' s injuries and claim. 
Farm Bureau has now performed this same review again in light of the filing of the Complaint 
to confirm its prior coverage position. Again, it has determined that the allegations contained in 
the Complaint do not give rise to any coverage under your Farm Bureau Policy. 
A. The Premises Liability Cause of Action Against the Cooks and Bloom Lake 
Campground 
The first cause of action is a premises liability claim against the Cooks and Bloom Lake 
Campground. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground owed a duty to 
Stanczak as an invitee of the Campground. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake 
Campground breached this duty when they failed to take ordinary and reasonable care to keep 
the premises safe and/or to warn Stanczak about Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable conduct, 
namely, Chisholm becoming intoxicated and discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges that this 
breach of duty caused his damages. Stanczak does not state that Chisholm pointed the gun at 
him and fired. Rather, he alleges that as Stanczak was walking away, Chisholm fired rounds 
from his .45 caliber handgun and two of these rounds struck Stanczak. 
The premises liability cause of action against the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground does not 
trigger coverage under the Policy. While the Cooks are named insureds under the Policy, no 
"occurrence" occurred to trigger coverage under either Section I or Section II of the Policy. An 
occurrence means "an accident ... which results in unexpected bodily injury or property 
damage." Chisholm admitted the elements of his offense when he entered into his plea 
agreement. One of these elements is the intent to batter someone. This admission precludes 
coverage because it was not an accident resulting in unexpected bodily injury. In addition, the 
allegations in the Complaint continue to assert that the Cooks were running a for-profit business 
at the Bloom Lake Campground. As the shooting as alleged by Stanczak, arose from the 
Cooks' alleged "business activities", it is also not covered per the business activities exclusion 
contained within your Policy. 
B. The Negligent Supervision Claim Against the Cooks and Bloom Lake 
Campground 
Stanczak alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground had a duty to supervise their 
agent/employee Chisholm from injuring guests at the Campground. He alleges that the Cooks 
and Bloom Lake Campground breached this duty by failing to prevent Chisholm from 
becoming intoxicated and discharging a weapon. He alleges that the Cooks and Bloom Lake 
Client:4168126.1 
159
Edgar and Laurie Cook 
June 2, 2016 
Page 4 
Campground breached the duty by failing to protect Stanczak or warn Stanci;ak from the 
dangers posed by Chisholm becoming intoxicated and discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges 
that these breaches caused his injuries and damages. 
The same grounds as outlined above for denying coverage for the first cause of action for 
premises liability exist for denying the second cause of action for negligent supervision. There 
was no occurrence and the cause of action asserted relates to business activities that You are to 
have alleged to have conducted on your property. In short, your Farm Bureau Policy did not 
provide commercial general liability protection or coverage. You did not purchase that kind of 
an insurance policy from Farm Bureau and the Policy you did purchase specifically excludes 
any coverage from any "business activity" or claim arising out of a "business activity". 
C. The Strict Liability Claim Against Chisholm 
Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was engaged in the ultra-hazardous activities of maintaining a 
loaded firearm on the premises, handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated while in close 
proximity to Stanczak, and firing a loaded firearm while intoxicated. Stanczak alleges that he 
was not aware that Chisholm had a firearm, that it was pointed in his general direction, or that 
the firearm was loaded. The same grounds as outlined above require denial of coverage for this 
cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. Farm Bureau is not aware 
that you had anyone working for you or employed by you in any capacity. Moreover, the 
shooting was not an occurrence and, per the allegations contained in the Complaint, it relates to 
the insureds' business activities and there is no coverage for the same. 
D. The Negligence, Reckless, and Tortious Conduct 
Stanczak alleges that Chisholm owed a duty to him of reasonable care to handle the firearm in a 
safe manner, not to handle or discharge the firearm while intoxicated, and to protect those 
around Chisholm from an unreasonable risk of harm. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm breached 
these duties by handling the firearm in an unsafe manner while intoxicated, maintaining a 
dangerous condition on the premises by having a loaded gun, failing to give warning to 
Stanczak of the hazard on the premises, and exposing him to an unreasonable risk of harm on 
the premises. Again, the same grounds as outlined above required denial of coverage for this 
cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. The shooting was not an 
occurrence and, per the allegations contained in the Complaint, it relates to the insureds' 
business activities and there is no coverage for the same. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau has once again concluded that there is no coverage 
under your Farm Bureau insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that occurred 
on your property on June 28, 2015, involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael Chisholm. As 
such, Farm Bureau will not be able to provide you with a defense for the lawsuit filed by Mr. 
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Stanczak in Bonner County. Nor will Farm Bureau be able to indemnify you for any resulting 
judgment or settlement arising from that lawsuit. 
We hope that you have already obtained your own attorney to defend this action and if you 
haven't we would suggest that you immediately do so. You certainly will need to act _timely to 
respond to the allegations in the Stanczak Complaint and take the appropriate actions to defend 
that matter. 
Farm Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the Policy's insuring agreement, as well as other 
coverage provisions and limitations set forth in the Policy and which were described to you in 
detail in the prior Denial and ROR Notices which are incorporated herein by reference. Farm 
Bureau reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage and does not admit 
any obligations under the Policy. Certainly, if Farm Bureau is provided additional information 
from you or others regarding Mr. Stanczak's claim, the subject incident, or resulting lawsuit, 
then Farm Bureau reserves the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the 
extent that additional information is determined to be relevant to this coverage determination. 
Farm Bureau continues to fully and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now 
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the terms, 
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as well as all endorsements thereto, 
irrespective of whether or not they are referenced in its prior Denial and ROR Notices. Farm 
Bureau specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and 
amend its coverage determination based upon further investigation of the fact or circumstances 
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it. 
No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute 
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the subject Farm Bureau Policy. 
NEW DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION FILED BY FARM BUREAU 
Finally, to confirm that Farm Bureau has neither a duty to defend or indemnify You with 
respect to the claims asserted in the Complaint, Farm Bureau has filed an insurance declaratory 
judgment action in Bonner County, Idaho against You. The attached Amended Complaint is 
being sent up to be filed in that action. We will get you served with that Amended Complaint 
once it is filed and the appropriate summonses have been issued. 
Please consult with vour own attornev regarding this separate legal action which has now 
been filed against You. Again the purpose oftliis separate lawsuit is to confirm Farm 
Bureau's lack of any obligation to defend or indemnifv You related to the claims asserted by 
Stanczak. Once the Amended Complaint is served upon You, you will have twenty (20) days 
to respond to this complaint as well. 
Again, we would strongly recommend that you have your own attorney advise you and 
represent you regarding these two different matters. If you have .a lawyer already, please have 
them contact me so that we can discuss these issues. 
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Very tru y yours, 
~~ 
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Pefe.udai-it I,aµ,.ie Cook, Upon inf 01mation ~nd b~lief, at all times material hereto Defendant Ed 
W, Cool< owned and operated th~ Bloom Li:lke Campground in Bonn.er Coµ.nt-;, State of Idaho, as 
a priva~ for~proftt busine$s, tog~ther with Defendant Lauri" Cook. 
1.3 ~l':llM:\'t:ff. i.P;1.JJ1Ji <:;:..QQI~ Opon il;tfor.mation arid beli~f, f;\t all times me\tt}rifl.l 
hereto Dofemdant La1.Jrie Cook reisided in Bonner Couu·cy-1 State of Xdab.01 and was 1nanied to 
D.e!0ndaut Ed W. Coo~. U f,1Qtl. infon1l~ti~.n end l:ieliet at ~11 tu1.1.@s 1P,,a,terl11l 1li;,ret0 D.~f~nd..ant U.ude. 
Cook owµ.ed and opeiat~d tl;le '.Blqom L~ke Qrunpgro1rod in. Boroer Coi,mty, State of ld.;dio, as a 
private for .. proflt l)U1.l1Jl~S&, toieth!.;ll' with D~end&it Er:!. W, CQt>k, 
.1.4 D~~L~f ..OQM t,AIIB ~ MPQRO:miQ.; Upon information aµd b~li~f 
and at all times l'l;ltit~ril\l hereto. J)ef011clant Bloom Lal(e Ca'{Ilpgrouud is a for-pro6.t caqipgrouru.i 
and rr;s;oreatiqn~ a:r!:Ja loc;i.ue-d in Bo:p.n~t Couut')I, Stat~ ofldabo, privately ownijd. im.d op~awd by 
Defendants Ed W. Cook; Md U!urle Cook. Plaintiff was ivjured on or ~bout June is, :2015, while 
~taying at th.e Bloom J:Jike ~mpivourw. 
1.5 QEf'Rt'WAtf!....ML~L .J~~SE QiilSHQ.LM; At all ti.mCIS m•"iaJ he~. 
Pefer~t Mfoh~ Jll~tile Chhlhohn ~~id~d m Bonqer CPWJ.tr, Stat,;>, of Idaho, at the ofl.1'.'etaker's 
cabin of fu; Bloom Lflkgi Cronpgi'O ~4, Up~m Ln:ft:i1,nmioii !m!'.l bel.iet at a.11 t:i,m.es nin:retifl.l b.0,"etQ 
Deff$n<mnt Chlaht>lm w~ tlie em.plQyoe. :.md/or t\~ft\1 ofD@fondt1nts Eel W. Cook. U\t-ltie Cool~ ;md 
BloQm t,el~@ CwJilpgr~uJl.d, A1.'1,d wiii tht µ!':)$1: ~d c~r(t)tah:.e~· of th~ cronpgro'-!n.d, 
1.6 1'hb Cow·t ha!ll Juris4iotjop. attcl vemu~ i$ ~~rop:ri~t~ by virtu~ Qt' ld~b.9 Codi,, §§ 5,. 
404 <Uld 5~~14. 
165
I.I. !JllfNE~~,iIIOM§ 
2, 1 Plaintiff :r~alkige$ anq irworporatea l:>y refe.x~nce all other paragraphs of ~ 
Cor!.lplai..ut as if fif$t forth l~C!ll'eiii. 
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r0a£1ona.µly .\I life frqm au.cl to :wam Plajnti!f PfDe:f¢.ndant (;bisholm' s feasona.bly for~eeable 
oondw~. 
J.lA De:fo.~~ts JE<l. W, Co~k~ L.at;irl~ Cook, a:nq Bloom trike CwnpgrotJml. and 
@a9h o-f th~~ 1:,re~c~d tlii~ dufy by f~lllilt to w~ guuJ protect P.laintJf:f i\'00:1 a fir@at'm. 
b~mg diseharg?d by I;etbas:laut Cbishohµ wbil@ iu.-w;x:ioo.ted on the Defel,ldan~ 1 prnperty, 
3.2..5 A.a a dire~t and pFWrimate l'e!llult of th~ Pefend&ntl.l' aot3 0r Oll'\issfonsi 
Plaintiff Wt!.S serioµsl.y injt.tted. Plamtiif ha.'> 1n~t1!':recl. ru1d ~vm Likely COi}Il!U)C to inc.ur 
damages, These dan.1age.s U'lGl.iide tn,edfoal e.,,;pe:us!;lS, los.t wageii, out..of~poc;ket 0Jtp0ns~$, 
au4 oth_er a.pens~s to~ pr9v~d at the time of4~1, all to s~d :rt~xtifs gen1.?ral dmmigea 
in an MlOUllt now ~kno'Wll., The&; damage~ fL_irther i;nalude pl,'J.;,S'.ical injury, dimir. i~heo 
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ability to fmlction. at home a:od wctrk, disfigurem~ut, anxiety, frustration, conoem., and 
general etnotional 11pset · 
S~~t\d C~~WU.~.timu NMJ~@~d-&~nriffll!! 
.(A,s _t1> J}efeat:§am1t Ed"':, ~fJ~l&, l,a1pje !;g(J,k,.a1Jd lt~!!l.14!l~e.,&;amp~·o_tQMJ) 
3.2.6 Piaintiffreallegea and iucorponrtes by rwfenmce all other pa:ragr~pbs of this 
Complaint as if set forth herein. 
3 .2. 7 Defelidiw.1·s Ed W. Cook;, Laurie Co9k, and Blqom Lake Cl!Jll.pground 
breached a common la.w duty qf t'lllij~Ot)J1ble 9lll'~ by foiling to J)l'Qp~ly s'!.lpervise. their 
agent/~mpl9yee, Defen~ant Mich~eil J@i,$.e Chisholm., to px-c:vcnt injury tq cainpground 
invitees end lioens~es o:q th@ir prop.irty, includini the Plai.p,tiff. 
3.2.8 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Lau,rie Cook,, and Bloom Lak1;1 Ctunpgroun,d, a.ud 
each Qf th~m, breached the common law duty of reasonabl~ gare by fmUng to pr~p~ly 
supervise Defendant CWsholm to prev~t him from becoming intm;icated ~d dischargm; 
fir~. which could result in injury to canwwound .invitees and lic?ruiees, incfoding th~ 
Plaintiff. 
3..2.9 Defen,~ts Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and 13looni Li:!k@ Campgr<:iund, an,.d 
each of them, breached the eommo.n law dut, of reasonabl~ oare py failing to protect ftqm 
or WE\l'n Pl~tiif of the dfu.1gon, pos~d by Defenc4int Chiiholm becoming intoxicat~d an.d 
discharging firearms. 
3.2.10 A! a pro~im!;!.te re~ult cfD,rendant~ E(l W. Cook; L~mrie Coo~ and Bloom 
Lake Cm.npgrol.!.nd's tir~aclies of duty, e..c."tB, and omfasions ii.s d~$oribe:d ab.ov~. Plaiutiff 
was injured by multiple .45 Galiber rounds while at the Bloom Lake Cam.wgrotmd. 
COM'.PLAil'>IT FOR DAMAOES • s 
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3.2.11 D@fendant Micha,1 Je~se Chisho.lm1 while in the cours~ and scope of his 
en1ployJ+1~mt itnd agency as host and o~t<1ker of the Bloom La.le@ Cai;npg:round. viobited 
statu(:ory ®d oommon law duties by discharging a firearm while intoxicated. 
3.~.U As a dir;;:pt and proximate t'esult of the Qe:fenclan:ts' acts or om:il3sioua. 
and oth~r t>Jq.'.ii,tmi~s to be fll'OV!i?d (:lt the time of trial. an to allid Plamtiff s geniraj, dami:lies 
ill a:n amount now tlD./cnown. Tb~tJ~ dw].1flg@S fll.rthijr include physical hajury, dimloished 
3 .z. D PJ~i.rrtlff' r~all~g©& ~ i,nomipo:,;,at~s by r@f'e~.no~ ~11 flth~r pailJ.gf-aph~ qftbis 
Com1h1mt as if s,t forth b~~m; 
J.Z.14 Defenda.nt lv:ijQhii~1 J~r,(tl ChJshohu wa.e in'liag<m in ultra ... JmzfwclQus 
ootivitles, iri91~ hut ~Qt Jmdw.d w; 
a. Mru.otra,i:ofng i loru:tet:I tir~-u on. tbe prtimfoe:;1; 
b. H.an.dU,Hi a loaded fi.ri::arru <>1hile l.nt0~ictttecl, in clos~ 
pronm.ity t,, Plaintiff and oihm'Si and 
c, Flrlu& a loaded :.(ire;um wbile iiitoX..ic~ted, reeulti:u~ m Plaiut.if'f 
b1m1g faj1Jr~d. 
3 .;i, lS. PlQintiff diq not JQ10,v 'tha:t Om@l&mt ChlshoJrn h,,d a hfl.nd!P,Ul. thf!t the ~m 
WM pointed in his eerter-"11 dirii:ction. or thtit th~ gun, was load@d. Plemtif!ba~ hfa bae.k tlUmcl 
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by a roµnd fil'ed from a flr?arm, 
3.2,16 Defendant Chisholm is Jiabl~ tQ Plaintiff for all ~es proxiroa~ly ea_t'ISed. 
by ~ch o.f srud activities, regc\,fdless of the degree of ~e or ue~Ugenc~ on the pa~ of the 
~ .:i, l 7 As a direct a11ti proxim.ate r~$W.t of th~ De:fol'l.rl~llt' Ii ~ts or oinh,ision&~ 
J?lei.intiff w.as ~lou~ly mjur!ii4, Plaintiff hwi hwiJrre~ ang will likely contm.1,.te to incu.r 
~s. These d;;i.~g.~s inclyde modioa.1 ~xpeiJS®$1 lost wage.s, o~lt,..of--poc~t exp~WiflS, 
@4 othet f:'Ipens~3 to be p~·ovcd at the ti:t(le of ~l, all to s.aid P-lah1tiff s genet~ damages 
ir.. i.µi amount now unkno'llv.o.. Those c.mtm:1.g!.ls furthet' in.Glud~ physical hajWY, dim,W84.ed 
ability to function at home and w~n·ll;, disi!igux~,m01It, an.~ety. fi:usttatkm., ci;:,ncei'II., !'lnd 
general enio1;ional ups"t. 
L-,.~. to I!,feng99t Mi®nfll J easp ,Q!!sue!wl 
3.4-. l 8 :Pli:tiutU'fi."Cilalleg@S. IUld in(:;orporate~ by referetioc all other par~gt'i4phs ofthia 
Complaint a~ if see forth lwr~ln. 
$.2.19 At all ti:mes matetjal h~-eto, Piofenc:!a.11t Chhholm had ~~'tam duties 
Jrnposed l.lp.On him by law, wbieh P~fepd~t then ap.q thm·e owed to Pla.4J.tiff, in~lU(iiug the 
duties to han?l~ his gi.m in a manmw tna.t was eaf01 tP not hand!~ or di$01J.EIJ:g~ the gun whHe 
intoxic-;at~d, aml to pmU:ct pliiu:sona O'I:), thi,: ptewis~s from. Ullre~l.ie>J;).able risk of harp.t 
Pefend11nt torti9usly. l).egligently, r,1.13,d r~cklessly breached f1eiid d1,1tio.s by: 
I..\. H@s.iling tile ,45 caUber handsun in ~ UD!}fJ.fe lll~er whll~ 
intoxicated, result.ing in i..njury to Plaintiff; 
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1 "t " I 
1:,. Mah:i.taini:ng l,l, dqerous eondition on the premises, including a 
loaded gun; 
o. Failin~ i'Q g:jve wm'lling to Plaintiff of hazards on the preltli~ea; and 
d. ExpoSllli Plaintiff to an unn,asonable risk of harm on the premie1es. 
3.2.20 Ail n direct a;nd p,:oxh;nate ~ult of Defendant's tortious., MgligE;nt, end 
of trial, al.11;{.) said Plaintiffs generi:tl dti.mager, in an a:mount now u.ruo1ov,,1t1. These c:lamages 
fu.iilJ~ inchl~ physieal injur11 din:rillished ability to function at home and wo-:i:~, 
disfigurement, m.ID~ty, ft1,1strati<m, coucem, iilnd gel;l(i;tal el'JlotionaJ ups~t, 
rv. mAXlttttll~ 
mrei.EJFOF~ Pl§Ui.d pray~ fQ jurl~~P.t agairult U,l~ ~te.Pdmrtlii, ~ . .;I ~oh ~f th\®!, iv. 
said ~ t}:it.cee1'.ib.;m $1 O~OOQ.00 U;m will fully tt:ltq f.~ixly Q!lt11pi.me/l!:a him for his injw.'i~B lllld 
chunn;1113, m.elu~ij l!ms of past, pr~~Ci?nt. 11nd futur~ m~dica! flxpi.,ns~; lost wa~es rwJ:i !03:s of 
~g o~ity; past, pr@sQnt, and· fh~ pain. au~ .suff~rini; and loss of. t3nJOJIU'"Wnt r;,f life, 
1Pi@tb.er. w!t,h aitor.ney's fe~s} oosw tmd iri~re~ and aueh otb.~r reH~f ~s the Co¥rt may ct~~nu 
Dated tbiJ3 10th d~y of May, 201(i. 
JAMES, VERNON&. WEEKS P.A. 
Mqk 
~~~,,-lf1.< .illl:-.L .. . • .t .• 91*')!:J U(J;zy 
W f;S $. Lar.s~n., 1SB #913 4 
~$1@1Y2!.ht~1~ 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~;..._~~-'-'l1Uw~orn~· ~ey~fi~ue_ElaintiffJosep.b.-S~tm.-~~~~~~~~~-
















MICHAEL T. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, a 
Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
mth@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Cook 
( ~ • "' I f 
, ' I . • -
(" .. • T'. I ( I I t: ·t: \ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK'S ANSWER, 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
15 EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR., and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and 
16 JOSEPH STANCZAK, 













For answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook ("Cooks") admit, deny 
and allege as follows: 
1.1 Cooks admit those allegations contained in Paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 
25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, and 32 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
1.2 Paragraphs 1 and 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint require no answer from Cooks, and is therefore 
denied. 
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
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P~t///4an-~ t& 'tfatt 
A "RO=ESSlONAL SE"l\/lCE C.OR.?ORATlON 
250 Norli'meet Blvd., &Jrta 206 
Coe<ur d' Alene, ,dsho B3814 
































As a result of FBMI' s breach, Cooks have and will continue to suffer direct and consequential 
damages in an amount greater than $10,000 to be proven at the time of trial. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM - DECLARATION OF COVERAGE 
A justiciable controversy exists between Cooks and FBMI regarding whether the Policy issued 
to Cooks provides coverage for defense or indemnity of the claims alleged in Stanczak's First 
Amended Complaint. 
Cooks seek an Order, declaring coverage for defense and indemnity of the claims by Stanczak. 
W H E R E F O R E, having fully answered Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendants Cook pray that: 
1. Plaintiff take nothing by its Complaint; 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without cost to Cooks; 
3. Judgment be granted in favor of Cooks for all counterclaims against FBMI and damages 
be awarded in an amount to be proven at trial, but more than the jurisdictional amount of 
the magistrate court; 
3. Cooks recover all costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to LC. §12-121, §10-1210, and LC. 
§41-1839; and 
4. For such other relief the Court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this 5th day of August, 2016. 
MICI LT. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a Professional 
Service Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendants Cook 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand delivered; ~ sent 
via facsimile on August 5, 2016, to: 
James Martin 
Moffatt Thomas 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
MICH 
888932 
ANSWER AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
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~t?UJbt<l#?i~lc 
A "RO=ESSlONAL SE~ViCE COR.:>ORATiON 
250 Northwest Blvd .. Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene :daho 83814 
Phore: (208) 667-21 OJ 
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JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Aleu.e, ID 83814 
TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683 
F ACSlMILE: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak 
JVW PAGE 01/08 
~ EOF IDAHO ) ss 
Copn~ ~f Bonner L ) . ___ ,.., . - \D- \ _ c, 
FILED U-...\-~-.t--~"-:-;::~ 
AT 1 ·,S5 O'CLOCK ~-'M 
CLERK, DISTRICT C©tJRT 
Deputy 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
CO:MPANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, .TR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S 
ANSWER TO AMENDED 
COMPLAINT FOR 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
Fee Categories: I(l )(b) 
Fees: $0.00 
Defendant Joseph Stanczak, as and for an Answer to Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Idaho's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, pleads and al.leges 
as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau's Amended Complaint, and each and every allegation contained 
therein., fails to state a claim against Defendant Stanczak upon which relief can be gr.anted. 
Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended Complaint fQr Declaratory Judgment - I 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
Defendant Stanczak denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiff Fann Bureau's 
Amended Complaint, unless expressly and specifically hereinafter admitted. 
1. Defendant Stanc7..ak admits the allegations asserted in Para~ph 1 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Com.plaint. 
2. Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to fonn a belief 
as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and 
accordingly denies the 5arne. 
3. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
4. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
TIJRTSDICTION AND VENUE 
5. Defendant Stanczak admits the alJegations asserted in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
6. Defendant Stanczak admits the al.legations asserted in Paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
7. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's 
Am.ended Complaint. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
8. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's 
Am.ended Complaint. 
Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment - 2 
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9. Regarding Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Amended Com.plaint, Defendant Stanczak 
admits that the Cook Policy bas a number of provisions that are implicated and applicable to this 
dispute. However, Defendant Stanczak denies that the Cook Policy has a number of exclusions 
that are implicated and applicable to this dispute. 
10. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint. 
11. Regarding the acreage of the Bloom Lake Property, Defendant Stanczak is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations asserted in 
Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and accordingly denies the same. Defendant 
Stanczak admits that the Bloom Lake Property includes Bloom Lake and a small cabin. 
12. Regarding the statement in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, '"For 
the past seventeen years and up until approximately June 28, 2015." Defendant Stanczak is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations asserted, and 
accordingly denies the same. Defendant Stanczak admil~ all other allegations in Paragraph 12 of 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
13. Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph J 3 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and 
accordingly denies the same. 
14. Defendant Stan.czak is without knowledge or information sufficient to fo~ a belief 
as to the truth of the alJegatio:ns asserted in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and 
accordingly denies the same. 
15. Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, and 
Defendant Stanc7.ak's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment"' 3 
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accordingly denies the same. ,.1 
16. Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sutlicient to form a belief 
as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 16 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and 
accordingly denies the same. 
17. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 17 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
J 8. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint. 
19. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Com.plaint. 
20. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 20 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
21. Defendant Stanczak adm.its the allegations asserted in Paragraph 21 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
22. Defendant Stanc:;r..ak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint. 
23. Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of the allegations asserted in Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Amended CompJaint, and 
accordingly denies the same. 
24. Defendant Stanczak is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth of the alJegations asserted in Paragraph 24 of PJain.tiff's Amended Complaint, and 
accordingly denies the same. 
25. Regarding Paragraph 25 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Defendant Stanczak 
Defendant Stanc7..lil.k's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment -- 4 
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acknowledges and admits that three letters from Fa.mi Bureau to the Cooks are attached to 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as Exhibits "B", "C", and "D~'. However, Defendant St.ancz.ak is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to fonn a belief as to the truth of the allegations 
asserted in Paragraph 26 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint regarding whether such letters include 
all of Farm Bureau's conclusions regarding its coverage position, and accordingly denies the same. 
26. Regarding Paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Amended Complai.nt, Defendant Stanczak 
admj.ts the allegations asserted regarding a Complaint for Damages (hereinafter "Stanczak's 
Original Complaint") he filed in Bonner County on May 12, 2016, although Stanczak's Original 
Complaint was subsequently amendec;l on July 7. 2016. 
27. Regarding Paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant Stanczak 
denies the allegation that Stanczak's Original Complaint included a cause of action for "'Negligent, 
Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct" against Chisholm, as Sta.nc7.ak.'s Origio.al Complaint instead 
in.eluded a da.im for "Negligent, Reckless, and Tortious Con.duct" against Chisholm. Defendant 
Stanczak admits all other allegations in Paragraph 27 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. 
28. Regarding Paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Amended Corn.plaint, Defendant Stanczak 
denies the allegation. that Stanczak's Original Complaint alleged that "Chisholm left the scene and 
was later apprehended by law enforcement." Defendant Stancz.ak admits all other allegatfons in 
Paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint regarding Stanczak's Original Complaint. 
29. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended CompJaint for Declaratory Judgment- 5 
179
01/09/2017 15:23 12085541584 JVW PAGE 05/08 
·~ · ·~·- ·· 
COUNT 1-DECLARATORY RELIEF 
30. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
31. Defendant Stanc7.ak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 31 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
32. Defendant Stanczak admits the allegations asserted in Paragraph 32 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Complaint. 
33. Defendant Stanczak denies the allegations asserted in Paragraph 33 of Plainti.:ff's 
Amended Complaint. 
34. Defendant Stanczak denies the allegations asserted in Paragraph 34 of Plaintiff's 
Amended Com.plaint. 
35. Defendant Stanczak denies the allegations asserted in Paragraph. 35 of Plaintiffs 
Am.ended Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant Stanczak prays for judgment as foUows: 
1. For declaratory judgment finding that (a) Plaintiff Farm Bureau owes under a 
contract of insurance a duty to defend the Cooks in the Stanczak Lawsuit and a duty to indem11ify 
the Cooks for any adverse judgment or settlement that may arise out of the Stanczak Lawsuit and 
claims, and (2) there is insurance coverage under the Cook Policy for the claims and damages 
asserted by Stanczak against the Cooks arising out of the shooting incident th.at occurred on the 
Cook's Bloom Lake Property on or about June 28, 2015; 
2. That Defendant Stanczak be awarded attorney fees and costs incurred in defending 
this action, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1210, 12-120, 1.2-121, 12-123, and 41 ~1839, Rules 54 
Defendant Stanczak's Answer To Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment- 6 
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and 57 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure) and other applicable law; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
DA TED this 10th day of August, 2016. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Stanczak 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of August 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the folJowing persons in the foUowing manner: 
James L. Martin 
Tyler J. Anderson 
Benjamin C. Ritchie 
MOFFATT. THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & FIELDS, 
CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 




Attorneys for Plaintiff Parm Bureau 




__ Federal Express 
t------------- ------------------- -; 
Michael T. Howard 
WINSTON & CASHATT 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 206 
Coeurd'Alen.e, Idaho 83814 
Fax: (208) 765-2121 
mth@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorney.for Defendants Cook 
Stephen F. Smith 
Attorney at Law, Chtd. 
102 Superior Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Fax: (208) 255-4325 
steve@stevesmithlaw.com 
Attorney.for Defendants Cook 
__ U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid 
__ E-mai.l 
__ Hand Delivery 
---2'( Facsimile 
__ Federal Express 




__ Federal Express 
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James L. Martin, TSB No. 4226 
Tyler J. Anderson, 1Sli No. 6632 
B~njamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210 
MOFFATT", THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise. Idaho 83 70 l 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 





Attorneys for Defendant Fann Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Idaho 
.. ........ . 
:• oil 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK. 
Defendants, 
Case No. CV-2016-0590 
·FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 
•INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
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EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK. husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants, 
VS. 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
Counterdefendant, 
ill 003/007 
Count.erdefendant Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofTdaho (''Farm 
Bureau"), by and through their undersigned counsel ofrecord, and without admitting liability or 
damages to CountcrcJahnants Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks"), 
and without assuming the burden of proof as to any issue in this litigation, answer the allegations 








Fann Bureau denies each andjevery allegation, paragraph, claim, and theory of 
I 
the Counterclaim which is not expressly and !specifically admitted herein. .Farm Bureau denies 
the allegations based on its belief that the all~gations are incorrect, false, and misconstrue facts, 
or based upon the lack of sutlicicnt infonnat~on or knowledge to admit or deny the allegations. 
FIRST COUNTERCLAI!M- BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. Fann Bureau admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.1 of the 
Cooks' Counterclaim. 
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2. With respect to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.2· of the Cooks' 
Counterclaim, Farm Bureau admits the Cook~ paid Farm Bureau the premiums for the insurance 
policy they obtained from Fann I3ureau. Because the terms or phrase ""all conditions precedent 
to coverage" is not defined and can be subject to different interpretations, Farm 8ur~au denies 
the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 3.2 of the Cooks' Counterclaim. 
3. Fann Bureau admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.3 of the 
Cooks' Counterclaim. 
4. Faun Bureau denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.4 of the 
Cooks' Counterclaim. 
5. Fann Bureau denies the allegations contained in Para.graph 3.5 of the 
Cooks' Counterclaim. 
6. Fann Bureau denies the allegations contained in Paragraph 3.6 of the 
Cooks' Counterclaim. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM~ DECLARATION OF COVERAGE 
7. Farm Bureau incorporates and realleges all preceding paragraphs as 
though fully set forth herein. 
8. Fann Bureau admits the allegations contained in Paragraph 4.1 of the 
Cooks' Counterclaim. 
9. Responding to the alle:gations contained in Paragraph 4.2 of the Cooks' 
Counterclaim, Fann Bureau denies that it is required to defend or indemnify the Cooks from the 
claims made by Stanczak. 
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AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
By raising the following defenses, Famt Bureau makes no admission of any kind 
and doe~ not assume any burden of proof or production not othermse properly resting upon it in 
this lawsuit. Rather, Farm Bureau merely identifies defenses to preserve them for all proper uses 
under applicable law. Farm Bureau has yet to complete discovery in this case, the result of 
which may reveal additional defenses to the Counterclaim. As such, Fam1 Bureau reserves the 
right to supplement, modify, or delete defen~s after discovery is comp]eted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Cooks may have failed to,mitigate their damages, if any, as required by law. 
TlllRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Cooks' counterclaims are:barred, either in whole or in part, by the doctrine of 
waiver. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Cooks' counterclaims are barred~ either in whole or in part, by the doctrine of 
estoppel. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Cooks' counterclaims are barred, either in whole or in part. by the doctrine of 
laches. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Cooks' counterclaims are barred because there is no coverage for the claims 
asserted by Stanczak under the insurance policy jn question. 
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SEVF:NTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
.Faun Bureau has or may ha.ve other affirmative defenses which are not known at 
this time, but which may be ascertained in the future; .Fann Bureau reserves the right to assert 
each and every such other affinnat1ve defense that may be so ascertained. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Fann Bureau prays for judgment: 
1. Dismjssing the Counterclaim against Farm Bureau, with pre,iudice, 
without granting any relief against it; 
2. Awarding Farm Bureau its reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred in 
defending this action; 
3. For other such relief as the Court deems to be just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Farm Bureau hereby demands a jury trial for the Cooks' counterclaim for Breach 
of Contract, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DA TED this 18th day of August, 2016. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
. Martin-Of the Firm 
omeys for Defendant Farm Bureau 
utuaJ Insurance Company of Jdaho 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S REPLY 
TO COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - S c11ent:4224a1s.1 
187
08/18/2016 09:17 FAX 20838553A4 1 MOFFATT THOMAS laJ 007 /007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of August, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO'S REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL to be 
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Michael T. Howard 
WINTON & CASH A TI 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
Attorneys.for Edgar and Laurie 
Cook 
Wes S. Larsen 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 667-0683 
Attorneys jhr .Joseph Stanczak 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postagt> Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S RF.PLY 





James L. Martin, ISB No. 4226 
Tyler J. Anderson, ISB No. 6632 
Benjamin C. Ritchie, ISB No. 7210 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 





Attorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Idaho 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 28, 2016, Michael Chisholm shot Joseph Stanczak twice with a .45 
caliber handgun. The two had an altercation outside of a cabin near a small lake called Bloom 
Lake in Bonner County, Idaho. Chisholm shot Stanczak and then fled the scene in his pickup, 
and later on foot after he wrecked his pickup. Stanczak survived, but alleges that he suffered 
severe injuries and damages arising from the shooting. After the shooting, Chisholm was 
arrested and charged with aggravated battery. He pled guilty to this charge before this Court in 
January of2016 and this Court sentenced him in March of 2016. 
The real property where the shooting occurred is owned by Edgar and Laurie 
Cook. At the time of the shooting, the Cooks had a personal insurance policy in place with Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho that gave them coverage for their various 
properties, including the Bonner County property, liability insurance, and automobile insurance. 
After he was shot, Stanczak made a claim against the Cooks for his injuries and damages and 
later filed a civil lawsuit against them in Bonner County for the injuries and damages. The 
Cooks tendered the initial claim and then the defense of the lawsuit to Farm Bureau. Chisholm is 
not a named insured under the Cooks' Farm Bureau policy. 
Coverage under the policy can only be triggered by an "occurrence," which is 
defined as an accident that causes unexpected bodily injury. Farm Bureau denied coverage to the 
Cooks because, among other things, the shooting was not an occurrence under the Farm Bureau 
policy, as it was not an accident. Chisholm pled guilty to the offense of aggravated battery, 
which includes elements of intentional conduct. There was no occurrence under the Cooks' 
Farm Bureau policy. Farm Bureau further denied coverage based upon several exclusions, 
including that the claim cannot arise out of the violation of criminal law, that the claim cannot 
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arise out of intentional conduct, and that the claim cannot arise out of the Cooks' business 
activities. 
In May of 2016, Fmm Bureau filed this action for declaratory judgment seeking a 
determination that there is no coverage for Stanczak's injuries and damages under the Cooks' 
Farm Bureau policy. The defendants have answered. In this Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Farm Bureau demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact on the question of 
whether coverage exists under the Farm Bureau policy for the shooting. There is no coverage. 
One threshold issue for the Court is whether the shooting was an accident that caused unexpected 
bodily injury. It was not, as Chisholm has admitted that his actions constituted aggravated 
battery. Based upon the grounds outlined herein, Farm Bureau requests that the Court grant its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and declare that there is no coverage under the Farm Bureau 
Policy and, thus, Farm Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks for any claims 
made by Stanczak. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
A. Bloom Lake Campground and Michael Chisholm. 
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks") are the owners 
ofreal property located in Bonner County, Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, a 
campground, a lake called Bloom Lake, and a small cabin (the "Bloom Lake Property"). The 
Cooks have owned the Bloom Lake Property since 1950. Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment ("Am. Cplt.") ,r,r 10, 11; Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and 
Counterclaim ("Cooks' Answer") ,r 1.1. 
The Cooks have never charged a fee for individuals to use the campground and 
lake, but they do solicit voluntary financial donations from users which can be left in a donation 
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box located at the campground. Up until the late 1990s, the Cooks would allow logging on the 
Bloom Lake Property and then they would use the funds to pay for maintenance of the Bloom 
Lake Property. In the late 1990s, Michael Jesse Chisholm ("Chisholm") contacted the Cooks 
and asked ifhe could stay in the cabin and maintain the Bloom Lake Property. The Cooks 
agreed and Chisholm began caring for the Bloom Lake Property. See Edgar Cook's Recorded 
Statement attached as Ex. A to the accompanying Declaration of Steven Johnson .. 
Chisholm has cared for the Bloom Lake Property since that time. His 
responsibilities include keeping the weeds down, taking out the trash accumulated by campers, 
and maintaining the road. The Cooks provided some equipment to Chisholm in order to 
maintain the real property, including a weed eater, snowmobile, and diesel generator. The Cooks 
never paid Chisholm for his work at the Bloom Lake Property. They did not consider him their 
employee. They did not control or instruct him on his job responsibilities. There are no public 
utilities for the cabin and Chisholm paid for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for heating 
or maintenance of the cabin and campground areas. Declaration of Steven Johnson ,r 9, Ex. A. 
B. The Cooks' Insurance Policy. 
The Cooks have a Country Squire fann insurance policy with Farm Bureau that 
insures, among other things, the Bloom Lake Property (the "Policy"). 1 The Policy has three 
separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III 
(Automobile). The Policy Declarations list only the individuals Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and 
Laurie Frances Cook as the "Insureds." Because this is a personal policy, there is no business or 
1 The Policy and Declarations are attached to Farm Bureau's Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment, ,r 8, Ex. A. The Cooks and Stanczak both admit that the Policy attached 
to the Amended Complaint is a true and correct copy in their respective answers. 
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other entity insured by this Policy. The Policy Declarations also note that the Policy period is 
1/26/2015 - 1/26/2016. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability Coverage include 
coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (coverage Fl) and for Premises Medical Coverage (coverage 
F2). The Policy Declarations also note that premises under Section II includes "Location 03," 
one residence and 200 acres, which is the Bloom Lake Property, including the cabin.2 Finally, 
the Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to four endorsements, including: 
Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Limits), Endorsement I269 (Limited Employer's 
Liability Endorsement), Endorsement I282 (Personal Injury Endorsement), and 
Endorsement I287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement). 
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the following: 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, 
occupation, or activity, engaged in for compensation, other than 
farming or custom farming .... 
Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the 
raising or keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, 
fox, or similar small mammals for fur production .... 
Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The 
following are also insureds: 
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your 
household, your spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of 
you or your relatives .... 
Insured location means: 
2 
• The Policy also provides coverage for the property where the Cooks have their 
personal residence, along with a mobile home and a 135 acre farm in Sandpoint, Idaho (location 
2 in the Policy) and another separate residence and 7 acres in Sandpoint (location 4 in the 
Policy). 
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1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a form 
or residence, including private approaches; 
Insured location does not include property where a business is 
conducted. 
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in 
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy 
period. All bodily injury and property damage resulting from a 
common cause will be considered the result of one occurrence. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or 
adoption, who is a resident of your household, including a ward or 
foster child. This definition applies only if you are a person. 
Residence employees means someone employed by you who 
performs duties in connection with the maintenance or use of the 
residence premises. This includes a person who performs duties 
for you elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with your 
business or farming. 
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a 
dwelling that is your principal residence, including its grounds and 
private garages, or (b) that part of any other building where you 
reside. A residence premises does not include any part of a 
building used for business. 
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages, Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) and 
F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) provides the following coverage: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for 
damages because of bodily injury or property damage, caused by 
an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will: 
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the 
insured is legally liable ( damages includes any awarded 
prejudgment interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice .... 
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The Policy provides coverage under Coverage F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) as follows: 
the following: 
Subject to the limit ofliability, we will pay reasonable and 
necessary medical and funeral expenses resulting from bodily 
injury caused by an occurrence as described below. This 
coverage does not apply to you or residents of your household 
other than residence employees. This coverage applies only: 
1. To a person on the insured location with the pe1mission of any 
insured .... 
Both of the above-described coverages are subject to several exclusions, including 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II 
. . . . Section II does not cover bodily injury or property 
damage: 
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any 
professional service; 
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion 
does not apply to the use of reasonable force by an insured to 
protect a person or property. 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law . .. if committed 
by any insured. 
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the following: 
I269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages 
F-1 and F-2 are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an 
occurrence and sustained by a person performing labor for you in 
your farming operation ... . 
I282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, 
we cover personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than 
bodily injury arising out of one or more of the following offenses: 
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious 
prosecution; 
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2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or 
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry. 
(Bold emphasis in original.) 
C. The Shooting. 
On June 28, 2015, Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") and his girlfriend Susan Jackson 
were camping at the Bloom Lake Property. Chisholm invited Stanczak and his girlfriend into the 
cabin located on the Bloom Lake Property. A dispute arose between Chisholm and Stanczak. 
Chisholm had a .45 caliber handgun and shot Stanczak twice, injuring him. Chisholm then left 
the scene, but was later apprehended by local authorities. Am. Cplt. ,r,r 18-20; Cooks' Answer 
,r,r 1.1, 1.5; Defendant Stanczak's Answer to Amended Complaint for Declaratory Damages 
("Stanczak's Answer") ,r,r 18-20. 
D. Chisholm's Arrest, Plea Agreement and Sentence in the Criminal Case. 
Chisholm was arrested on June 28, 2015, and was charged with two counts: 
Count !--Aggravated Battery pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-907; and Count II --
Enhancement - Use of a Deadly Weapon in Commission of a Felony. Declaration of 
Benjamin C. Ritchie ("Ritchie Deel.") ,r 2, Ex. A (hereinafter referred to as the "Chisholm 
Criminal Case"). Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18-907, aggravated battery is: 
Aggravated battery defined. (1) A person commits aggravated 
battery who, in committing battery: (a) Causes great bodily harm, 
permanent disability or permanent disfigurement; or (b) Uses a 
deadly weapon or instrument .. .. 
Battery is defined as follows: 
Battery defined. A battery is any: (a) Willful and unlawful use of 
force or violence upon the person of another; or (b) Actual, 
intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another person 
against the will of the other; or ( c) Unlawfully and intentionally 
causing bodily harm to an individual. 
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IDAHO CODE§ 18-903. Idaho Code section 19-2520 allows for an extended sentence when 
battery is committed with the use of a firearm. 
Chisholm entered and executed an Acknowledgment of Alford Plea in the 
Chisholm Criminal Case on January 5, 2016, which this Court ultimately accepted, which stated, 
in part: 
1. I understand that a defendant may plead guilty to a felony 
charge, even though he/she claims to be innocent of the charge, or 
does not admit to all of the elements of such charge. This is 
known as a North Carolina v. Alford guilty plea. 
2. In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, pursuant to the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), I understand that the Court must make 
the following findings: 
That there exists a strong factual basis to support the guilty 
plea; 
That the defendant's guilty plea is voluntarily, knowingly 
and understandingly made; 
3. When the Court accepts a guilty plea, pursuant to North 
Carolina v. Alford, a defendant must understand that the Court will 
treat the defendant as though he/she were in fact guilty of all the 
elements of such felony offense. The Court willnot accept a guilty 
plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, unless the court record 
reflects that the guilty plea was voluntary, and was also an 
intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the 
defendant. 
Ritchie Deel. ,r 3, Ex. B. Chisholm also executed a Guilty Plea Advisory Form that informed 
him of his constitutional rights. Ritchie Deel. ,r 4, Ex. C. At the hearing on the plea, Chisholm 
acknowledged that he understood the plea offer from the State of Idaho and that he was giving 
up his rights to contest the charges. Ritchie Deel. ,r 5, Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne ,r 4, 
Ex.A. 
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A sentencing hearing was held on March 8, 2016, as a result of Chisholm's guilty 
plea in the Chisholm Criminal Case. Ritchie Deel. ,r 5, Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne ,r 5, 
Ex. B. The Court, in sentencing Chisholm to two years fixed and eight years indeterminate, 
made the following comments: 
And really, I don't know that the word is a Jekyll and Hyde, but 
it's - Mr. Chisholm, in some ways you are two different people. I 
note that everyone that came into this courtroom is in support of 
you. And you, since you've lived in this county, you have given a 
lot to the community . . . . It is concerning to the Court that you, 
though, that people have to realize too, though, that your whole life 
was built on a lie. You are not 66. You were born in 1952. You 
used a number of different aliases . . . . But you have two children. 
One that you abandoned as an infant and never paid, from the 
Court. And the child has no relationship with you. Never 
supported that child. Your son thought you were dead and just 
recently discovered after 30 years that his father was actually alive. 
You didn't support either of your children. Three marriages. You 
were declared dead by your family. So those are the kinds of 
things I'm trying to balance. It is hard for the Court to understand. 
But you did come here and make a better life. And start giving 
back to the community. It is concerning that I've read letters about 
your great military service and PTSD and - because none of that is 
true. You have to, you know, you kind of built this fantasy life 
that you have. That you were a Vietnam vet and you're not a 
Vietnam vet. I get the person is a member of the military service. 
I take very seriously somebody claiming that they were when 
they're not. Those kinds of things. 
So then, that, the problem is you don't tell the truth. So like it is 
hard for me to give much truth to what vou say happe11ed that 
night. . . . You were all drinki11g. . . . But the victim didn't have 
a g1111. And you shot him hvice and the shot, the wound is·to the 
back. Let's be clear about that. It's not to the front. And then, 
as Mr. Taylor said, if you are in an altercation and are fearful and 
you shoot someone, you don't hop in your pickup truck with two 
loaded weapons and take off. Wreck your truck. Go two miles out 
in the woods, hide, and when the police were looking for you. I'm 
glad there was a dog. Because from their perspective in reading 
the reports, you, they thought you were in a shooting stance. You 
had the weapons next to you, fully loaded. There was a bullet in 
the firing position. And that, and you, the drug, the dog attacked 
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you. But I'm afraid you could have shot an officer or an officer 
could have shot you. That's not what we're, what I'm judging. 
But that's what the facts show the Court. So, all this is very 
concerning. 
And that's what I'm trying to balance. And this case, tlzis Court 
cannot sav that it is all right to shoot a person and to flee and to 
be tracked by the police and that you get probation. That doesn't 
deter you or anyone else from shooting a person. That - you have 
to take responsibility. Mr., for all you know Stanczak was dead. 
Because you shot him and ra11. And luckily medical got there and 
he did not die. Or you would be charged with murder. So there 
have to be consequences. And that's what this Court has to 
balance. That's my job. 
Id ( emphasis added). 
The Court entered a formal felony Judgment on March 8, 2016, in the Chisholm 
Criminal Case, confirming its finding that Chisholm was guilty of Felony Aggravated Battery. 
Ritchie Deel. ,r 6, Ex. D. Chisholm was sentenced to incarceration. No appeal was filed and his 
conviction remains intact. 
E. The Insurance Claim and Farm Bureau's Response. 
In July of 2016, Stanczak obtained counsel to assert a claim against Chisholm and 
the Cooks and Farm Bureau for injuries and damages arising out of the lawsuit. On February 1, 
2016, Stanczak, through his counsel, made a demand on Farm Bureau for damages for Stanczak 
under the Policy arising out of the June 28, 2015, shooting. Ritchie Deel. ,r 7, Ex. E. On 
March 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks denying coverage for the claim made by 
Stanczak. Am. Cplt. ,r 25, Ex. B; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1. Farm Bureau analyzed the potential 
coverage under Section II Liability Coverage, including Bodily Injury Liability (Coverage Fl) 
and Premises Medical Coverage (coverage F2) of the Policy. Farm Bureau made the following 
conclusions: 
• Neither Chisholm nor Stanczak were insureds under the Policy; 
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• No occurrence occurred under the Policy; 
• Even if Chisholm was an insured under the Policy and an occurrence 
occurred, the business pursuit, intentional acts, and criminal acts 
exceptions to coverage preclude coverage for Stanczak's injuries; and 
• No other provision in the Policy afforded coverage for Stanczak's injuries. 
Farm Bureau noted that the claim was still under investigation, but that it was reserving its rights 
under the Policy to deny coverage ~nd that Farm Bureau would welcome any additional 
information from the Cooks about the claim. Id. No further information was forthcoming. In 
fact, at no time prior to the filing of this declaratory judgment action have the Cooks challenged 
Farm Bureau's denial of this claim. 
On March 22, 2016, Farm Bureau sent another letter to the Cooks stating that 
Farm Bureau had completed its investigation and advised the Cooks that it was denying the 
claim relating to the Chisholm shooting on the grounds set forth in its March 2, 2016, letter. Am. 
Cplt. ,r 25, Ex. C; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1. 
F. The Stanczak Lawsuit and Farm Bureau's Response. 
On May 12, 2016, Stanczak filed a complaint against Chisholm and the Cooks for 
injuries and damages arising from the June 28, 2015, shooting (the "Stanczak Complaint" or the 
"Stanczak Tort Action"). Stanczak alleges premises liability against the Cooks, negligent 
supervision against the Cooks, strict liability against Chisholm, and negligent, reckless, and 
tortious conduct against Chisholm. Throughout the Stanczak Complaint, Stanczak alleges that 
Chisholm was the employee and/or agent of the Cooks. Am. Cplt. ,r 26, Ex. E; Cooks' Answer 
,r 1.1. The Cooks tendered the defense of this lawsuit to Farm Bureau. 
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On June 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent additional correspondence to the Cooks 
addressing whether there might be coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak 
Complaint. Am. Cplt. ,r 25, Ex. D; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1. Once again, Farm Bureau found no 
coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, citing to the same grounds as 
noted in its prior denials. 
On June 7, 2016, Stanczak filed an Amended Complaint against Chisholm and the 
Cooks (the "Amended Stanczak Complaint") in the Stanczak Tort Action. Ritchie Deel. ,r 8, 
Ex. F. The Amended Stanczak Complaint deleted references that the Cooks operated the Bloom 
Lake Property as a for-profit enterprise. The Amended Stanczak Complaint also modifies its 
references to Chisholm, calling Chisholm just an agent of the Cooks and not an "agent and/or 
employee." The Cooks also tendered the defense of this lawsuit to Farm Bureau. On August 22, 
2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks' counsel denying coverage for the allegations 
contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint. Ritchie Deel. ,r 9, Ex. G. Farm Bureau stated 
that the modified allegations failed to alter the coverage opinion previously given to the Cooks 
by Farm Bureau. 
Farm Bureau also addressed whether the independent torts of premises liability 
and negligent supervision could be considered "occurrences" under the Policy. Farm Bureau 
cited to several decisions from the Idaho courts rejecting this argument. Farm Bureau also 
reasoned that the nature of the torts of negligent supervision and premises liability is whether the 
conduct was foreseeable. Namely, if the conduct and damage were foreseeable, then the 
tortfeasor can be held liable for negligent supervision and premises liability, because the 
tortfeasor should have prevented the harm. However, an "occurrence" only occurs under the 
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Policy if the harm was unexpected. Because Stanczak is alleging that the harm was foreseeable, 
there was no occurrence under the Policy. 
Chisholm never has made a request to Farm Bureau to defend him in the Stanczak 
Tort Action. He has never claimed that he was an employee of the Cooks. He has not tendered 
the defense of the Stanczak Tort Action to Farm Bureau with a request that Farm Bureau defend 
him. Nor have the Cooks ever claimed that Farm Bureau should be providing Chisholm a 
defense to the Stanczak Tort Action. 
G. The Action for Declaratory Judgment. 
Farm Bureau originally filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on May 2, 
2016 (hereinafter referred to as the "Farm Bureau Dec. Action"). Upon receipt of the Stanczak 
Tort Action, Farm Bureau filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 3, 
2016, requesting a declaration that there is no coverage for the Cooks' claim and the Stanczak 
Complaint. Farm Bureau named Stanczak in the Farm Bureau Dec. Action as a defendant under 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code section 10-1211. Given the various 
communications directly from Stanczak's counsel, it was clear he was claiming an interest in the 
Cook's insurance Policy. 
The Cooks filed their answer to the Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment on August 5, 2016, and also asserted Breach of Contract and Declaration of Coverage 
counterclaims against Farm Bureau, alleging that the allegations contained in the Amended 
Stanczak Complaint create a potential for coverage under the Policy. Stanczak answered the 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on August 10, 2016. 
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III. LEGAL STANDARD 
The Court is well versed in the legal standard for adjudicating a motion for 
summary judgment. "Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, summary 
judgment is proper if 'the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."' Silicon Int'/ Ore, LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 
Idaho 538,544,314 P.3d 593,599 (2013) (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). If a review of the evidence 
reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. 
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583, 587-88 (1996). "The 
burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party," 
and the Court should "construe the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion for summary judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wesco 
Autobody v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,890,243 P.3d 1069, 1078 (2010). Given these standards, 
summary judgment is improper "if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw 
conflicting inferences from the evidence presented." McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,394, 
64 P .3d 317, 320 (2003). However, a "mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the 
facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary 
judgment." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 552,556,212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. General Principles of Idaho Law Regarding Construction of Insurance 
Contracts. 
The Idaho courts have set forth certain rules for determining whether a claim is 
covered by an insurance policy. An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the 
insured and must be construed the same way as any other contract. See Auto Club Ins. Co., Inc. 
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v. Tyrer, 560 F. Supp. 755, 758-59 (D. Idaho 1983), aff'd, 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984); see also 
Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 875,878,655 P.2d 82, 85 (1982). Like any other contract, 
an insurance policy is to be construed as a whole, the court looking to the plain and ordinary 
sense of the words used in the policy. See Miller v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 
899, 702 P.2d 1356, 1359 (1985); see also Juker v. Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644,645, 
637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981); Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,509,600 P.2d 1387, 
1391 (1979). Absent ambiguity, words are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular 
meaning. SeeMeckertv. Transamericalns. Co., 108Idaho597,601, 701 P.2d217,221 (1985), 
superseded by statute on other grounds. Where the language of the insurance policy is clear and 
unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction thereof and coverage must be determined 
according to the plain meaning of the words employed. See Kromrei v. AID Ins. Co. (Mut.), 110 
Idaho 549, 553-54, 716 P.2d 1321, 1323-24 (1986). 
Where the language of the insurance policy is susceptible to only one meaning, 
that meaning will be given effect. See Burgess Farms v. NH Ins. Grp., 108 Idaho 831, 834, 702 
P.2d 869, 872 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985). Where a word or phrase in an insurance policy has a 
settled legal meaning or interpretation, that meaning will be given effect even though other 
interpretations are possible. See Nielsen v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 223, 
226,596 P.2d 95, 98 (1979); Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 8-9, 843 P.2d 154, 158-
59 (1992). However, not every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be defined. 
Id. at 8, 843 P.2d at 158. 
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B. There Is No Coverage Under the Policy for the Insurance Claim for the 
June28,2015,Shootin~ 
The Cooks made a claim to Farm Bureau for the allegations made against them by 
Stanczak for Stanczak's injuries and damages. Stanczak memorialized his claim against the 
Cooks and Farm Bureau in Stanczak's counsel's demand letter of February 1, 2016, which 
basically stated that Chisholm shot Stanczak and fled the scene. Stanczak alleged that Chisholm 
was either the Cooks' agent or employee. Based upon the information from the Cooks and the 
February 1, 2016, demand letter, there is no coverage for Stanczak's claim against the Cooks 
under the Policy. 
1. There is no coverage under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) for 
Stanczak's claim against the Cooks. 
Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) coverage under the Policy provides 
"coverage to an Insured if a claim is made or a suit is brought against the Insured for damages 
because of a bodily injury caused by an occurrence." Am. Cplt. 1 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 22 
(emphasis in original). There is no coverage under Section II Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) for 
Stanczak's claim against the Cooks on, at least, the following grounds: 
a. Stanczak is not an insured under the Policy. 
Section II Fl only applies to a claim brought against an Insured under the Policy. 
Under the Policy, an Insured is the individual named in the Policy Declarations or "insured also 
means, if residents of your household, your spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you 
or your relatives .. .. " Am. Cplt. 18, Ex. A, Policy p. 2 (emphasis in original). The Policy 
Declarations list only the Cooks as Insureds and you would expect that given this a personal farm 
policy, not a commercial general liability policy. Am. Cplt. 1 8, Ex. A. There is no business or 
other entity listed as an Insured. Chisholm is not a "relative" who might be considered an 
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additional insured under the Policy. There is no definition or other provision under the Policy 
that would include Chisholm as an Insured. Because he is not an Insured, Chisholm is not 
entitled to coverage under the Policy. To the extent the Cooks had a "business" related to the 
Bloom Lake Property, no such business is insured under the Policy and no employees of that 
business are insured by the Policy. 
b. No occurrence occurred under the Policy. 
Even if Chisholm was somehow an Insured under the Policy, no occurrence 
occurred under Section II Fl. Again, occurrence is a defined term and is defined as "an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in 
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and 
property damage resulting from a common cause will be considered the result of one 
occurrence." Am. Cplt. ,r 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 3 (emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court 
has applied the following definitions for the term accident: 
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event 
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through 
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and 
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more 
comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common 
signification the word means an unexpected happening without 
intention or design. 
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979). 
ac • ci • dent ( ak' si dent), n. 1. an undesirable or unfortunate 
happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, 
injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2. 
any event that happens unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or 
cause .... Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9. 
Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 9-10, 843 P.2d 154, 159-60 (1992). The shooting in 
question was not an accident because it was not an unexpected happening without intention or 
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design. Chisholm intentionally pulled the trigger several times and ended up shooting Stanczak 
multiple times. Whether he intended to actually shoot Stanczak is irrelevant given he had 
admitted to aggravated battery already and, irrespective, he clearly intended to pull the trigger on 
his gun and in doing so, put into play the injuries that the Stanczak ultimately received. 
Likewise, the shooting did not cause unexpected bodily injury. The shooting caused bullet 
wounds to Stanczak, which is the expected injury when pointing and shooting a gun at another 
man. 
Courts agree with this interpretation. The Texas Court of Appeals in Texas Farm 
Bureau Underwriters v. Graham, 450 S.W.3d 919, 926-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014), recently 
confirmed the majority view and found no coverage under an insurance policy for a shooting 
because it was not an accident, nor did it cause unexpected injuries. In that case, a homeowner 
sought reimbursement from his insurance company for legal expenses incurred in defending a 
wrongful death action that arose after the homeowner shot and killed a would-be burglar. One of 
the issues addressed by the Texas Court of Appeals was whether the shooting could be 
considered an "accident" under the policy, thus affording coverage for the legal expenses 
incurred. The evidence demonstrated that the homeowner intended on shooting the gun at the 
decedent, but there was an allegation in the wrongful death complaint that the shooting occurred 
because of negligence or gross negligence. The court refused to find an accident, and held: 
A claim does not involve an accident or occurrence when ... direct 
allegations purport that the ... circumstances confirm that the 
resulting damage was the natural and expected result of the 
insured's actions, that is, was highly probable whether the insured 
was negligent or not ... The natural result of an act is the result 
that ordinarily follows, may be reasonably anticipated, and ought 
to be expected. This standard is objective. A person is held to 
intend the natural and probable results of his acts even ifhe did not 
subjectively intend or anticipate those consequences 
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Graham, 450 S.W.3d at 928 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court found that the type 
of injury that occurred was a natural and probable consequence of shooting a loaded gun at 
someone. As such, there was no accident affording coverage under the policy. The same 
situation occurred here, Chisholm pulled the trigger on a loaded gun in the direction of Stanczak 
causing him injuries. Stanczak's injuries are the natural result of those actions. 
The California Court of Appeals made a similar finding recently in Bilyeu v. State 
Farm General Ins. Co., Case No. B262117 (Cal. Ct. App. September 1, 2016) (available at 2016 
WL 4547658). In that case, Bilyeu and Cowgill were next door neighbors. Bilyeu allegedly 
threatened Cowgill's dog and daughter, so Cowgill struck or punched Bilyeu in the face. He 
suffered broken ribs and a traumatic brain injury. Cowgill was arrested and convicted by the 
jury of battery with serious bodily injury. Cowgill argued that he acted in self-defense, but the 
jury in the criminal case convicted him and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. The court of 
appeals in the criminal case found that Bilyeu suffered extensive injuries and that the jury would 
have had to suspend belief to find that Cowgill acted in self-defense and that Bilyeu's injuries 
were caused by one blow and a fall to the ground. Bilyeu later filed a civil suit against Cowgill 
for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the jury awarded him and his 
wife $6.3 million and $1.25 million respectively, rejecting the self-defense affirmative defense. 
State Farm refused to indemnify Cowgill, "[r]elying on Cowgill's admission that he 'struck' 
Bilyeu and the two juries' rejection of Cowgill' s claim of self-defense and defense of another. 
State Farm explained that the Bilyeus' claim was not covered by the policy because it was not an 
'accident[al]' 'occurrence' and because it was an excluded, 'intentional' act." Bilyeu, slip op. 
at 3. Cowgill then assigned his rights to assert a claim against State Farm to Bilyeu, which it did, 
and the lower court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
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Bilyeu appealed, asserting a number of issues as to coverage under the policy for 
his own injuries. The California Court of Appeals found that Cowgill's conduct was not an 
accident. It noted that Cowgill: 
[F]rankly admitted that he did precisely what he intended to do: He 
struck Bilyeu in the face. This act was intentional. Although 
Cowgill asserted that he undertook this intentional act in self-
defense or in defense of his daughter, two juries-the criminal jury 
that heard the assault charges against him and the civil jury that 
awarded the Bilyeus $6.3 million-specifically and necessarily 
found that Cowgill did not reasonably act in self-defense. These 
jury findings are binding. 
Bilyeu, slip op. at 4. Bilyeu argued that the prior juries' rejection of Cowgill's claim for self-
defense is not binding in this dispute. The court noted that the same issue of self-defense was 
litigated and that Bilyeu does not get a third bite at that apple of the self-defense issue. Id., slip 
op. at 5. Bilyeu also argued that while Cowgill intended on hitting Bilyeu in the face, Cowgill 
did not intent to injure him as greatly as he did. The court rejected this argument, stating 
When an insured intends the acts resulting in the injury or damage, 
it is not an accident 'merely because the insured did not intend to 
cause injury. The insured's subjective intent is irrelevant.' " ... 
["the term 'accident' refers to the insured' s conduct, rather than the 
unintended consequences of that conduct"]..) 
Id. ( citations omitted) . The court also found that because no occurrence occurred under the 
policy, it was not necessary to address the application of various exclusions, because the claim 
never fit into the policy coverages. Id., slip op. at 4. 
This case is very similar to the case at hand. Pursuant to the Chisholm Criminal 
Case, Chisholm is already deemed to have committed battery, and it should not be re-litigated in 
this case. Also, it is irrelevant that Chisholm only fired warning shots and did not intend on 
hitting Stanczak. Also it is irrelevant if Chisholm will now say he acted in self-defense. These 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-20 client:421s907_3 
215
arguments contradict the criminal conviction. In addition, his commission of an intentional act, 
the firing of the gun at Stanczak, takes his actions out of coverage under the Policy, regardless as 
to whether he intended on injuring Stanczak or not. Also, while Farm Bureau has included 
analysis as to the application of various Policy exclusions, the Court need not address those as 
Chisholm's firing of the gun takes his actions out of any coverage under the Policy, as no 
occurrence occurred. See also Home Owners Ins. Co. v. Chammus, Case No. 299412, slip op. at 
2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011) (available at 2011 WL 4953499) (where shooter intentionally 
fired a gun and hit another individual, the shooting created a direct risk of harm and could not be 
deemed an accident); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neal, 304 Ga. App. 267, 268-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 201 O); 
Stone v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 812-14 (Ky. App. 2000) (shooting was 
clearly not an accident, intent to harm inferred from nature of act of pointing and shooting gun at 
victim.); Norman v. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (Va. 1978); Harris v. Richards, 867 P.2d 
325, 327-28 (Kan. 1994) (intent to injure inferred since serious bodily injury was natural 
consequence of shooting gun into back of occupied truck); Barton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 527 So. 2d 
524, 525-26 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (intentional act exclusion barred coverage under policy for 
shooting through a door knowing someone was on other side); Allstate v. Peasley, 910 P.2d 483, 
484-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (criminal act exclusion applied in shooting case as exclusion 
meant an act for which a criminal conviction may result). 
It is anticipated that the Cooks will argue that Chisholm did not intend on hitting 
or injuring Stanczak, rather, that he only fired warning shots. Indeed, at his sentencing hearing, 
he said: 
I grabbed my gun and I went outside to get between [Stanczak] and 
the cab of his truck ... And he came back at me and that's when I 
drew my gun and fired a couple of warning shots. I had no idea 
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that I even struck Mr. Stanczak. And the alleged shot in the back, 
he was grazed once in the arm. And as he was lunging at me, one 
went here, traveled down his body and lodged in his pelvis. I did 
not intentionally shoot Mr. Stanczak. It was unfortunate. I did fire 
the weapon. And I did not shoot him in the back. I shot him 
accidentally up top and that's where the bullet traveled. 
Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne ~ 5, Ex. B. The Cooks may argue that there are issues of 
material fact about Chisholm's state of mind at the time of the shooting. They will likely argue 
that an occurrence did occur under the Policy because Chisholm did not have the intent to injury 
Stanczak and that actually hitting him was an accident. Even if the Court accepted this as true, it 
must still find that no occurrence occurred under the Policy. As shown above, gunshot wounds 
are the natural consequence of intentionally pointing a gun at someone and pulling the trigger. 
Also, the other circumstances surrounding the shooting do not lead to a conclusion that the shots 
were warning shots. Stanczak was shot from behind and Chisholm fled the scene at the shooting. 
Even if Chisholm was firing warning shots, no occurrence occurred under the Policy. 
In Safeco Insurance Co. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the 
insured took several loaded handguns and got into his vehicle in order to pursue some 
individuals who blew up his mailbox with firecrackers. The insured pursued the individuals'. 
pickup at high speeds through the city. The pickup eventually stopped and the insured exited. 
The insured testified that the occupants of the pickup exited and the insured believed that he was 
going to be attacked, so he started shooting at the truck in order to break off any confrontation. 
One of the bullets hit one of the occupants of the pickup, injuring him. Other witnesses stated 
that no one got out of the pickup and that the insured just started shooting. The injured 
individual eventually filed suit against the insured, and the insured tendered the defense to his 
insurance company. The insurance company denied the claim on the grounds that no occurrence 
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occurred because no accident occurred and also denied coverage based upon an intentional act 
exclusion. The insurance company eventually filed suit, requesting a declaration that there was 
no coverage, and the lower court granted a motion for summary judgment on the coverage issue 
in the insurance company's favor. The insured appealed and argued that the insured did not 
mean to shoot the victim or cause him injuries and did not foresee that his shots would cause 
injuries. The insured argued that the injury must have been caused by an unintentional ricochet. 
The Washington Court of Appeals analyzed whether an accident occurred and found that "no 
reasonable person could the reach the conclusion that Zenker's injury was unforeseeable." 
Safeco, 118 Wn.2d at 401. It held: 
On the day of this incident, he intentionally fired his gun at an 
occupied, metal truck. Under the facts of this case, no reasonable 
person could conclude Butler was unaware of the possibility of 
ricochet, or that a ricochet might hit an occupant of the truck. 
Therefore, Zenker's injury is not the result of an "accident," and 
Safeco has no obligation to provide coverage to the Butlers for that 
lllJury. 
Id. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's holding. 
The same is true in this case. The fact that Stanczak sustained gunshot wounds 
from Chisholm firing a loaded gun near him is not an unexpected happening without intention or 
design. Chisholm was aware that the firing of the gun could have resulted in injury. The mere 
fact that he did not intend to hit Stanczak does not make his pulling the trigger and the 
subsequent injuries an "occurrence." See also authority cited supra; Berry v. Mclemore, 795 
F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986) (no occurrence under policy even though shooter only fired warning 
shots; intentional act of firing weapon sufficed to find no coverage); Allstate v. Cannon, 44 F. 
Supp. 31 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (fact that rifle was discharged intentionally resulting in finding of no 
occurrence under the policy and no coverage despite fact shooter meant to only fire warning 
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shots); Orr v. Jurick, Case No. 205107 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 1999) (available at 1999 WL 
33441236) (No occurrence occurred under the policy because plaintiffs injury was the 
foreseeable result of the insured' s intentional act of bringing a loaded weapon into a 
confrontational, tense atmosphere.). 
No occurrence occurred under the Policy because Chisholm plead guilty to the 
charge of aggravated battery in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which is an intentional tort. That 
conviction is final and cannot be appealed. Again, battery is defined as "[w]illful and unlawful 
use of force or violence upon the person of another," "[ a ]ctual, intentional and unlawful touching 
or striking of another person against the will of the other," or "[u]nlawfully and intentionally 
causing bodily harm to an individual." IDAHO CODE§ 18-903. The criminal Judgment 
unequivocally states that Chisholm is guilty of criminal battery. Ritchie Deel. ,I 6, Ex. D. 
Therefore, Chisholm's actions were intentional and/or willful, so they cannot constitute an 
occurrence under the Policy. See Colo. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Snowbarger, 934 P.2d 
909, 911 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (guilty plea to intentional criminal act precluded coverage under 
homeowner's insurance policy; no duty to defend or indemnify; intent cannot be relitigatetl so 
as to avoid the intentional act exclusion ofan insurance policy); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. 
Groshek, 411 N.W.2d 480,484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (defendant's guilty plea established the 
necessary intent to make the insurance policy's exclusionary clause applicable). 
The Cooks may argue that Chisholm did not plead guilty to the offense of 
aggravated battery, but rather, he entered into an Alford plea in the Chisholm Criminal Case, so 
there is inadequate evidence that he acted intentionally. This argument has no merit. In this 
situation, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admitted to violating criminal law. 
Chisholm gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by accepting the Alford plea. He and 
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others are bound by his admission and abandonment of his defenses. One court has noted the 
following: 
Under an Alford plea, a defendant maintains innocence while 
entering a plea of guilty because the defendant concludes that his 
interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the 
court contains strong evidence of actual guilt. A guilty plea is an 
admission of all the elements of the criminal charge. Guilty pleas 
must be rooted in fact before they may be accepted. Accordingly, 
courts treat Alford pleas as having the same preclusive effect as a 
guilty plea. The collateral consequences of a guilty plea may not 
be avoided by the simultaneous assertion of innocence. 
Cortese v. Black, 838 F. Supp. 485,492 (D. Colo. 1993). In Harden v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 605 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), defendants named in a lawsuit alleging child 
molestation tendered the defense of the claim to their homeowners' insurance company. The 
insurance company successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no 
coverage because no occurrence occurred. One of the arguments the insurance company made in 
support of its assertion that no occurrence occurred was that the insured entered an Alford plea 
on the criminal charge of child molestation. The Georgia Court of Appeals, in affirming the 
lower court's decision, held: 
Harden' s guilty plea under Alford placed him in the same position 
as ifhe had been convicted of child molestation, and "the collateral 
consequences flowing from an Afford plea are the same as those 
flowing from an ordinary plea of guilt." Accordingly, evidence 
that Ronald Harden entered an Alford plea of guilt to child 
molestation was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that State 
Farm had no duty under the terms of the policy to provide 
coverage or a defense to Mr. Harden. 
Harden, 605 S.E.2d at 38. See also, Eberle v. Nationwide Mut'l Ins. Co., Case No. 2013-CA-
000898-MR, slip op. at 6-8 (Kty. Ct. App. May 6, 2016) (available at 2016 WL 2609311) 
(Insured' s conviction pursuant to Alford plea establishes that the elements necessary to convict 
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him were factually satisfied, thus precluding insurance coverage); Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Arzillo, 98 A.D.2d 495, 501-02 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (with Alford-type plea, the issues 
representing the essential elements of the crime have necessarily been judicially determined by 
the acceptance of the plea); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sallak, 914 P.2d 697, 700 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1996) (acceptance of plea is the equivalent of a judicial determination of each of the 
material elements of the crime). 
In this case, Chisholm admitted to the intentional offense of aggravated battery, 
including all of the elements to that offense. No occurrence occurred because Chisholm acted 
intentionally. As such, there absolutely can be no coverage under the Policy under Section II Fl 
for Stanczak' s claim. 
c. Specific Policy exclusions bar coverage for Stanczak's claim 
against the Cooks. 
Even if plaintiffs were able to get past this initial coverage question, there are also 
specific exclusions contained within the Policy that would still preclude coverage for Stanczak's 
claim against the Cooks. 
i. The violation of criminal law exclusion. 
Section II Exclusion Number 14 excludes bodily injury that arises out of the 
violation of a criminal law. Am. Cplt. 1 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 25. As noted above, Chisholm has 
entered an Alford guilty plea for the charge of aggravated battery in the Chisholm Criminal Case. 
An Alford plea is a guilty plea. State v. Salisbury, 143 Idaho 476,479, 147 P.3d 108, 111 
(2006). A judge has discretion to accept an Alford plea and will do so only where there is 
sufficient evidence that the prosecution would likely be able to persuade a jury to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge in the criminal case accepted Chisholm's 
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Alford plea, thus finding that the prosecution would likely be able to convict Chisholm ofthis 
crime if it moved forward. Again, because Chisholm entered a guilty Alford plea, he admitted to 
violating criminal law. Chisholm gave up his defenses to the shooting charge by entering into 
the Alford plea. He and others are bound by his admission and abandonment of his defenses. 
See authority outlined, supra and infra. 
Chisholm plead guilty in the Chisholm Criminal Case on January 5, 2016. 
Stanczak did not send his demand letter to Farm Bureau and the Cooks until February 1, 2016. 
By the time Stanczak sent his demand letter to Farm Bureau and the Cooks, there could be no 
coverage under the Policy under Exclusion Number 14, as the claim arose out of a violation of 
criminal law. So, even if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the Policy and it 
was also found that an occurrence had occurred, this exclusion would preclude coverage. 
ii. The business activities exclusion. 
Stanczak argued in his demand letter that the operation of the campground was a 
business activity of the Cooks because they invited or licensed campers to come onto the Bloom 
Lake Property for a voluntary donation. Stanczak has also submitted that Chisholm was the 
Cooks' employee, even though he was not paid a wage or salary, because he was paid to do work 
on the Bloom Lake Property by virtue of the fact that the Cooks allowed him to reside in the 
cabin on the Bloom Lake Property without paying rent. If Chisholm was somehow the Cooks' 
employee or agent (ignoring that he would likely still not be performing duties within the scope 
of his employment) given that there was some business related to the operation of Bloom Lake 
Property, then Stanczak's claims would still be specifically excluded under Section II Exclusion 
Number 1 because the Cooks have no insurance coverage under this Policy arising out of any of 
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the insureds' "business activities." This would be the case even if the operation of the 
campground at the Bloom Lake Property was only a break-even proposition. 
In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically 
look at: whether the activity is customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and 
purpose of the activity are commercial in nature, and in furtherance of the business, or the means 
oflivelihood. Blacks v. Fireman 's Fund Am. Ins., 115 Idaho 449, 453, 767 P.2d 824, 828 Idaho 
(Ct. App. 1989). Applying these factors, the Cooks' activity of offering up campground sites in 
exchange for a voluntary fee may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be 
deemed to be commercial in nature. It does not appear to matter whether the Cooks made a 
profit on this activity for it to be considered a business pursuit, which would then bar any 
coverage for that activity under the Policy, even if Chisholm was somehow found to be an 
Insured under the Policy and it was also found that an occurrence had occurred. 
iii. The intentional act exclusion. 
Similarly, Section II Exclusion Number 3 excludes bodily injury intentionally 
caused by an Insured. Thus, even if Chisholm was somehow found to be an Insured under the 
Policy-which he is not-his intentional act of shooting Stanczak would be excluded. Again, 
Chisholm may say that he did not intentionally cause bodily injury to Stanczak, but that he was 
shooting warning shots. The intentional act of shooting a gun near a person is sufficient grounds 
to deny coverage under Section II Exclusion Number 3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Herman, 551 N.E.2d 
844, 845-46 (Ind. 1990) (Intentionally firing gun into a fleeing crowd is an egregious act and 
intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law). 
There is no coverage for Stanczak's claim against the Cooks under Section II Fl 
of the Policy. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 28 c1ient:42159o7.3 
223
2. There is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises Medical 
Coverage) for Stanczak's claim against the Cooks. 
For all the same reasons, there is no coverage for Stanczak's claimed medical 
expenses under Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. This section does not 
require that the actors be insureds under the Policy. Rather, the Policy gives coverage for 
medical costs for those who suffer bodily injury caused by an "occurrence" to those who are on 
the insured location with permission of an Insured. Am. Cplt. ,r 8, Ex. A, Policy p. 2. For 
purposes of this motion, Farm Bureau will assume that Stanczak was on the insured location with 
permission and that he was camping at the campground on the Bloom Lake Property. 
However, there was still no occurrence as that term is defined in the Policy. As 
outlined above, shooting someone is not an accident and does not caused unexpected injuries. 
Without an occurrence causing bodily injury, there is no coverage under Section II F2 (Premises 
Medical Coverage) of the Policy for Mr. Stanczak's claimed medical expenses. 
In addition, even if there was an argument that there was an occurrence under the 
Policy and Chisholm was deemed to be an Insured under the Policy, the same exclusions, 
specifically Ereclusion Nos. !(business activities), 3 (intentional acts) and 14 (violation of 
criminal law), identified and discussed above, would preclude coverage for any medical 
expenses claimed by Stanczak arising out of the shooting. 
As such, there is no coverage for any claimed medical expenses of Stanczak under 
Section II F2 (Premises Medical Coverage) of the Policy. 
C. There Is No Coverage Under the Policy for the Stanczak Complaint or the 
Amended Stanczak Complaint. 
Farm Bureau also seeks a ruling that there is no coverage or duty to defend the 
Cooks relating to the Stanczak Complaint and the Amended Stanczak Complaint. As a general 
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rnle, an insurer must defend a suit against the insured where the complaint alleges facts which, if 
trne, would bring the case within the policy coverage. Pendle bury v. W Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 
Idaho 456,464,406 P.2d 129, 134 (1965). The duty to defend exists so long as there is a 
genuine dispute over facts bearing on coverage under the policy or over the application of the 
policy's language to the facts. Constr. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am., 135 Idaho 680, 
682-83, 23 P.3d 142, 144-45 (2001). Farm Bureau asserts that there is no genuine dispute over 
facts bearing on coverage.3 
1. There is no coverage under the Policy for the Stanczak Complaint or 
the Amended Stanczak Complaint because they were filed after 
Chisholm's guilty plea. 
The timing of the filing of the Stanczak Complaint and the Amended Stanczak 
Complaint preclude coverage under the Policy. Again, Farm Bureau reminds the Court of the 
following relevant events: 
• 6/28/2015: The shooting and Chisolm's arrest. 
• 6/29/2015: Criminal charges are filed against Chisholm in the Chisholm 
Criminal Case. 
3 Though not part of the Court's consideration here, Farm Bureau is of the opinion that it 
will be difficult for Stanczak factually and legally to prove his claims for negligent supervision 
and premises liability against the Cooks. On the negligent supervision claim, there does not 
appear to be any evidence that the Cooks knew or should have known that Chisholm had violent 
tendencies. Edgar Cook called Chisholm "perfect" and said he would hire Chisholm again in his 
statements. There does not appear to be any event at the Bloom Lake Property involving 
Chisholm that would put the Cooks on notice that Chisholm would shoot someone. On the claim 
for premises liability, there also does not seem to be any evidence that the Cooks created a 
foreseeable risk of harm in allowing Chisholm to be present at the Bloom Lake Property. In 
addition, Chisholm's presence at the Bloom Lake Property does not constitute a "dangerous 
condition" on land sufficient as a matter of law to implicate the Cooks under a theory of 
premises liability. The duty implicated by Stanczak's allegations concerns the control of 
Chisholm's conduct, not the physical condition of the premises or activities conducted thereon. 
See Am. Econ. Ins. Co. v. Simon, 662 N.W.2d 373, slip op. at 4 (Iowa Ct. App. 2003). 
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• 1/5/2016: Chisholm enters a guilty plea in the Chisholm Criminal Case. 
• 3/8/2016: This Court in the Chisholm Criminal Case accepts the guilty 
plea and sentences Chisholm. Chisholm has not appealed the sentencing 
in the Chisholm Criminal Case. 
• 5/2/2016: Farm Bureau files the Farm Bureau Dec. Action. 
• 5/12/2016: Stanczak files the Stanczak Tort Action against the Cooks and 
Chisholm. 
• 6/3/2016: Farm Bureau files an amended complaint in the Farm Bureau 
Dec. Action reflecting that the Stanczak Tort Action has been filed and 
tendered to Farm Bureau. 
• 6/17/2016: Stanczak files the Amended Stanczak Complaint the Stanczak 
Tort Action. 
Farm Bureau submits that it is unnecessary to analyze the allegations contained in the Stanczak 
Complaint or the Amended Stanczak Complaint because the timing of the plea in the Chisholm 
Criminal Case cut off any potential coverage under the Policy. As outlined above, Policy 
Exclusion Number 14 precludes coverage for a claim arising out of the violation of criminal law. 
In addition, coverage under the Policy requires that there be an occurrence, which is an accident. 
The allegations in the Stanczak Tort Action relate to Chisholm's actions in shooting Stanczak, 
which constituted violation of criminal law. The criminal law that was violated requires intent. 
Therefore, Policy Exclusion Number 14 was implicated on January 5, 2016, the date of the plea. 
In addition, the question of whether an occurrence occurred was absolutely determined on 
January 5, 2016, when Chisholm admitted to the charge of aggravated battery. 
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Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dahms, Case No. 1-14-1392 (Ill. Ct. App. 
May 19, 2016) ( available at 2016 Westlaw 2941713 ), is a somewhat procedurally similar case. 
In that case, on October 9, 2012, Enadeghe was a cab driver in Chicago and pulled his cab up to 
a crosswalk near Dahms, a pedestrian. Dahms' briefcase allegedly came into contact with the 
cab and Enadeghe left his cab to pursue Dahms. A scuffle ensued and Dahms struck Enadeghe 
with his briefcase. On October 9, 2012, Enadeghe filed a tort action against Dahms alleging 
negligence and battery. Before Enadeghe filed suit, Dahms had informed his insurance 
company, Country Mutual, of Enadeghe's claim. Country Mutual denied the claim on 
September 5, 2012, because no occurrence occurred and because of the criminal acts exclusion in 
Dahms' policy. On December 10, 2012, Country Mutual filed an action for declaratory 
judgment that there was no coverage for the October 9, 2012, event. On March 20, 2013, Dahms 
was convicted of aggravated battery. On September 25, 2013, Dahms filed a counterclaim for 
declaratory judgment against Country Mutual, along with breach of contract and bad faith causes 
of action. With respect to the application of the criminal acts exclusion, the Illinois Court of 
Appeals held that the criminal acts exclusion unequivocally went into effect at the time of 
Dahms' criminal conviction. 
Cotmtry Mutual could not automatically assume that Dahms' s 
striking of Enadeghe was a criminal act before he was convicted, 
because there were less culpable interpretations of what may have 
occurred, including negligence or self-defense. But those 
competing interpretations became irrelevant after Dahms's 
criminal conviction. His conviction for aggravated battery meant 
that a jury had found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Dahms had, 
in fact, committed a crime ... At that moment, Country Mutual 
could not be accused of self-serving, unbridled discretion in 
determining that Dahms 's conduct constituted a criminal act; 
Country Mutual could point to a jury verdict based on the highest 
burden of proof known to our legal system. At that moment, the 
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applicability of the criminal-acts exclusion became clear and free 
from doubt. 
Country Mut'l Ins. Co. ,r 76 (emphasis added). The court held that Country Mutual only had a 
duty to defend from the time of the filing of the tort case until Dahms' conviction. Id., ,r 79. 
The Court should apply a similar holding in this case. Chisholm entered his 
guilty plea on January 5, 2016. By entering his plea, he admitted that a crime had been 
committed relating to the shooting of Stanczak in June of 2015. Policy Exclusion Number 14 
went immediately into effect, over four months before the filing of the Stanczak Tort Action. At 
the same time, Chisholm admitted that he intentionally battered Stanczak, which means an 
occurrence did not occur. The Court need not even consider the allegations of the Stanczak 
Complaint and Amended Stanczak Complaint because the violation of criminal law exclusion 
was already in effect and no occurrence had occurred, excluding any coverage. The Court 
should grant Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. There is no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in 
the Stanczak Complaint. 
Even if the Court considers the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, 
there is no coverage under the Policy. Again, the Stanczak Complaint seeks damages for 
Stanczak's injuries when he was shot by Chisholm on June 28, 2015, at the Bloom Lake 
Property. Stanczak alleged that the Bloom Lake campground is a "for profit" campground 
owned and operated by the Cooks. Stanczak also alleged that Chisholm was the Cooks' 
employee and/or agent because he acted as caretaker of the Bloom Lake Property. Am. Cplt. 
,r 26, Ex. E; Cooks' Answer ,r 1.1. 
The factual allegations in the Stanczak Complaint are similar to those alleged in 
previous correspondence from Stanczak's counsel. Stanczak alleges that on June 28, 2015, he 
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was camping at the Bloom Lake Property with his girlfriend, Sally Johns. Chisholm invited 
Stanczak and Sally Johns into a cabin located at the Bloom Lake Property to stay the night. 
Chisholm allegedly became intoxicated and an argument ensued between Chisholm and 
Stanczak. Stanczak left the cabin, and as he was walking away from the cabin, Chisholm fired a 
.45 caliber handgun at him. Two bullets struck Stanczak, one in the arm and one in the back. 
Stanczak sustained serious injuries. Chisholm left the scene and was later apprehended by law 
enforcement. Law enforcement found several other firearms at the cabin at the Bloom Lake 
Property. Id. 
Stanczak alleged four causes of action in his Complaint: (1) Premises Liability 
against the Cooks and the Bloom Lake Campground;4 (2) Negligent Supervision of Chisholm 
against the Cooks and Bloom Lake Campground4; (3) Strict Liability against Chisholm; and 
(4) Negligent, Reckless, and Tortious Misconduct against Chisholm. The Court should find that 
there is no coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint. 
a. The Premises Liability Cause of Action against the Cooks. 
The first cause of action in the Stanczak Complaint is a premises liability claim 
against the Cooks. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks owed a duty to Stanczak as an invitee of the 
campground. Stanczak alleges that the Cooks breached this duty when they failed to take 
ordinary and reasonable care to keep the premises safe and/or to warn Stanczak about 
Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable conduct, namely, Chisholm becoming intoxicated and 
discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges that this breach of duty caused his damages. Stanczak 
4 As there is no entity called the Bloom Lake Campground and the Bloom Lake 
Campground is not an insured under the Policy, only the allegations against the Cooks will be 
analyzed. 
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does not state that Chisholm pointed the gun at him and fired. Rather, he alleges that as Stanczak 
was walking away, Chisholm fired rounds from his .45 caliber handgun and two of these rounds 
struck Stanczak. 
The premises liability cause of action against the Cooks does not trigger coverage 
under the Policy. As outlined above, while the Cooks are named Insureds under the Policy, no 
occurrence occurred to trigger coverage under either Section I Fl or F2 of the Policy. In 
addition, as outlined above, the violation of criminal law exclusion was already in effect at the 
time of the filing of the Stanczak Complaint. Also, the allegations in the Stanczak Complaint 
assert that the Cooks were running a for-profit business at the Bloom Lake Property. As the 
shooting, as alleged by Stanczak, arose from the Cooks' alleged "business activities," it is also 
not covered per the business activities exclusion contained within the Policy, outlined above. 
b. The Negligent Supervision Claim against the Cooks. 
Stanczak alleges that the Cooks had a duty to supervise their agent/employee 
Chisholm from injuring guests at the Campground. He alleges that they breached this duty by 
failing to prevent Chisholm from becoming intoxicated and discharging a weapon. He alleges 
that the Cooks breached the duty by failing to protect Stanczak from or warn Stanczak of the 
dangers posed by Chisholm becoming intoxicated and discharging a firearm. Stanczak alleges 
that these breaches caused his injuries and damages. 
The same grounds as outlined above for denying coverage for the first cause of 
action for premises liability exist for denying the second cause of action for negligent 
supervision. There was no occurrence, and the cause of action asserted arose from the violation 
of a criminal law. In addition, the cause of action relates to business activities that the Cooks are 
alleged to have conducted on Bloom Lake Property. In short, the Policy did not provide 
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commercial general liability protection or coverage and the benefits bargained for by the Cooks 
specifically exclude any coverage from any "business activity" or claim arising out of a 
"business activity." 
c. The Strict Liability Claim against Chisholm. 
Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was engaged in the ultra-hazardous activities of 
maintaining a loaded firearm on the premises, handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated while 
in close proximity to Stanczak, and firing a loaded firearm while intoxicated. Stanczak alleges 
that he was not aware that Chisholm had a firearm, that it was pointed in his general direction, or 
that the firearm was loaded. The same grounds as outlined above require denial of coverage for 
this cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. The Cooks did not have 
a commercial general liability policy for their farm and properties. They had a personal general 
liability policy that insured the Cooks and their relatives. There was no coverage for any 
employee or agent of the Cooks. Moreover, the shooting was not an occurrence and, per the 
allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, it relates to the Cooks' business activities, for 
which there is no coverage. In addition, as outlined above, the violation of criminal law 
exclusion was already in effect at the time of the filing of the Stanczak Complaint. 
d. The Negligence, Reckless, and Tortious Conduct Claims 
against Chisholm. 
Stanczak alleges that Chisholm owed a duty to him of reasonable care to handle 
the firearm in a safe manner, not to handle or discharge the firearm while intoxicated, and to 
protect those around Chisholm from an unreasonable risk of harm. Stanczak alleges that 
Chisholm breached these duties by handling the firearm in an unsafe manner while intoxicated, 
maintaining a dangerous condition on the premises by having a loaded gun, failing to give 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 36 c1ient421s9o7.3 
231
warning to Stanczak of the hazard on the premises, and exposing him to an unreasonable risk of 
harm on the premises. Again, the same grounds as outlined above required denial of coverage 
for this cause of action. Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. The shooting was 
not an occurrence and, per the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, it relates to the 
Cooks' business activities and there is no coverage for the same. In addition, as outlined above, 
the violation of criminal law exclusion was already in effect at the time of the filing of the 
Stanczak Complaint. 
3. There is no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in 
the Amended Stanczak Complaint. 
Consideration of the allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint 
does not lead to coverage under the Policy. As outlined above, in the Amended Stanczak 
Complaint Stanczak deleted references to the fact that the Cooks "operated" the Bloom Lake 
Campground as "a private for profit business." It also appears that Stanczak deleted the 
reference that Chisholm was an employee of the Cooks, but still left in the reference to him being 
the Cooks' agent. In paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 in the Stanczak Complaint, he alleges that the 
Cooks "owned and operated" the Bloom Lake Campground and that it was a "private for 
profit business." The Amended Stanczak Complaint states that the Cooks owned the 
campground and Stanczak deleted the reference that it was a "private for profit" business. 
In paragraph 1.4, the Stanczak Complaint read that the Cooks owned and 
operated the campground, where the Amended Stanczak Complaint states simply that the Cooks 
owned the Bloom Lake Campground. Stanczak also previously alleged in the Stanczak 
Complaint that Bloom Lake Campground is a "for profit" campground and privately owned by 
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the Cooks. In paragraph 1.4 of the Amended Stanczak Complaint, Stanczak deleted the adjective 
"for profit" in front of his references to "campground." 
For Stanczak's causes of action against the Cooks, Stanczak in his negligent 
supervision claim, paragraph 3 .2. 7, instead of alleging that the Cooks failed to supervise their 
"agent/employee," he alleges in the Amended Stanczak Complaint that the Cooks failed to 
supervise their "agent" and deleted references to "employee." Stanczak made similar changes to 
paragraph 3.2.11 of the Amended Stanczak Complaint. He alleges that Chisholm was acting 
"while in the course and scope of his agency" as host and caretaker instead of alleging that 
Chisholm was acting "while in the course and scope of his employment and agency." 
(Emphasis added.) 
The allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint do not bring the 
case within the coverage under the Policy. The focus of the amended allegations seems to be on 
whether Chisholm was the Cooks' agent instead of employee and whether the Cooks were 
operating the campground as a for-profit enterprise. As outlined above, the main thrust of Frum 
Bureau's denial is that the claim arises out of the violation of a criminal law and intentional act 
and no occurrence occurred. The allegations in the Amended Stanczak Complaint do not change 
the conclusion of no coverage under the Policy. 
Farm Bureau also submits that the business activities exclusion also precludes 
coverage of the allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint. Whether or not the 
Cooks were actually "operating" the campground "for profit" is not the key basis for the denial 
of coverage. Farm Bureau has previously cited to Coverage Section II, Exclusion Number 1, 
which precludes coverage arising from the insured's business activities. Even with the new 
allegations, Farm Bureau still asserts that the business activities exclusion applies. The Cooks 
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are insureds, and this claim relates to their business activities of having a campground on their 
property. The Court should find no coverage for the allegations contained in the Amended 
Stanczak Complaint. 
4. There is no coverage for the allegations corresponding to the Premises 
Liability and Negligent Supervision claims even if the Court considers 
them separately from the underlying intentional tort committed by 
Chisholm. 
The Cooks may argue that the Court must consider the two allegations against the 
Cooks found in the Amended Stanczak Complaint, namely premises liability and negligent 
supervision, as separate from the underlying intentional tort committed by Chisholm. They may 
argue that the allegations that the Cooks failed to keep their premises in a reasonably safe 
condition and/or negligently supervised Chisholm are separate occurrences under the Policy and 
afford coverage thereunder. This argument has no merit. There still is no coverage afforded 
under the Policy on the following two grounds: 
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected this argument. While there are cases 
from other jurisdictions that look at these torts separately, Idaho has rejected this line of 
authority. Under Idaho law, the courts must look at the actions that actually caused the harm. 
For example, in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 
( 1992), an insurance company brought an action for declaratory relief against its insured, Shirley 
Wilcox, seeking a ruling that there was no coverage under a homeowners insurance policy for a 
lawsuit brought against her and her ex-husband by a number of minor foster children who were 
abused in her home by Wilcox's ex-husband. The insurance company argued that there was no 
occurrence under the applicable policy. The minor foster children alleged in the underlying case 
that Wilcox herself failed to report abuse to law enforcement, failed to report to her ex-husband's 
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employer his tendencies to molest, and negligently failed to protect the children. The lower 
court found that Wilcox's actions in failing to report her husband's actions or failing to protect 
the children from her husband' s tendencies constituted an error in judgment, so it found that 
there was an occurrence under the policy. 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed this holding. It applied the following 
definitions for the word "accident," which is pm1 of the definition of the term "occurrence": 
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event 
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through 
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and 
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more 
comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common 
signification the word means an unexpected happening without 
intention or design. 
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979). 
ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. l. an undesirable or unfortunate 
happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, 
injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 
2. any event that happens unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan 
or cause .... 
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989). 
Mut: of Enumclaw, 123 Idaho at 8-9, 843 P.2d at 158-59. The Court stated that its role was to 
look at Wilcox's actions, and not the actions of her ex-husband, because she was the only one 
whose actions could be covered under the insurance policy in question. The Court held: 
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an 
"occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct 
which caused injury. The injury suffered by the minors is child 
molestation. While the acts or failure to act by Wilcox may have 
created or contributed to the environment which permitted her ex-
husband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained of 
by the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw 
Policy and the Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox. 
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Id. The Court found that the event causing the damage in the underlying complaint was her ex-
husband's abuse, not her alleged negligence for failure to supervise her ex-husband nor the 
failure to report the abuse. The Court held there was no occurrence under the policies in 
question and that the insurance companies owed no duty to defend its policyholder. 
The Idaho Supreme Court came to a similar holding in State Farm v. Doe, 130 
Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997). In that case, parents of a minor child brought suit against 
insureds who operated an in-home day care. The minor child was allegedly abused by the 
insureds' son, who worked at the in-home daycare. The parents of the minor child brought suit 
against the insured for a number of causes of action, including the same two claims Stanczak has 
asserted against the Cooks-negligent supervision of its agent and premises liability. The 
insureds made a claim to their insurance company for coverage of the underlying suit, and the 
insurance company, State Farm, filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing that there was no 
occurrence under the policy and thus, no coverage. The district court agreed and the insureds 
appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that intentional acts caused the damage, and not 
any of the other claims, including negligent supervision and premises liability. State Farm, 130 
Idaho at 695-96, 946 P.2d at 1335-36.5 
5 Other courts agree with Idaho's treatment of this issue. Allstate Ins. Co v. JJM, 657 
N.W. 2d 181 , 183-84 (Mich. Ct. App 2002) (court found no occurrence under an insurance 
policy when minor party-goer molested another passed-out party-goer, notwithstanding 
allegations of negligent supervision and premises liability, because an intentional act caused the 
harm, not an accident); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornwell, 90 P.3d 978, 980 (Nevada 2004) (named 
insureds' failure to prevent their adult son's sexual seduction of minor neighbor was not an 
"accident," and, thus, their allegedly negligent supervision of their son was not a covered 
"occurrence" under the Uability coverage of homeowners' insurance policy); Ojjhuas v. Guthrie, 
746 N.E.2d 685, 688-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (insureds' allegedly negligent supervision of 
juvenile and their allegedly negligent entrustment of a gun to him were not "occurrences" 
separate and apart from the underlying intentional tort); Allstate v. Hill, Case No. 261543, slip 
op. pp. 2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. August 16, 2005) (available at 2005 WL 1959560) (artful pleading 
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Idaho law requires the Court to look at the actions that caused the harm in 
question, and whether those actions constitute an occurrence. Here, Chisolm shooting Stanczak 
was what caused the harm in question and those actions do not constitute an occurrence and, 
thus, it is not covered under the Policy. 
Second, even if the Comi were to look separately at the allegations of the 
Premises Liability and Negligent Supervision causes of action, they would not constitute 
occurrences under the Policy. The natures of these causes of action both involve foreseeability, 
i.e., what the negligent party knew or should have known. In Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 
222, 723 P.2d 755, 769 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds, the court analyzed the 
tort of negligent supervision and found that the duty "extends to the protection and safety of 
"others" foreseeably endangered." In McDonald v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 305,308, 
707 P.2d 416,419 (1985), the court found that a premises liability claim can arise when the 
landowner negligently creates a foreseeable risk of harm. Stanczak alleges in the Stanczak 
Amended Complaint that the Cooks "failed to exercise ordinary and reasonable care to keep the 
premises reasonably safe from and to warn Plaintiff of Defendant Chisholm's reasonable 
foreseeable conduct." 
The very nature of these two torts is that the harm was expected because it was 
foreseeable, and that the tortfeasor should have prevented the harm. Because Stanczak is 
by alleging claims for negligence does not get around requirement that event causing harm must 
be an occurrence under an insurance policy). 
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alleging that the harm was foreseeable, it was not unexpected, so again, there was no occurrence 
under the Cooks' policy. 6 
Here, the Stanczak Amended Complaint alleges that the actions of the Cooks 
were foreseeable in not reasonably caring for their premises and failing to properly supervise 
Chisholm. Because these actions were allegedly foreseeable, they cannot be considered an 
occurrence because they were not unexpected. The Court should find that there is no coverage 
for the allegations relating to Stanczak's claims of Premises Liability and Negligent Supervision 
of Chisholm. 
D. Because There Is No Coverage Under the Policy for Stanczak's Claim, the 
Stanczak Complaint or the Amended Stanczak Complaint, the Court Must 
Dismiss the Cooks' Counterclaims Against Farm Bureau. 
The Cooks have asserted two counterclaims against Farm Bureau, one for Breach 
of Contract and one for Declaration of Coverage. As outlined above, there are no issues of 
material fact that coverage does not exist for Stanczak's claim, the Stanczak Complaint, or the 
Amended Stanczak Complaint. The Cooks allege in their Breach of Contract Counterclaim that 
"the allegations made in Stanczak's First Amended Complaint create a potential for coverage 
6 In Mountain State Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009), a 
restaurant employee was sexually assaulted by her supervisor. She brought suit against her 
employer, alleging claims for negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention of 
the supervisor. The restaurant tendered the defense of the lawsuit to its insurer and the insurer 
filed an action for declaratory judgment, asking the court to rule that there was no coverage for 
the claims. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer and the victim, 
now standing in the shoes of the bankrupt insured restaurant, appealed. The Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed, first holding that the event causing the damage, sexual assault, was not an 
occurrence under the policy because it was not an accident. The court also found that the 
tortfeasor had a history of committing violent crimes and for mistreating and assaulting female 
employees. The court found that because the actions of the tortfeasor were foreseeable based 
upon prior conduct, it could not "conclude that the negligent hiring and supervision by [the 
restaurant] was an 'occurrence' or 'accident' within the meaning of the policy." Hauser, 221 
P.3d at 61. 
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under the Policy." Under Idaho law, there must be coverage under an insurance policy in order 
for an insured to recover on a breach of contract claim. Robinson v. State Farm Mut 'l Auto. Ins. 
Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180, 45 P.3d 829, 836 (2002). Without coverage, there can be no breach of 
the Policy. The Court should dismiss the Cooks' Breach of Contract Counterclaim. In addition, 
implicit in the Court's granting of Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment on its 
Declaratory Judgment action should be a dismissal of the Cooks' cause of action for Declaration 
of Coverage. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the Court grant 
its Motion for Summary Judgment and rule that there is no coverage under the Policy for 
Stanczak's claim against the Cooks, no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in 
the Stanczak Complaint, and no coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in the 
Amended Stanczak Complaint. As such, Farm Bureau has no duty to defend or indemnify the 
Cooks or Chisholm for the claims asserted by Stanczak. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2016. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Art r.neys for Defendant Farm Bureau 
tual Insurance Company of Idaho 
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Michael T. Howard 
WINTON & CASHATT 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie Cook 
Wes S. Larsen 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
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COMES NOW, the plaintiff, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho, 
by and through undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and 
hereby submits its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company ofldaho's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Benjamin C. 
Ritchie, the Declaration of Steven Johnson, the Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne and the Court's 
record on file. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2016. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
ttorneys for Defendant Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho 
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1. I am a Senior Regional Claims Manager with Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm Bureau"). 
2. My job duties included the investigation of claims made to Farm Bureau, 
the supervision of claims examiners and adjusters, the maintenance of claims files, and the 
payment and processing of approved claims. 
3. I am familiar with the claims investigation process for Farm Bureau. For 
each claim made to Farm Bureau, a claims file is prepared and maintained. The claims file 
contains all documents relating to the investigation of the claim along with notes prepared by the 
claims examiner regarding the investigation and status of the claim. These claims files are 
prepared and kept in the ordinary and normal course of business. 
4. Recorded interviews of insureds are regularly conducted by claims 
examiners for Farm Bureau when claims are made. 
5. All recordings and transcripts of interviews conducted in the course of 
investigating a claim are stored in the corresponding claims file in the ordinary and normal 
course of business. 
6. In the summer of 2015, Edgar and Laurie Cook made a claim to Farm 
Bureau under their policy relating to a shooting that occurred on their real property. The claim 
number for the claim is 01038872012015062801. 
7. As part of the investigation of the claim, a claims adjuster, Brenda 
Speakman, who reported to me, conducted a recorded telephone interview of Edgar Cook on 
August 5, 2015. 
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8. After the interview was conducted, Farm Bureau prepared a transcript of 
the recorded telephone interview on August 6, 2016 as part of its normal business practice. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the transcript 
of the recorded telephone interview with Edgar Cook on August 5, 2015. Both the recording and 
the transcript of the recording were placed and stored in the claims file for Edgar and Laurie 
Cook's insurance claim. 
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this Jj_ day of October, 2016. 
DECLARATION OF STEVEN JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FARM 
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S MOTION FOR 






This is Brenda B Speakman a Farm Bureau Insurance claims representative and I'm conducting a 
recorded interview. Today I am speaking with Edgar Cook. The date is August 5, 2015. The time 
is 11:06am. And we are speaking with regards to our policy number 01-038872-01. And 
regarding a general liability claim for damages a claimed by an individual um who claims to 
have been uh shot on uh on some property. 
Q Edgar are you aware that I'm recording this interview? 
A Yes. 
Q And do I have your permission? 
A Of course. 
Q Okay alright so I um, I'm pulling up a claim document that we received from.James 
Vernon & Weeks and in that it claims a shooting at Bloom Lake on June 28· 2015 and 
they are indicating that they represent Joseph Stanczak, S-T-A-N-C-2-A-K who was shot 
um, by a Michael Jessie Chisholm, C-H-1-;5-H-O-l-M, on June 28, 2015. So the assertion is 
that um, Joseph's oh was shot by Michael. So the purpose of this interview then is to 
establish your relationship or lack of relationship um, with these individuals. Alright so 
let's first talk about Bloom Lake uh do you have property there? 
A Yes I own the lake and 200 acres. 
Q Okay so you own Bloom Lake? 
A Correct 
Q Okay and then. 
A My wife and I, my wife and I. 
Q Okay and 200 acres around the lake? 
A Uh about 80 percent of it. 
Q Okay alright and do you have structures on the property then? 
A Yeah we have a cabin and yeah we have a cabin yes. 
Q Okay and what's the cabin for? Who used the cabin? 
A Um, uh whoever we, there (inaudible) is to live in it and take care of the property while 
we are not up there. 




Q Okay so it's a cabin, so is this cabin then for recreational use for you guys when you guys 
are in the area? 
A Yeah we have done that in the past. 
Q Okay alright and so who currently maintains that cabin? 
A Mike (inaudible) 
Q Okay and what type of relationship do you have with him arrangement, I should say, 
arrangement you have with him for him to maintain that cabin? 
A Well he gets to stay in the cabin and he suppose to maintain and keep the lake up to 
specs and there was no paid work. You know he's not on our payroll and so uh he keeps 
the place clean and parked out. So it looks nice. And we've had he lake for I don't know 
65 years. 
Q Okay. 
A And Mike has worked for the Blue Lake has done that work for about 17 years. 
Q Okay and how did that uh arrangement start then so 17 years ago how did that all um 
become you know the plan of action of the maintenance of the lake? 
A Well we needed someone up there because there was so much uh going on at the lake 
that was bad. 
Q Uh huh. 
A And he was, he was uh go up there and straighten it up and it was a lot going on that we 
couldn't control. 
Q Okay. 
A So he, we allowed him to live up there all year round. And and he would take care of the 
facility and he has been doing that for 17 years. 
Q Okay what are some of the things that he does? 
A He goes around. He takes trash out um, just (inaudible) sometimes we have 200 people 
up there fishing and hiking and enjoying the area. 
Q Uh huh. 
A On the holidays, 18 camp sites. And uh rather beautiful and parked outs. Four outhouse 
and uh he keeps the uh weeds down and repairs the road once in a while. 
Q Okay so is Bloom Lake then sounds like it has actual, has actual it's a functioning camp 
area. Do people pay to camp there? 
A Only by donation only 
Q Okay and do they have to book it or is it first come first serve? 




Q Okay and where do they normally leave their donation? 
A We have two donation boxes that are locked and they just drop them in. 
Q Do you find that people do donate? 
A Oh yeah we, we try to collect the uh box every Sunday and it's just enough to pay the 
infrastructure cost. 
Q Okay alright and have you ever paid anybody to maintain the property? 
A Never. 
Q Okay and how is it that Mike Chisholm became the individual that you um agreed to 
have this arrangement? 
A 17 years ago he loved the lake up there. And he said he loved to be up there and keep it 
and that was 17 years ago which law now you could stand, stay in the cabin if you do 
that because it would be a load off our shoulders. 
Q Okay so does he provide for himself in that cabin? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay do you pay the utilities in the cabin, are there utilities or Is it utility free cabin? 
A It's a utility free and he supplies all the uh gas and propane and all the things he needs 
to operate. I don't supply that at all. 
Q Okay and do you have. 
A (inaudible) this cabin. 
Q So that property in Bloom lake do you then insure that particular cabin like you would a 
home? Do you have insurance on that particular cabin? 
A Yes you guys are insuring it 
Q Okay alright and uh does he have anybody else living there with him? 
A No he's supposed to be up there by himself but I guess he has friends once in a while. 
Q Okay. 
A We don't, we don't track that. 
Q Okay so he doesn't have a family 
A No. 
Q Okay alright and then I understand from our conversation prior to you know starting this 
recording that you don't really know that much about the circumstances that happened 
that day on June 28th but can you share with me what you do know? 




A (inaudible) went down there quite load and drunk and arguing and fighting went to go 
break lt up and I assume this gentleman got mad and turned on him or did something 
causing to endanger my, I, I don't know what the circumstances are I just guessing. 
Q Okay so does it sound like Joseph was then a camper there? He was camping? 
A Yeah he was camping in the lower side of the lake. 
Q Okay what, do you know if he was camping with family and things like or was it just him 
by himself? 
A I'm not really sure. 
Okay. Q 
A I don't have those details. That would probably be in the police report. 
Q Okay have you talked to Michael about this? 
A No not directly. He's in jail. 
Q Oh I see okay. Alright so what's happening with the cabin right now? Who's taking care 
of it or living there? 
A It's empty. 
Q Okay. Alright so how did you first become aware of this situation was it thru the mail 
that you received from James Vernon & Weeks? 
A Oh yes thru the mail. 
Q Okay. 
A And you know we've already, we've gotten two letters from him that one you have and 
one that's in the mail to you know. And it's four pages long. 
Q Okay alright have you made any attempts to call Michael or to visit him, Michael 
Chisholm? 
A It's very difficult to do that. No I have not. 
Q Okay and you said he's in jail. Do you know where he is in jail? 
A Bonner County jail. 
Q Okay do you know what they are holding him for? 
A Aggravated. 
Q Specifically. 






A The stuff you read in the papers is you can't believe everything. 
Q Okay so that's where your getting some of your information is from the papers? 
A Most of it. 
Q Okay alright um, just back to Michael a little bit more um, and his um, relationship with 
you in terms of the maintenance of the property. Uh did you provide him with supplies 
to maintain the property like uh brooms? 
A Yeah. 
Q Other equipment. 
A Yeah we, yeah he was suppose to take care of the property. He weeded it and kept it 
clean and took out the trash and took it to the dump and. 
Q But did you provide any of the equipment that he used? 
A Oh yeah the weed eater uh snowmobile, some of that equipment yes. 
Q Okay did he use any of his own equipment do you know? 
A Oh yes I think he used his own chainsaw when he had to and uh he had his own 
equipment. We had a diesel generator up there it supplies the power. 
Q Okay. 
A And that's about all we provided. 
Q And so he used, he used your snowmobile and your weed eater. Did you ever supply hi 




Q And did you say were there any port a potties up there or any uh? 
A He had, he had four out house. 
Q Okay and how about the servicing of those outhouses what's entailed with uh the 
servicing? 
A If they get full we have a truck come up and pump the out. They are big concrete 
reservoirs. 
Q Okay. 
A Yeah. And normally once a year we will put lie in there and that usually takes care of it. 




A And they, there is (inaudible) for out in the woods, not just the regular 
Q So did Michael is Michael the one who would then report to you um the status of those 
out houses and whether they you know look like they may need to be pumped or not? 
A Oh yeah he would report to me and let me know that there needed something needed 
to be taken care of or sometimes uh he would get the friend in Bloom Lake which I have 
about 100 members and they would come out and help him. Like one time we had 100 
people come out in two different groups. They went out and cleaned up the woods and 
forest and it's a beautiful area for use by everybody. 
Q Oh that's very nice. So it sounds like there is an organization who volunteers you said 
friends of Bloom Lake. They volunteer to maintain the place as well? 
A Yeah they maintain and also they build things. Like they help me build the doc, the boy 
scouts built the doc and then there is a library for children who uh built and donated by 
one of the campers. And it's uh a very nice place 
Q And do people maintain that uh? 
A Yeah they do. 
Q And do the friends of Bloom lake who maintain it or is it going to be Michael? 
A Friends, the friend of Bloom Lake is there is no official organization. We just call them 
the friends of Bloom lake cause they do good things for us. 
Q Oh got it okay. 
A It's all volunteer, the whole operation is volunteer. 
Q Okay. 
A Including Mike Chisholm. 
Q Okay well lets define a little bit more about what some of the other individuals do there 
and then give me an example of what some of the friends do for the area? 
A Build the docs, build the library for the children, um, repair things. There is not too 
much up there. 
Q Okay do they coordinate with Michael on that or do they do It somewhat independently 
ordotheyyouknow? 
A No they most, they mostly coordinate with Michael to make sure that it gets done 
properly. 
Q Okay do they normally, do they ever come to you first or do they normally go thru 
Michael? 
A No they go thru Michael. I usually am not involved. 
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Q Okay and then does Michael kind of report back to you what's going on? 
A Yeah and I mean, I might get up there every couple years. 
Q Okay. 
A I don't go up there very often. 
Q Okay have you even known Michael to have any issue, incidents like this in the past over 
the 17 years? 
A No he's been perfect and uh all the people up there loved him. He even uh plays a 
harmonica at the camp ground and supplies then with fire wood and really good 
relationship for 17 years. 
Q Okay have you ever known him to create any problems up there at all? 
A No he's been very good. 
Q Okay alright um I guess one last question if you were to uh mail him in for any, anything 
does he have a mailing address that would take it to Bloom Lake or um, where does he 
get his ma ii? 
A I believe, I believe he has a PO Box in Palmyra or at at the Post Office at Palmyra store. 
Q Okay. 
A I don't know, I don't know what number that is but. 
Q Okay alright it do you have any question for me or anything else you'd like to add? 
A No if uh I guess I guess you're going to be defending me against this but are you, are you 
defending me or the insurance company? 
Q Oh so what we do is we, I'm just, I'm the claims adjuster here in Walt Denning's office 
and I'm collecting the information just to find out your relationship with this individual 
and then from there I put it in the claim file and my boss in Boise will take a look at it 
and then he'll decipher you know what he needs to do and how he needs to interact um 
with the parties involved. So you'll find out more information a time goes on. Um we 
will get somebody to give you a call back in just a bit now that I have the right number 
for you. Well have them give you a call and fill you in and let me you know. 
A Okay the old number must have been our land line that we disconnected several years 
ago. 
Q That's what I was thinking yeah cause I've been having a tough time. So now I have 290-
6912 so I'll just go ahead and pass that number along. · 
A Yeah I keep it under my pillow at night 





Q Alright let me go ahead and conclude formally then. So I've been speaking with Ed Cook. 
The time Is now 11:23am. and we've been speaking with regards to an incident that we 
have reported occurring on June 28, 2015 involving Michael Chisholm and have you 
been aware that I've been recording this interview correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And I had your permission? 
A Correct. 
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1. I am one of the attorneys for Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company of Idaho in the above-noted matter and have personal knowledge with respect to the 
matters contained herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Register 
of Actions in the criminal case State ofldaho v. Michael Jesse Chisholm, Case Number CR-
2015-0003326, which was adjudicated in Bonner County, Idaho (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Chisholm Criminal Case") .. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the 
Acknowledgement of Alford Plea dated January 5, 2016 in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which 
my office obtained from Bonner County. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of a Guilty Plea 
Advisory Form executed by Michael Chisholm in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which my office 
obtained from Bonner County. 
5. In June of 2016, my office requested and obtained from Bonner County, 
Idaho compact discs containing audio files of the 1/5/2016 plea hearing and the 3/8/2013 
sentencing hearing in the Chisholm Criminal Case. I instructed our firm's word processor Barb 
Mayne at my office to prepare written transcripts of the hearings. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Felony 
Judgment entered against Michael Chisholm in the Chisholm Criminal Case, which my office 
obtained from Bonner County. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of a demand 
letter received dated February 1, 2016 sent by Wes S. Larsen and sent to Farm Bureau. 
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8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the First 
Amended Complaint for Damages filed in Bonner County case number CV-2016-679. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy of a letter dated 
August 22, 2016 prepared and sent by my office to Michael Howard on behalf of Edgar and 
Frances Cook. 
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. ~ 
DATED this / r day of October, 2016. 
Benjamin C. Ritchie 
DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN C. RITCIDE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMP ANY 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of October, 2016, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN C. RITCHIE IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following: 
Michael T. Howard 
WINTON & CASHATT 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie 
Cook 
Wes S. Larsen 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
DECLARATION OF BENJAMIN C. RITCHIE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
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Ex Parte Motion for appoval of additional emergency funds for 
ball istics expert, per I daho code 31-1608 
Affidavit in support of Daniel D. Taylor in support of Ex Parte motion 
10/15/2015 for approval of additional emergency funds for ballistics expert, per 
Idaho code 31-1608 
1011612015 
Order Approving Additional Emergency Funds for Ballistics Expert, Per 
I daho Code§ 31-1608 
10/16/2015 Waiver of Speedy Trial 
10/19/2015 Subpoena Issued- Deputy Jordan Thompson c/o BCSO 
10/19/2015 Subpoena Issued- Detective Gary Johnston, BCSO 
10/19/2015 Subpoena Issued - deputy Jordan Thompson,BCSO 
1011912015 
Objection to defendant's _exparte motion for approval of additional 
emergency funds for bal11st1cs expert 
1011912015 
Motion to Suppress; Notice of Hearing November 24m 2015 at 
2 :30pm 
1011912015 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Suppress 11/24/2015 02:30 PM) 
Defendants 
1011912015 
Defendant's Motion in Limine Object ing to 608(b) Evidence; Notice of 
Hearing November 24, 2015 at 2 :30pm 
1011912015 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion ·in Li mine 11/24/2015 02:30 PM) 
defendants 
10/19/2015 Brief in Support of Motion in Limine Pursuant to IRE 608(b) 
10/20/2015 Defendant's Witness List 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Pretrial Conference Hearing date: 
1012312015 
10/23/2015 Time: 10:35 am Courtroom : Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt Tape Number: 1 Defense Attorney: 
Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
1012312015 
Hearing r~sult for Jury Trial - 3 Days scheduled on 11/16/2015 09:00 
AM: Continued 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 10/23/2015 
10/23/2015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: None Number 
of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less Than 100 Pages 
10/23/2015 Notice Of Hearing/Trial 
10/23/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 12/18/2015 10:00 AM) 
10/23/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial - 3 Days 01/11/2016 09 :00 AM) 
10/23/2015 Waiver Of Speedy Trial - See Courtlog 
ll/l0/2015 Sheriff's Return on Criminal Subpoena Service - Jordan Samuel Thomson served 10-23-15 
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11/19/2015 PM: Continued 
1111912015 
Hearing result f?r Motion to Suppress scheduled on 11/24/2015 
02:30 PM: Continued 
11/19/2015 Hearing Rescheduled (Motion to Suppress 12/01/2015 09:30 AM) 
11/19/2015 Hearing Rescheduled (Motion in Limine 12/01/2015 09:30 AM) 
11/19/2015 Amended Notice of Hearing 
11/20/2015 Subpoena Issued- Detective Gary Johnston, BCSO 
11/20/2015 Subpoena Issued- Deputy Jordan Thompson, BCSO 
11/25/2015 Continued (Motion to Suppress 12/08/2015 02:00 PM) 
11/25/2015 Continued (Motion in Limine 12/08/2015 02:00 PM) 
11/25/2015 Amended Notice of Hearing 
11/25/2015 Subpoena issued-Detective Gary Johnston Dec 8, 2015 2p.m. 
11/25/2015 Subpoena issued-Deputy Jordan Thompson Dec 8, 2015 2p.m. 
1210112015 
Sheriff's Return on NON Service - Jordan Samuel Thomson -
UNSERVED 
1210112015 
Sheriff's Return on Subpoena Service - Gary John Johnston served 
11-30-15 
12/02/2015 Witness List 
1210412015 Sheriff's Return on Service - Subpoena Jordan S. Thomson served 12-03-2015 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Motion to Suppress - Motion in Limine 
1210812015 
Hearing date: 12/8/2015 Time: 2:21 pm Courtroom: Court reporter: 
Diane Bolan Minutes Clerk: Cherie Moore Tape Number: Ctrm 1 
Defense Attorney: Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on 12/08/2015 02:00 
1210812015 
PM: District Court Hearing Held - Court Reporter: Diane Bolan -
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
pages - TO BE ADDRESSED AT TRIAL IF NEEDED 
Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled on 12/08/2015 
1210812015 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held - Court Reporter: Diane Bolan 
- Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 
100 pages 
1210812015 
Hearing result for Motion to Suppress scheduled on 12/08/2015 
02:00 PM: Motion Granted in part . 
12/09/2015 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response To Request For Discovery 
12/09/2015 Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Pretrial Conference Hearing date: 
1211812015 
12/18/2015 Time: 10:33 am Courtroom: Court reporter: Amy Brown 
Minutes Clerk: Linda Oppelt Tape Number: 1 Defense Attorney: 
Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled on 12/18/2015 
1211812015 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held - Leave Trial Set Court 
Reporter: Amy Brown Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less Than 100 Pages 
12/18/2015 Notice Of Hearing 
12/18/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 12/28/2015 01:30 PM) 
1211812015 
Hear)ng result for Entry of Plea scheduled on 12/28/2015 01:30 PM: 
Continued 
12/18/2015 Hearing Scheduled (Entry of Plea 12/29/2015 09:15 AM) 
12/18/2015 Amended Notice of Hearing 
12/22/2015 Amended Notice of Hearing 
12/22/2015 Continued (Entry of Plea 01/05/2016 02:30 PM) 
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Time: 2:30 pm Courtroom: Court reporter: Byrl Cinnamon Minutes 
01/05/2016 Clerk: Cherie Moore Tape Number: Ctrm 1 Defense Attorney: Daniel 
Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
Hearing result for Entry of Plea scheduled on 01/05/2016 02:30 PM: 
0110512016 
District Court Hea ring Held - Court Reporter : Byrl Cinnamon -
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated : less than 10 
pages 
0110512016 
Hearing result fo r Entry of Plea scheduled on 01/05/2016 02:30 PM: 
Guilty Plea or Admission of Guilt 
0110512016 
Dismissed by Motion of the Prosecutor ":'ith heari_ng_ (!19-2520 
Enhancement-Use of a Deadly Weapon in Comm1ss1on of a Felony) 
0110512016 
Hearing result for Jury Tria l - 3 Days scheduled on 01/11/2016 09:00 
AM: Change Plea to Guilty Before Trial 
01/05/2016 Guilty Plea Advisory and Form 
01/05/2016 Acknowledgement of Alford Plea 
0110512016 
Order for Presentence Investigation Report and Substance Abuse 
Assessment 
01/05/2016 PSI Face Sheet Transmitted 
01/06/2016 Order Dismissing Count II 
01/06/2016 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing/District Court 03/08/2016 02:00 PM) 
01/06/2016 Notice of Hearing 
01/13/2016 Plaintiff's Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - Leonard M Sanders 
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - John W Hobday 
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - Edgar W Cook 
03/03/2016 Subpoena Issued - John L La Point 
03/03/2016 Defendant's Amended Witness List 
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - John La Pointe Served on 3-3-16 
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - Leonard Sauders Served on 3-3-16 
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - Edgar Cook Served on 3-3-16 
03/04/2016 Declaration of Service - Jon Hobday Served on 3-3-16 
03/07/2016 Notice Of Filing Character reference letters/letters of support 
Miscellaneous Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Keith Kinnaird 
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $5.00 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Keith Kinnaird 
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $1.25 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Keith Kinnaird 
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $.08 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Keith Kinnaird 
03/08/2016 Receipt number: 0003568 Dated: 3/8/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
Court Minutes Hearing type: Sentencing/District Court Hearing date: 
0310812016 
3/8/2016 Time: 2: 11 pm Courtroom: Court reporter: Diane Bolan 
Minutes Clerk: Cherie Moore Tape Number: 1 Defense Attorney: 
Daniel Taylor Prosecutor: Shane Greenbank 
Hearing result for Sentencing/District Court scheduled on 03/08/2016 
0310812016 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Diane Bolan 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated : More Than 
100 Pages 
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Sentenced To Incarceration (I18-907 Battery-Aggravated) 
03/08/2016 Confinement terms: Credited time: 58 days. Penitentiary 
determinate: 2 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 8 years . 
03/08/2016 STATUS CHANGED: closed pending clerk action 
03/08/2016 Property Bond Exonerated (Amount 100,000.00) 
03/08/2016 Jail Information Sheet 
03/08/2016 Felony Judgment (Sentence Imposed) - 5 Pages 
03/30/2016 Motion for Correction or Reduction of Sentence, ICR 35 
03/30/2016 Defendant: Chisholm, Michael Jesse Appearance Susie D Jensen 
0313012016 Notice o~ Assignment Change - Attorney Jensen appears/ Attorney Taylor withdrawn 
0410512016 
Order Denying Rule 35 Sentence Reduction and Notice of Right to 
Appeal 
04/26/2016 Motion and Stipulation for Restitution 
04/28/2016 Order of Restitution 
05/05/2016 Notice of Loss of Right to Vote 
0610212016 
Notice of Withdrawal After Entry of Judgment Pursuant to ICR 44.1 -
Attorney S. Jensen PD 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By 
06/07/2016 The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Cecilia Reid Receipt number: 0008309 
Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $17.00 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Registered Mail Fee Paid by: Cecilia Reid 
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $2.34 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Cecilia Reid 
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $5.00 (Credit 
card) 
0610712016 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Cecilia Reid Receipt 
number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $1.25 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Cecilia Reid 
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $.08 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Cecilia Reid 
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008309 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $3.00 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Tape/copy Time Fee Paid by: Ciecilia Reid 
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $5.00 (Credit 
card) 
0610712016 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Fee Paid by: Ciecilia Reid Receipt 
number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $1.25 (Credit card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Court Tape Sales Tax Paid by: Ciecilia Reid 
06/07/2016 Receipt number: 0008340 Dated: 6/7/2016 Amount: $.08 (Credit 
card) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Ciecilia Reid 










-- I f,,:. 0fECEiVEv· n JUN f O 2016 
BY: ------
State of Idaho v. G ~; ~b<1 l f':::>.,, 
Case No. l -S-- _. ~j L {a 
.- ....... 
STATE OF IDAHO L 
County of BolJl!er / F 
FILED 1/05 [h 
AT i{ :'50 O'ClOCK f M 
CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
~ 
D£PUTV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ALFORD PLEA 
NOTICE: DEFENDANT MUST READ AND INITIAL EACH PARAGRAPH 
/'0::& 1. -I understand that a defendant may plead guilty to a felony charge, even though 
he/she either claims to be innocent of the charge, or does not admit to all of the elements of 
such charge. This is known as a North Carolina v. Alford guilty plea. 
~ 2. In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, pursuant to the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), I understand that the 
Court must make the following findings: 
'.YY\ t, a. That there exists a strong factual basis to .support the guilty plea; 
~ b. That the defendant's guilty plea is voluntarily, knowingly and 
understandingly made; 
':c'.!d~. , c. That the defendant understands the elements of the charge, the potential 
defenses and his/her right against self-incrimination; and 
,... ~ d. '!'h?.t fue defe!?d~t !! 2W~!'~ 9f th~ <.'t:rn~ennenees of Ms/her v.uiltv nlea and . - - -
the rights that are waived by such guilty plea. 
~3. When the Court accepts a guilty plea, p~uant to North Carolina v. Alford, a 
defendant must understand that the Court will treat the defendant as though he/she were in 
f~ct guilty of all the elements of such felony offense. The Court will not accept a guilty plea~ 
pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, unless the court record reflects that the guilty plea was 
voluntary, and was also an intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the 
defendant 
~ <4. I consent that the judgment be entered against me, without a trial of any kind, even 
though I do not admit that I committed all of the elements of the offense to which I plead 




___ 5. In signing this form, I hereby attest and acknowledge that I have discussed my 
guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, with my attorney and that I fully understand 
this type of guilty plea and the consequences which result. 
Dated this · $ 
I hereby attest and acknowledge that I have fully discussed a guilty plea, pursuant to 
North Carolina v. Alford, with the above named defendant. 
Dated this 2) day of _---"j..._Clv--..... ______ , 20_. 
V 










DECEIVE, n JUN I O 2016 u 
BY: _____ _ 
(i)}8@Jif ~j I ~IIIM~ 
SrATE .,Or fBAHO )_ 
County of Bonne: /. -. , f"' '!!_i 
FILED I [ o S ( 1., 
AT :z: ~0 ~'CLOCK .f _M .' 
CLERH DISTRICT COURT -
DENTY 
h:it> 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TID: COUNTY 0}~ BONNER 
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY AND FORM 
TO BE FILLED OUT BY THE DEFENDANT 
Defendant's Name: ((Lcfunsd Cfi<51,d"1 Sign~ i,_ c,£7-LL_ 
Date: / - 5' - ;)___o / 0 Case Number: ~ ) .- ·:> "> l_ G 
Age: b C Date of Birth: 
STATEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
(Please initial each response) 
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything about the crime(s) you are 
accused of committing. If you elect to have a trial, the State may not call you as a witness or ask 
you any questions. If you do decide to testify the State will be permitted to ask you questions and 
anything you say can be used as evidence against you in court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I run waiving my right to remain silent as to the elements of 
the crime( s) to which I am entering this plea. >t,&:e,.._. 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to the crime(s) in this 
case. Even after pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any question or to 
provide any information that might tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can 
also refuse to a"!lswer or provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the 
crime(s) to whi9h you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the right to remain silent 
with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering questions or providing 
information that may increase my sentence.\M.,e ,.. 
- . 
3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an attorney and cannot pay for 
one, you can ~k the Judge for an attorney who will be p~the county. You may be required to 
reimburse the c.ounty for the cost of this representation. , · 
.. . . . .. _· ~.- ' .... ··- ~-~ .... - . -- -· -::. . . -..--~ -~- . . ~ . . 
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM 06/14 1 
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4. You are presumed to be innocent. You will be found guilty if: 1) you plead guilty in front of the 
Judge; or 2) yo~ are found guilty at a jury trial . .. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed innocent.~/ 
5. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial before twelve persons. A jury trial is a court 
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge( s) brought against you. In a 
jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in your defense and to testify in your own defense. 
You are not required to do so, however. The State must convince all of the jurors of your guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I understand t.J;lat by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and public jury trial. 
~/ . 
6. You have the right to question ( confront) the witnesses testifying against you. This occurs during a 
jury trial. At trial, the State must prove its case by calling witnesses to testify under oath in front of 
you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney could then cross-examine (question) each ·witness. 
You could also call witnesses of your choosing to testify on your behalf. If you do not have the 
funds to bring those witnesses to court, the State will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to 
court and will ~ompel their attendance by the use of the subpoena power of the court . 
.. 
I ~derstand that by plea~ guilty I~ wai~g my right ~tion (confront) the witnesses 
agamst me an~ present witnesses and evidence m my defense: · / 
7. The State has t4e burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
I understand tb,at by pleading guilty, I am waiving my right to require the State to prove my guilt 
beyond a reaso~able doubt.~ _ ·(; . 
-,~,»,.,. 
. .,(.fi,~ · 
. QUESTIONS REGARDING ABn..~YTO ENTER PLEA 
(Please answer every question. If you do not understand a question, consult your attorney 
before answering.) 
Please Circle and Initial 011e 
1. Do you read and write the English language? YESVNO_ 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to help you fill out this form? YES NO 
.,. 
Do you want an Interpreter? YES NO V--
2. What is your true and legal name? r(l ~ e,1 r?cE l ~l A:~ Y ~~£Jc- S c,;:J 
~. m ,eh f.lc{ -:r: ~is hot wt 
3. What was the ~gbest grade of school you completed? __ _,/ ...... 0_-_________ _ 
4. If you did not cpmplete high school, have you received either a general 
education diplC!hia or high school equivalency diploma? 
GUILTY PLEA ADVJg(}RY FORM 06/14 2 
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5. Are you currently under the care of a mental health professional? YES NO~ 
6. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental health disorder? YES NO v" 
If so, what was the diagnosis and when was it made? -------- -------
7. Are you currently prescribed any medication? YES NO V--
If yes, whatmedications are you talcing at this time?------------- -
If you answered "yes," have you taken your prescription medication 
during the J ast 24 hours? 
8. In the last 48 hours, have you taken any medication or drugs, 
including QVer the counter, or drank any alcoholic beverages 
which you believe affect your ability to W1derstand these questions 
and to make a reasoned and informed decision in this case? 
9. Are you under the influence of any alcohol, drugs, or other 
medication at this time? 
10. Are you ca~able of understanding these proceedings? 
11. Do you claim that you are mentally incapable of understanding 
these proceedings or what it means to plead guilty to a crime? 
' 
12. Is there anything going on in your life that affects your ability 
to enter a v~luntazy guilty plea? 
13. Are you having any difficulty in understanding what you are 
doing by ~g out this form? 
14. Is there anY:pther reason that you cannot make a reasoned and 









If yes, what)s the reason? _________ _______________ _ 
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM 06/14 3 
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PLEA AGREEMENT 
15. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement? 
If so, what ;J.re the terms of that plea agreement? 
See attached Addendum A. 
Jf a written plea agreement was done, have you read this 
plea agreement? 




17. There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial the one paragraph below which 
describes tl:te type of plea agreement: 
a. I understand that my plea agreement is a binding plea agreement. This means that if the 
District,Court does not impose the specific sentence as recommended by both parties, I will 
be allo'W'ed to withdraw my plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial. ____ _ 
b. I Wlders:tand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This means that the 
Court i~
1 
not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and may impose 
any se,n.tence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence. Because the Court is not 
bound ~y the agreement, if the District Court chooses not to follow the agreement, I will 
not hav~ the right to withdraw my guilty plea. Me_,, 
,, 
18. Has your a~omey or anyone else forced or coerced you in 
any way into accepting this plea agreement? ·, 
19. Have any otJier promises been made to you that have influenced 
your decisiC?n to plead guilty? 
20. Has anyon~·told you what your sentence will be? 
If so, what tave you been promised? 
21. Is this a cotlditional guilty plea in which you are reserving your 
right to app~al any pre-trial issues? 
i 
22. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment of conviction 
as part of y9ur plea agreement? 
23. Have you waived your right to appeal your sentence as part of 
your plea ~eement? 
J 
GUILTY PLEA ADVISPRY FORM 
YES_NO / 





Under whatcondition can you appeal your sentence? 
24. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you will waive 
( or give up) any defenses, both factual and legal, that you 
believe you· may have in this case? 
25. Have you discussed the elements of the offense(s) for which 
you are charged with your attorney? 
POTENTIAL SENTENCE 
YES /No_ 
I am charged with the crime( s) of: I understand the Minimum & Maximum - Fine 
and Imprisonment: 
, 
Aggravated Bw,:tery, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907 
Use of a Firearm or Deadly Weapon During 
the Comm.issiop. of a Crime, LC. § 19-2520 
Up to 15 years in prison/Up to $50,000 fine. 
An additional 15 years in prison. 
r 
26. If you plead guilty to more than one crime do you understand that your 
sentences f€~r each crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
( at the srun~ time) or consecutively ( one after the other)? YES j/'. NO 
27. Do you understand that if you plead guilty and you commit crimes 
in the futur~, this conviction could be considered m the future 
case and cquld cause more severe penalty in the future case? 
' 
ADDITIONAL cpNSEQUENCES OF A GUILTY PLEA 
28. Are you c\;trently on probation or parole? 
If so, do yoh tmderstand that a plea of guilty in this case could be 
the basis of\a violation of that probation or parole 
(WlllCH MEANS THAT ANY SUSPENDED SENTENCE 
COULD B;E IMPOSED AND ANY PAROLE REVOKED)? ,. 
29. Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the United States, 
the entry of a plea or making of factual admissions could have 
consequen~~s of deportation or removal, inability to obtain legal 
status in the United States, and or denial of an application for 
United StatFs citizenship? 
! 
'· 








30. Does the crime to which you will plead guilty require you to 
register as a sex offender? (I.C. § 18-8304) 
31. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be required 
to pay restitution in this case? (I.C. § 19-5304) 
32. Are you pl~ading guilty to a crime for which you may 
be required:to pay the costs of prosecution and 
investigatiqn? (I.C. § 37-2732 (k)), (I.C.R 33(d)(2)) 
If so, have you and the State agreed upon the amount of this 
reimburseiµent? 
If you havef what is the amount? ut--2 d~f'{'i,;..&l 
33. Have you $eed to pay restitution as a condition of your plea 
agreement?; 
34. If the amount of restitution has not been agreed upon, do you 
understand that you cannot withdraw your guilty plea even 
if the restitution amount is determined to be higher than you thought 
it might be br should be? 
l 
35. Is a license· suspension required as a result of a guilty plea in 
this case? · 
36. Do you uncterstand that if you plead guilty you will be required to 
submit a DNA sample and Right Thumbprint impression to 
the State? (J.C. § 19-5506) 
37. Are you pl~~ding guilty to a crime for which the Court could 
impose a fine for a crime of violence of up to $5,000, payable to 
the victim ~fthe crime? (LC§ 19-5307) 
, 
•> 
38. Do you un~erstand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose 
your right to vote in Idaho during the period of your sentence? 
(Id. Const. art.6, §3) 
~ 
39. Do you un~erstand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose 
your right tQ hold public office in Idaho during the period of your 
sentence? (J.d. Const. art.6, §3) 
40. Do you un{erstand that if you plead "guilty to a felony, you wiII lose 
your right to perform jury service in Idaho during the period of your 
I 
seatenee? qa-. C0nst-. art.6, §3) 













41. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a felony, you will lose 
your right to purchase, possess, or carry firearms? (LC. § 18-310) 
42. Do you understand that by pleading guilty to a felony, you run the 
risk that if you have new felony charges in the future, you could 
be charged !15 a Persistent Vfo]ator? (lC §§ 19-2514, 37-2739) 
RELATIONSHIP WITH YOUR ATIORNEY 
I 
43. Have you had sufficient time to discuss your case with your attorney? 
44. Have you had adequate time to fill out this form? 
.. 
45. Have you liad adequate access to your attorney's assistance in 
filling out tp.is form? 
46. Have you told your attorney everything you know about your case? 
47. Your attorney can obtain various items from the prosecutor relating 
to your case. Tiris may include police reports, witness 
statements, ,tape recordings, photographs, reports of scientific testing, 
etc. This is:-called "discovery." Have you reviewed the evidence 
provided to-xour attorney during discovery? 
48. Do you WaJi.t your attorney to take any further action in this case? 
f 
49. If you are iiot a citizen of the United States, have you talked to your 
attorney alJ?ut the impact of your guilty plea on deportation, on your 
legal status}n the United States and on obtaining United States 
citizenship?, 
50. Do you unqerstand that no one, including your attorney, can force you 
to plead guµty in this case? 
51. Are you satisfied with your attorney's representation? 
If not, please state why you are dissatisfied? 
ENTRY OF PLEA 
52. Are the ~ers throughout this form your own answers? 
53. Are you e~emg y-0ur plea freely and vehmtaFily? 
GUILTY PLEA ADVISORY FORM 
YESVNO_ 




YES v" NO_ 
YES/. NO -- --
YES NO/ 
YES/ NO -- --
YES v' NO 
YESV""'NO_ 













54. Do you understand the consequences of entering a guilty plea? 
55. Are you admitting to all the elements of the crime(s) to which you 
are pleading guilty? 
Or are you pleading guilty because you are entering an Alford Plea? 
56. Jfyou are e:ptering an Alford Plea, do you understand that the Court 
will consider you just as guilty as if you enter a non-Alford plea? 
57. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions in his 
form wbich_you could not resolve by discussing the issue(s) with 
you attomej? 
58. If you wer<provided with an interpreter to help you fill out this form, 
have you bad any trouble understanding your interpreter? 
59. Do you neJd any additional time before you enter your guilty plea(s)? 
1 
60. Do vou llllderstand that if the Court accepts your guiltv pJea(s) that 
you. may not be able to withdraw your plca(s) at a later date? 
61. Is there anything else you want to tell the court about that's affecting 







YES __ NO~ 
YES_NO / -
I have answered the questions on pages 1-9 of this Guilty Plea Advisory Form truthfully, 
understand all of tl,ie questions and answers herein, have discussed each question and answer with my 
attorney, and ha've completed this form freely and voluntarily WITH A COMPLETE 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CHARGE(S) TO WHICH I AM PLEADING GUILTY AND 
WITH KNOWLEDGE OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TIIlS PLEA. 
Furthermore, no otjf has forced me or threatened me to plead :ty. 
" 
DATE: 1-S-.lZ?(b 
I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I HA VE DIS SSED IN DETAIL THE FOREGOING 
QUESTIONS ANJ? ANSWERS WI1H MY CLIENT. 
DATE: l / 5 Y\ {.p 
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POST PLEA RIGHTS 
A presentence investigation will be ordered by the Court unless both you and the State waive 
that report and the Court approves that waiver. The Court may order evaluations as part of this 
investigation AND THESE REPORTS WILL BE USED TO DETERMINE YOUR SENTENCE. 
You have the right to remain silent during all proceedings and interviews from now until 
sentencing WHICH INCLUDES THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION AND ANY COURT 
ORDERED EVALUATIONS. 
The information in the presentence interview and any evaluations (which will include any 
statements you make in these processes) will be used by the Court in determining your sentence. 
In particular if ypu are ordered to undergo a psychosexual evaluation (which can include a 
polygraph examination), a domestic violence evaluation, a substance abuse evaluation or a 
mental health exa,nination (which can include a psychological or psychiatric examination) you 
will be asked extensive questions and your answers to those questions may be used against you 
during sentencing. 
1. Have you discµssed the right to remain silent with your attorney? 
2. Do you underitand the nature of these rights? 
3. Do you understand that you may waive these rights? 
4. Have you wa~ved any of these rights in your plea agreement? 
5. Do you have a,ny questions concerning either these rights or the waiver 
of these rights.? 
6. Have you disc;.ussed with your attorney your rights regarding your 
attorney's att~ndance and presence during the presentence 
investigation _gr these various evaluations? 
7. Do you want the Court to order any particular evaluations to assist the 
Court in deterprining your sentence in this case? 
If yes, which evaluations and why? 
I ACKNOWLEDGE THE FOREGOING POST PLEA RIGHTS. 









I -- s- ~;;i..01 /:=> 
Date 
I ACKNOW}.,EDGE THAT I HA VE DIS ED THE POST PLEA RIGHTS LISTED 
ABOVE WITH MY CLIENT. 
V 
Date 





IN THE OISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT Of 
THE STATE OF IOAHO IN ANO FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STA TE OF IDAHO Case No.: CR-2015-3326 
vs. 
PRETRIAL SETILEMENT AGREEMENT 
MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM. OF FER EXPmES: 115/16 
AKA: MICHAEL ALLEN PEDERSON • 
. - - - - -- . - - --- ----- - --- ------ ------ --- - -
T h he State offers t at in,,exchange for the Defendant's gulltv plea(s) to: 
Count Charae Statutorv Maximum Penalty 
I AGGRAVATED BATTERY 0-15 years prison/ 0 - $50,000 Fine 
And Defendant's agreement to: 
[El Waive rights to appeal conviction and sentence {as described below). 
t8) Pay restitution: ft~ titution to victim - amount to be determined. 
It will agree and recorn!"end as follows: 
[8] Sentence recommendation: State will limit its underlving sentencing recommendation to 5 fixed, plus 
5 indeterminate, for a unified sentence of 10 years; State will seek full restitution for victim's 
injuries; Standard fines and costs will be requested; • 
Dismissal: State will dism.is-s -Counts 11, USE OF A FIREARM OR DEADLY WEAPON 
DURING THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, [extends- the 15 year penalty for Aggravated 
Battery bv an afditional 15 years prison!. 
Other; State will will agree not t-0 pursue the additional chi l penalty of $5,000 to the victi:m per 
19-5307, [this hrovision is in addition to restituUon. fines and eosts. J. 
-
Other. DEFENhANT JS FREE TO MAKE SEPARATE RECOM.lVJENDATIONS. 
NOTE: THE STATE'S'.;SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION (5 CONOlTfONED UPON NO FTAs (INCLUDING PRE-
SENTENCE INTERVIEW} AND NO NEW CRIMINAL LAW VIOLATIONS BEFORE THE r=: TENCING .. 
Dated: 26 October 2015' 
~ BY SIGNING BELOW, l SfGNIFY THAT I ACCEPT THE ABOVE PRETRIAL SETTLEMENT OFFER AND IN 
CONSIOERATJOI') THEREOF DO KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY HEREBY WAIVE THE FOLLOWING 
RIGHT$: ' 
I. The right to:appeal the conviction; 
Z. The right to) itppe11l simtence (except to the eirtent the term of actual incarceration or the fine is greater than is 
recommended herein). 
\·/ 1 / t fu· 
DATE 







8~~ STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
FILED 3/8/2016 02:42 PM 
MICHAEL W. ROSEDALE 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF,THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Michael Jesse Chisholm 
Defendant. 
DOB~ 










- ----------- ---) 
Case No: CR-2015-0003326 
FELONY JUDGMENT 
(SENTENCE IMPOSED) 
On Tuesday, March 08, 2016, before the Honorable Barbara Buchanan, District 
Judge, you, MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM, personally appeared for a sentencing hearing. 
Also appearing were Shane Greenbank, Prosecuting Attorney for Bonner County, Idaho, 
and your Counsel, Daniel Taylor. 
WHEREUPON, the previously ordered presentence report having been filed, and the 
Court having ascertained that you have had an opportunity to read the presentence report 
and review it with your lawyer, and you havil'.lQ been given the opportunity to explain, 
correct or deny parts of the presentence report, and .recommendations having been made 
by counsel for the State and by your lawyer, and there being no legal reason given why 
judgment and sentence should not then be pronounced, the Court did then pronounce its 
sentencing disposition as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that you, MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM, having been 
advised of and having waived your constitutional rights to a) trial by jury; b) remain silent; 
_and_ c) confront wjtnesses,.and thereaf!~r hC§''{i~g .P!~d g~ilty !o_the. ~rin1_i~.c:1I offla~~~(~) 
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charged in the Information on file herein as follows: 
Count 1 - tdaho Code §118-907 
Battery-Aggravated, a Felony, 
ARE GUil TY OF THE CRIME(S} SO CHARGED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code §19-2513, you are 
sentenced as follows: You are committed to the Idaho State Board of Correction for a total 
unified sentence not to exceed 10 years, commencing with a fixed term of 2 years, to be 
followed by an additional 8 years indeterminate. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are assessed and ordered to pay a fine in the 
amount of $1000, inclusive of all counts, to the Clerk of the Court. Such fine shall be paid 
in full within forty eight months of your release from custody. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are assessed and ordered to pay court costs in 
the amount of $245.50, inclusive of all counts, to the Clerk of the Court. Such costs shall 
be paid in full within forty eight months of your release from custody. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall reimburse the County for the expenses 
incurred in the defense of this case in the amount of $500, inclusive of all counts, to the 
Clerk of the Court. Such reimbursement shall be paid in full within forty eight months of 
your release from custody. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall pay restitution pursuant to any Order of 
Restitution fifed in this case. In the event the amount of restitution has not yet been 
determined, the State has sixty days from today's date to either request a restitution 
hearing or to submit a stipulated restitution order and judgment, unless an extension of 
time is authorized by this Court. If ordered, such restitution shall be paid in full within forty 
eight months of your release from custody. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Idaho Code §19-5506, you are 
required to provide a DNA sample and a fingerprint impression. Wherefore, you shall pay 
$100 restitution to help offset costs incurred by any of the foUowing entitled law 
enforcement agencies for the_expense of DNA analysis: Idaho state police, county or city 
law enforcement agencies. or the office of the attorney general, county prosecuting 
attorneys or city attorneys. 
. ......... ..... -··· -- . _, ·--- -- _,, . . - ~- -·---·-·-
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall pay to the Idaho Department of 
Corrections an amount not to exceed one-hundred dollars ($100) which will be used as 
reimbursement for its costs of conducting your Presentence Investigation. Such 
reimbursement shall be paid in full within forty eight months of your release from custody. 
tT IS FURTHER ORDERED that payments for any fine, court costs, reimbursement, 
and restitution ordered herein shall be made payable to the Clerk of the Court in cash, 
certified check, cashier's check, or money order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any bail posted in this matter shall be exonerated, 
provided that any deposit shall be applied pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2923. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you shall be given credit for all time served on the 
above charge(s). The parties stipulate that you have accrued 58 days pre-sentence jail time 
for which you shall recieve credit. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you are committed to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Corrections, and are remanded to the custody of the County Sheriff for transport 
to the same. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have a right to appeal this order to the Idaho 
Supreme Court Any notice of appeal must be filed within forty-two (42) days of the entry 
of the written order in this matter. 
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal, 
you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for the 
appointment of counsel at public expense. If you have questions concerning your right to 
appeal, you should consult your present lawyer. 
DATED: March 8, 2016. 
BARBARABUC~ 
District Judge 
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RECEIPT BY DEFENDANT 
I, the undersinged defendant, hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing 
order. /' 
DATED: March 8, 2016. 
\ (-.......· . 
J. HALL, WITNES 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the q'f'\ day ot_lrla_-1-A~"'_1'.~ -------· t,01 l,. 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing was ~IJows: 
Shane Greenbank, Bonner County Prosecutor 
Served via interoffice mail. 
Daniel Taylor, Attomey¥or fendant 
Served via: ail [ J Hand Delivered 
If mailed, m : 
Bonner County Sheriff's Offi~ 
Served via: 't:xt:P~ [ ] Hand Delivered 
Idaho Department of Corrections 
centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov 
Probation & Parole 
dist1@idoc.idaho.gov 
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JAMES, VERNON~ WEEKS, P.A. 
MELANIE E. BAILLIE 
LEANDER L. JAMES* 
DANIEL M. KEYES*•0 
WESS. LARSEN*•0 
STEPHEN J. NEMEC*f 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
tREGlSTER ED PATENT ATfORNEY 
*LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
0 LICENSED IN MONTANA 
•LICENSED IN ALASKA 
•LICENSED lN UTAH 
+OF COUNSEL 
February 1, 2016 
***FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY*** 
Steve Johnson 
Regional Claims Manager 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company 
1250 S. Allante Avenue 
Boise, ID 83709 
Re: Claim Number:· 
Date of Loss: 
Your Insured: 
Our Client: 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
010388720120·1506280] 
June 28, 2015 
Edgar Cook 
Joseph Stanczak 
DoUGLAS A. PIERCE* 
CRAIG K. VERNON* 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
STEVEN C. WETZEL+ 
This letter constitutes Joseph Stanczak's settlement proposal. Joseph is entitled to recover 
from your insured the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate him for the 
damages proximately caused by Mr. Cook's negligence. 
FACTS: 
On June 28, 2015, Joseph Stanczak and his girlfriend, Susan Jackson, were camping on 
your insured's property, known as the Bloom Lake Campground. Bloom Lake was a private 
campground open to the public for recreational use, and Joseph and Susan had camped at the 
lake for a couple of weekends already that month. 'The campground caretaker, Michael Jesse 
Chisholm, and Mr. Chisholm's friend, Sarah "Sally" Johns, had been spending time with Joseph 
and Susan whi1e they were camping. Although he was acting as the caretaker of the campground, 
Michael Chisholm consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication during the time he spent with 
Joseph and Susan. At some point that evening, Mr. Chisholm invited Joseph and Susan to spend 
the night in the caretaker's cabin because they were having trouble fighting off mosquitos while 
in their tent. However, after Joseph and Susan arrived at the cabin, Mr. Chisholm became 
belligerent and inappropriate towards Susan. After a verbal argument~ Joseph left the cabin and 
walked toward Susan's pickup truck to go back to his tent. However, as Joseph was walking 
1626 LINCOLN WAY, COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814 TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683 FACSIMILE: (208) 664-1684 
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away from Mr. Chisholm and toward the truck, Mr. Chisholm pulled out a .45 caliber handgun 
and shot Joseph twice: once in the back and once in the left arm. Mr. Chisholm then jumped into 
his own truck and drove away (while still intoxicated) from the scene of the shooting. After 
crashing his truck, he was eventually found hiding in the woods by local authorities using 
canines. Mr. Chisholm was charged with aggravated battery (I.C. § 18-907) and use of a deadly 
weapon in commission of a felony (l.C. § 19-2520). The police report is attached, as well as 
photographs of Joseph's wounds. 
LIABILITY: 
Under Idaho law, the duty that owners and possessors of land owe to a land entrant 
depends on whether the entrant is an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. A licensee is a visitor who 
goes upon the premises of another with the consent of the landowner in pursuit of the visitor's 
purpose. The duty toward a licensee is such that a landowner is required to share knowledge of 
dangerous conditions or activities on the land with the licensee. Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 
401, 732 P.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1987). The landowner also owes a duty to a licensee to avoid 
willfully or wantonly injuring him, and to refrain from exposing him to dangerous 
instnunentalities on the premises which are unknown to the licensee. Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 
105 Idaho 649, 652, 671 P.2d 1112 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 
P.2d 1208 (1984). 
Joseph entered onto your insured's property at Bloom Lake pursuant to the purpose of 
fishing and camping and enjoying the lake. Joseph could be considered a licensee on your 
insured's property; thus, Mr. Cook owed Joseph a duty to share knowledge of dangerous 
conditions or activities on the land, to avoid willfully or wantonly injuring him, and to avoid 
exposing him to dangerous instrumentalities on the premises. Mr. Cook breached this duty by 
exposing Joseph to a dangerous and violent individual, Michael Chisholm, with a criminal 
background and multiple firearms in his possession (which he stored in your cabin). As the 
owner of the property, your insured knew or should have known of this dangerous condition on 
his land. In contrast, Joseph did not know, and was unable to take precautions for his own safety. 
Mr. Chisholm's actions resulted in Joseph's injuries. Thus, Mr. Cook~s breach of his duty to 
Joseph was the proximate cause of Joseph's injuries. 
In the event that your insured's property at Bloom Lake was open to the public, and that 
Mr. Cook required or solicited "donations" from campers (as is suggested by the Facebook posts 
attached hereto), then Idaho law would mandate a higher duty of care towards Joseph, who 
would be considered an invitee: 
An invitee is one who enters upon the premises of another for a purpose 
connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can reasonably be 
said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible 
benefit to the landowner. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347 P.2d 341 (1959). A 
landowner owes an invitee the duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Bates v. Eastern Idaho 
Regional Medical Center, 114 Idaho 252,253, 755 P.2d 1290, 1291 (1988). 
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Holzheimer v. Johannesen, 125 Idaho 397, 400, 871 P.2d 814, 817 (] 994); see also Martin v. 
Brown, 56 Idaho 379, 54 P.2d 1157 (1936). Moreover, "[it] is the proprietor's superior 
knowledge of the perilous instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the 
property. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not to the 
person injured that a recovery is permitted." Martin, 56 Idaho at 379, 54 P.2d at 1158; see also 
Morgan v. State, Dept. of Public Works, 124 Idaho 658,665,862 P.2d 1080, 1087 (1993). 
Mr. Cook was required under Idaho law to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe 
condition. This would entail performing background checks on all caretakers, inspecting the 
caretaker cabin and property for any hidden or concealed dangers or perilous instrumentalities 
(such as guns), and warning Joseph and others of these dangers. Your insured did not do so. 
' In response to any argument that Mr. Chisholm was not Mr. Cook' s employee, please be 
informed that this does not prevent Mr. Cook from being liable. Idaho law recognizes agency 
relationships created by apparent authority. Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 
Idaho 109, 113, 206 P.3d 473, 477 (2009). Apparent authority may arise even when actual 
authority is absent. The Idaho Court of Appeals has explained: 
Apparent authority is created when the principal "voluntarily places an agent in 
such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business 
usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that ·the 
agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Clark, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 
280. See also Bailey, supra; Tri-Circle, Inc. v. Brugger Corp., 121 Idaho 950, 
955, 829 P.2d 540, 545 (Ct.App.1992); Hieb v. Minnesota Farmers Union, 105 
Idaho 694, 697, 672 P.2d 572, 575 (Ct.App.1983). "Apparent authority differs 
from express and imp]ied authority in that it is not based on the words and 
conduct of the principal toward the agent, but on the principal's words and 
conduct toward a third party." Tri-Circle, 121 Idaho at 954-55, 829 P.2d at 544-
45. 
Landvik by Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 59, 936 P.2d 697, 702 (Ct. App. 1997). In like 
manner, Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
Section 2.03 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency defines "apparent authority" as 
"the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal's legal relations 
with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to 
act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's 
manifestations." Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 2.03 (2006). The rationale for 
imposing liability under apparent authority is so "[aJ principal may not choose to 
act through agents whom it has clothed with the trappings of authority and then 
determine at a later time whether the consequence of their acts offers an 
advantage." Id. at§ 2.03, comment c. 
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 113-14, 206 P.3d 473, 477-78 
(2009). 
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Even if Mr. Chisholm was not officially your insured's employee or his property 
caretaker, he was still Mr. Cook's agent. Joseph reasonably believed that Mr. Chisholm was the 
caretaker at Bloom Lake, and his belief is traceable to your insured's manifestations as the 
property owner: Mr. Cook allowed Mr. Chisholm access to his property and the caretaker's cabin 
at Bloom Lake, and he allowed Mr. Chisholm to hold himself out to the public (including to 
Joseph) as the caretaker of the property. Furthermore, in light of visitor postings on the Bloom 
Lake Facebook page (see the attached Facebook posts), other visitors to the area have also 
believed that Mr. Chisholm was the owner/caretaker at Bloom Lake. Your insured cannot, as the 
Supreme Court states, clothe Mr. Chisholm with the "trappings of authority" and then suddenly 
remove that authority simply because it proves inconvenient. 
As shown above, Joseph has a viable claim against your insured for the injuries he 
incurred on Mr. Cook's property at the hands of one with apparent authority to care for and 
oversee his property. Your insured owed a duty to Joseph to keep the premises safe, to warn him 
of dangerous conditions and activities on the land, and to prevent Joseph from being harmed on 
the property. Your insured also owed a duty to perfom1 a background check on and properly 
supervise his agent, Mr. Chisholm. Your insured's breach of these duties resulted in Joseph 
being injured. 
DAMAGESffREATMENT: 
After Mr. Chisholm shot Joseph and the authorities were called, Bonner County EMS 
came to assist and Joseph was flown by Life Flight Network to Kootenai Medical Center in 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, trauma code red. At Kootenai Medical Center, Joseph complained of 
significant left hip pain as well as left shoulder and deltoid pain. Henry Amon, Jr., M.D., 
performed an abdominal ultrasound to rule out blood in the abdominal cavity; he also performed 
an ultrasound of the left leg. CT scans of the head, neck, chest, abdomen, and pelvis were used to 
assess Joseph's wounds. Scott Brown, D.0., noted a comminuted fracture of the left iliac crest. 
He also noted a retained foreign body (the bullet) localized to the lateral aspect of the bladder on 
the left. Vascular surgeon Christopher Ward, M.D., noted that because of the location of the 
bullet in the iliac fossa/pelvic bone, iliac artery or vein injury would be high risk, and also put 
Joseph at risk for limb ischemia, hemorrhage, and damage to adjacent structures during repair or 
even death. Dr. Ward suggested proceeding with diagnostic laparoscopy surgery. Trauma 
surgeon Antoine Sarkis, M.D., performed the surgery. Dr. Sarkis noted that Joseph had one 
gunshot wound with entry at to the left subscapular region, and that the bullet traveled through 
the left lateral chest wall and abdominal wall, then entered the pelvis, causing a fracture to the 
left ilium. The bullet was lodged in the retroperitoneal region of the pelvis in proximity of the 
external iliac artery and vein. Dr. Sarkis also noted that Joseph had another wound in the left 
deltoid region that was related to another bullet that grazed over the area causing injury to the 
skin and superficial subcutaneous layer. Joseph was taken to the operating room, and a small 
incision was made at the umbilicus and pneumoperitoneum and a 5 mm port was introduced. 
Two additional ports were placed in the lower abdomen. During the laparoscopy, Dr. Sarkis 
could see that there was no evidence of intraperitoneal injury. However, due to the location of 
the bullet in relation to the iliac artery, Dr. Sarkis was unable to remove the bullet from Joseph's 
pelvis. Following the laparoscopy, Dr. Sarkis closed the bullet entry wounds. 
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Following the surgery, Joseph was admitted to Kootenai Medical Center's intensive care 
unit in critical but stable condition. He was discharged on June 30, 2015. 
On July 6, 2015, Joseph arrived at Boundary Community Hospital and saw Robert Yost, 
M.D., for a wound recheck and to get pain medication. Dr. Yost advised Joseph to continue to 
pack the wound on the back once per day, apply antibiotic dressings and use pain medication as 
prescribed for pain. On July 18, 2015, Joseph returned to Boundary Community Hospital for a 
prescription medication refill and to have the gunshot wounds redressed. 
On August 5, 2015, Joseph presented at Orthopedic Surgery and Sports Medicine in 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, to follow up with Scott Brown, D.O. Dr. Brown noted that Joseph had 
pain with pressure applied to the iliac crest/ASIS, and had pain with active and passive hip 
motion. The doctor also noted that Joseph's other symptoms included fever, weakness, 
instability, fatigue, loss of motion, pain, sleep disturbances, limit of motion and radiation of pain 
on the injury involved side. His symptoms were worse with activity, when sitting, while walking 
and climbing stairs. Dr. Brown noted that the symptoms would worsen as the day progressed. 
Upon reviewing new imaging, Dr. Brown noted progressive healing of the left iliac wing 
fracture. No interval change in position. The retained cartridge from the gunshot was also 
visualized. Dr. Brown gave Joseph a prescription for physical therapy with emphasis on HEP. 
On August 12, 2015, Joseph went to Boundary Community Clinic to get established with 
a primary care provider near his home and to obtain follow-up care for the gunshot wound. He 
met with Michael Snyder, M.D. Joseph reported that his symptoms were severe, with a pain level 
of 5/10 at rest and 7/10 with activity. Dr. Snyder prescribed Endocet to be taken every four hours 
for pain. Joseph followed up with Dr. Snyder on October 19, 2015, for pain management. 
Joseph still experiences debilitating pain each day due to the .45 ca1iber slug that is 
pennanently embedded in his pelvic bone. He is in need of further medical treatment and 
physical therapy, but has exhausted the funds available to him via the Crime Victims 
Compensation Fund and does not have health insurance due to his inability to work. Mr. 
Chisholm's careless actions have left Joseph with permanent pain and no way to continue in his 
welding profession or obtain the medical treatment he stil1 needs. 
Joseph has incurred the following medical expenses to date: 
Provider Date(s) of Service Charge 
Life Flight Network 06/28/15 $30,800.00 
Kootenai Medical Center 06/28/15; 06/29/15; 06/30/15 41,198.22 
Kootenai Health 06/28/15 4,326.00 
Anesthesia Associates of Coeur d'Alene 06/28/15 2,200.00 
Boundary Community Hospital 07/06/15 356.00 
Kootenai Imaging 06/28/15 390.00 
Boundary Community Clinic 08/12/15; 10/19/15 358.00 
Orthopedic Surgery and Sports Medicine 08/05/15 100.00 
Medicine Man Bonners Ferry 240.85 
Safeway Nos. 1470 and 2954 343.98 
Total $80,313.05 
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Medica] records and bil1s are attached, separated by provider. 
FUTURE MEDICAL TREATMENT: 
As noted above, Dr. Brown prescribed physical therapy. However, Joseph has not been 
able to obtain the therapy because he has no way to pay for it, and the physical therapists in his 
area will not provide treatment on credit. At two times weekly and $200/session, eight weeks of 
physical therapy amounts to $3,200.00. Please recognize that this is simply an estimate; Joseph 
will likely need more than 16 therapy sessions. Furthermore, he would need at least one 
additional follow-up visit with Dr. Brown (as directed), and regular follow-up visits with Dr. 
Snyder as primary care provider, as well as updated imaging. This equates to roughly $1,000.00 
of additional physician treatment. Furthermore, due to the extreme pain generated by the bullet 
being lodge in Joseph's pelvic bone, he will need perpetual refills of prescription pain 
medication, which for a twelve-month period totals about $1,800.00. Total future medical 
treatment and medication is therefore in excess of $10,000.00. 
LOST WAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY: 
Joseph previously worked as a welder for Advanced Paint and Construction in Montana 
prior to moving to Bonners Ferry, Idaho a few months before the shooting to care for his ill 
fiance. While working for Advanced, Joseph earned $24.00/hour and worked full-time. His job 
duties required him to crawl into difficult spaces, be on his feet or in awkward positions for 
hours at a time, and occasionally lift over 75 lbs. He made roughly $50,000.00 a year as a welder 
due to his trained skills. 
Although Joseph had intended to work as a welder again for Advanced or a similar 
company following his relocation, he is now not able to work because of his injuries - and his 
injuries make him a worker's compensation liability to future employers. The pennanently-
embedded bullet in his pelvic bone causes him constant pain, especially with activity. He has 
been prescribed physical therapy but, due to having no job, no income, and no health insurance 
cannot afford to obtain the necessary treatment. He is scared and uncertain about how long he 
will be unemployable in his trained profession, and how he will obtain further treatment and pay 
living expenses without income or insurance. 
To date, Joseph has past lost wages equal to $29,760.00 (31 weeks X 40 hours/week X 
$24.00/hour). Furthermore, there is no indication that he will ever be able to work again as a 
welder given the permanent nature of his injuries and the physical job requirements, especially 
because of the bullet's dangerous proximity to the iliac artery. As Joseph is currently 44 years 
old, he has at least 21 working years ahead of him. Even at a modest salary of $40,000.00/year, 
this still equates to $840,000.00 in lost future wages. While this wage loss amount could be 
discounted in the future should Joseph obtain the remaining treatment he needs and find some 
sort of part-time work that does not aggravate his injuries, the amount of lost future wages and 
lost earning capacity is still substantial. 
02/08/2016 11 :17 AM 96497 _5228 
293
February I, 2016 
Page 7 
GENERAL DAMAGES: 
Joseph's general damages fall between the range of $500,000.00 to $3,000,000.00. 
CONCLUSION: 
Joseph suffered greatly during the months following his injury, and could very easily 
have died. He still has significant pain because of the injury and is unable to obtain continuing 
medical treatment due to a lack of health insurance and income. Your insured is 100% liable for 
Joseph's injuries and inability to work, as but for your insured's negligence Mr. Chisholm would 
not have shot Joseph in the back on June 28, 2015. 
Although liability is clear and Joseph's damages are astronomical, he is reasonable and 
recognizes the expense and risks of proceeding with litigation. I am therefore authorized to offer 
settlement in the amount of $950,000.00. 
Please contact me within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter, either via phone at 
(208) 667-0683 or via email at wes@jvwlaw.net, to discuss the resolution of Joseph's claims. 
Sincerely, 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
!1.L::!~ 
Attorney at Law 
Encls. 
cc: Joseph Stanczak (without enclosures) 





JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
WES S. LARSEN, ISB #9134 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Rf=CEIVED 
AUG 15 2016 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BAAAffi 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHTD. ' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF'THE 




ED W. COOK and LAURIE COOK, 
individually and as husband and wife; 
BLOOMLAKECAMPGROUND;and 
MICHAEL JESSE CIIlSHOLM, 
individually, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-679 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR 
DAMAGES 
Plaintiff.. by and through his attomey of record, Wes S. Larsen of James, Vernon & Weeks, 
P.A., hereby complains and alleges as follows: 
I. IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE 
1.1 PLAINTIFF JOSEPH STANCZAK: At all times mate1ial hereto, Plaintiff Joseph 
Stanczak resided in Boundary Comity, State ofldaho. Plaintiff incurred serious personal injuties 
as a direct and pl'oximate result of the Defendants' acts and omissions, and each of them, in Boime1· 
County, State ofldaho. 
1.2 DEFENDANT ED W. COOK: Upon information and belief, at all times material 
hereto Defendant Ed W. Cook resided in Bonner County, State of Idaho, and was manied to 
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Defendant Laurie Cook. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto Defendant Ed 
W._ Cook owned real property lmown as the Bloom Lake Campground in Bonner County, State of 
Idaho, together with Defendant Laurie Cook. 
1.3 DEFENDANT LAURIE COOK: Upon information and belief, at all times mate1ial 
hereto Defendant Lamie Cook resided in Bonner County, State of Idaho, and was mani.ed to 
Defendant Ed W. Cook. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto Defendant Laurie 
Cook owned real property known as the Bloom Lake Campground in Bonner County, State of 
Idaho, together with Defendant Ed W. Cook. 
1.4 DEFENDANT BLOOM LA.KE CAMPGROUND: Upon informa~on and belief 
and at all times material hereto, Defendant Bloom Lake Campground is a campground and 
. . 
recreational area located in Bonner County, State ofldaho, privately owned by Defendants Ed W. 
Cook and Laurie Cook. Plaintiff was injured on 01· about June 28, 2015, while staying at the Bloom 
Lake Campground. 
1.5 DEFENDANT MICHAEL JESSE CHISHOLM: At all times mate1ial hereto, 
Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm resided in Bonner County, State of Idaho, at tbe caretaker's 
cabin of the Bloom Lake Campground. Upon information and belief, at all times material hereto 
Defendant Chisholm was the agent of Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake 
Campgl'Ound, and was the host and cai:~taker of the campground. 
1.6 This Court has jurisdiction and venue is appropriate by virtue of Idaho Code §§ 5-
404 and 5-514. _ 






II. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
2.1 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if set forth herein. 
2.2 On or about June 28, 2015, Plaintiff Joseph Stanczak. and his girlfriend, Susan 
Jackson, were camping at the Bloom Lake Campground in Bonner County, Idaho. The couple had 
stayed at the campground a few times previously that summer. ~he campground and recreational 
area were owned by Defendants Ed. W. Cook and Laude Cook. 
2.3 Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm, the host and caretaker of the Bloom Lake 
Campground, visited with Plaintiff and Susan at their campsite and helped them set up camp. 
Defendant Chisholm was accompanied by his gidfriend, Sarah "Sally'' Johns. Later in the evening, 
Defendant Chisholm invited Plaintiff and Susan to stay at the Bloom Lake caretaker's cabin. 
2.4 While at the caretaker's cabin, after Susan had gone to bed, Defendant Chisholm 
be~ame intoxicated with alcohol and began arguing with Plaintiff. Plaintiff decided to leave the 
cabin and 1·eturn to the campsite. However, as Plaintiff walked away from th~ cabin, Defendant, in 
bis-intoxicated state, fired rounds with a .45 caliber handgun. Two of these rounds struck Plaintiff 
in the upper left arm and upper back, with the latter bullet traveling down and becoming 
pe1manently lodged in his pelvic pone. 
2.5 Following the shooting, Plaintiff was taken to a local hospital by helicopter and was 
admitted as an inpatient. 
2.6 Local law enforcement subsequently found several firearms stored 1n the Bloom 
Lake Campground caretaker's cabin. 
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ill. CAUSES OF ACTION 
3.1 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if set forth herein. 
First Cause of Action: Pa·emises Liability 
(As to Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook. and Bloom Lake Campground) 
3.2.1 Plaintiffl'ealleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if set forth herein. 
3.2.2 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, as 
owners and/or possessors of land, had a duty to their invitees, social guests, and licensees, 
including the Plaintiff, to ·inspect and keep the premis~ reasonably safe and warn of known 
dangers. 
3.2.3 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and 
each of them, failed to exercise· ordimuy and reasonable care to keep the premises 
reasonably safe from and to wam Plaintiff of Defendant Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable 
conduct. 
3.2.4 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and 
each of them, breached this duty by failing to wam and protect Plaintiff :from a firearm 
being discharged by Defendant Chisholm while intoxicated on the Defendants' property. 
3.2.5 As a dfrect and proximate result of the Defendants' acts or omissions, 
Plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff has incurred and will likely continue to incur 
damages. These damages include medical expenses, lost wages, out-of-pocket expenses, 
and other expenses to be proved at the time of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages 
in an amount now unknown. These damages further include physical injury, diminished 
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ability to fum~tion at home and work, disfigurement, anxiety, frustl'ation, concem, and 
general emotional upset. 
Second Cause of Action: Negligent Supe1'Visio11 . 
(As to Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Blooin Lake Campground) 
3.2.6 Plaintiffrealleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of1his 
Complaint as if set forth.herein. 
3.2.7 Defendall1s Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campgl'Ound 
breached a common law duty ofreasonable care by failing to properly supervise their agent, 
Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm, to prevent injury to campground invitees and licensees 
on their property, including the Plaintiff. 
3.2.8 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and 
each of thein, breached the common law duty of reasonable ~are by failing to properly 
supervise Defendant Chisholm to prevent him from becoming intoxicated and discharging 
firearms, which could result in injury to campground invitees and licensees, including the 
Plaintiff. 
3.2.9 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom Lake Campground, and 
each of them, breached th~ common law duty of reasonable care by failing to protect from 
or warn Plaintiff of the dangers posed by Defendant Chisholm becoming intoxicated and 
discharging firearms. 
3 .2.10 As a proximate result of Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook, and Bloom 
Lake Campground's breaches of duty, acts, and omissions as desclibed above, Plaintiff 
was injured by multiple .45 caliber rounds while at the Bloom Lake Campground. 







3.2.11 Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm, while in the course and scope of his 
agency as host and caretaker of the Bloom Lake Campground, violated statutory and 
common law duties by discharging a firerum while intoxicated. 
3.2.12 As a direct and proximate resuit of the Defendants' acts or omissions, 
Plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff has incurred and will likely continue to incur 
damages. These damages include medical expenses, lost wages, out-of-pocket expenses, 
and other expenses to be proved at the time of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages 
in an amount now unknown. These damages further include physical injwy, diminished 
ability to function at home and wol'lc, disfigurement, anxiety, frustration, concern, and 
general emotional upset. 
Third Cause of Action: Strict Liability 
(As to Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm) 
3.2.13 Plaintiffrealleges and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if set forth herein. 
3.2.14 Defendant Michael Jesse Chisholm was engaged in ultra-hazardous 
activities, including but not limited to: 
a. Maintaining a loaded firew.m on the premises; 
b. Handling a loaded firearm while intoxicated, in close 
proximity to Plaintiff and others; and 
c. Firing a loaded fireann while intoxicated, resulting in Plaintiff 
being injured. 
3.2.15 Plaintiff did not know that Defendant Chisholm had a hand~ that the gun 
was pointed in his general direction, or that the gun was loaded. Plaintiff had his back turned 
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to Defendant Chisholm and did not expect Defendant to discharge a fireru.m, or to be 'injured 
by a round fired from a firerum. 
3.2.16 Defendant Chisholm is liable to Plaintiff for all damages proximately caused 
by each of said activities, regardless of the degree of care or negligence on the pru.1 of the · 
Defendant. 
3.2.17 As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's acts or omissions, 
Plaintiff was seriously injured. Plaintiff has incurred and will likely continue to incm· 
damages. These damages include medical expenses, lost wages, out-ofwpocket expenses, 
and other expenses to be proved at the time of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages 
in an amount now unknown. These damages fiuther include physical injury, diminished 
ability to function at home and work, disfigurement, anxiety, frustration, concern, and 
general emotional upset. 
Fow·th Cause of Action: Negligent, Recldess, and Tortious Conduct 
(As to Defendant Michael Jes.9e Chisholm) 
3.2.18 Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference al] other paragraphs of this 
Complaint as if set f01th herein. 
3 .2.19 At all times material hereto, Defendant Chisholm had certain duties 
imposed upon him by law, which Defendant then and there owed to Plaintiff, including the . 
duties to handle his gun in a manner that was safe, to not handle ot· discharge the gun while 
intoxicated, and to protect persons on the p1'emises ftom unreasonable risk· of harm. 
Defendant tortiously, negligently, and recklessly breached said duties by: 
a. Handling the .45 caliber handgun in an unsafe manner while 
intoxicated, resulting in injury to Plaintiff; 












b. Maintaining a dangerous condition on the premises, including a 
loaded gun; 
c. Failing to give waming to Plaintiff of hazards on the premises; and 
d. Exposing Plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm· on the premises. 
3.2.20 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's tortious, negligent, and 
reckless acts or omissions, Plaintiff Joseph Stanczak was seriously injured. Plaintiff has 
incurred and wilt likely continue to. incur damages. These damages include medical 
expenses, lost wages, out-of-pocket expenses, and other expenses to be proved at the time 
of trial, all to said Plaintiff's general damages in an amount now unknown. These damages 
furthel' include physical injury, diminished ability to function at home and work. 
disfigurement, anxiety, frustration, concern, and general emotional upset. 
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE Pl~ffprays for judgment against the Defendants, and each of them, in 
said sums exceeding $10,000.00 that will fully and fairly compensate.him for his injuries and 
damages, including loss of past, present, and future medical expenses; lost wages and loss of 
eaming capacity; past, present, and future pain and suffering; and loss of enjoyment of life, 
together with attorney's fees, costs and interest and such other relief as the Court may deem 
appropriate. 
I 
Dated this ~ day of July, 2016. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS P.A. 
Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134 
wes@jvwlaw.net 
Attorney for Plaintiff Joseph Stanczak 





James L. Martin 
(208) 385-5303 
jlm@moffatt.com 
~ugust 22, 2016 
Michael T. Howard 
Winston & Cashatt Idaho 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
MOFFATT 
THOMAS 
Attorneys at Law 
MAILING ADDRESS: PHYSICAL ADDRESS: 
PO Box 829 IOI S Capitol Blvd 10th A 
Boise ID 83701.0829 Boise ID 83702-7710 
,uww.moffatt.com 208.345.2000 MAIN 
800.422.2889 TOLI.,FREE 
208.385.5384 FAX 
Re: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho v. Edgar Cook, Jr. and Laurie 
Co_ok, et al. 
MTBR&F File No. 13900.0252 
Dear Mr. Howard: 
We are in receipt of your letter dated August 9, 2016, which included a courtesy copy of the 
First Amended Complaint filed by Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") against Michael Chisholm 
("Chisholm") and Ed and Laurie Cook (the "Cooks"). On behalf of the Cooks, you tendered 
the defense of the First Amended Complaint to our client, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company ofldaho ("Farm Bureau"), and asked that the company review the same and advise 
you as to.Farm Bureau's coverage position in light of the filing of this First Amended 
· Complaint; 
Farm Bureau has now had a chance to review the First Amended Complaint and its prior 
coverage positions and based upon the same, we have been instructed to inform you that Farm 
Bureau stands on its prior coverage position relative to this matter. The filing of this First 
Amended Complaint does not change Farm Bureau's position that there is no coverage under 
the Cook's insurance policy with Farm Bureau, and thus, there is no duty to defend or 
indemnify the Cooks for the claims being asserted by Stanczak. 
A. The First Amended Complaint 
In the First Amended Complaint, it appears that Stanczak deleted references to the fact that the 
Cooks "operated" the Bloom Lake Campground as "a private for profit business." It also 
appears that Stanczak deleted the reference that Chisholm was an employee of the Cooks, but 
still left in the reference to him being the Cooks' agent. In paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3, in the prior 
. original complaint Stanczak alleges that the Cooks "owned and operated" the Bloom Lake 
Campground and that it was a "private for profit business." The First Amended Complaint 
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states that the Cooks owned the campground and Stanczak deleted the reference that it was a 
"private for profit" business. 
In paragraph 1.4, the original Complaint read that the Cooks owned and operated the 
campground, where the First Amended Complaint states simply that the Cooks owned the 
Bloom Lake Campground. Stanczak also previously alleged in the original Complaint that 
Bloom Lake Campground is a "for profif' campground and privately owned by the Cooks. In 
the amended paragraph 1.4, Stanczak deleted the adjective "for profit" in front of his 
references to "campground." 
For Stanczak's causes of action against the Cooks, Stanczak in his negligent supervision claim, 
paragraph 3.2.7, instead of alleging that the Cooks failed to supervise their "agent/employee," 
he alleges that the Cooks failed to supervise their "agent" and deleted references to 
"employee." Stanczak made similar changes to paragraph 3.2.11. That is he alleges that 
Chisholm was acting "while in the course and scope of his agency" as host and caretaker 
instead of alleging that Chisholm was acting ''while in the course and scope of his employment 
and agency". 
Your letter of August 9, 2016, did not provide any analysis as to why the filing of the First 
Amended Complaint should change Farm Bureau's prior coverage position. Nor did it describe 
the above-referenced changes that were made by Stanczak or how those changes might impact 
Fann Bureau's prior coverage analysis. We are happy to review your thoughts in that regard 
should you provide them. Nevertheless, without the benefit of your thoughts, we have 
proceeded to conduct the review you requested. 
B. Analysis 
1. The Amended Allegations 
As it appears that Stanczak only amended the allegations in the complaint that related to the two 
causes of actions asserted against the Cooks, namely the Negligent Supervision and Premises 
Liability claims. This, our review, is limited to whether these new amended allegations against 
the Cooks, trigger coverage under the Cooks' policy. As no changes were made to the 
allegations Stanczak made against Chisholm, we need not analyze coverage for the claims 
against him and simply reiterate that there is no coverage for the allegations against Chisholm 
as outlined in previous correspondence. 
From the changes made by Stanczak in his First Amended Complaint, it appears he is unsure 
whether the Cooks themselves operated the campground and if so, whether they intended to 
make a profit operating the campground. He also appears to recognize that the Cooks did not 
pay Chisholm a salary or wages, but that he did get to live at the cabin for free in exchange for 
keeping up the campground and doing other work for the Cooks--thus, the change in the 
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These new a11egations do not change Farm Bureau's coverage opinion. Whether or not the 
Cooks were actually "operating" the campground "for profit" is not the key basis for the denial 
of coverage. Fann Bureau has previously cited to Coverage Section II, Exclusion Number 1, 
which precludes coverage arising from the insured's business activities. Even with the new 
allegations, Fann Bureau still asserts that the business activities exclusion applies. The Cooks 
are insureds, and this claim relates to their business activities of having a campground on their 
property. In looking at whether an activity is a business pursuit, the courts will typically look 
at: whether the activity is customary to a business pursuit and whether the objective and 
purpose of the activity are commercial in nature, and in furtherance of the business, or the 
means of livelihood. Blacks v. Fireman's Fund American Ins., 115 Idaho 449 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Applying these factors, the Cooks' activity of offering up campground sites in exchange for a 
voluntary fee, may be considered a business pursuit as its objective may be deemed to be 
commercial in nature. It does not appear to matter whether the Cooks made a profit on this 
activity for it to be considered a business pursuit which would then bar any coverage for that 
activity under the business activities exclusion. The fact of the matter is the Cooks had a 
campground on their property for which they or Chisholm accepted a fee from campers to stay 
at the campground. 
Fann Bureau preciously cited to several other exclusions, including preclusion of coverages for 
bodily injury intentionally caused by an insured or bodily injury arising out of the violation of a 
criminal law by an insured. These exclusions only apply if the insured acted intentionally or 
violated a criminal act. While these exclusions apply to Stanczak's allegations against 
Chisholm, to the extent he is an insured under the Cooks' policy, they would also apply to the 
Cooks to the extent Stanczak alleges, like he has here, that Stanczak was Cooks' agent. 
Regardless, the main thrust of Farm Bureau's denial for the shooting of Stanczak by Chisholm, 
whether as alleged in the original Complaint or the First Amended Complaint, is that no 
"occurrence" occurred under the Cooks' policy. Pursuant to the Cooks' policy, "occurrence" is 
defined as: 
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in 
unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy 
period. All bodily injury and property damage resulting from a 
common cause will be considered the result of one occurrence. 
(emphasis added). Section II Liability Coverage of the Cooks' policy contains two relevant 
coverages, Fl (Bodily Injury Liabi1ity) and F2 (Premises Medical Coverage). Both of these 
coverages require an occurrence to trigger coverage. Webster's Online Dictionary defines 
"accident" as a "sudden event ... that is not planned or intended and that causes damage or 
injury." The shooting in question was not an accident because it was not a sudden event that 
was not intended. Indeed, recently, Chisholm pied guilty and was sentenced for the felony 
crime of aggravated battery. One of the elements to that felony is that the battery must be 
actual and intentional. Therefore, Chisholm's actions in shooting the gun and hitting Stanczak 
Cllent:4226003.2 
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fall outside the definition of an occurrence under the Policy, because it was not an accident. 
Chisolm likewise told the judge that he intentionally fired the gun in Stanczak's direction. The 
Cooks' policy only provides coverage for bodily injury caused by an occurrence, which is 
defined as an accident which results in unexpected bodily injury. The shooting of the gun was 
not an accidi;mt and thus there was no covered occurrence. Farm Bureau must therefore stand 
by the authority cited in its March 2016 letter to the Cooks regarding occurrences and Alford 
pleas. As there was no occurrence, that can be no coverage and without coverage, there is no 
duty to defend. 
2. Alleged Negligent Supervision and Premises Liability as 
"Occurrences" 
In reviewing the First Amended Complaint, we have also analyzed whether the Cooks' alleged 
failure to properly supervise Chisholm and/or their alleged failure to take reasonable care in 
caring for their premises could constitute an "occurrence" separate from the shooting. Even 
viewing these allegations independently from the underlying intentional tort, coverage does not 
exist. 
First, while there are cases from other jurisdiction that look at these torts separately, Idaho has 
rejected this line of authority. Under Idaho law, the courts must look at the actions that actually 
caused the harm. 
For example, in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992) an insurance 
company brought an action for declaratory relief against its insured, Shirley Wilcox, seeking a -
ruling that there was no coverage under a homeowners insurance policy for a lawsuit brought 
against her and her ex-husband by a number of minor foster children who were abused in her 
home by Wilcox's ex-husband. The insurance company argued that there was no occurrence 
under the applicable policy. The minor foster children alleged in the underlying case that 
Wilcox herself failed to report abuse to law enforcement, failed to report to her ex-husband's 
employer his tendencies to molest, and negligently failed to protect the children. The lower 
court found that Wilcox's actions in failing to report her husband's actions or failing to protect 
the children from her husband's tendencies constituted an error injudgment, so it found that 
there was an occurrence under the policy. 
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed this holding. It applied the following definitions for the 
word "accident," which is part of the definition of the term "occurrence": 
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event 
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through 
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and 
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more 
comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common 
signification the word means an unexpected happening without 
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Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979). 
ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. 1. an undesirable or unfortunate 
happening, unintentionally caused and usually resulting in hann, 
injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 
2. any event that happens unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan 
or cause .... 
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989). 
Mutual of Enumclaw, 123 Idaho at 8-9, 843 P.2d at 158-159. The Court stated that its role was 
to look at Wilcox's actions, and not the actions of her ex-husband, because she was the only one 
whose actions could be covered under the insurance policy in question. The Court held: 
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an 
"occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct 
which caused injury. The injury suffered by the minors is child 
molestation. While the acts or failure to act by Wilcox may have 
created or contributed to the environment which permitted her ex-
husband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained 
ofby the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw 
Policy and the Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox. 
Id. The Court found that the event causing the damage in the underlying complaint was her ex-
husband's abuse, not her alleged negligence for failure to supervise her ex-husband nor the 
failure to report the abuse. The Court held there was no occurrence under the policies in 
question and that the insurance companies owed no duty to defend its policyholder. 
The Idaho Supreme Court came to a similar holding in State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 
P.2d 1333 (1997). In that case, parents of a minor child brought suit against insureds who 
operated an in-home day care. The minor child was allegedly abused by the insureds' son who 
worked at the in-home daycare. The parents of the minor child brought suit against the insured 
for a number of causes of action, including the same two claims Stanczak has asserted against 
the Cooks--negligent supervision of its agent and premises liability. The insureds made a claim 
to their insurance company for coverage of the underlying suit, and the insurance company, 
· State Farm, filed an action for declaratory relief, arguing that there was no occurrence under the 
policy and thus, no coverage. The district court agreed and the insureds appealed. The 
Supreme Court affirmed, finding that intentional acts caused the damage, and not any of the 
other claims, including negligent supervision and premises liability. State Farm, 130 Idaho at 
695-696, 946 P.2d at 1335-1336. 
Other courts agree with Idaho's treatment of this issue. Allstate Ins Co v. JJM, 254 Mich.App 
418; 657 N. W. 2d 18 J (Mich. Ct. App 2002) ( court found no occurrence under an insurance 
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allegations of negligent supervision and premises liability, because an intentional act caused the 
harm, not an accident); Fire Ins. Exchange v. Cornwell, 90 P.3d 978 (Nevada 2004) (named 
insureds' failure to prevent their adult son's sexual seduction of minor neighbor was not an 
"accident," and, thus, their allegedly negligent supervision of their son was not a covered 
"occurrence" under the liability coverage of homeowners' insurance policy); Ofjhuas v. 
Guthrie, 140 Ohio App.3d 90, 746 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (insureds' allegedly 
negligent supervision of juvenile and their allegedly negligent entrustment of a gun to him were 
not "occurrences" separate and apart from the underlying intentional tort); Allstate v. Hill, Case 
No. 261543, 2005 WL 1959560 (Mich. Ct. App. August 16, 2005) (artful pleading by alleging 
claims for negligence does not get around requirement that event causing harm must be an 
occurrence under an insurance policy). 
Second, the nature of the allegations relating to negligent supervision and premises liability 
against the Cooks precludes coverage. Under the definition of occurrence, the harm must be 
unexpected. Under Idaho law, the torts of negligent supervision and premises liability both 
involve foreseeability, what the negligent party knew or should have known. See Sterling v. 
Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986) and Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,985 P.2d 
669 (1999). The very nature of these torts is that the harm was expected because it was 
foreseeable, and that the tortfeasor should have prevented the harm. Because Stanczak is 
alleging that the harm was foreseeable, it was not unexpected, so again, there was no 
occurrence under the Cooks' policy. See Mountain State Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hauser, 221 
P.3d 56 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009) (Where harm alleged by victim of assault by manager was 
foreseeable from owner's knowledge and actions in negligently hiring, supervising, and 
retaining manager, no occurrence occurred under insurance policy). 
3. Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau has once again concluded that there is no coverage 
under the Cooks' Farm Bureau insurance policy for any claim arising out of the incident that 
occurred on the Cooks' property on June 28, 2015, involving Joseph Stanczak and Michael 
Chisholm. 
As such, Farm Bureau will not be able to provide the Cooks with a defense for the underlying 
lawsuit, including the First Amended Complaint, filed by Mr. Stanczak in Bonner County. Nor 
will Farm Bureau be able to indemnify the Cooks for any resulting judgment or settlement 
arising from that lawsuit. 
Farm Bureau bases this denial of coverage on the Cooks' policy's insuring agreement, as well 
as other coverage provisions and limitations set forth in the Cooks' policy and which were 
described to you in detail in the prior Denials and ROR Notices which are incorporated herein 
by reference. Farm Bureau reserves the right to rely upon any and all defenses of non-coverage 
and does not admit any obligations under the Cooks' policy. 
Certainly, if Farm Bureau is provided additional information from you or others regarding Mr. 
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Farm Bureau reserves the right to modify this denial of coverage determination to the extent 
that additional information is determined to be relevant to this coverage determination. 
Farm Bureau continues to fully and expressly reserve all rights and defenses which may now 
exist and all right and defenses which it may hereinafter have under any and all of the tenns, 
conditions, provisions, and exclusions of the policy, as well as all endorsements thereto, 
irrespective ofwhether'or not they are referenced in its prior Denials and ROR Notices. Farm 
Bureau specifically reserves its right to add additional defenses to coverage and to modify and 
amend its coverage detennination based upon further investigation of the fact or circumstances 
pertaining to this matter or upon the discovery or notice of facts not currently available to it. 
No actions taken by or on behalf of Farm Bureau in connection with this claim shall constitute 
an admission of liability or an admission of coverage under the subject Farm Bureau Policy. 
Steve Johnson 
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I, BARBARA E. MAYNE, declare and state as follows: 
1. I work as a Word Processor for Moffatt Thomas, the law firm representing 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho in the above-noted matter, and have 
personal knowledge with respect to the matters contained herein. 
2. I have been a word processor at Moffatt Thomas for 33 years and over the 
years have prepared numerous transcripts of recorded hearings similar to those attached hereto. 
3. In August of 2016, I was given audio recordings of the 1/5/2016 plea 
hearing and the 3/8/2016 sentencing hearing in the criminal case entitled State of Idaho v. 
Michael Jesse Chisholm, Case Number CR-2015-0003326, which was adjudicated in Bonner 
County, Idaho. 
4. From those audio recordings, in August 2016, I prepared transcripts of 
both hearings. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the transcript 
for the 1/5/2016 plea hearing. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the transcript 
for the 3/8/2016 sentencing hearing. 
I certify under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the 
foregoing is true and correct. 
DATED this 18th day of October, 2016. 
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TRANSCRIPTION OF HEARING ON ENTRY OF PLEA 
First Judicial District Judge Barbara A. Buchanan 
Michael Jesse Chisholm, Defendant 
Unidentified Female 
Shane L. Greenbank, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office 
Daniel D. Taylor, Bonner County Public Defender 
Mr. Chisholm is present with Mr. Taylor. Mr. Greenbank is here for the State. 
This is the time scheduled for entry of a plea. Mr. Chisholm has filled out a 
written plea and an acknowledgment of Alford plea. Mr. Chisholm, would you 
please stand and be sworn? 
Yes Your Honor. 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
I do. 
You may be seated. 
Thank you. 
I have to ask you a series of questions to make sure that your plea is both knowing 
and voluntary. 
Your Honor? Before we proceed. I just want to advise the Court. I don't think 
it's an issue. The security downstairs had noted the odor of alcohol on the 
defendant. The bailiff tested him with a BAC. It came back a .027. Because 
that's well below the legal limit I don't believe that it is something that would 
impact the voluntarilyness, knowingly, voluntarily. And with an understanding of 
his rights, guilty plea. So - but I did want the Court to be aware of it. 
Note that that would be probably the equivalent of one drink. Well below the 
legal limit. Mr. Chisholm, apparently you have consumed some alcohol. 
I have not today, Your Honor. 
Okay. So you feel fully capable of understanding everything that's happening? 
Oh definitely, Your Honor. 
Okay. Do you have any difficulty reading or understanding English? 
No. 
TRANSCRIPTION OF HEARING ON ENTRY OF PLEA - 1 Client:4232428.1 
316
Judge: And did you read, initial and sign both these documents? 
Chisholm: I did. 
Judge: Is there anything in the documents you don't understand or want to ask a question 
about? 
Chisholm: Everything I didn't understand I went over with Mr. Taylor. And I understand 
everything fully. 
Judge: Okay. Are your answers true and con-ect? 
Chisholm: Yes. 
Judge: And you just said that you had Mr. Taylor's help filling it out when you needed 
it? 
Chisholm: Yes, I did. 
Judge: And you've been represented by Mr. Taylor throughout this case? 
Chisholm: I have. 
Judge: Are you satisfied with his representation? 
Chisholm: Very satisfied. 
Judge: Have you fully discussed your case with him? 
Chisholm: Yes, I have. 
Judge: You haven't been diagnosed with any mental health disorders, and you 're not 
under the care of a mental health professional? Is that right? 
Chisholm: That's correct. 
Judge: There's a pretrial settlement agreement. And it is attached as, to the end of the 
written plea. It provides that you will plead guilty to one count of aggravated 
battery. That crime has a prison sentence ofup to 15 years. And a fine ofup to 
$50,000. The State at sentencing will limit its recommendations to five years 
fixed, five years indeterminate. That's a unified ten year sentence. And will seek 
full restitution for the victim's injury, standard fines and costs. The State will 
dismiss Count Two, the use of a firearm enhancement. The State will agree not to 
pursue a civil penalty of $5,000 to the victim. You 're free to make your own 
recommendations. So, am I understanding that the State is going to recommend, 
though, five years of imprisonment and another five years indeterminate? 
Greenbank: That's correct, Your Honor. 
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Judge: The Court, excuse me. So, Mr. Chisholm, did you understand what the State's 
recommending? 
Chisholm: Yes I do. 
Judge: And you understand the State's offer? 
Chisholm: Yes. 
Judge: And do you understand that the Court isn't bound by that. A judge can give you a 
greater sentence than the State recommends or a lesser sentence? 
Chisholm: I understand, yes. 
Judge: And do you understand that if the judge does give you a harsher sentence, you 
don't have the right to withdraw your guilty plea? 
Chisholm: Yes. 
Judge: You can appeal the sentence, but the plea still stands. You are pleading under the 
North Carolina v. Alford case. And what that means, and you've filled out the 
form, is that you're agreeing with it that there is a strong factual basis for the plea, 
and that if you went to trial you could be found guilty. And you want to take 
advantage of the State's offer. Am I correct on that? 
Chisholm: Yes. 
Judge: Both sides agree that there is a strong factual basis for a plea in this case? 
Greenbank: Yes, Your Honor. 
Taylor: Yes, Your Honor. 
Judge: And court, the Court actually heard a motion to suppress on this case. Or a 
motion in limine, I think it was. And so the Court is familiar with the facts as 
well and agrees that there is a factual basis to support the guilty plea. And 
Mr. Chisholm, you understand that the effect of an Alford plea at sentencing, you 
get sentenced as if you pled guilty? 
Chisholm: Yes. 
Judge: Has anyone done anything to get you to enter this plea against your will? 
Chisholm: No, Your Honor. 
Greenbank: There are the rights waivers at the bottom of the pretrial settlement agreement as 
well. 
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Judge: Yes. That by entering into the plea agreement you waive your right to appeal 
your conviction. And your right to appeal your sentence unless, as I said, you got 
a harsher sentence than the State recommends, then you can appeal. Do you 
understand that? 
Chisholm: Yes, I do. 
Judge: And do you want to go forward with this plea agreement today? 
Chisholm: Yes I do, Your Honor. 
Judge: Do you have any questions? 
Chisholm: I believe they've all been answered by counsel. 
Judge: I'll find then that you've knowingly and voluntarily entered into the written plea, 
the Alford plea. Accept and file these documents. I find they're knowingly and 
voluntarily made with a full understanding of the potential consequences. We'll 
set a sentencing date or a pre-sentence investigation. We have time on Tuesday, 
March 8, at two in the afternoon. Will the, will this one take longer? 
Greenbank: If, if 
Judge: [inaudible] testify with him. 
Greenbank: I don't know at this time. But I would anticipate that it will take longer. 
Taylor: I would anticipate that too. 
Judge: So shall we set this - will an hour be long enough? 
.Taylor: Maybe. I honestly can't say at this point, Your Honor. 
Judge: Okay. 
Taylor: If I decide I need more time. 
Judge: Let me know. Right now we'll set it. We'll give you an hour. Ifwe need to we 
can block out a little more. We could make this the last one of the day. 
Greenbank: Return to the - pursuant to the pretrial settlement agreement in this case, the State 
would move to dismiss Count Two with prejudice. I'll provide an order to the 
Court later. 
Judge: All right. I'm signing the order. Mr. Chisholm, we're going to give you a short 
form that you need to fill out before you leave. It just has contact information. 
And then there's a pre-sentence packet. You take that with you and you have to 
fill that out and take it with you to the pre-sentence interview. You have to 




contact the pre-sentence investigator's office within 24 hours. What you do is just 
call a Coeur d 'Alene number and they'll schedule your appointment. I believe the 
actual interview will be able to take place in Sandpoint. But you need to keep 
calling to get that scheduled. Sometimes you might have to leave a message or 
someone might not answer. It is your responsibility to get the interview 
scheduled, though. Okay? 
I understand. 
We'll go off the record. 
(Recording ends] 



















TRANSCRIPTION OF SENTENCING HEARING 
Judge Barbara A. Buchanan 
Daniel D. Taylor, Bonner County Public Defender 
Jackie Bailiff 
Ed Cook, Witness 
Shane L. Greenbank, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office 
John Hobday, Witness 
John LaPointe, Witness 
Leonard Sanders, Witness 
Michael Jesse Chisholm, Defendant 
We'll go on the record this afternoon. We're here for sentencing in State of Idaho 
v. Michael Chisholm. Mr. Chisholm is present. He's represented by Mr. Taylor. 
Mr. Greenbank is here for the State. Prior to coming into court, the Court has 
reviewed a number of things. The pre-sentence report, gain evaluation. The pre-
sentence included a number of letters of support for Mr. Chisholm. Then there 
prosecutor's off - excuse me, the public defender's office, Mr. Taylor, filed a 
number of other character references. There is an addendum to the pre-sentence 
report, which contained a mental health screening. And then, Mr. Taylor, are 
these additional? 
Those just came in. I made the State aware of them. 
Letters of support? 
Yes. 









... read all of the submissions. Does either side wish to present testimony? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Mr. Taylor. 
Thank you, Your Honor. Call Ed Cook. [ short pause] 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, 
the whole trnth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Yes I do. 


















Jackie, could you bring me a notebook please? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Go ahead, Mr. Taylor. 
Thank you, Your Honor. Would you please state your name and spell your last 
name for the record? 
Ed Cook. The last name is C-0-0-K. 
All right, Mr. Cook. How do you know Mr. Chisholm? 
I met him at the Elmira store 25 years ago. 
All right. Have you had any contact with him since then? 
Yes. I've had quite a bit of contact with him. 
Tell us a little bit about that. 
Well, my wife and I bought the Elmira store in December of 1990. And we met 
Mike through the Elmira store. He used to come in and play cribbage and - with 
Pinky and some of the other locals. Come in and have coffee. And that's how we 
got to know him. 
And how did you - oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. 
About 17 years ago. We've owned Bloom Lake - it's been in their, in the family 
for, since 1950. And so we went up there and it was a total mess up there. So we 
took, Ed had 25 percent of it logged. And took that money and put it in the 
infrastructure to put in a road, four outhouses, and remodeled the old cabin. And 
about that time Mike volunteered to be a - to go up there and stay in the cabin and 
sort oflook out after everything. There's things seem to disappear and things get. 
Like we had a police officer up there once that - 24 trees were chopped down by 
the bad guys. So he would, he's been there doing this for 17 years. And never 
had any problem. And he's the President of the Friends of Bloom Lake, which 
just sort of formed. There's nothing formal. About 100 people. And we had to 
clean the place up because it was full of toilet paper and all the debris. So we had 
about 100 people show up. Pete took 50 of 'em, Mike took the other 50 and they 
split up and cleaned up the whole area. 
Okay. 
And it has been a really nice place ever since. There's been a couple of women 
that had a couple of children that'd go up there and fish with their children. 
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Because they know that Mike is there. And they appreciated that kind of thing. 
Because he helped the kids go fishing and do all that. And so, and that's how we 
know Mike. And he's been perfect and I believe he's not a danger to civilization, 
or anybody. I'm very surprised that we're here today. 
Taylor: All right. So you've known him for the last 17 years? 25? 
Cook: Yeah. 
Taylor: And he has been the caretaker at Bloom Lake for all that time? 
Cook: Yes. 
Taylor: Okay. And do you know anything about his family? 
Cook: Very little. 
Taylor: Well, do you know [inaudible] his wife and his daughter? 
Cook: I didn't know any of them. 
Taylor: All right. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
Judge: Mr. Greenbank, any questions? 
Greenbank: Yes, Judge. You stated that you're surprised we're here today. Can you explain? 
Cook: Yeah. Yes. Because he's not a violent person. And so many people like him. 
He did a great job and I think he can continue to do it after this. 
Greenbank: Okay. You agree that shooting someone in the back twice requires -
Cook: Yeah, I think that's sort of significant. 
Greenbank: Okay. 
Cook: If it's true. 
Greenbank: You don't think it's true? 
Cook: Well I wasn't there. I don't know. 
Greenbank: Okay. So you don't know anything about this event? 
Cook: No. 
Greenbank: Okay. So your knowledge of this case is based on? 
Cook: What I hear in the newspaper. And I know they're not very accurate. 
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Greenbank: Okay. And what about your discussions with Mr. Chisholm? Have you talked 
with him about the case? 
Cook: Oh yeah, I talked to him afterwards. Since - afterwards. 
Greenbank: Okay. Ed, would you find him to be a truthful, credible person? 
Cook: Yes. 
Greenbank: You wrote a letter for the Court to consider, correct? 
Cook: Yes, I did. My wife and I. 
Greenbank:: Okay. Was it [inaudible]? 
Cook: Yes. She's here. 
Greenbank:: All right. In there you stated he was trained in the military when he was young? 
Cook: Yes. I believe he served in Vietnam. 
Greenbank: Would it surprise you to know he was never in the military? 
Cook: It would be, yes. 
Greenbank:: Okay. Marked State's Exhibit 1. 
[inaudible whispered discussion in background] 
Greenbank: Take a look at that document sir. 
Cook: He did mention to us that he was dead. He's been fighting that for quite a few 
years. 
Greenbank:: Fighting what? 
Cook: That he was dead and he couldn't get it reversed. 
Green bank: What do you mean? 
Cook: That's all I know. He says, he has difficulty getting anything done because he's 
officially dead. Somehow the records got screwed up. That's all I know. 
Greenbank: Under the five dates of birth, under those five social security numbers, known to 
be used by him, under both of his names, none of the five branches have a record 
of him. 
Cook: I don't know. 
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Greenbank: Okay. I'd admit State's 1. 
Cook: I don ' t know his social security number other than this. 
Greenbank: Okay. Moved to admit State's 1. 
Judge: Any objection? 
Taylor: Well, it has been shown to the witness and he's recited the contents, but I don't 
know that he's qualified to authenticate what it is. Again, this is a sentencing 
hearing and I'll leave the rules of evidence up to the Court. But-
Judge: I don't know that he could admit the document. I will note that I read in the pre-
sentence report that Mr. Chisholm has never served in the military. 
Greenbank: Does that surprise you? 
Cook: Yeah. If that's true, it would surprise me, yes. 
Greenbank: That he told the pre-sentence investigator that he never did? 
Cook: I don't know what he told the pre-sentencing prosecutor. 
Greenbank: That's what we're talking about. The pre-sentence investigator. 
Cook: Oh. 
Greenbank: During his interview. 
Cook: I have no knowledge of that. 
Greenbank: Do you still believe him to be truthful and honest though, huh? 
Cook: Absolutely! 
Greenbank: Okay. No further questions. 
Cook: I would trust him with Bloom Lake again. 
Judge: Thank you sir. 
Taylor: Call John Hobday, Your Honor. 
[ short pause] 
Bailiff: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, 
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Hobday: Yes, I do. 
























Thank you. Please state your name and spell your last name for the record. 
John Hobday. Excuse me. H-0-B (as in Baker)-D (as in David)-A-Y. 
All right. And how do you know Mr. Chisholm? 
I've lived in Elmira for 43 years and I live across the highway from where you 
turn to go up to the lake. And I've fished the lake for 35, 40 years. I believe I 
met Mike up at the lake and he's just been a good friend for many, many years. 
He'd do anything for you. 
And how long has he been the caretaker at Bloom Lake, do you know? 
I think Ed said 17 years. I would say that's pretty accurate. 
What was Bloom Lake - you said you've lived across from the entrance to -
Across the highway. Yes sir. 
How you get to Bloom Lake. For how many years? 
Forty-three. 
Okay. Prior to Mr. Chisholm arriving at Bloom Lake, what was Bloom Lake 
like? 
It was a mess. Good fishing but a mess. And people would go up there and just 
run amuck basically. 
And what's it like now? 
It's beautiful. It's a campground, family oriented, and safe. It's beautiful. They 
spent a lot of money on the fire pits, which Mike is instrumental in building those. 
They are steel. There is nice gravel pads for camping. You can either take a tent 
or an RV. And it is a very family-oriented place and ve1y nice to visit. And good 
fishing. 
Have you ever been at Bloom Lake with Mr. Chisholm when other campers were 
there? 
Yes. 
About how many times do you think? 
Countless. 

























Okay. And how would you say he interacts with them? 
Very well. He's a gentleman, just a very nice man. 
And have you, you say you've known him. Would you say you're friends with 
him? 
Absolutely. 
Okay. This sort of behavior, what can you tell me about this? 
What sort of behavior? 
The sort of behavior that we're here for today. 
It is not like him at all. 
How so? 
May I take a drink of water? I have asthma. 
Sure. 
And my [inaudible]. I'm very nervous. Sorry. 
People are often nervous when they have to, you know, go up [inaudible]. 
And I've only testified once before. And I'm 68 years old. So I'm nervous. 
So back to the question. 
Yes sir. 
The sort of behavior that we're here for today, what can you tell me about that? Is 
that typical for Mr. Chisholm, based upon your knowledge of him? 
No. No. The only reason I believe Mr. Chisholm would do what he is accused of 
- and I wasn't there so I don't know what happened - is that he feared for his life. 
That's the only reason he would do it, in my opinion. 
Do you know anything about Mr. Chisholm's military service or? 
No sir. 
Or his life in California? 
Just what I read in the paper. 
All right. Nothing further, Your Honor. 
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Judge: Mr. Greenbank, any questions? 
Greenbank:: Sir, what's your training and experience? 
Hobday: I'm a real estate broker. I own Alpine Realty. Opened it 23 years ago. Previous 
to that I was with Century 21 in Sandpoint for five years. 
Greenbank: So in your opinion, you stated that you don't believe he could do this? 
Hobday: I don't hear well either. I'm sorry. 
Greenbank: You stated that in your opinion you don't believe he could do this. And that 
opinion is based on your real estate experience? 
Hobday: No. It is based on my personal experience with Mr. Chisholm. 
Greenbank:: Okay. But you're not an expert in psychology or? 
Hobday: No sir. 
Greenbank: [inaudible] No expert in forensics? 
Hobday: No. 
Greenbank: Never worked as a police officer? 
Hobday: No. 
Greenbank: Okay. But your opinion. And you wrote one of the letters that's attached to the 
PSI? 
Hobday: Yes sir, I did. 
Greenbank:: Okay. And you state in there that you believe he was acting in self-defense? 
Hobday: Yes. 
Greenbank: Okay. But the victim was shot twice in the back? 
Hobday: So they say. I wasn 't there. 
Greenbank: So you don't believe the police reports, the forensics? What? 
Hobday: I don't know. I wasn't there. 
Greenbank: Okay. So what is it you are basing your opinion on? 
Hobday: Just because I know Mike. And I don't think he's that kind of man unless his life 
was in danger. 
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Greenbank: So did you know him prior to, you know, when he operated under the other 
name? 
Hobday: No. 
Greenbank: Okay. But you are aware that he fled responsibilities, changed his name and 
ended up here? 
Hobday: Yes sir. That's what the paper said. I don't have personal knowledge of that. 
Greenbank: Okay. 
Hobday: But, may - -one thing I'm really curious about. You mentioned at one of the 
hearings that Mike had stomped a man to death and stole his motorcycle. And 
that was on the front page of the paper. And I was at one of the hearings and one 
of the investigators, a man named Kurt Lieman [SP?], I believe, heard a few of us 
in the hall talking. And he came over there and asked me some questions. And I 
asked him, I said, is it true that Mike Chisholm stomped a man to death and took 
his motorcycle? And he said no, the fingerprints have come back and they're not 
Mike's. It was a different alias. 
Greenbank: And your issue is? 
Hobday: Pardon me? I -
Greenbank: What is your issue? What's your? 
Hobday: My issue is that he was convicted in the court of the Bonner County Daily Bee. 
And the retraction just said Mike wasn't this guy. It didn't go on to say that this 
guy was the guy that stomped a man to death and stole his motorcycle. 
Greenbank: So you have an issue - so you have an issue with the reporting of the Daily Bee? 
Hobday: Yes. But they were quoting you. 
Greenbank: Allegedly. 
Hobday: Allegedly, yeah. I'm not a lawyer. Sorry. I'm just a real estate broker. 
Greenbank: Okay. All right. 
Hobday: And a fisherman. 
Greenbank: So back on track. 
Hobday: Yes sir. 
Greenbank: You believe he acted in self-defense? 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SENTENCING HEARING - 9 Client:4232142.1 
330
Hobday: Yes. 
Greenbank:: If the victim was shot twice in the back. And I understand you weren't there, so -
and you have limited knowledge - but if he was shot twice in the back, is it 
consistent with self-defense that you take your two firearms, get in a vehicle, 
drive away? 
Taylor: Objection, Your Honor. We're getting into hypothe- Mr. -
Judge: I'll sustain. Let's move on. 
Taylor: Asked in the [inaudible]. 
Judge: I'll sustain the objection. 
Greenbank:: Is fleeing the scene consistent with self-defense? 
Taylor: Again, objection, Your Honor. We're hammering this poor man on stuff he has 
no - he's already said he has no personal knowledge of any of it. He's basing his 
opinions on his personal knowledge of Mr. Chisholm. Unless he's had an 
opportunity to sit down and read the police reports -
Hobday: I have not. 
Taylor: Then all of this line of questioning is sort of irrelevant. We already know what 
the State's opinion is. That's pretty well established. I think: the witness should 
be allowed to step down unless the State has some specific questions about 
Mr. Chisholm's character or his personal dealings with him during the time in 
which he's known him. 
Greenbank: This witness's statements are part of the Court record in a PSI. That's what I'm 
questioning him on. Counsel got his opinion out of him that he was acting in self-
defense. I have a right, I have a right to rebut. 
Taylor: I never -
Greenbank: This witness. 
Taylor: I never wanted- I didn't want him to state his personal opinion about self-
defense. That was the witness blurting that out. That's not, that wasn't my reason 
for putting him on the stand. 
Judge: Why don't we move on. 
Greenbank: Okay. No further questions. Thank you. 
Judge: Sir, you can step down. 






















John LaPointe, Your Honor. 
Mr. LaPointe? 
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the trnth, 
the whole trnth, and nothing but the trnth, so help you God? 
I do. 
Please state your name and spell your last name for the record. 
John LaPointe. L-A-P-0-I-N-T-E. 
All right. And how do you know Mr. Chisholm? 
I've known Mike for over 20 years. When I first moved out here in 1994 I met 
Mike. Mike was playing in a band where I used to go to a place and listen to him 
play and just really enjoyed it. And spent some time after that just sitting down 
and talking to him. And then I met him at the Elmira store. I live in Elmira. I 
met him at the store there and we strnck up a friendship. I'm a general contractor 
so I was the one who built the house up at Bloom Lake for Mike to live in. And 
he helped with that. I also plow snow in the wintertime and I do snow plowing 
for his place. And Mike's always paid me. We've always had a great 
relationship. So -
Okay. And how long have you known him? 
Over 20 years. 
All right. And you've been to Bloom Lake? 
Oh, many times, yeah. 
Have you ever been up to Bloom Lake prior to all this? 
I have, yeah. It was a real dump. Broken bottles everywhere, trash everywhere, 
wild parties at night, loud music. It was really a bad place to be. 
And what's it like now? 
Oh, it's almost a paradise. It's beautiful. 
And Mr. Chisholm, as far as you know, is the caretaker up there? 
Oh, I attribute most of the state of Bloom Lake right now to Mike. I think he did 
a wonderful job. 
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Taylor: All right. 
LaPointe: Cleaning out the riff-raff and getting rid of the undesirable characters that were 
constantly there messing it up. 
Taylor: And have you ever seen him interact with anybody who is staying there or fishing 
there? 
LaPointe: Oh, I have. 
Taylor: And how's that [inaudible] 
LaPointe: In a lot of ways. 
Taylor: How's that usually go? 
LaPointe: Oh, he's - Mike's always been cordial to people who follow the rules. And my 
wife and I had a good friend that had a - wanted to have a wedding up there. And 
Mike helped us set that whole thing up. We had a real nice wedding. Yeah, I just 
found Mike to be very accommodating and very cordial and very pleasant. Just -
I really admire Mike. 
Taylor: Thank you. No further questions. 
Judge: Mr. Greenbank, any questions? 
Greenbank: So you like Mike? 
LaPointe: I really do. I trust Mike with my wife. I mean, he's just a great guy. 
Judge: You can step down. Thanks. 
Taylor: Leonard Sanders, Your Honor. 
Bailiff: Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
Sanders: I do. 
Taylor: Please state your name and spell your last name for the record. 
Sanders: My name and what? 
Taylor: And spell your last name for the record. 
Sanders: Leonard Sanders. S-A-N-D-E-R-S. 
Taylor: And what's your occupation, sir? 
















What's your occupation? 
Retired metallurgical engineer. 
All right. Do you have certification for that? 
Pardon? 
Do you have certification for that? 
No,no. 
Okay. And how do you know Mr. Chisholm? 
I met Mike about 22 years ago when we, my wife and I were operating the Elmira 
store. And Mike would come in. That's where we first met him. And then 
actually did a little bit of music with him. He was learning to play the harmonica 
and I played the flute. And we got together a couple of times with that. And then 
later up at Bloom Lake. 
All right. How well do you know Mr. Chisholm? 
Very well. I've spent a good deal of time up at Bloom Lake with him. And I've 
seen where he's helped children. He's had fishing poles for 'em to use and 
sometimes he provided bait for them if they didn't have it. He's worked with the 
Boy Scouts up there. A friend that I've had since kindergarten, I actually enticed 
him to move up here to north Idaho. And he just fell in love with Bloom Lake 
and he had cancer and he spent his last few months up at Bloom Lake. And Mike 
attended to him. And he was there with Sanford, my friend, until his dying breath 
along with hospice helping him. Another point that I might make is that Ed Cook 
and I have known each other for about 50 years. So - we met at college studying 
metallurgy. And we, my wife and I, one of the draws for us to move to north 
Idaho was Bloom Lake. We thought that we might be caretakers up there. We 
talked - the Cooks talked about having some kind of a youth camp or something 
up there. And I'm just more than pleased that Mike took that job and did such an 
excellent - has been doing such an excellent job of caretaker up there. And 
helping people. He also has helped one of the people in the audience here, the 
Gibbons, he's helped their child- some of their children- learn to cut meat so 
they can do their own butchering and meat cutting. He's just been a real good 
friend and we've just got along good. 
You ever seen him deal with people up at the lake? 
Yes, I have. He always goes down and greets people and makes sure that, you 
know, everything is in order. And that - and just friendly with the people that are 
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there. And that's why he's got, what, over 60 letters of character reference. And 
so many people showed up here to support him. 
Taylor: Have you ever seen him deal with a troublesome camper up at the lake? 
Sanders: No. One time he told me about a situation that I kind of, I think, exemplifies his 
attitude. He said some guy was drunk and giving him a hard time. And he told 
the guy, he said, I'm just an old man but if you 're feeling froggy go ahead and 
JUmp. 
Taylor: Okay. All right. Anything else you want to say, Mr. Sanders? 
Sanders: That's about it. 
Taylor: All right. Thank you. No further questions. 
Judge: Any questions, Mr. Greenbank? 
Greenbank: Yes Judge. You wrote a letter as well, correct? 
Sanders: Pardon? 
Greenbank: You wrote a letter as well, correct? 
Sanders: Yes, I did. 
Greenbank: All right. You make some statements about the victim in this case? 
Sanders: Pardon? 
Greenbank: You make some statements in that letter about the victim in this case? 
Sanders: About what? 
Greenbank: About the victim in this case? 
Sanders: Un-huh. 
Greenbank: Do you recall making those statements? 
Sanders: Pardon? 
Greenbank: Do you recall making the statements about the victim? 
Sanders: Yes, sir. 
Greenbank: Okay. How do you know the victim? 
Sanders: I don't know the victim. 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SENTENCING HEARING - 14 Client:4232142.1 
335
Greenbank: Okay. So, you wrote that Mike tried to help the fugitive, convicted felon. And 
the man turned on him. And he was bigger than Mike. 
Sanders: Pardon? 
Judge: Why don't you show him what he wrote? 
Greenbank: We could get the hearing in places. He heard fine -
Judge: Sure. 
Greenbank: On direct examination for some reason. 
Sanders: Better open my hearing aids? 
Judge: Yes. 
Greenbank: Can you hear now? 
Sanders: Uh-huh. 
Greenbank: Okay. Do you remember writing, Mike tried to help the fugitive, convicted felon, 
and the man turned on him and is way bigger than Mike? 
Sanders: Yes. 
Greenbank: Okay. And you don't know the victim though? 
Sanders: I'm, that's true. I don't. 
Greenbank: So where are you getting those statements from that you're making? 
Sanders: From Mike. 
Greenbank: So that's according to Mike? 
Sanders: Yeah. 
Greenbank: Okay. No further questions. 
Judge: Anything further Mr. Taylor? 
Taylor: No, Your Honor. 
Judge: Thank you sir. Mr.? 
Taylor: Nothing further. No further witnesses. 
Judge: Mr. Greenbank, do you have any witnesses? 
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Green bank: No, Your Honor. The victim in this case was notified of the sentencing that was 
occurring today. We'd operated under the assumption that he was showing up for 
the hearing. So he did not complete a victim's impact statement before the 
hearing. I'd confirmed, I didn't worry that he wasn't here. We made contact with 
him up in Bonners Ferry. He wasn't going to come down to it. And asked that 
the sentencing proceed without him. So -
Judge: Is there a request for restitution? 
Greenbank: There is not. And the basis for that is the victim in the case has retained civil 
counsel and prefers to go that route, as opposed to through the Crime Victims 
avenue. So -
Judge: So the State doesn't have any testimony or evidence that they want to present? 
Greenbank: No. Your Honor, on the issue of restitution, I'm going to ask that we leave that 
open for 60 days from the perspective of the Crime Victims' compensation output 
in this case. Because they maxed out at the $25,000. So I do want to talk with 
civil counsel, who I haven't talked with, with regard to who is representing the 
victim in the case. But I don't want to leave the State ofldaho out this $25,000 if 
not necessary. But anything beyond what Crime Victims paid, we're not seeking 
restitution for. So, I'll get with counsel on that aspect later. 
Judge: The Court has a question. I guess from, for both counsel. Because I don't have a 
victim's impact statement. And I was concerned about talking about the victim 
being a fugitive, a convicted felon. Do you have any information that would 
support that? 
Greenbank: I do not. 
Taylor: Not that I'm aware of. 
Judge: Mr. Greenbank, then - well actually, Mr. Taylor, I don't think I asked you, we 
had a pretty extensive pre-sentence report in this case. As we've talked about. 
Many letters of support. But the pre-sentence itself, or the gain, do you want to 
make any changes or corrections? 
Taylor: No, Your Honor. 
Judge: And Mr. Chisholm, you've had a chance to review the pre-sentence in that? 
Chisholm: Yes I have, Your Honor. 
Judge: Okay. 
Chisholm: Yes. 
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Judge: All right. Let's - what we generally do is begin with Mr. Greenbank's comments 
and recommendations. 
Greenbank: May 1 proceed? 
Judge: You may. 
Greenbank: Thank you Judge. Your Honor, in going through the PSI I recognize there are a 
lot of letters that his supporters have submitted for the Court's consideration. 
Four of them testified here today. Counsel did notify me of the letters that you 
considered on the Bench. Provided them to me ifl wanted to review them. I 
assume they were in the same vein as the other letters. So -I had declined to 
review them anyway. I think it is important to note that he certainly has a fan 
club coming forth. I also find it interesting that they don't really know him. They 
know what he's told them. What he's informed them of. Military services for 
naught. He admits that much in his PSI. So these people don't really know who 
Mr. Chisholm is. Frankly I don't know who Mr. Chisholm is. But what I do 
know is that he shot a man in the back twice. And fled the scene. Wrecked the 
car. Traveled on foot for two to three miles before he was apprehended. That is 
not a self-defense act. That's an act of someone who was, again, trying to run 
away from a problem. And that is something that demands consequences in this 
case. I do find it noteworthy on page 7 at the very bottom. He indicates that 
alcohol and drugs weren't a factor. That's concerning. To act in this manner, in 
this way, and not be driven by booze or narcotics. 
So the State's recommendation in this case is a fair recommendation. Five fixed, 
five indeterminate, for a unified sentence of ten years. Now it is also noteworthy 
that it is an aggravated battery case. It carries the same punishment as attempted 
murder. Which in my eye it is the same thing. When you sh~ot somebody twice 
and you leave them, and if you are truly in fear, acting in self-defense, you 
wouldn't leave behind your girlfriend. And conduct yourself in this manner. So 
those are the factors to consider for the Court and ask for [inaudible] such 
sentence. 
Judge: Mr. Greenbank, I have another question. Mr. Taylor. The difficulty for the Court 
is trying to sift through everything that happened in this case. The police reports, 
the statements from the women that were present that evening. And reading this. 
And one thing I was unclear about, Mr. Chisholm had several weapons. Was 
there any weapon found that the victim had? 
Greenbank: No, Your Honor. 
Taylor: Not that I'm aware of. 
Judge: Okay. I just wanted to clarify that. Mr. Taylor, I would then hear all of your 
comments and recommendations. 
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Taylor: Thank you, Your Honor. Now Your Honor, I think Mr. Cook did say one thing 
on the stand that is particularly noteworthy. This case was tried in the newspaper 
long before we even had a contested hearing. The odds of us picking a jury that 
had no knowledge of this case was going to be slim. Now we all know how that 
goes. You bring them in and they say, oh yeah, you know, it's not going to affect 
my judgment, blah, blah, blah. Is that true or is it not? I don't know. But in the 
papers we heard everything about Mr. Chisholm being, from being an FBI, or a, 
excuse me, a Mafia hitman wanted by the FBI, being someone who steals 
motorcycles and stomps peoples' brains out, up to running from the mob in 
California, to living aJl over the country in different areas under different aliases. 
I think the PSI is pretty clear on Mr. Chisholm's life. He married in the '70s to 
someone whose father was wrapped up in the, apparently, the drug business in 
California. And that went badly. He was apparently brutally murdered for 
whatever reason. Nobody knows. And it doesn't have anything to do with what 
we're doing here. And Mr. Chisholm ran away from that. Leaving his family 
behind. Coming here to North Idaho. He did change his name. That' s never 
been in dispute. But we have heard everything and anything that can possibly be 
conceived as having been done wrong by somebody who has a name similar to his 
as being this man. He was all these different things because of the scenario that 
brings us to the Court today. And it has noth - none of those things have anything 
to do with why we're here. But yet, it was all in the paper. And everybody read 
about it. And everybody knew about it. So that's why I submitted all those letters 
ofreference to the Court. That's why I put all four of those people on the stand. 
Regardless of the charges and regardless of anything that he pled to, I think the 
Court and Mr. Chisholm has the right to have it known that none of that stuff 
about him was true. 
So what we're dealing with is an aggravated battery. It's not an attempted 
murder. He pled to aggravated battery. That is what he was charged with, that's 
the plea that he entered. A significant amount of time and effort was put into this 
case by my office. Between myself and the investigator and the expert that we 
hired, here is what I think happened that night. I think they all were drinking. 
Including my client. And I think that there was a fight going on down by the lake 
that Mr. Chisholm kind of interjected himself into. And he brought those two 
people up to the cabin. And Mr. Stanczak, who has never really participated in 
this case, was one of the belligerents. And he is significantly younger than my 
client. And he is significantly larger than my client. Mr. Stanczak is bigger than I 
am. And I'm a couple of inches taller than Mr. Chisholm. You put those two 
things together. Whether or not it was reasonable, or whether or not it was 
something that anybody else would have done, what happened was that they got 
face-to-face. They were having words. My client had a gun and it went off. And 
he wasn't shot in the back twice as he was walking away. He was shot in the 
torso and he was grazed in the arm. The State has tried to make it sound like 
Mr. Stanczyk was running off and my client gunned him down like in a James 
Bond movie or something. From everything that my ballistics expert has told me, 
they were probably closer than I am to the court reporter. And most likely the 




gun was fired at a downward angle and then fired it off kind of at a 45 degree 
angle that got him in the arm. 
Everything that I know about this case leads me to believe that that gun wasn't 
supposed to go off It just did. I think my client was afraid. It was a subjective 
fear. Not an objective fear. It was a subjective fear based upon his interactions 
with Mr. Stanczak. And this thing about his leaving his girlfriend behind, it is not 
like they were engaged, it is not like they were living together. This is someone 
that he had an informal relationship with. And yes, he did run. And he paid the 
price for it that night. Unless we forget that the Sheriff's deputies put the canine 
on him. And I don't want, know if the Court remembers his arm. He paid the 
price for running. And he knows. He has told me over and over again. And I 
have told him, if you don't run that night, this is a much different case. And he 
has acknowledged that to me repeatedly. 
As far as how he feels about this case, Mr. Chisholm regrets what he did. He 
regrets that Mr. Stanczak was injured. And he regrets his actions that night. And 
I think that's reflected in his LSI score of 16. I was really expecting to see a score 
somewhere in the mid 30s. I mean, based upon everything that has gone on in 
this case, everything that's been said, everything that's in the police reports. But I 
think if you look at the defendant's criminal record, I think we find out a little bit 
why. In the '70s there was a bunch of drug-related offenses. The last one, 
Alameda County, Oakland, California, 1974. Then there's a 26 year gap, the 
Bonner County failure to purchase a driver's license. Then there's a 15 year gap 
and we're here. So the last time this man was charged with anything other than 
not buying a driver's license, I wasn't even born yet. That was a long time ago. 
I'm pushing 40 now. So I think he's earned, just based on that alone, and the fact 
that there is a probation recommendation from the PSI examiner. And he does 
have an LSI score of 16. I think he's earned a little bit of credibility with the 
Court. 
Yeah, maybe he's said some things that aren't true. And maybe he is a draft 
dodger, maybe he's not. I don't know. And I don't care. That's not why I'm 
here. That's not why any ofus are here. We're here to bring things back into 
balance. How do we provide justice in this case? There's a significant amount of 
restitution it sounds like it is going to be gone after civilly. Mr. Stanczak is going 
to be trying to hold back the ocean with a rake and my client is in prison. He can 
have his money or Mr. Chisholm can go to prison. He's 66 years old. $25,000, 
$50,000. 
He's not 66. 
$25,000, $50,000. That's a lot of money to pay. So what we're asking the Court 
to do today is oppose local jail and give him an opportunity of probation. And 
Mr. Chisholm has agreed to gladly pay the restitution. If the State offers up a 
restitution amount, we will agree to whatever it is. Now, as far as whether or not 
he's going to be sued civilly, that's got nothing to do with me. So what we're 
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asking for is credit for time served. Which I think is about a week. I didn't do 
[inaudible] to check. Oh, excuse me, 60 days. 
Judge: I do believe Mr. - I'm not - we'll have to look that. Mr. Chisholm was in for 
awhile because he was doing a property bond and it took some time. 
Taylor: That's right. 
Judge: Time. So I' 11 take a look at that. 
Taylor: Getting credit for time served, local jail and probation. Thank you, Your Honor. 
Judge: Thank you. Mr. Chisholm, I want to hear from you certainly. I'm just kind of 
looking back here. So Mr. Chisholm would have been arrested on June 28. The 
evening this occurred. 
Taylor: Conect. 
Judge: Let me see when he bonded. Property bond. August. August 24th. So, that's 
three days in county [inaudible], 58 days. Correct? Mr. Chisholm? 
Chisholm: Yes. 
Judge: This will be your opportunity to make any statement, comments you want the 
Court to know. A statement on your own behalf. 
Greenbank: Your Honor, before we get to that. I do have one point I'd like to make. 
Judge: Okay. Go ahead. 
Greenbank: Okay. I heard reference to the defendant, or the victim rather, being shot in the 
front of his body. Not supported by the medical documentation. I'd hand up 
what's been marked as, or what hasn't been marked but was discovered to defense 
as Item No. 85. Showing that the entry wound was in the back scapula. 
Taylor: And I believe that's accurate, Your Honor. I never said front. 
Judge: Okay. 
Taylor: I said torso and I said downward angle. 
Judge: We'll just note that the medical report says a gunshot wound to the chest, close 
range. And it says posterior wound. And anterior wound. And it shows a wound 
to the - it looks like the upper back and then grazing [inaudible]. 
Greenbank: The bullet hit the scapula, traveled interior of the body and lodged in the pelvis. 
Judge: Oh, I see. I didn't see that part. Thank you. 
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Greenbank: Nothing further. 
Judge: Mr. Chisholm? 
Chisholm: Yes, Your Honor. 
Judge: This is your opportunity to make any statement that you want. 
Chisholm: Okay. I would like to address the shooting itself just briefly. There was a verbal 
argument several times with Mr. Stanczak. And I declined. And, you know, I 
tried to calm Mr. Stanczak down. And I got him a tent so he didn't have to drive 
drunk. And he ruined that. That was fine. I offered a room in my little cabin that 
he could stay in. And as he drank he got more aggressive and he started using his 
finger like this. I know how to take care of old guys like you. The girls went in 
to prepare the bedroom. That's when Mr. Stanczak got up and got right in my 
face. I told him, get out of here. That's enough. As he exited the front door, he 
turned around and pointed his finger at me like a gun again. I grabbed my gun 
and I went outside to get between him and the cab of his truck. I thought he had 
maybe a weapon in his truck. That's when Mr. Stanczak assaulted me. And there 




As I arose I'm huffing and puffing. And he came back at me and that's when I 
drew my gun and fired a couple of warning shots. I had no idea that I even struck 
Mr. Stanczak. And the alleged shot in the back, he was grazed once in the arm. 
And as he was lunging at me, one went here, traveled down his body and lodged 
in his pelvis. I did not intentionally shoot Mr. Stanczak. It was unfortunate. I did 
fire the weapon. And I did not shoot him in the back. I shot him accidentally up 
top and that's where the bullet traveled. 
I've been a member of this community for 25 years. I haven't had any serious 
charges against me except for failure to buy a driver's license or something. I've 
been a member of the community. I'm a homeowner in Elmira. I would ask that 
the Court consider that and I'm asking for a chance at probation so I can continue 
to be a member of the community. I have my own little business that I operate in 
the fall. And I work with meat processing. I worked for them for ten years 
straight. And our businesses work together. I went again and worked for them 
this fall. And I am sorry for what happened. I apologize to people of Bonner 
County, Boundary County, the Court, all my friends here. And I'm ashamed of 
my actions. But I would like a chance to prove that I can still be a protective 
member of this community. 
Thank you. Mr. - you can be seated. Mr. Taylor, any legal, factual or ethical 
reason not to impose a sentence? 
No, Your Honor. 
It is a very, very unusual situation. When a judge sentences [inaudible] we look 
at aggravating factors, we look at mitigating factors. We specifically can - there 
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are four goals in sentencing: protecting society, to deter you and to deter other 
people from committing similar crimes, rehabilitation, and then there's 
retribution. There's punishment. I think it's important to try to set the record 
straight in this case. First of all, the Court, the articles that came out in the 
newspaper were a long time ago. And certainly this Court is not relying on 
anything that would have been in the newspaper. I did not become involved in 
this case until recently. The case starts off in Magistrate Court and the Magistrate 
Judge has issued search warrants and did hearings and set bond and did those 
things. So this Court knew actually very little about the case. And so I - and I try 
to sort through what happened in this case. 
And really, I don't know that the word is a Jekyll and Hyde, but it's -
Mr. Chisholm, in some ways you are two different people. I note that everyone 
that came into this courtroom is in support of you. And you, since you've lived in 
this county, you have given a lot to the community. I mean, person after person 
talks about the great job you did in improving this campground. And that you are 
a gracious host and you give of your time and people like you. It is concerning to 
the Court that you, though, that people have to realize too, though, that your 
whole life was built on a lie. You are not 66. You were born in 1952. You used 
a number of different aliases. You had - it's not fair to say that you were nmning 
from a drug murder. That, you know, there may have been a murder. But you 
have two children. One that you abandoned as an infant and never paid, from the 
Court. And the child has no relationship with you. Never supported that child. 
Your son thought you were dead and just recently discovered after 30 years that 
his father was actually alive. You didn't support either of your children. Three 
marriages. You were declared dead by your family. So those are the kinds of 
things I'm trying to balance. It is hard for the Court to understand. But you did 
come here and make a better life. And start giving back to the community. It is 
concerning that I've read letters about your great military service and PTSD and -
because none of that is true. You have to, you know, you kind of built this 
fantasy life that you have. That you were a Vietnam vet and you're not a Vietnam 
vet. [inaudible] I get the person is a member of the military service. I take very 
seriously somebody claiming that they were when they're not. Those kinds of 
things. 
So then, that, the problem is you don't tell the truth. So like it is hard for me to 
give much truth to what you say happened that night. And the women that were 
there, this - what I can get from their police reports is from your girlfriend and the 
girlfriend of Mr. - the victim, Mr. Stanczak, is that you were all there. You were 
all drinking. You were - it doesn't appear that you drink very often, at least 
everyone has said they don't see you drink. You admit that you had very serious 
drug issues and were - as a young man. And very involved. And you have a 
number of charges for drugs and alcohol when you were a young man. So 
perhaps that's part of the thing, that you got highly intoxicated. The argument, 
the only, the women talk about the argument might have been jealousy about the 
women. In reading what they had to say. But the victim didn't have a gun. And 
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you shot him twice and the shot, the wound is to the back. Let's be clear about 
that. It's not to the front. And then, as Mr. Taylor said, if you are in an 
altercation and are fearful and you shoot someone, you don't hop in your pickup 
truck with two loaded weapons and take off. Wreck your truck. Go two miles out 
in the woods, hide, and when the police were looking for you. I'm glad there was 
a dog. Because from their perspective in reading the reports, you, they thought 
you were in a shooting stance. You had the weapons next to you fully loaded. 
There was a bullet in the firing position. And that, and you, the drug, the dog 
attacked you. But I'm afraid you could have shot an officer or an officer could 
have shot you. That's not what we're, what I'm judging. But that's what the 
facts show the Court. So, all this is very concerning. 
And that's what I'm trying to balance. In this case this Court cannot say that it is 
all right to shoot a person and to flee and to be tracked by the police and that you 
get probation. That doesn't deter you or anyone else from shooting a person. 
That - you have to take responsibility. Mr., for all you know Mr. Stanczak was 
dead. Because you shot him and ran. And luckily medical got there and he did 
not die. Or you would be charged with murder. So there have to be 
consequences. And that's what this Court has to balance. That's my job. 
I think the State's recommending five years fixed, five years indeterminate. I 
think given your age, lack of record for the, criminal record, for the last number of 
years, risks to the community, that that's too harsh of a sentence. So what I'm 
going to do instead is a unified ten year sentence. Two years fixed, eight years 
indeterminate. A crime like this cannot, in this Court's view, I cannot impose 
probation and I cannot impose [inaudible]. So that's what I'm going to do. We'll 
leave the restitution issue open as Mr. Greenbank asked, for 60 days. That's what 
I typically do in my judgments. But it appears that that will be, the issue will be 
dealt with civilly. I'm going to impose a fine of $1,000. Court costs are $245.50 
on an aggravated battery. And $500 to reimburse some of the costs to the county 
for your attorney. TU give you credit for, I believe I said 58 days served. I'm 
required to impose $100 for the DNA sample. It's required in every case. The 
Court will prepare the judgment. It will just take a couple of moments and we' 11 
be in recess. 
[Recording ends] 
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JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Wes S. Larsen, ISB #9134 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
TELEPHONE: (208) 667-0683 
FACSIMILE: (208) 664~ 1684 
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak 
IN THE DTSTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK~ .TR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wffe; and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW Defendant Joseph Stancz.ak, by and through his attorney ofrecord, Wes 
S. Larsen. of the firm Jam.es, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., and moves this Court to strike portions of 
the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and the Declaration of 
Benjamin C. Ritchie filed in support therewith, including Exhibit E of said Declaration in its 
entirety, pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 408 of the Idaho 
Rules of Evidence. 
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant Stanczak, s 
Motion to Strike filed concurrently herewith. 
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Oral argument is requested, 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2016. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Stanczak 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .1.,.j_ day of October 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following persons in the following manner: 
James L. Martin 
Tyler J. Anderson 
Benjamin C. Ritchie 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS~ 
CHARTERED 
l 01 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 




Attorneys for Plaimf{f Farm Bureau 
Michael T. Howard 
WINSTON & CASHATT 
250 Northwest Blvd.i Ste. 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Fax: (208) 765-2121 
mth@\vinstoncashatt.com 
Attorney.for Defendants Cook 
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IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, .JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
PAGE 04/10 
COMES NOW Defendant Joseph Stanczak, by and through hi.s attorney of record, Wes 
S. Larsen of James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., and submits this Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike. 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 20; 2016, Plaintiff Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho 
(hereinafter '"Farm Bureau") filed a motion for summary judgment, a memorandum in support 
thereof, and declarations of Barbara E. Mayne, Benjamin C. Ritchie~ and Steven Johnson in 
support thereo'f. The Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchi.e included as Exhibit Ea demand Jetter 
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sent by the undersigned counsel for Defendant Stanc:r..ak to Farm Bureau on February 1, 2016, 
prior to initiation of this litigation and Stanczak's underlying personal injury lawsuit. Ritchie 
Deel., Ex. E. The phrase "FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY" is written in bold lettering 
in the upper-half of the first page of the demand letter. Id Farm Bureau's memorandum in 
support of its motion. for summary judgment makes various references to the demand letter and 
statements m.ade in compromise negotiations therein in an effort to show why Stanczak's claims 
are not covered under Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook' s insurance policy v.-ith Farm Bureau. 
Plaintiffs submission of Defendant Stan.czak's demand letter as evidence in support of its 
motion for summary judgment is Wln.ecessary and violates Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 and 
Idaho Supreme Court case law :regarding offers to compromise, and this Court should therefore 
strike and disregard such evjdence. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau has submitted Defendant Stanczak's prior demand letter as 
evidence in. support of its m.otion for swnmary judgment, and discusses various "statements 
made in compromise negotiations'' in an attempt to prove the invalidity of Mr. Stan.c.7.:ak's claims 
unde:r: the Cooks' Fann Bureau insurance policy. This directly violates Idaho Rule of Evidence 
408 and Idaho case law. As such, all evidence regarding Stanczak's demand letter must be 
disregarded and omitted under IRCP 12(f). 
1. Legal Standard for Motion to Strike 
Either upon the Court's own initiative, or upon the moti.on of a party, "the Court may 
strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 
scandalous matter.'' IRCP 12(f). Thus, this Court has the authority and discretion to strike matter 
l'vfEMORANDUM TN SUPPOtn OF DEFENDANT STANCZAK1S MOTTON TO STRIKE- 2 
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presented in support of Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment if such evidence violates the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence and Idaho court precedent. 
2. Farm Bureau.'s Violations of Evidence Rule 408 ("Compromises and Offers to 
Compromise") and Idaho Supreme Court Precedent 
The Court should strike all references to and inclusion of Defendant Stanczak's demand 
letter from Farm Bureau's memorandum. and supporting declarati.ons because such evidence 
blatantly violates Idaho Rule of Evidence 408, which states: 
Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting, 
offedng, or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising Ol" 
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the 
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or. statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of 
any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course 
of compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if the evidence i.s 
offered for another pur.pose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal 
investigation or. prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass medi.atioo.. 
Idaho R. Evi.d. 408 (l 990) (emphasis added). 
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed application of ER 408 in depth in Hatfield v. Max 
Rouse & Sons Nw., 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980): 
The modern approach is to exclude All [sic] statements made in the course of 
settlement negotiations. This is the position adopted by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
"Rule 408 Compromise and Offers to Compromise "Evidence of (1) 
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering 
or promising to accept; a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempti.ng to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity 
or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim 
or its amoW1t. Evi.dence of conduct or statements made in com.promise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the 
exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is 
presented in the course of corn.promise negotiations. T.hls rule also does not 
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require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as 
proving a bias or prejudice of a witness. negativing a contention of undue 
delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a crirninal investigation or 
prosecution." Federal Rules of Evidence 408. 
This position has also been widely recommended by the commentators. E. g., 
Cleary (ed.), McConnick on Evidence, s 274~ p. 664 (2d ed. 1972); McConnJ.ck, 
Evidences 76 (1954); Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein1s Evidence, P 408(02), pp. 
408-14 to 408-19 (1979); 2 Louisell and Mue.ller, Federal Evidence, s 170, pp. 271-
3 (1978); Bell~ Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer, 78-9 (2d ed. 1972). 
Because of its encouragement of settlement negotiations, the Feder.al Rule's blanket 
prohibition is the best position on the question., and the one we adopt. 
PAGE 07/10 
Hatjieldv. Max Rouse & Sons Nw . ., 100 Idaho 840,846,606 P.2d 944; 950 (1980) (overruled on 
other grounds). In light of the Idaho Supreme Court's adoption of the federal standard, evidence 
of statements made in compromise negotiations is not adinissible. 
Yet Plaintiff attempts to use such state1nents in. support of its motion for summary 
judgment. In addition to including the entire demand Jetter as an exhibit to Mr. Ritchie's 
declaration, Plaintiff also refers to various statements made in the demand Jetter throughout 
Plaintiffs support memorandum. Examples include: 
• "On February 1, 2016, Stanczak, through his counsel, made a demand on Farm 
Bureau for damages for Stanczak under the Policy arising out of the June 28, 2015, 
shooting. Ritchie Deel. ,r 7; Ex. E." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 10. 
• "Stanczak memorialized his claim against the Cooks and Fann Bureau in 
Stanczak's counsePs demand letter of February l, 2016, which basically stated that 
Chisholm shot Stanczak and fled the scene. Stanczak alleged that Chisholm was 
either the Cooks' agent or employee. Based upon the information from the Cooks 
and the February 1, 2016, demand letter, there is no coverage for Stanczak's claim 
against the Cooks under the Policy." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. l. 6. 
• "Stanczak did not send his de:m.and letter to Farm Bureau and the Cooks W.ltiJ 
February 1, 2016. By the time Stanczak sent his demand letter to Fann Bureau and 
tbe Cooks, there could. be no coverage under the Policy under Exclusion Number 
14, as the claim arose out of a violation of criminal law." Plaintiff's Memorandum, 
p. 27. 
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• ··stan.cza.k argued in his demand letter th.at the operatiou of the campground was a 
business activity of the Cooks because they invited or licensed campers to come 
onto the Bloom Lake Property for a voluntary donatioo .. Stanczak has also 
submitted that Chisholm was the Cooks1 employee, even though he was not paid a 
wage or salary) because he was paid to do work on the Bloom Lake Property by 
virtue of the fact that the Cooks allowed him to reside in the cabin on the Bloom 
Lake Property without paying rent." Plaintiff's Memorandum, p. 27. 
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The evidence speaks for itself, and Plaintiff clearly attempts to use these various "'statements 
made in compromise negotiations" in order to "prove . .. invalidity of' Mr. Stanczak's claims 
asserted in his personal injury Jawsuit. Idaho R. Evid. 408. This is a clear violation of Eviden.ce 
Rule 408 and the Haffield court's ruling. Id.; Hatfield, 100 Idaho at 846, 606 P .2d at 950; see 
also Saim Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479,495,224 P.3d 
1068, 1084 (2009) ( .. The Rule should be given a broad~ not narrow, interpretation in order to 
encourage settlement negotiations.;'). 
Fann Bureau may try to argue that the demand letter is admissible as evidence in this 
declaratory action case because it is necessary to show why Mr. Stanczak's claims are not 
covered tmder the Cooks' insurance policy. However, the demand letter and all statements 
therein1 which were made as part of an ER 408~protected communication ••promising to accept .. 
. a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity or amount," are not at issue in Fann Bureau's declaratory action, 
and the demand letter was not included as an. exhibit to Fann, Bureau's Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment (and should not have been). 'What is at issue in this declaratory action is 
Mr. Stanczak's personal injury lawsuit against Mr. and Mrs. Cook, for which the Cooks have 
sought indemni.fication from Fann Bureau. 
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Mr. Stfil1c7.ak's lawsuit is not based on his demand letter. It is based on the claims 
asserted in his First Amended Complaint for Damages~ 1 which makes no reference whatsoever to 
the demand letter. The claims in Stanczak's First Amended Complaint should therefore be the 
sole basis of any motion for summary judgment filed by Fann Bureau in this declaratory action 
regarding insurance coverage and indemnification. It is jmproper to attempt to sway the Court 
with outside evidence prohibited by the Rules of Evidence. Because Plaintiff Far.m Bureau has 
attempted to do so, this Court should strike such evidence under IRCP 12(.f). 
3. Attorney Fees 
In the event the Court grants Defendant Stanczak' s Motion to Strike, Defendant Stanczak 
also moves for an award of attorney fees under J.C. § 12-121 and sanctions for frivolous conduct 
under J.C. § 12-123. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Stanczak respectfully requests that the Court 
strike the inclusion of and aU references to Defendant Stanczak's demand letter from Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting declarations. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 2016. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
Wes S. Larsen 
Attorney for Defendant ,Toseph Stanczak. 
1 Stancz.ak's Fii:st Amended Complaint for Damages ii:; provided as Exhibit F to Mr. Ritchie's Declaration. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EDGAR Wil,KINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, . 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
DEFENDANT STANCZAK'S 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF FARM BUREAU 
MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant Joseph Stanczak, by and through his attorney of record, Wes S. Larsen of the 
firm James, Vernon and Weeks, P.A., hereby objects to Plaintiff Fann. Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment, and joins in and incorporates Defendants 
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook's arguments in opposition to Plaintiff Farm 
Bureau's Motion. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2016. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS,P.A. 
Wes S. Larse~ ISB No. 9134 
Attorney for Defendant Joseph Stanczak. 
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MICHAEL T. HOWARD, ISB No. 6128 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, 
a Professional Service Corporation 
250 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-2103 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
mth@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Cook 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV 2016-0590 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR., and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants. 
EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
FARM BUREAU'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 










Insured Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook request that the court deny Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company's (Farm Bureau's) motion for summary judgment because the claims made 
against them in the underlying litigation are based on negligence and their insurance company is 
required to defend and indemnify them for those claims. In the underlying litigation, the Stanczaks 
sued the Cooks because Michael Chisholm, who was residing in a cabin on the Cooks' premises, shot 
Mr. Stanczak with a gun after the Stanczaks accepted Mr. Chisholm's invitation to join him in the 
EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK'S MEMORANDUM IN 
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cabin. Farm Bureau's lengthy brief relating to whether Joseph Stanczak is an "insured" under the 
policy, or whether Mr. Chisholm acted intentionally, or criminally, is irrelevant to the Cooks' right to 
coverage for allegations of negligent supervision and premises liability. Under these theories, it is 
the Cooks' conduct that must be analyzed, and it is undisputed they had no intent to shoot or injure 
Mr. Stanczak, and any breach of their duty to keep their premises safe or supervise Mr. Chisholm 
arose out of "accidental" conduct constituting an occurrence which triggers coverage. 



















The Cooks own rural real property in Bonner County, Idaho; there is a lake on the property, 
and a small cabin. The Cooks have allowed people to camp on the property, at no charge, since the 
1950s. One of the campers, Mr. Chisholm, asked if he could reside in the cabin, in tum for doing 
some chores on the property for them; they agreed. As Farm Bureau points out, the Cooks 
gratuitously allowed camping on their property; they did not charge any fees, nor did they realize any 
income from this permissive use. Similarly, no money changed hands as a result of Mr. Chisholm's 
residence in the cabin. 
An incident occurred on the Cooks' property when Joseph Stanczak was camping on the 
property, and accepted Mr. Chisholm's invitation to join him in the Cooks' cabin. Some type of 
altercation occurred, and Mr. Chisholm shot Mr. Stanczak. 
Mr. Stanczak sued the Cooks, claiming as a First Cause of Action "Premises Liability": 
3.2.2 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook ... as owners and/or possessors of 
land had a duty to their invitees, social guests, and licensees including 
plaintiffs, to inspect and keep the premises reasonably safe and warn of 
known dangers. 
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3.2.3 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook ... failed to exercise ordinary and 
reasonable care to keep the premises reasonably safe from and to warn 
plaintiff of Defendant Chisholm's reasonably foreseeable conduct. 
3.2.4 Defendants Ed W. Cook, Laurie Cook ... breached this duty by failing to 
warn and protect plaintiff from a firearm being discharged by 
Defendant Chisholm while intoxicated on the Defendants' property. 
(Complaint for Damages)1 
For the Second Cause of Action against the Cooks, "Negligent Supervision," the plaintiff 
alleged: 
3.2.7 [Cooks] breached a common law duty of reasonable care by failing to 
properly supervise their agent/employee, Defendant Michael Jesse 
Chisholm, to prevent injury to campground invitees and licensees on 
their property, including the plaintiff. 
3.2.8 [Cooks] breached the common law duty of reasonable care by failing to 
properly supervise Defendant Chisholm to prevent him from becoming 
intoxicated and discharging firearms, which could result in injury to 
campground invitees and licensees, including the plaintiff. 
3.2.9 [Cooks] breached the common law duty of care by failing to protect 
:from or warn plaintiff of dangers posed by Defendant Chisholm 
becoming intoxicated and discharging firearms.2 
(Complaint for Damages) The remaining claims were solely against Mr. Chisholm. 
The Cooks had purchased a liability policy from Farm Bureau to protect them in relation to 
the relevant premises. The "Country Squire" policy promised in relevant part: 
1 The plaintiffs Amended Complaint did not change this cause of action against the Cooks. 
2 The Amended Complaint changed the allegation that Mr. Chisholm was an employee/agent to simply claiming he was 
an agent. 
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We will provide the insurance described in this policy and the declaration if 
you have paid the premium ... 
SECTION II LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE Fl BODILY INJURY LIABILITY ... 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this coverage 
applies, we will: 
1. 
2. 
Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is 
legally liable ... ; and 
Provide a defense at our expense ... 
(Policy, p. 22, Ex. A to Amended Complaint) 
The relevant definitions portion of the policy provides that occurrence means "an 
accident ... which results in unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period." 
(Policy, p. 3, Ex. A to Amended Complaint) "Accident" is not defined. So long as no exclusion 
exists which limits the coverage provided, Farm Bureau is required to defend and indemnify its 
insureds under this broad scope coverage. 
3. Law. 
The Cooks are entitled to the defense and indemnification which their insured promised them. 
They were unconnected to the shooting, and are being sued for their own allegedly negligent conduct 
in allowing Mr. Chisholm to reside in the cabin, failing to supervise him, and creating Mr. Stanczak's 
risk of harm on their premises. Irrespective of the underlying allegations regarding the shooting, it is 
undisputed that the Cooks had insurance for claims against them of premises liability and negligence, 
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It is under these principles that the court must analyze the policy to determine whether a duty 
to defend and indemnify exists as a matter of law; because there exists a "potential" for the Cooks' 
liability when the Complaint is read broadly, Farm Bureau's motion must be denied. 
3.2 The conduct of the insureds, the Cooks, is what must be analyzed to determine 
whether an "occurrence" existed, and that alleged conduct triggers coverage for 
claims of premises liability and negligent supervision. 
The Cooks do not assert that Mr. Stanczak is an insured, nor need he be so designated for 
liability coverage under the Farm Bureau policy. The Farm Bureau policy insured the Cooks for the 
claims made against them. As Farm Bureau notes, coverage exists if "a claim is made or a suit is 
brought against the Insured" for bodily injury caused by "an occurrence." There is no dispute the 
Cooks are insured and have been sued for bodily injury of Mr. Stanczak, which occurred on their 
insured premises. 
And contrary to Farm Bureau's argument, the Cooks' alleged conduct constitutes an 
"occurrence" triggering Farm Bureau's duty to defend and indemnify. To determine an "accident" or 
"occurrence" under an insuring agreement, when the policy does not define these terms, courts 
analyze what is "expected" or "intended" from the viewpoint of the insured. See, North Pacific Ins. 
Co. v. Mai, 130 Idaho 251, 253-54, 939 P.2d 570 (1997); City of Boise v. Planet Ins. Co., 126 Idaho 
51, 57-58, 878 P.2d 750 (1994).3 In this instance, there is no allegation that Mr. Chisholm's conduct 
was expected or intended by the Cooks, when analyzed from the Cooks' standpoint. It is irrelevant 
3 To the extent the policy does not expressly provide that an "occurrence" or "accident" must be viewed from the 
24 insured's perspective, it merely creates an ambiguity which must be read to favor coverage. See, Brumley v. Lee, 963 
P.2d 1224, 1233 (Kan. 1998). 
25 
26 
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whether Mr. Chisholm intended either the act, or the injury resulting from the act, because it is clear 
the Cooks intended neither the act or the injury. 
While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, and the shooting, that is not the 
"occurrence" being alleged against the Cooks. Instead, it is the Cooks' conduct in allowing 
Mr. Chisholm to reside at the cabin that underscores their alleged liability; such liability is based on 
claims that the Cooks knew or failed to discern that an unsafe condition existed on their premises, 
potentially by either knowing of or failing to investigate the presence of intoxicants or weapons; 
knowing of or failing to determine Mr. Chisholm's background or condition; failed to supervise his 
conduct; and without warning of or eliminating the presence of potential risk he posed. In Idaho, a 
premises liability claim exists if a landowner fails to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition, 
or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. Boswell v. Steele, 158 Idaho 554, 562, 348 P.3d 497 
(2915) (homeowner sued for presence of a dangerous animal that attacked). Questions of fact exist 
on issues of premises liability based on the property owner's knowledge of the dangerous propensities 
allowed on the premises, and whether the property owner minimized such risks and/or warned of 
them. Id. Negligent supervision of others takes various forms, but all involve a common law duty 
"that one who takes charge of a third person who he knows or should know to be likely to cause 
bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third 
person to prevent him from doing such harm." Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 223-227, 723 P.2d 
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755 (1986). Such issues generally create issues of fact, like premises liability, relating to motive, 
knowledge, and reasonable care. Id. 4 
Thus, both of these theories are based on allegations of negligent conduct; neither theory 
encompasses any claim of intentional conduct by the Cooks which would preclude the existence of an 
"occurrence" under the Farm Bureau policy.5 Yet, Farm Bureau's argument for lack of its obligation 
to defend or indemnify is that the shooting was not "unexpected" and was "intentional," and thus not 



















conduct, not the Cooks, or claims made against the Cooks, and the numerous cases cited by Farm 
Bureau are primarily those analyzing the intentional assaultive behavior of the insured. Whether 
courts refuse to impose a duty on an insured when an insured criminally assaults or shoots someone, 
is irrelevant to determine whether the policy covers the Cooks for the conduct alleged in the 
Complaint; as a result, those authorities fail to provide any guidance to the issues here. 
Farm Bureau only briefly analyzes the actual issue in this matter - - whether the Cooks are 
entitled to coverage based on the allegations made against them, for their conduct, separate and apart 
from Mr. Chisholm's; it cites two Idaho cases to assert that the only behavior to be analyzed is 
Mr. Chisholm's. However, these cases do not establish as a matter of law that there can be no 
coverage for the Cooks under the insuring agreement for an "occurrence" based on the broad reading 
of all potential claims by the Stanczaks. 
4 
While the Stanczaks' initial complaint alleged Mr. Chisholm was an agent or employee of the Cooks, it was amended to 
eliminate the "employment" context, and it is this amended complaint which governs the analysis of the issues here; 
however, the general concept is the same relative to the existence of an "occurrence." 
5 While Farm Bureau asserts that Mr. Stanczak may have difficulty proving these claims, it does not base its motion for 
summary judgment on any claim that issues of fact do not exist on the Cooks' liability for these claims of negligence. 
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First, in State Fann Fire & Casualty Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997), the 
intentional tortfeasor was a minor resident of the home which was the insured premises, and thus an 
"insured" himself; a minor son living in a home in which a daycare was operated sexually abused one 
of the children and his conduct constituted intentional conduct of the insured for the purposes of an 
"occurrence," irrelevant to the issue here. 
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992), the court analyzed 
whether the sexual assault by the ex-husband of the insured at an in-home daycare triggered 
coverage, but did so based on "causation" of the bodily injury in Wilcox, and not whether the conduct 
was intentional. Causation is usually a question of fact, and in this instance, when the underlying 
action has been consolidated, a finding of no causation would be a determination of both cases. More 
specifically, because Stanczak's claims against the Cooks include the element of causation, Stanczak 
necessarily asserts that his bodily injury was caused by the Cook's conduct. Because of this, if the 
court were to rule that the Cook's conduct didn't cause bodily injury for the purposes of constituting 
an "occurrence," the same ruling would require the Court to dismiss Stanczak's underlying claims 
against the Cooks for failure to prove an essential element of his claims. 
Moreover, there were no claims of premises liability in the Wilcox case, which would have 
differing elements of causation. These cases should be limited to their facts of the type of claims 
made, the identity of the underlying intentional tortfeasors. 
That these concepts are inapplicable here is underscored by the out-of-state cases also cited by 
the Farm Bureau in support of its argument that the insured's conduct cannot be analyzed 
independently of the underlying intentional act. (See, Farm Bureau Memorandum, p. 41, fn. 5) For 
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example, in Allstate v. J.J.M. , 657 N.W.2d 181 (Mich. App. 2003), the court refused to find an 
"accident" when the insured intentionally committed a crime by giving alcohol to a minor at the 
insured's home, and the minor committed an intentional sexual assault; the insured was an active 
participant and the insured's intentional conduct led to the intentional assault. No such active 
intentional criminal conduct is alleged against the Cooks. The remaining cases are similarly 




















negligence in giving juvenile child gun, who then murdered neighbor; court noted no duty to defend 
or indemnify when "acts of the insured were intentional"); Allstate v. Hill, 2005 WL 1959560 (Mich. 
App. 2005) (no "accident" when insured was convicted of assault and battery for her role in an attack 
at her home). 
Contrary to these authorities, the circumstances here are based on claims of negligent 
behavior of the Cooks who did not actively participate in the intentional conduct, did not 
intentionally create the situation, and are not being sued based on any of their intentional conduct. 
Courts faced with such similar circumstances find that an "occurrence" has been sufficiently pled to 
trigger a potential for coverage and corresponding duty to defend. For example, in Nationwide 
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir. 1998), a property owner's insurer argued that 
there could be no "occurrence," and thus no duty to defend or indemnify, when a painter hired by the 
property owner murdered a tenant at the building; the pled claims against the property owner 
included premises liability and negligent hiring. The Court stated: 
Although [the tenant's] death was the direct result of a third party's intentional 
conduct, the complaint alleges that the insured's own negligence also played a 
significant part in her death ... the fact that the event causing [bodily injury or damage 
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to property] may be traceable to an intentional act does not preclude the occurrence 
from being an accident. 
140 F.3d at 225. The court noted that from the insured's standpoint, the assault and death was 
unexpected. 
Moreover, the Pipher court noted that the insurance company could have easily drafted a 
provision to preclude coverage for an occurrence that happens as a result of the intentional conduct of 
"any person," or a "third person," and its failure to do so at best creates an ambiguity read against 
the insurer. 140 F.3d at 227. See also, Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dl"y. Inc., 336 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 
2003) (insured's negligent hiring and retaining of former employee who murdered customer was a 
qualifying "occurrence" under CGL policy; court found that insured's conduct and actions must be 
evaluated, not the perpetrator of the intentional act); Safeco Ins. Co. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 
2009) (stabbing of a neighbor by an insured's son was an "occurrence" for purposes of negligence 
claim against insureds; whether underlying act was intentional must be determined from perspective 
of insureds who are sued for negligent supervision). 
Ultimately, when properly analyzed under the rules of construction of an insurance policy 
favoring coverage: 
The fact that an accident is caused by or traceable to the act of a person other than the 
insured does not prevent the occurrence from being an "accident." When the injury is 
not a result of the misconduct or the participation of the [insured] party, it is, as to 
him, accidental although intentionally inflicted by the other party. 
Brumley v. Lee, 963 P.2d 1224, 1232 (Kan. 1998) [citing 10 Couch on Insurance 2d §41 :14 (1982)]. 
When viewed from the standpoint of the insured, assaults committed by third persons are 
unexpected events constituting accidents and occurrences under insurance policies. See, COUCH 
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ON INSURANCE, §127:21 (32rd Ed.)(" ... where the insured is not the assailant, but is instead liable 
based on ... negligent supervision or some other negligence theory, the assault may constitute an 
accident or occurrence, at least from the standpoint of the insured."); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 
898 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D. Ariz. 2012) (medical clinic's CGL "occurrence" policy triggered for sexual 
assault by physician); Morris v. Coker, 923 F. Supp. 2d 863 (W.D. La. 2013) (employer's insurer 
obligated to cover claim by consultant punched by employee). 
The better reason resulted in interpreting an "occurrence" in instances in which there are 
clearly negligent claims pled against the insured to include premises liability and negligent 
supervision is that a duty to defend and/or indemnify exists. The insurer must more clearly and 
unambiguously define "occurrence" if it intends to exclude the intentional acts of third parties. Here, 
the claim against the Cooks is based on negligent, i.e. accidental conduct, which Farm Bureau agreed 
to insure. 
3.3 There are also no applicable exclusions to avoid Farm Bureau's duty to defend or 
indemnify. 
Farm Bureau, in addition to asserting that there was no coverage triggered because there was 
no "occurrence," also argues that there is no duty to defend or indemnify under the policy based on 
applicable exclusions.6 Terms in an insurance policy are given a broad meaning in cases involving 
the extension of liability coverage, and are construed narrowly in those cases involving an exclusion 
from coverage. Farm Bw:eau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Schrock, 150 Idaho 817, 826, 252 P.3d 98 
23 6 While Fann Bureau argues that the exclusions precluded coverage before the Stanczak complaint was filed, because 
Mr. Chisholm had already pled to a criminal charge, the timing of the criminal plea and the filing is irrelevant, because 
24 Mr. Chisholm is not the insured, and the issues will not be separately addressed herein. Similarly, because the Cooks did 
not plead to any criminal conduct, the existence of Mr. Chisholm's "Alford plea" is irrelevant. 
25 
26 
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(2011). Neither the intentional act nor criminal conduct exclusions, when properly construed, operate 
to avoid Farm Bureau's duty to defend and indemnify. 
(a) The alleged conduct of the Cooks was neither criminal nor intentional and 
is not excluded from coverage under the policy. 
Farm Bureau misstates the "criminal conduct" and "intentional acts" exclusions in its policy. 
The policy provides that there is no coverage under Section II of the policy (the bodily injury liability 
coverage at issue): 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law .. .if committed by any insured. 
Amended Complaint. Ex. A. p. 25 (Emphasis added) 
Chisolm is not an insured, and there is no allegation that the Cooks committed a violation of criminal 
law. Had the exclusion been intended to include third party conduct, it would have ended at the 
"arising out of' language. The criminal conduct of Mr. Chisholm is irrelevant and the CGL coverage 
for allegations of the negligence of the Cooks is not excluded. 
The same is true of the "intentional acts exclusion". The policy excludes only bodily injury 
"intentionally caused by any insured." Amended Complaint, Ex. A. p. 24. Again, Chisolm is not an 
insured and there is no allegation the Cooks intentionally caused the Stanczaks bodily injury. 
All of the cases cited by Farm Bureau to assert the exclusion applies are ones in which the 
insured committed intentional criminal conduct, and are inapplicable to this analysis. In fact, the 
way in which these exclusions are phrased underscores the intent of the policy to cover those events 
in which intentional or criminal conduct may exist, but are not alleged to have been committed by the 
insured. But in any event, the exclusions do not preclude coverage. 
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(b) The Cooks were also not engaged in a "business pursuit" which excludes 
coverage. 
Farm Bureau notes that the Stanczak complaint alleges that the Cooks operated the 
campground "for profit," but in its memorandum, admits the Cooks did not charge fees for its use; 
Farm Bureau also admits the Cooks did not financially compensate Mr. Chisholm. The policy has a 
definition of "business": 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity, 
engaged in for compensation ... 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A, p. 1 (Emphasis added) 
It is undisputed the Cooks did not engage in the campground "for compensation." And while 
Farm Bureau ignores the existence of this definition, the only authority it cites recognizes that a 
"business pursuit" must be "commercial in nature" and in furtherance of a business or livelihood. 
(See, Farm Bureau Memorandum, p. 28) While Farm Bureau concludes that the voluntary donation 
for upkeep converts this into a commercial enterprise, when the exclusion is narrowly construed, the 
permissive use of property for recreational activity cannot construed as a matter of law to be a 
"business." 
4. Conclusion. 
For the foregoing reasons, Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 2016. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR TI-TE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
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vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and 
JOSEPH STANCZ~ 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2016-0590 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho ("Fann Bureau") 
brought this action for declaratory relief against Edgar and Laurie Cook (the "Cooks") to ask the 
Court to declare whether an intentional shooting is covered under the Cooks' in~unmce policy 
with Fann Bureau (the "Policf'). On June 28, 2015, Michael Chisholm shot Joseph Stanczak. 
("Stanc:.r..ak") on real property owned by the Cooks. Stanczak made a clajm for his damages 
against the Cooks and Farm Bureau. In fact, Stanczak sent a demand letter directly to Farm 
Bureau on February 1, 2016 (''February 1st Demand Letter). Fann Bureau responded to 
Stancza.k's demand and denied coverage under the Policy for the allegations contained in the 
February 1st Demand Letter. Stancz.ak later filed suit against the Cooks on May 12, 2016 and 
then filed an amended complaint against the Cooks on June 7, 2016. The Cooks tendered the 
defense of the lawsuit to Farm Bureau. which Farm Bureau subsequently denied finding that 
there was no duty to defend that lawsuit under the tenns of the Policy. 
Shortly thereafter, Farm Bureau filed this declaratory judgment action against the 
Cooks. Farm Bureau also named Stanczak in this action brought under Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 57(b) and Idaho Code § 10-1211 because Stanczak was a party who had claimed .a 
direct interest in the Farm Bureau Policy. On October 20, 2016, Fann Bureau moved for 
summary judgment in this action and included a copy of the February 1st Demand Letter as an 
exhibit. 
On October 21. 2016, Stanczak. moved to strike the inclusion of and all references 
to the February 1st Demand Letter, arguing that the same is inadmissible under Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 408, which states: 
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Evidence of (I) fumishing, offeringt or promising to furnish, or (2) 
accepting, offering, or promising to accept, a valuable 
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a 
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible lo prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the 
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made 
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule 
does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise 
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of 
compromise negotiations. This rule does not require exclusion if 
the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negatjving a contention of undue delay, or 
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or 
prosecution. Compromise negotiations encompass mediation. 
14] 004/007 
(emphasis added). Stanczak argues that Farm Bureau's submission of the February 1st Demand 
Letter to the Court constitutes a violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 408, and the letter and all 
references to the content of the letter should be struck from Farm Bureau's summary judgment 
filings. Stanczak also argues lhat this lawsuit is not based on the February 1st Demand Letter 
and the only thing at issue in this declaratory judgment action is "Mr. Stanczak's personal injury 
lawsuit against Mr. and Mrs. Cook ... '' as alleged in the underlying complaint filed by Stanczak 
against the Cooks. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Stanczak's motion is misplaced and Fann Bureau respectfully requests that the 
Court deny Stanczak's Motion to Strike on at least the following grounds: First, Farm Bureau 
did not submit the February 1st demand letter to the Court in order "to prove liability for. 
invalidity of, or amount of the claim or any other claim." Rather, it submitted the demand letter 
in order to analyze whether there is insurance coverage under the Policy for the allegations 
Stanczak made in his demand letter. In that demand letter be asserted certain factual allegations 
which he believes should invoke coverage under the Cooks' Policy. The factual allegations he 
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has macle in that letter is relevant for the coverage issues that are under consideration in this 
declaratory judgment action. As the February I st demand letter was not submitted for the 
purposes specifically precluded by Rule 408, it can, in fact, be considered by the Court. See 
Owens Corning v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 660 N.E.2d 829 (Ohio CL Common Pleas 
~ 005/007 
I 997) (Evidence relating to negotiation!'. or settlement admissible when presented for a purpose 
other than proving liability or the validity of a claim). 
Second, courts routinely analyze the contents of demand letters when they look at 
insurance coverage issues. See Shorno v. State Farm, Case No. C09-5778 RBL (W.D. Wash. 
August 3, 2010) (available at 2010 WL 3119449); Opal Bank v. Liberty Underwriters Ins. , Inc., 
Case No. SACV 13--00469-CJC(JPRx) (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) (available at 2013 WL 
11037456). It is obvioui:; that courts need to have the contents of demand letters admitted in 
insurance coverage declaratory actions so that courts can analyze if claims made in demand 
letters, in addition to later filed complaints against insureds, are covered. How else could a court 
analyze if coverage is triggered by allegations contained in a demand letter? 
Third, Stanczak. argues that the contents of the demand letter arc irrelevant 
because the Cooks are not seeking coverage for the February 1st demand letter, rather, they are 
seeking coverage for the allegations contained in the First Amended Complaint. It is difficult to 
perceive how Stancz.ak can make this statement on behalf of the Cooks. Indeed, the Cooks have 
given no notice to Farm Bureau that they arc only seeking coverage for the allegations contained 
in the First Amended Complaint. The fact of the matter is the February 1st Demand Letter 
contains factual allegations about Stanczak's claims against the Cooks in addition to those 
factual allegations detailed in the First Amended Complaint. 
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The February 1st Demand Letter was not submitted to this Court for any improper 
purpose. Stanczak's attempt to assert that the submission of this relevant demand letter was 
somehow frivolous and evidences bad intent on behalf of Fann Bureau is also misplaced. This is 
an insurance declaratory judgment action and the sole purpose of this action is to determine if the 
Cooks have insurance coverage under the Farm Bureau Policy for this shooting incident. The 
action will have nothing to do with the validity or merits of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks 
and Mr. Chisholm, the value of his claims against the Cooks and Mr. Chisholm, or any potential 
resolution of those claims. As such, the submission of the same was not intended at all a~ an 
"improper attempt to sway the Court with outside evidence." 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Farm Bureau respectfully requests that the Court de11y 
Stanczak's Motion to Strike. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2016. 
MOPFA'rr, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
es L. Martin- Of the Firm 
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utual Insurance Company of Idaho 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their opposition brief to Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, the 
Cooks have attempted to manufacture coverage under their Farm Bureau homeowners' insurance 
policy for the claims that have been asserted against them by the man, Stanczak, who wa.5 shot 
by Chisholm at the Coo.ks' cabin at BJoom Lake. The Cooks have done what other insureds have 
unsuccessfuHy attempted to do in similar situations. They have argued that Farm Bureau has a 
duty to defend and indemnify the Cooks for the claims asserted by Stanczak simply because 
Stanc:zak has artfully pleaded claims against the Cooks for negligent supervision and premises 
liability. And they assert that should be the end of the Court's inquiry. 
Unfortnnately for the Cooks, this very strategy had been rejected by the Idaho 
Supreme Court and the majority of other courts across the country that have looked at this 
specific issue. The rationale for rejecting this strategy is simple: Where the damages that 
Stanczak claims he incurred arise entirely out of an act that would not be covered under the Fann 
Bureau homeowner policy, the negligence and premise liability claims asserted against the 
Cooks are not claims that are covered by this Policy. That is, if the damages claimed by 
Stanczak resulted entirely from an excluded cause of toss, then there is no coverage. 
Under these facts, it is undisputed that Stanczak's claimed injuries and damages 
result from one thing: the act of being shot in the arm and the back by Chisholm that resulted in 
him being sent to the hospital-intentional and criminal acts excluded by the Farm Bureau 
Policy. Neither the Cooks nor Stanczak can identify any separate damages claimed by Stanczak 
that are attributable to the al]eged independent negligence acts by the Cooks or the alleged 
premises liability c]aim for which coverage would be required. As such, Farm Bureau's motion 
for summary judgment in this declaratory judgment action should be granted. 
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The Cooks argue that they are entitled to a defense of the Amended Stanczak 
Complaint because they are being sued for their own negligent conduct pursuant to the negligent 
supervision and premises liability claims, and their alleged negligent conduct constitutes a 
covered "occurrence" under the Policy. The following statement from the C(loks' opposition 
summar:faes their argument: 
While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, and 
the shooting, that is not the "occurrence" being alleged against the 
Cooks. Instead, it is the Cooks' conduct in allowing :Mr. Chisholm 
to reside at the cabin that W1derscores their aJieged liability; such 
Jiabi1ity is based on claims that the Cooks knew or failed to discern 
that an unsafe condition existed on their premises, potentially by 
either knowing of or failing to investigate the presence of 
intoxicants or weapons; knowing of or failing to determine 
Mr. Chisholm's background or condition; failed to supervise his 
conduct; and without warning of or eliminating the presence of 
potential risk he posed. 
Edgar and Laurie Cook's Memorandum in Opposition to Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (''Cooks' Opposition'') at 8. The Cooks also argue that none of the cited Policy's 
exclusions apply to them. Stanczak filed a one paragraphjoinder in the Cooks' Opposition and 
he made no separate legal or factual arguments. 
Based upon the limited arguments made in the Cooks, Opposition as adopted by 
Stanczak, the defendants to this insurance declaratory judgment action have conceded at least the 
following issues: 
I 
• Neither Chisholm nor Stanczak is an insured under the Policy; 
• The shooting by Chisholm was not an accident and, thus, not an 
"occurrence" under the Policy; 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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• The fact that Chisholm may have been firing warning shots at Stanczak 
does not change the conclusion that the shooting was not an accident and, 
thus, not an "occurrence" under the Policy; 
• Chishohn's guBty plea to the charge of Aggravated Battery results in a 
conclusion that the shooting was not an accident, continns that it was 
intentional and the result of a criminal act and, thus, not an "occurrence" 
under the Policy; 
• Chisholm's criminal conviction is final and cannot be appealed, and as 
such these issues cannot be re-litigated in this subsequent civil action 
regarding insurance coverage in an attempt to avoid the intentional and 
criminal act exclusions of the insurance policy; 
• There is no coverage for Stanczak' ::5 claimed medical expe11ses under the 
Premises Medical Coverage provisions of the Policy (Section II F2 of the 
Policy); and 
• Business activities are not covered under the Policy. 
What the Cooks have argued in their opposition are strictly legal arguments that 
can be resolved in this summary judgment setting. However, their arguments ignore controlling 
Idaho authority and the undisputed facts. The Court should grant Fann Bureau's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and fmd that there is no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks for the 
claims asserted in the Amended Stanczak Complaint and there is no coverage for Stanczak's 
claimed damages. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
At the outset, the Cooks have incorrectly stated that Fann Bureau bears the 
burden of proving that there is no coverage for the claims asserted in the Amended StElilczak 
Complaint. When an insured claims he or she is covered under an insurance policy and the 
insurer denies coverage, the burden of proof falls on the person seeking coverage. That is not 
altered by the fact the insurer may become the nominal plaintiff by seeking a determination of 
noncoverage. Am. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 85 F.Jd 327,330 (8th Cir. 1996); see also 2 LAW 
AND PRAC. OF!Ns. COVERAGELITIG. § 19:8 (2016). Here, the Cooks bear the burden of proof of 
showing that coverage exists under the Policy for the allegations asserted against them in the 
Amended Stanczak Complaint. Granted, Farm Bureau has the burden of proof as it relates to the 
applicable exclusions, but the Cooks have not challenged in their opposition Farm Bureau's 
interpretation or application of the stated exclusions, other than the business activities exclusion 
which will be addressed below. 
The Cooks and Stanczak have failed to carry their burden of demonstrating 
coverage. First, they fail to distinguish the binding rules announced and applied by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P .2d 154 ( 1992), and Slate 
Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,946 P.2d 1333 (1997). Second, the claims asserted by Stanczak in 
the Amended Stanczak Complaint allege causes of action against the Cooks that are foreseeable 
in nature, which further confirms that there was no occurrence under the Policy. Third, the 
business activities exclusion does in fact preclude coverage for the claims asserted against the 
Cooks, 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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A. The Cooks and Stanczak Have Failed to Distinguish Binding Precedent. 
The issue argued by the Cooks and Stanczak in support of coverage has been 
litigated extensively throughout the country: namely, whether theories of negligence against 
insureds for their aI1eged negligent hiring, training or supervision of an individual who 
intentionally causes injuries may be an "occurrence" under a general liability or homeowner's 
policy. Idaho has followed the majority of courts that have found that insureds cannot 
manufacture coverage in this situation. Despite the various causes of action that may be asserted 
against an insured, whether it be negligence, negligent supervision or premises liability, there can 
be no coverage under an insurance policy if the underlying claimant's injuries would not have 
occurred but for the intentional or criminal acts of the third party. The focus again is on the 
damages that the injured person is claiming. If the damages arise out of an act not coveTed by 
the policy, then there is no duty to defend or indemnify the named insureds irrespective of the 
claims asserted against them directly. 
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 ldaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992), the 
underlying claim invo]ved 12 victims of child abuse who had brought a lawsuit against 
Mrs. Wilcox and others. As for Mrs. Wilcox, the 'Victims alleged various claims of negligence 
by her in failing to protect them from and warn them about her ex-husband1 who committed acts 
of physical and sexual abuse against them. Mrs. Wilcox's insurance company, Mutual of 
Enwnclaw, filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to confirm that there was no 
coverage undeT Mrs. Wilcox's homeowner's insurance policy for the claims asserted against 
Mrs. Wilcox. The insurer, like Fann Bureau in this case, asserted there was no "occurrence" or 
'~accident" under the terms of the policy and, moreover, the intentional act exclusion barred 
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coverage because Mr. Wilcox's acts, which caused the damage to the victims, were intentional. 
Wilcox, 123 ldaho at 4-5, 843 P.2d at 154-55. 
When the insurer moved for summary judgment, the district court denjed its 
motion, finding there was a question of whether an ••accident" or "occurrence" had occurred. In 
addition, the district court attempted to distinguish between Mrs. Wilcox• s conduct and her 
ex-husband's conduct and the claims asserted against Mrs. Wilcox, finding that "it is her acts or 
omissions, and not those of her husband, which much be scrutinized in order to determine 
whether they constitute an 'accident' within the meaning of [the Wilcox] [P]oJicy." Ultimately 
the district court concluded that Mrs. Wilcox's conduct may have been an accident as there was 
no evidence that she intended to harm anyone. Jd at 6-7; 843 P-2d at 156-57 (emphasis in 
original). As such the district court denied the insurer's summary judgment motion. 
This is the exact same argument that the Cooks have made in this case: 
(1) whether or not there is coverage has to be viewed from the Cooks' position, not Chisholm's; 
(2) the Court has to distinguish between the claims Stanczak asserts against the Cooks versus the 
claims asserted against Chisholm for this coverage determination; and (3) that what the Cooks 
are alleged to have done is certainly an "accident" from their perspective as they never 
committed an intentional act nor meant to cause hann to Stanczak. 
Unfortunately for the Cooks, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Wilcox's 
claims for coverage in that case and rejected the district court's attempt to separate the claims 
asserted against Mrs. Wilcox from the claims asserted against Mr. Wilcox, the tortfeasor. 
Granted, the appellate court did focus on Mrs. Wilcox's conduct because she was the only one 
whose acts could be covered by the policy, and it looked specifically at the claims of negligent 
failure to report and warn asserted against her. Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court reached 
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Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court found in the Wilcox case that despite the 
separate allegations against Mrs. Wilcox and her specific conduct that was called into question, 
there still wa.c; no "occurrence" under Wilcox's homeowners insurance policy "because iJ was 
tiot fher/ conduct whicl, caused the inlury." Id. at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added). The 
conduct that caused the damage to the victims in the underlying complaint was the insured's 
ex-husband's abuse, not her alleged negligence for failure to supervise her ex-husband nor the 
failure to report the abuse---even if her 11acts or failure to act ••• may have created or 
conttibtded to tl,e environment which permitted her ex-husband's conduct." Id. (emphasis 
added). The fact remains that the insured, Mrs. Wilcox, did not commit the acts complained of 
by the 12 minors, nor cause their alleged damages. As a result, the appellate court reversed the 
district court and held there was no "occurrence" under the policies in question and that the 
insurance company owed no duty to defend its policyholder, Mrs. Wilcox, for the claims asserted 
against her by the 12 victims of that abuse. The Idaho Supreme Court did not even get to the 
application of the intentional act exclusion. Id. 
The Wilcox case is on all fours with the facts and law presented by Fann Bureau's 
motion for summary judgment. The Wilcox case rejects all the same arguments made by the 
Cooks in their opposition. 1 And it confirms that Idaho is a jurisdiction that follows the majority 
rule that there is no coverage for claims asserted against an insured when the plaintiff's injuries 
1 The Cooks also argue Farm Bureau could have drafted the Policy language more 
clearly, and defined an "occurrence" to exclude the intentional acts of third parties. The Wilcox 
court has likewise already rejected this argument. Id. at 9,843 P.2d at 159. Occurrence is 
defined as an accident, which the Idaho Supreme Court in Wilcox found was not ambiguous. 
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in the underlying lawsuit would not have occurred but for the intentional or criminal act of a 
third party, irrespective of the actual causes of action asserted against the named insureds. If the 
insureds wants coverage under their policy, the burden of proof is on them to establish that the 
covered set of facts (the factual basis for the negligent supervision or premises liability claims) 
would have resulted in injury to the plaintiff independent of the excluded cause (the intentional 
and criminal acts of Chisholm). The Cooks have not met that burden nor can they. 
Likewise, a few years after the Wilcox decision, the Idaho Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its holding in Wilcox in State Farm v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997). 1n 
Doe, the district court had applied the Court's holding in Wilcox when it granted State Farm's 
motion for summary judgment in that insurance declaratory judgment action. Id. at 693, 946 
P .2d at 1 3 3 3. Again, the question arose as to whether there was coverage under the 
homeowners' insurance policies issued by State Farm for claims asserted against the parents of a 
13-year old boy who committed acts of sexual abuse against children in the parent's day care. 
Like Stanczak, the injured plaintiffs asserted independent negligence claims against the insureds 
for negligent entrustment, negligent supervision, negligent failure to notify a business invitee, 
etc., all independent claims versus what was asserted against the bad actor, the tortfeasor son. Id. 
at 694, 946 P.2d at 1334. 
State Farm brought an insurance declaratory judgment action, asserting that there 
was no cover.tge under their policies for the negligence and other claims asserted directly against 
the parents and that it had no duty to defend or inde11U1ify the parents for the claims asserted 
against them for their failure to act. In Doe, the parents again asserted that the claims against 
them had to be viewed from their perspective and that there should be coverage for the separate, 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8 Glient4310289.1 
386
12/14/2016 16:58 FAX 20838552 MOFFATT THOMAS ~012/024 
independent claims asserted against them. That again is exactly what the Cooks have asserted in 
the case at bar. 
The fdaho Supren1e Court, however, affirmed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to State FamJ and again found that no "occurrence" occurred under the 
homeowner8' insmance policy despite the fact that separate and independent negligence claims 
were brought against the insured parents. Id. at 695-96, 946 P.2d at 1335~36. Again, the Court 
focused on the aclual events that caused the damage to the injured parties, not just the claims or 
causes of action that were asserted against the insureds. Because the damage to the victirns was 
caused not by the negligent acts of the parents, but by the actions of the tortfeasor son, the Court 
found there was no "occurrence" under the policy and it affirmed that summary judgment for the 
insurer was appropriati:;. And, once again, the appellate court did not even get to the question of 
the application of the other exclusions that the insurer alleged were also applicable in that case. 
Id. 
Idaho is not unique in its application of insurance law to thjs fact pattern or 
sjtuation. Other jurisdictions have arrived at identical conclusions.2 And what the courts 
2 See cases previously cited by Fann Bureau in its opening brief. See also Miller v. 
Allstate, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1137-40 (S.D. Cal. 2007); United Nat'! Ins. Co. 'V. Enhn 't Grp., 
Inc., 945 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1991) (exclusion precluded coverage for negligent 
supervision because focus of exclusion was on injury caused. not on acts of insured); Hermitage 
Ins. Co. v. Dahms, 842 F. Supp. 319, 325-26 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (applying assault and battery 
exclusion to bar coverage even though claims against insured sounded in negligence because 
underlying injury was caused by assault); Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. SaJazat, 77 F.3d 
1291, 1295-97 (10th Cir. 1996) (allegations of negligent supervision against the mother could 
not be an "occurrence" as an .. occurrence" is the event that causes the plaintiff's injury, not the 
remote cause of that injury); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Claypoole~ 673 A.2d 348 (Pa. Super. 1995) 
( claimed negligence of bus company in hiring and supervising rapist would not have given rise 
to injury but for tortfcasor's intentional acts); Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Dist. of Amherst v. Aetna 
Commercial Ins. Co., 263 A.D.2d 949,695 N.Y.S.2d 445 (4th Dept. 1999) (allegations that 
school district was negligent in hiring teacher who sexually assaulted pupils did not allege a 
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consistently focus on is the key issue of whether the damages claimed by the injured plaintiff in 
the underlying case resulted from the excluded cause ofloss under the insurance policy. If that is 
the situation, then the courts have no problem finding there is no coverage for the independent 
causes of actions asserted against the named insureds. 
The Cooks' attempt to briefly distinguish these contro1ling Idaho appellate cases 
falls short. See Cooks' Opposition at 9. They first argue that none of these cases involve a claim 
for premises liability. In reviewing those cases, that fact is immaterial to the analysis applied by 
the Idaho Supreme Court given the whole host of various causes of action that were asserted 
against the insureds in Wilcox and Doe. The Cooks also argue that: 
The circumstances here are based on claims of negligent behavior 
of the Cooks who did not actively participate in the intentional 
conduct, did not intentionally create the situation, and are not being 
sued based on any of their intentional conduct. Courts faced with 
such similar circumstances find that an "occurrence" has been 
sufficiently pled to trigger a potential for coverage and 
corresponding duty to defend. 
Cooks' Opposition at I 0. But in fact that is exactly what Mrs. Wilcox claimed in the Wilcox 
case. There was no claim in that case that she actively participated in the intentional conduct of 
her ex-husband, that she intentionally created the bad situation, or that she was being sued for 
covered ''occurrence'' as it js "the nature of the underlying acts, not the theory ofliability, that 
governs"); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 7 F.3d 86 (5th Cir. 1993) (Texas law); 
Farmer:,· Union Mul. Ins. Co. v. Kienenherger, 84 7 P .2d 1360 (Mont. 1993 ); Am. Family Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Co Fat Lee, 439 F.3d 436, 439 (8th Cir. 2006) (with respect to claims in which losses 
concurrently arise out of both an insured and excluded risk, the court held that allegations that 
the insureds had maintained unsafe premises or negligently failed to warn their son's friends of 
the risk of harmful carbon monoxide were not independent claims distinct from claims that were 
barred); Hunt v. Capital lndem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341,345 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (bar owner's 
failure to protect a patron was not independent from the excluded cause of assault and battery). 
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jntentional conduct. Yet the Idaho Supreme Court still found there was no "occurrence." Same 
with the parents in the Doe case. 
Ignoring the controlling Idaho authority, the Cooks cite to a number of cases 
outside of Idaho to support their position, including Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. 
Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998). In that case, a tenant in an apartment building was 
murdered by an painter hired to paint another apartrnent. The surviving spouse brought suit 
against the landlord whn hired the painter. The: court found that because the complaint against 
the land]ord alleged negligence, an occurrence may have occurred and Lhe landlord's insurer was 
required to defend him. The Cooks also cite to Wes{field Insurance Co. v. Tech Dry, Inc., 336 
F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2003), where the court found that an insured' s negligent hiring and retaining 
of a former employee who murdered a customer was a qualifying "occurrence" under the 
insured's CGL policy. The court found that the insured's conduct and actions must be evaluated, 
not those of the perpetrator of the intentional act. The court in Safeco Insurance Co. v. White, 
913 N.E.2d 426 (Ohio 2009), came to a similar conclusion when it held that the stabbing of a 
neighbor by an insured's son was an "occurrence" for purposes of a negligence claim against 
insureds. 
Fann Bureau acknowledges that these cases arguably stand for the opposite 
holding of the Wilcox and Doe cases from Idaho and the other cases Farnt Bureau has cited 
above. However, the Cooks fail to state how the facts are different or why the Idaho court would 
not come to a different conclusion than what these other jurisdictions have based upon the Idaho 
court's prior reported decisions. For example, the tortfeasor son from the Safeco Insurance Co. 
v. White case Cooks cited from Ohio could easily trade places with the tortfeasor son from the 
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Doe case from Idaho. The fact of the matter is, Idaho has rejected the line of holdings from the 
few cases cited by the Cooks. 
Farm Bureau would ask that this Court follow contro11ing Idaho precedent and 
find that, notwithstanding the labels put on the claims Stanczak has asserted against the Cooks in 
the Stanczak Amended Complaint, there is no coverage under the Farm Bureau Policy for those 
claims. The act that caused the injury and damages to Stanczak was the intentional and criminal 
act of Chisholm pulling the trigger and shooting Stanczak. That shooting was not an accident 
and as such there can be no covered '~occurrence11 under the Policy. The Court should apply the 
holdings from the Idaho Supreme Court in Wilcox and Doe and find there is no duty to defend or 
provide coverage in this instance. The rationale behind these holdings js sound. 
The majority of courts that have addressed this issue are in line with Idaho law 
and they look and focus on the injuries alleged and the conduct causing those injuries. Here, the 
bodily injuries alleged by Stanczak resulted from gunshot wounds he suffered. The Cooks and 
Stanczak have provided no evidence to contradict a conclusion that the shooting by Chisholm 
was intentional. Indeed, Chisholm pled guilty to the intentional crime of Aggravated Battery. 
The injuries alleged in the Stanczak Amended Complaint are those arising from an intentional 
gunshot wound from Chisholm, not from any alleged negligent conduct by the Cooks. 
This precise issue was addressed in Sears v. National Union, 772 N.E.2d 247 
(2002). In that case, a customer of a Sears caipet cleaning contractor was raped by the carpet 
cleaner. She filed suit against Sears, who made a. claim to its insurance company. The customer 
alleged negligent hiring against Sears and Sears argued that their alleged negligence was an 
occurrence under their policy. "The court stated: "Sears' alleged negligence in hiring an 
employee with a troubled past may have helped create the conditions which made B1and's sexual 
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assault possible, but this docs not change the fact that the sexual assault itself was the direct 
result of a solely intentional act." Sears, 772 N.E.2d at 255. Likewise, in Smith v. Animal 
Urgent Care, Inc., 542 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 2000), a fonner employee of a veterinarian made 
claims of sexual harassment against her former employer, and couched some of her claims as 
negligence by the vet clinic. The employer sought a defense of the action and coverage under its 
insurance policy, arguing that because the plaintiff asserted independent negligence claims 
against it, the duty to defend and indemnify was triggered. The West Virginia Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, and held; 
Animal Care does not dispute the accepted view that sexual 
harassment does not come within the meaning of an "occurrence" 
under an accident-based definition, but instead argues that 
coverage is required because of the negligence-type allegations 
involving Animal Care . . . . /TJ/1e inclusion of a negligence-
oriented theory of recovery against Animal Care does not alter 
the essence of the claim for purposes of determining the 
availability of insurance coverage. Sexutd harassment, and its 
inherently nonaccidental nature, remain the crux of the C(lSe 
regardless of whether negligence is alleged against Animal Care. 
Smith, 542 S.E.2d at 832 (emphasis added). See also Sweet Home Cent. Sch. Di.'it. of Amhersl & 
Tonqwanda, 263 A.D.2d 949 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("It is the nature of the underlying acts, not 
the theory ofliability, that governs. Because the operative acts giving rise to any recovery are 
intentional acts, i.e., assault and sexual abuse, it is of no import that the complaint in the 
underlying action alleges only negligent hiring, retention and supervision on the part of Sweet 
Home .... "); GATX Leasing Carp. v. Nat 'I Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d I I 12, 1118 (7th Cir. 
1995) (holding that insured's negligence in failing to prevent employee's intentional act does not 
constimte an "occurrence," reasoning that "'volitional act does not become an accident simply 
because the insured's negligence prompted the act."'). 
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These same rejected arguments are what the Cooks have asked this Court to adopt 
while ignoring controlling Idaho authority. However, neither the Cooks nor Stanc7.ak can avoid 
the parameters of the Cooks' insurance agreement with Farm Bureau by artful pleading. In their 
opposition, the Cnoks state that: "While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, 
and the shooting, that is not the 'occurrence' being alleged against the Cooks." The Stanczak 
Amended Complaint only alleges damages relating to the gunshot wounds he suffered at the 
hands of Chisholm. It fails to allege what additional damage occurred because of the Cooks' 
alleged negligent hiring/supervision and negligent maintenance of premises. Without the 
intentional gwishot, what damages would there be? As the Stanczak Amended Complaint does 
not contain allegations that tie any different or additional damages to the alleged negligence, 
there is no occurrence, no duty to defend and no coverage. See Hunt v. Capital Indem. Corp., 26 
S.W.3d 341, 345-46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) ("Without the underlying assault and battery, there 
would have been no injury and therefore no basis for plaintiffs' action ... for negligence. The 
assault and battery and [the] negligence are not mutually exclusive; rather the acts are related and 
interdependent. [N]egligence ... was not a separate and non-excluded cause apan from the 
assaull and battery."); Preferred Nat 'l Ins. Co. v. Docusearch, Inc., 829 A.2d 1068 (N.H. 2003) 
(where the damages arise entirely out of an act that would not be covered under an insurance 
policy, the negligence claim is not one that would be covered under the policy). The key issue 
adopted by the Idaho appellate court is whether the damages claimed by Stanczak resulted 
entirely from an excluded cause of loss or whether there are separate damages attributable to the 
independent acts of negligence for which coverage would be required. Here, there is no separate 
damage for which coverage would be required. 
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The Cooks also make much of the fa.ct that Stanczak alleges a cJaim for premises 
liability and that cause of action was not addressed by either Wilcox or Doe. However, the 
plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit in Doe did assert a claim for "negligent failure to notify a 
business invitee.'' This allegation did not change the court1s analysis. Rather, the labels for the 
causes of action make no difference in the court's analysis. A simple comparison between the 
causes of action asserted against Mrs. Wilcox and against the parents in the Doe case make that 
clear. While it is not the duty of the Court to analyze the adequacy of the allegations contained 
in the Amended Stanczak Complaint, it is difficult for Fann Bureau to perceive how Chisholm 
shooting Stanczak in the back is a condition on real property that would impose premises 
Jiability on the part of the Cooks. Again, all this is artful pleadings. Regardless, as there is no 
separate allegation of damages that Stanczak suffered from this premises liability claim. separate 
and apart from being shot in the back, it does not trigger the duties of defense, indemnity or 
coverage. 
An allegation of premises liability was also addressed in American Family Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Co Fat Le, 439 F.Jd 436 (8th Cir. 2006). 1n that case, five teenaged boys died 
when they remained overnight in a running car inside of a closed garage. The parents of four of 
the deceased boys brought suit against the owners of the home (also parents of the other 
deceased youth) and alleged claims for negligent operation of an automobile, premises liability 
and general negligence. The homeowners submitted a claim to their homeowners' insurer, 
which initiated a declaratory action to determine coverage. The homeowners' policy specifically 
excluded any claim relating to the use of an automobile. With respect to the claim for premises 
liability, the Eighth Circuit held: 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
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Appellants allege that the unsafe conditions on the premises were 
an inadequately ventilated garage and a running automobile jn a 
closed garage. The fonner is not an inherently dangerous 
condition. It became dangerous only when the automobile was left 
rWllling in the garage while the garage door was cJosed. The 
condition of a running automobile in an inadequately ventilated 
garage is not independent from the use of an automobile, which 
falls under the policy exclusion. Further ... there would have 
been no injury in the case at bar if Trai Van Le had not run the 
automobile in the closed garage . . . . Appellants' premises 
liability claim for running an automobile in a closed garage is 
not independent from the use o(an a11tomobile1 and thus it also 
falls within the policy exclusion. 
Co Fat Le, 439 F.3d at 440 (emphasis added). Herc, Stanczak's premises liability claim is not 
independent from the intentional tort alleged against Chisholm, which is the only thing that 
caused Stanc:z.ak's claimed damages. There is no coverage for this claim. 
@019/024 
Idaho law is settled on the argument the Cooks and Stanczak are attempting to 
make to this Court. In essence, they are asking this Court to ignore controlling authority and 
create new Idaho law. This Cow1 should reject that invitation and apply the law as adopted by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in Wilcox and Doe and the other courts that have applied this same 
sound reasoning. Farm Bureau's motior for summary ju~gment should be granted by finding 
there is no occurrence and thus no covekge under the Policy. 
B. As the Negligence Claims in the Amended Stanczak Complaint Require 
Foreseeability, They Are Not Occurrences Entitled to Coverage. 
In its opening memorandum, Fann Bureau argued that the negligence causes of 
action against the Cooks, negligent supervision and premises liability, contained in the Amended 
Stanczak Complaint involve the element of foreseeability, i.e., what the negligent party knew or 
should have known. Farm Bureau cited to the case of Mountain State Mutual CU$ualty Co. v. 
Hau.'ier. 221 P.3d 56 (Colo. App. 2009), which held that where the allegations in the underlying 
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complaint were that a restaurant knew or should have known its supervisor would assault another 
employee, the alleged negligent hiring and supervision claims were not ."occurrences" under the 
policy because they were foreseeable. Here, Stanczak's artful pleading attempts to assert by 
virtue of his negligent supervision and premises liability claims that it was foreseeable to the 
Cooks that Chisholm might shoot an invitee or licensee that came onto the Cooks' property. 
Because these claims have a foreseeable element, the claimed bad act(s) by the Cooks cannot be 
considered an accident and thus not an "occurrence" triggering the duty to defend or coverage 
under the Policy. The Cooks have fajled to counter this argument and it should serve as 
additional grounds for the granting of Farm Bureau's sununary judgment motion. 
C. The Business Activities Exclusion Applies and Precludes the Duty to Defend 
and Coverage Under the Policy. 
The Cooks also allege that the operation of the campground was not a business 
activity, and should not apply to precJude coverage for their defense of the Amended Stanczak 
Complaint. Again, the Court need only address this exclusion issue in the event it first rejects all 
the above arguments that there was no .. occurrence" and thus no coverage under the Policy. 
However, if the Court does get to this exclusion issue, a closer look at the plain language of the 
exclusion found in the Policy requires its application to these undisputed facts. 
It is important to analyze the purpose of such an exclusion. One court has noted 
that ''because people characteristically separate their business activities from their personal 
activities, business pursuits coverage is not essential for their homeowners coverage and is 
excluded to keep premium rates at a reasonable level." Nat'/ Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. 
v. Garfinkel, 277 P.3d 905, 908 (Colo. App. 2012). One of the reasons for such an exclusion is 
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that business activities present "special risks beyond the ordinary risks and hazards inherent in 
maintaining a home, from personal liability coverage in homeowner policies." Id. 
Here, the exclusion at issue states: 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under 
Section II .... Section II does not cover bodily injury or 
property damage: 
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any 
professional service .... 
(Emphasis in original.) The Policy contains the following definition: 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, 
occupation., or activity, engaged in for compensation, other than 
farming or custom farming .... 
(Emphasis in original.) Farm Bureau asserts that the reason Chisholm was at the campground 
was pursuant to an activity in which he and the Cooks were engaged for compensation. A 
common definition of compensation simply means to receive "payment for services." 
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY at 289 (1984). Pursuant to the arrangement between the 
Cooks and Chisholm, it is undisputed that Chisholm was maintaining the Cooks' property, 
including the Bloom Lake campground, their cabin at Bloom Lake and the property surrounding 
the lake, all in exchange for living in the Cooks' cabin at the campground rent free. See 
admissions in Mr. Cook's 8/5/15 recorded statement, Exhibit A to Declaration of Steve Johnson 
filed 10/20/16; see also statements made by Mr. Cook at Chisholm's sentencjng hearing, 
Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne. It is also undisputed that the Cooks would ask for monetary 
donations in order to cover the operating expenses of the campground and, in fact, received such 
donations that were collected by Chisholm. Id 
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The Cooks' arrangement with Chisholm for caring for their property and the 
Cooks' policy of asking for donations to help offset the upkeep of their campground, lake 
property and cabin were activities. The Cooks received compensation in the form of donations 
by campers and services rendered by Chisholm in keeping up and maintaining their property. 
The Cooks were, in fact, engaged in an activity for which they were compensated. The language 
of the business activity exclusion is broad and the operation of the campground and lake property 
falls within the exclusion. The only reason Chisholm was there was because of his position as a 
caretaker of the Cooks' property. But for him being allowed to stay there rent free in exchange 
for maintaining the Cooks' property, Stanczak would not have been shot by Chisholm. As such, 
the shooting arose out of the business activities conducted by the Cooks. 
Again, there are policy reasons to consider in applying the business activities 
exclusion. A business-purposes exclusion is intended "to confine the homeowner's policy 
coverage to nonbusiness risks and to relegate business coverage to a commercial policy." 
Erick.'iOn v. Christie, 622 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). The Cooks do not live at the 
campground or in their cabin at Bloom Lake, yet they sought to insure them with a homeowners' 
insurance policy. By their own admissions, they invited campers to stay at their lake and 
campgrowtd and they requested monetary donations by those who used their campground and 
lake property. The business risks associated with running a campground and lake property are 
not the same as those associated with insuring personal property and a personal residence or even 
a second home. Compound that fact with the fact the Cooks agreed to have someone live in their 
personal cabin in exchange for maintaining it, the lake property and the associated campground 
increases that insu.rability risk substantially. Yet, the Cooks did not pay any premiums for 
commercial liability coverage. They did not pay any premiwns to have coverage for damages 
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caused by their employees, agents or quasi-employees who they agreed could live in their cabin 
in exchange for working for them to maintain their property. 
In light of the same> Fann Bureau would request that this Court apply the business 
activities exclusion to fulfil the basic purposes of the exclusion. The Cooks are attempting to get 
commercial general liability coverage when they have only paid for homeowners protection for 
their covered properties. That attempt should be rejected. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Fann Bureau respectfully requests that the Court grant 
its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of December, 2016, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Michael T. Howard 
WINSTON & CA SHA IT LA WYERS, PS 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile (208) 765-2121 
mth@winstoncashatt.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Edgar Wilkins Cook, 
Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook 
Wes S. Larsen 
JAMES, VERNON & WF.EKS, PA 
1626 Lincoln Wy. 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile (208) 664-1684 
wes@jvwlaw.net 
Attorneys for D~fendanl Joseph Stanczak 
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THIS MATTER came before the Court on December 21, 2016, for a hearing on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2016, and Defendant Stanczak's 
Motion to Strike, filed October 21, 2016. Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 
Idaho ("Farm Bureau") was represented at the hearing by Benjamin C. Ritchie, of MOFFAT, 
THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook 
were represented by Michael T. Howard, of WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS. Defendant 
Joseph Stanczak was represented by Wes S. Larsen, of JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[t]he court must grant summary 
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). "A party asserting that a fact 
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of 
materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 
affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), 
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials .... " I.R.C.P. 56(c)(l)(A). "A mere 
scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary 
judgment .... " Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 459, 210 P.3d 563, 567 (Ct. App. 2009), 
review denied ( citations omitted). "When a court considers a motion for summary judgment in a 
case that would be tried to a jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion." Id. at 460, 210 P.3d at 568 
( citations omitted). 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike is Moot. 
Defendant Joseph Stanczak moves to strike portions of the Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October 20, 2016, and the supporting 
Declaration of Benjamin Ritchie, filed October 20, 2016, including Exhibit E of said Declaration 
in its entirety, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) and Idaho Rule of Evidence 408. 
The Court finds that Defendant Stanczak' s Motion to Strike is moot because other than 
the fact that Joseph Stanczak ("Stanczak") sent a demand letter to Farm Bureau on February 1, 
2016, which is undisputed ( as set forth below), the Court has not considered the contents of the 
letter in rendering this decision on Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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B. Statement of Undisputed Facts 
1. Bloom Lake Campground and Michael Chisholm 
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook (the "Cooks") are the owners of real 
property located in Bonner County, Idaho. The property consists of 200 acres, Bloom Lake, a 
small cabin, and a campground ("Bloom Lake Property" or "Property"). The Cooks have owned 
the Property for nearly 67 years. Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (filed June 3, 
2016) ("Amended Complaint"), p. 3, ,r,r 10, 11; Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative 
Defenses, and Counterclaim (filed August 10, 2016) ("Cooks' Answer"), p. 1, ,r 1.1; 
Declaration of Steven Johnson in Support of Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 
Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed October 20, 2016) ("Johnson Declaration"), pp. 2-
3, ,r,r 7-9, and Ex. A, p. 2. 
The Cooks have never charged a fee for individuals to use the campground and lake, but 
they do solicit voluntary financial donations from users, which are left in two donation boxes 
located at the campground, to pay the infrastructure cost. Johnson Declaration, Ex. A, pp. 2-3. 
About 19 years ago, Michael Jesse Chisholm ("Chisholm") contacted the Cooks and asked if he 
could stay in the cabin and maintain the Bloom Lake Property. The Cooks agreed and Chisholm 
began caring for the Property. He cared for the Property year-round from then on, until his arrest 
for shooting Stanczak. Id., Ex. A, pp. 2-4. His responsibilities included keeping the weeds down, 
taking out the trash accumulated by campers, and maintaining the road. Id, Ex. A, p. 2. The 
Cooks provided some equipment to Chisholm to maintain the Property, including a weed eater, 
snowmobile, and diesel generator, and would send a truck up once a year to either place lye into 
or empty out the four concrete reservoir outhouses. Id., Ex. A, p. 5. The cabin has no public 
utilities. Chisholm paid for any gas, propane, or other supplies used for heating or maintenance 
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of the cabin and campground areas. Id., Ex. A at pp. 3, 5. The Cooks never paid Chisholm for 
his work at the Bloom Lake Property. They considered him a volunteer, and they did not control 
or instruct him on maintaining the Property. Id., Ex. A, pp. 2-3, 5-6. The Cooks do not reside 
near the Property and only go there once every couple of years. Id., Ex. A, pp. 1, 7. 
2. The Cooks' Insurance Policy 
The Cooks have a Country Squire Insurance Policy with Farm Bureau ("Policy"), which 
insures, amongst other things, the Bloom Lake Property. Amended Complaint, p. 3, ~ 8, and 
Ex. A. The Policy has three separate coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II 
(Liability), and Section III (Automobile). The Policy Declarations list only the individuals 
"Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr." and "Laurie Frances Cook" as the "insureds." There is no business or 
other entity insured by the Policy. The Policy period is 1-26-2015 to 1-26-2016. Id., Ex. A, 
County Squire Policy Declarations, p. 1. The Policy Declarations for Section II Liability 
Coverage include coverage for Bodily Injury Liability (Coverage Fl) and Premises Medical 
(Coverage F2). The "premises" under Section II includes "Location 03," which insures one 
residence and 200 acres, i.e., the Bloom Lake Property, including the cabin. 1 Id., at Ex. A, 
Declarations, p. 2. The Policy Declarations state that Section II coverage is subject to four 
endorsements, including: Endorsement I220 (Combined Single Coverage Limits), 
Endorsement 1269 (Limited Employer's Liability Endorsement), Endorsement 1282 (Personal 
Injury Endorsement), and Endorsement 1287 (Limited Pollution Coverage Endorsement). Id. 
The Policy contains a number of relevant definitions, including the following: 
Business means a full-time or part-time trade, profession, occupation, or activity, 
engaged in for compensation, other than farming or custom farming .... 
1 The Policy also provides coverage for the property where the Cooks have their personal residence: "Location 02" 
in the Policy insures two residences and 135 acres in Sandpoint, Idaho, and "Location 04" insures one residence and 
7 acres in Sandpoint, Idaho. Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Declarations, p. 2. 
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Farming means the production of fruit, nuts, or field crops, or the raising or 
keeping of livestock, fish, or bees, or the raising of mink, fox, or similar small 
mammals primarily for fur production .... 
Insured means you or the entity named in the Declarations. The following are 
also insureds: 
1. If you are a person, insured also means, if residents of your household, your 
spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives .... 
Insured location means: 
1. A location listed in the Declarations where you maintain a farm or residence, 
including private approaches; ... 
Insured location does not include property where a business is conducted. 
Occurrence means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the 
same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or property 
damage during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage 
resulting from a common cause will be considered the result of one occurrence. 
Relative means a person related to you by blood, marriage, or adoption, who is a 
resident of your household, including a ward or foster child. This definition 
applies only if you are a person. 
Residence employee means someone employed by you who performs duties in 
connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises. This includes 
a person who performs duties for you elsewhere of a similar nature not in 
connection with your business or farming. 
Residence premises means, if shown in the Declaration: (a) a dwelling that is 
your principal residence, including its grounds and private garages, or (b) that part 
of any other building where you reside. A residence premises does not include 
any part of a building used for business. 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, pp. 1-3 (emphasis in original). 
Section II Liability Coverage contains two relevant coverages: Fl (Bodily Injury 
Liability) and F2 (Premises Medical). Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) offers the following coverage: 
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of 
bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this 
coverage applies, we will: 
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally 
liable (damages includes any awarded prejudgment interest); and 
2. Provide a defense at our expenses by counsel of our choice .... 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22 (emphasis in original). 
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F2 (Premises Medical) offers the following coverage: 
Subject to the limit of liability, we will pay reasonable and necessary medical and 
funeral expenses resulting from bodily injury caused by an occurrence as 
described below. This coverage does not apply to you or residents of your 
household other than residence employees. This coverage applies only: 
1. To a person on the insured location with the permission of any insured .... 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22 (emphasis in original). 
Both of the above coverages are subject to certain exclusions, including the following: 
The following exclusions apply to all coverages under Section II .... Section II 
does not cover bodily injury or property damage: 
1. Arising from any insured's business activities or any professional service; 
3. Which is intentionally caused by any insured. This exclusion does not apply 
to the use of reasonable force by an insured to protect a person or property; 
14. Arising out of a violation of a criminal law ... if committed by any insured; 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, pp. 24 -25 (emphasis in original). 
Two relevant Policy endorsements state the following: 
1269 (0108) Limited Employers Liability Endorsement. Coverages F-1 and F-
2 are extended to apply to bodily injury caused by an occurrence and sustained 
by a person performing labor for you in your farming operation ... 
1282 (1014) Personal Injury Endorsement. Under Coverage F-1, we cover 
personal injury. Personal Injury means injury other than bodily injury arising out 
of one or more of the following offenses: 
1. False arrest, detention or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution; 
2. Libel, slander, or defamation of character; or 
3. Invasion of privacy, wrongful eviction, or wrongful entry. 
Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 42 (emphasis in original). 
3. The Shooting 
On June 28, 2015, Stanczak and his girlfriend, Susan Jackson, were camping at the 
Bloom Lake Property. Chisholm invited Stanczak and Susan into the cabin. A dispute arose 
between Chisholm and Stanczak. Chisholm used a .45 caliber handgun to shoot Stanczak twice, 
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once in the arm and once in the back, injuring him. Chisholm then left the scene, but was later 
apprehended by local authorities. Amended Complaint, p. 4, ,r,r 18-20; Cooks' Answer, pp. 1-2, 
,r,r 1.1, 1.5; Defendant Stanczak's Answer to Amended Complaint for Declaratory Damages 
(filed August 10, 2016) ("Stanczak's Answer"), p, 4, ,r,r 18-20. 
4. Chisholm's Arrest Guilty Plea, and Sentence in the Criminal Case 
Chisholm was arrested on June 28, 2015, and charged with two counts: Aggravated 
Battery, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-907 (Count I); and Use of a Deadly Weapon in 
Commission of a Felony (Count II), pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2520, in Bonner County Case 
CR-2015-0003326, State of Idaho v. Michael Jesse Chisholm ("Chisholm Criminal Case"). 
Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchie ("Ritchie Deel."), p. 2, ,r 2, and Ex. A. Idaho Code § 18-907 
provides: "(1) A person commits aggravated battery who, in committing battery: (a) Causes 
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement; or (b) Uses a deadly 
weapon or instrument; ... " LC.§ 18-907. Idaho Code§ 18-903 provides: 
A battery is any: (a) Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the 
person of another; or (b) Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of 
another person against the will of the other; or ( c) Unlawfully and intentionally 
causing bodily harm to an individual. 
LC.§ 18-903 (emphasis supplied). Idaho Code§ 19-2520 allows for an extended sentence when 
aggravated battery is committed with the use of a firearm or deadly weapon. 
Chisholm entered and executed an "Acknowledgment of Alford Plea" in the Chisholm 
Criminal Case on January 5, 2016, which this Court accepted, and which stated, in part: 
1. I understand that a defendant may plead guilty to a felony charge, even 
though he/she claims to be innocent of the charge, or does not admit to all of the 
elements of such charge. This is known as a North Carolina v. Alford guilty plea. 
2. In order for the court to accept a guilty plea, pursuant to the decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), I 
understand that the Court must make the following findings: 
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a. That there exists a strong factual basis to support the guilty plea; 
b. That the defendant's guilty plea is voluntarily, knowingly and 
understandingly made; 
3. When the Court accepts a guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. 
Alford, a defendant must understand that the Court will treat the defendant 
as though he/she were in fact guilty of all the elements of such felony offense. 
The Court will not accept a guilty plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 
unless the court record reflects that the guilty plea was voluntary, and was also an 
intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the defendant. 
Ritchie Deel., p. 2, ,r 3, and Ex. B (emphasis supplied). 
Chisholm also executed a Guilty Plea Advisory Form in the Chisholm Criminal Case that 
informed him of his constitutional rights. Ritchie Deel., p. 2, ,r 4, and Ex. C. At the plea hearing, 
Chisholm acknowledged that he understood the plea offer from the State of Idaho and that he 
was giving up his right to appeal his conviction. Id., p. 2, ,r 5; Declaration o.f Barbara E. Mayne 
("Mayne Deel."), p. 2, ,r,r 4-5, and Ex. A, pp. 3-4. A sentencing hearing was held for Chisholm 
on March 8, 2016, as a result of the guilty plea. Ritchie Deel., p. 2, ,r 5; Mayne Deel., p. 2, ,r,r 
4, 6, and Ex. B. Before imposing sentence, the Court made the following comments: 
And really, I don't know that the word is a Jekyll and Hyde, but it's 
Mr. Chisholm, in some ways you are two different people. I note that everyone 
that came into this courtroom is in support of you. And you, since you've lived in 
this county, you have given a lot to the community .... It is concerning to the 
Court that you, though, that people have to realize too, though, that your whole 
life was built on a lie. You are not 66. You were born in 1952. You used a 
number of different aliases.... But you have two children. One that you 
abandoned as an infant and never paid, from the Court. And the child has no 
relationship with you. Never supported that child. Your son thought you were 
dead and just recently discovered after 30 years that his father was actually alive. 
You didn't support either of your children. Three marriages. You were declared 
dead by your family. So those are the kinds of things I'm trying to balance. It is 
hard for the Court to understand. But you did come here and make a better life. 
And start giving back to the community. It is concerning that I've read letters 
about your great military service and PTSD and - because none of that is true. 
You have to, you know, you kind of built this fantasy life that you have. That you 
were a Vietnam vet and you're not a Vietnam vet. [inaudible] I get the person is a 
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member of the military service. I take very seriously somebody claiming that 
they were when they're not. Those kinds of things. 
So then, that, the problem is you don't tell the truth. So like it is hard for me to 
give much truth to what you say happened that night .... You were all 
drinking.... But the victim didn't have a gun. And you shot him twice and 
the shot, the wound is to the back. Let's be clear about that. It's not to the 
front. And then, as Mr. Taylor said, if you are in an altercation and are fearful 
and you shoot someone, you don't hop in your pickup truck with two loaded 
weapons and take off. Wreck your truck. Go two miles out in the woods, hide, 
and when the police were looking for you. I'm glad there was a dog. Because 
from their perspective in reading the reports, you, they thought you were in a 
shooting stance. You had the weapons next to you fully loaded. There was a 
bullet in the firing position. And that, and you, the drug, the dog attacked you. 
But I'm afraid you could have shot an officer or an officer could have shot you. 
That's not what we're, what I'm judging. But that's what the facts show the 
Court. So, all this is very concerning. 
And that's what I'm trying to balance. In this case this Court cannot say that it 
is all right to shoot a person and to flee and to be tracked by the police and that 
you get probation. That doesn't deter you or anyone else from shooting a person. 
That - you have to take responsibility. Mr., for all you know Mr. Stanczak was 
dead. Because you shot him and ran. And luckily medical got there and he did 
not die. Or you would be charged with murder. So there have to be 
consequences. And that's what this Court has to balance. That's my job. 
Mayne Deel., Ex. 8, pp. 22-23 (emphasis supplied). 
Lastly, this Court entered a "Felony Judgment (Sentence Imposed)" on March 8, 2016, in 
the Chisholm Criminal Case, convicting Chisholm of felony Aggravated Battery. Ritchie Deel. 
p. 2, ,r 6, and Ex. D. Chisholm was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of two years fixed, 
eight years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of 10 years. Ritchie Deel., Ex. D, pp. 1-2. 
5. Stanczak s Insurance Claim and Farm Bureau's Response 
Stanczak obtained counsel to assert various claims against Chisholm, the Cooks and 
Farm Bureau for his injuries and damages arising from the shooting. On February 1, 2016, 
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Stanczak, through his counsel, made a demand (by letter) on Farm Bureau for damages under the 
Policy arising out of the June 28, 2015, shooting. Ritchie Deel. p. 2, ,r 7, and Ex. E.2 
On March 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks denying coverage for the claim 
made by Stanczak. Amended Complaint, p. 5, ,r 25, and Ex. B; Cooks' Answer p. 1, ,r 1.1. Farm 
Bureau analyzed the potential coverage under Section II Liability Coverage, including Bodily 
Injury Liability (Coverage Fl) and Premises Medical (Coverage F2) of the Policy. Farm Bureau 
made the following conclusions: neither Chisholm nor Stanczak were "insureds" under the 
Policy; no "occurrence" occmred under the Policy; even if Chisholm was an insured under the 
Policy and an occurrence occurred, the business activities, intentional acts, and criminal acts 
exceptions to coverage preclude coverage for Stanczak's injuries; and no other provision in the 
Policy afforded coverage for Stanczak's injuries. Farm Bureau noted that the claim was still 
under investigation; that it was reserving its rights under the Policy to deny coverage; and that it 
welcomed any additional information from the Cooks about the claim. Amended Complaint, 
Ex. B. No further information was provided by the Cooks. On March 22, 2016, Farm Bureau 
sent another letter to the Cooks, stating that it had completed its investigation and advising the 
Cooks that it was denying the claim relating to the Chisholm shooting on the grounds set forth in 
its March 2, 2016, letter. Amended Complaint, p. 5, ,r 25, and Ex. C; Cooks' Answer, p. 1, ,r 1.1. 
6. Stanczak's Lawsuit and Farm Bureau s Response 
On May 12, 2016, Stanczak filed a Complaint for Damages against Chisholm and the 
Cooks for his injuries and damages arising from the June 28, 2015, shooting ("Stanczak 
Complaint" or "Stanczak Tort Action").3 Stanczak alleges premises liability and negligent 
2 The Court has ruled Defendant Stanczyk's Motion to Strike Exhibit E, and all references to the contents thereof, to 
be moot. It is an undisputed fact that a demand letter was sent on February 1, 2016; however, the Court did not 
consider the contents of the demand letter in rendering a decision on Farm Bureau's summary judgment motion. 
3 Bonner County Case CV-2016-0000679. 
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supervision against the Cooks,4 and strict liability, as well as negligent, reckless, and tortious 
conduct against Chisholm. In the Stanczak Complaint, Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was the 
employee and/or agent of the Cooks. Amended Complaint, pp. 5-6, ,r 26, and Ex. E; Cooks ' 
Answer, p. 1, ,r 1.1. The Cooks tendered defense of the Stanczak Tort Action to Farm Bureau. 
On June 2, 2016, Farm Bureau sent additional correspondence to the Cooks, addressing 
whether there might be coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint. 
Amended Complaint, p. 5, ,r 25, and Ex. D; Cooks' Answer, p. 1, ,r 1.1. Once again, Farm 
Bureau found no coverage for the allegations contained in the Stanczak Complaint, citing the 
same grounds outlined in its prior denials of coverage. Amended Complaint, Ex. D 
On June 7, 2016, Stanczak filed a First Amended Complaint for Damages against 
Chisholm and the Cooks5 ("Amended Stanczak Complaint") in the Stanczak Tort Action. 
Ritchie Deel. , p. 3, ,r 8, and Ex. F. The Amended Stanczak Complaint deletes references to the 
Bloom Lake Property as a "for-profit" enterprise. The Amended Stanczak Complaint also 
modifies its references to Chisholm to an "agent" of the Cooks and not an "agent and/or 
employee." Ritchie Deel., Ex. F. On August 22, 2016, Farm Bureau sent a letter to the Cooks' 
counsel denying coverage for the allegations contained in the Amended Stanczak Complaint. 
Ritchie Deel., p. 3, ,r 9, and Ex. G. Farm Bureau stated that the modified allegations failed to 
alter the coverage opinion previously given to the Cooks by Farm Bureau. Ritchie Deel., Ex. G. 
7. Farm Blll'eau Action for Declaratory Judgment 
Farm Bureau originally filed its Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on May 2, 2016, 
but upon receipt of the Stanczak Complaint, Farm Bureau filed an Amended Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment on June 3, 2016, requesting a declaration that: (1) there is no coverage 
4 Cooks are named individually, as husband and wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground. 
5 Cooks are named individually, as husband and wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground. 
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under the Policy for Stanczak's claimed injuries or damages sustained from the June 28, 2015, 
shooting, as outlined in the Stanczak Tort Action; and (2) Farm Bureau has no duty to defend the 
Cooks against the claims made in the Stanczak Tort Action. Amended Complaint, p. 7, ,i,i 33-34. 
The Cooks filed an "Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim" on August 10, 
2016. The Cooks have asserted Breach of Contract and Declaration of Coverage counterclaims, 
alleging that Farm Bureau breached the Policy by failing to provide coverage for the claims 
asserted in the Stanczak Tort Action, and seeking a declaration of coverage for the defense or 
indemnity of the claims made therein. Stanczak filed his Answer on August 10, 2016. 
C. Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the Cooks' 
counterclaims are dismissed. 
In Andrae v. Idaho Counties Risk Management Program Underwriters, 145 Idaho 33, 
175 P.3d 195 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Insurance policies are contracts, and "the parties' rights and remedies are 
primarily established within the four comers of the policy." Featherston By and 
Through Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843, 875 P.2d 937, 940 
(1994). Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law upon which this 
Court exercises free review. Martinez v. Idaho Counties Reciprocal Mgmt. 
Program, 134 Idaho 247, 250, 999 P.2d 902, 905 (2000). Like other contracts, 
insurance policies "are to be construed as a whole and the courts will look to the 
plain meaning and ordinary sense in which words are used in a policy." Miller v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 108 Idaho 896, 899, 702 P.2d 1356, 1359 (1985). 
Finally, where the "policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must 
be determined in accordance with the plain meaning of the words used." Mut. 
of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 235, 912 P.2d 119, 122 (1996). 
Id. at 36, 175 P.3d at 198 (emphasis supplied). Additionally, 
[N]ot every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be defined in the 
contract. Rather, insurance policies may contain words and phrases that 
simply have settled legal meanings or interpretations, and, thus, would not be 
ambiguous merely because the policy does not provide a definition. 
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 8,843 P.2d 154, 158 (1992) (emphasis supplied). 
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The Cooks made an insurance claim to Farm Bureau for policy coverage and defense of 
the allegations made against them by Stanczak (in the Stanczak Tort Action) for the injuries and 
damages he suffered as a result of being shot by Chisholm. Stanczak alleges that Chisholm was 
the Cooks' agent. In determining whether there is a "genuine dispute as to any material fact," 
I.R.C.P. 56(a), the Court shall apply the rules of contract interpretation to the Policy, and shall 
liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the 
motion, the Cooks. Applying this standard, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact regarding whether Stanczak's claims against the Cooks are covered under the 
Policy: Stanczak's claims against the Cooks are not covered, for the following reasons: 
1. There is no coverage under Section II Liability Coverage - Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) 
for Stanczak's claims against tJ1e Cooks. 
Coverage Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) under the Policy provides coverage to an insured 
"[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily 
injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence." Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22. 
Coverage Fl only applies to a claim brought against an insured under the Policy. Under the 
Policy, an "insured" is a person named in the Policy Declarations or "residents of your [the 
insured's] household, your spouse, your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your 
relatives .... Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 2. The Policy Declarations list only Edgar and 
Laurie Cook as insureds. Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Declarations, p. 1. Chisholm is not a 
relative of the Cooks who might be considered an additional insured under the Policy, and there 
is no definition or other provision in the Policy that would include Chisholm as an insured. 
Lastly, to the extent Stanczak has alleged that the Cooks have a "business" related to the Bloom 
Lake Property, no such business is insured under the Policy and no employees of such business 
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are insured by the Policy. 
Furthermore, Fl coverage only applies to "bodily injury or property damage, caused by 
an occurrence." Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 22. "Occurrence" is defined in the Policy 
as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful conditions, 
which results in unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period. All 
bodily injury and property damage resulting from a common cause will be considered the result 
of one occurrence." Amended Complaint, Ex. A, Policy, p. 3 (emphasis suuplied). The term 
"accident" is not defined in the Policy, but the Idaho Supreme Court has applied the following 
definitions to the term "accident": 
Accident. 
Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an event 
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency, 
an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the 
person to whom it happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence," 
and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening 
without intention or design. 
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979). 
ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. l. an undesirable or unfortunate happening, 
unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; 
casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens 
unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or cause .... 
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989). 
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 8-9, 843 P.2d 154, 158-159 (1992) (emphasis 
supplied). 
The Supreme Court in Wilcox, having held "that the word "accident," as used in an 
insurance policy such as the two policies in this case, and not otherwise defined in the policy, has 
a settled legal meaning or interpretation," id. at 9, 843 P.2d at 159, this Court finds that the 
shooting of Stanczak by Chisholm was not an accident because it was not "an unexpected 
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happening without intention or design." Id. Chisholm has already been found guilty in the 
Chisholm Criminal Case of committing battery against Stanczak, meaning "[ u ]nlawfully and 
intentionally causing bodily harm" to Stanczak. I.C. § 18-903(c). 
"[W]here the policy language is clear and unambiguous, coverage must be determined in 
accordance with the plain meaning of the words used." Andrae v. Idaho Counties Risk 
Management Program Underwriters, 145 Idaho 33, 36,175 P.3d 195,198 (2007) (internal 
quotations omitted). As a preliminary matter, the Court finds the policy language outlined above 
to be clear and unambiguous, and shall thus apply the plain meaning of the words used to 
determine coverage. So doing, and liberally construing all facts and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the Cooks, the Court finds that there is no genuine dispute left for trial that 
Chisholm is not an insured under the Policy, and because he is not an insured, he is not entitled 
to F 1 coverage under the Policy; and that, even if Chisholm was found to be an insured under the 
Policy, there would be no coverage for Stanczak's claims against the Cooks since Chisholm's 
commission of an intentional act precludes F 1 coverage because no "occurrence" occurred. 6 
2. Idaho case law precludes coverage of tanczak s claims against the Cooks. 
The Cooks argue that they are entitled to a defense of the Amended Stanczak Complaint 
because they are being sued for their own negligent conduct pursuant to Stanczak's negligent 
supervision and premises liability claims, and their alleged negligent conduct constitutes a 
covered "occurrence" under the Policy. Specifically, the Cooks' contend that: 
While Farm Bureau focuses on the conduct of Mr. Chisholm, and the 
shooting, that is not the "occurrence" being alleged against the Cooks. Instead, it 
is the Cooks' conduct in allowing Mr. Chisholm to reside at the cabin that 
underscores their alleged liability; such liability is based on claims that the Cooks 
knew or failed to discern that an unsafe condition existed on their premises, 
6 Based upon the lack of any argument on the issue, the Cooks appear to concede that there is no coverage for 
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks under Section II Liability Coverage - F2 (Premises Medical) of the Policy. 
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potentially by either knowing of or failing to investigate the presence of 
intoxicants or weapons; knowing of or failing to determine Mr. Chisholm's 
background or condition; failed to supervise his conduct; and without warning of 
or eliminating the presence of potential risk he posed .... 
Edgar and Laurie Cook 's Memorandum in Opposition to Farm Bureau 's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed December 9, 2016), at p. 7. 
The Cooks also argue that none of the cited Policy's exclusions apply to them. Stanczak filed a 
brief joinder in the Cooks' Opposition and he made no separate legal or factual arguments. 7 
There are two Idaho Supreme Court cases directly relevant to the coverage determination 
in the case at bar. The first is Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P .2d 154 (1992), 
the facts of which are as follows: 
A. The Underlying Action. 
On August 18, 1989, twelve anonymous plaintiffs filed suit against Shirley 
Mae Wilcox ("Wilcox"), her ex-husband, the state of Idaho, and ten unnamed 
employees of the state of Idaho. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 
Wilcoxes were employed by the state of Idaho at the Child Development Center 
and provided respite or foster care through the state of Idaho. In addition, 
plaintiffs alleged that "the minor Plaintiffs suffered incidences of repeated sexual 
exploitation, sexual molestation, and sexual abuse between May, 1980, and May, 
1987, at the said Child Development Center and at the home of Defendants Jay 
Wilcox and Shirley Wilcox .... " Further, plaintiffs alleged that "the adult Plaintiffs 
were never informed by representatives of the Defendant, State of Idaho, nor by 
its Department of Health & Welfare, nor by any of its employees at its Child 
Development Center, of the sexual exploitation, sexual molestation, and sexual 
abuse of the minor Plaintiffs." 
As to Wilcox, plaintiffs alleged that she "was negligent in one or more of the 
following:" 
a. In failing to report to the law enforcement authorities, the sexual abuse, 
exploitation and molestation which occurred at her home by Defendant, Jay 
Wilcox, which duty to report is set out in Idaho Code§ 16-1619, Idaho Code; 
b. In failing to report to her husband's employer the tendencies and sexual 
molestation of other children by her husband, Defendant Jay Wilcox. 
c. In failing to warn or provide adequate safety for the minor Plaintiffs herein, 
who were brought to her home by her husband, Defendant Jay Wilcox, 
knowing the sexual propensities of her husband, Defendant Jay Wilcox. 
7 See Defendant Stanczak 's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's 
Motion for Summa,y Judgment (filed December 7, 2016). 
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Plaintiffs prayed for their economic and non-economic losses against Wilcox, 
reasonable attorney fees, and costs and disbursements. 
B. The Declaratory Action. 
On June 25, 1990, Enumclaw filed a complaint for declaratory judgment. 
In the complaint, Enumclaw alleged that it was not liable under the policy of 
insurance issued to Wilcox with respect to the claims made against her by the 
twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Specifically, Enumclaw stated that it denied 
liability because "it appears that the basis of the claims against Shirley 
Wilcox, are not an accident or 'occurrence' as set out in the terms of the 
insurance policy .... " Enumclaw attached an insurance policy to its complaint, 
which it alleged was "in effect during all times relevant to the matters contained 
in this complaint." 
On July 9, 1990, Enumclaw filed an amended complaint for declaratory 
judgment. In the amended complaint, Enumclaw added that the insurance 
policy did not provide coverage pursuant to an exclusion relating to 
intentional conduct, because Wilcox's ex-husband's acts were intentional and 
Wilcox's failure to report was also intentional. 
On March 6, 1991, Enumclaw filed a motion for summary judgment. ... 
Argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment was heard on May 8, 
1991. The district court issued its memorandum decision on June 5, 1991, its 
order denying Enumclaw's motion and granting the Wilcox/intervenor motion for 
summary judgment on June 9, 1991, and summary judgment dated June 10, 1991. 
The district court first addressed Enumclaw's motion for summary judgment. 
As to the contention that Wilcox's conduct did not constitute an "occurrence," 
which the Wilcox Policy defines as "an accident ... ," the court noted that the 
Wilcox Policy did not define the term "accident," and, thus, the term is "unclear, 
and therefore ambiguous from the language of the policy itself.. .. " Since an 
ambiguity in an insurance contract must be resolved in favor of the insured, the 
district court reasoned, the court adopted the broad definition of "accident" given 
in Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305, 308 (Okla.1966), which the district court 
stated as: "an injury is the result of an 'accident' if it is not caused by intentional 
conduct." 
The second question was whether Wilcox's "alleged misconduct in the 
underlying case was intentional. If it was, then [the Wilcox] [P]olicy provides no 
liability coverage. On the other hand, if it was not, then coverage exists." In this 
regard, the district court specifically distinguished between Wilcox's conduct 
and her ex-husband's conduct-"it is her acts or omissions, and not those of 
her husband, which must be scrutinized in order to determine whether they 
constitute an 'accident' within the meaning of [the Wilcox] [P]olicy." 
(Emphasis added.) The court stated that "[w]hile it may be that [Wilcox] 
intentionally decided not to report or warn of her husband's misconduct, that 
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decision constituted nothing more than a mistake or an error in judgment. There is 
no evidence whatsoever to suggest that she intentionally harmed anyone." Thus, 
the district court found that Wilcox's conduct constituted an "occurrence" within 
the meaning of the Wilcox Policy. 
The district court then addressed the policy exclusions relating to the wilful 
violation of a law or ordinance by the insured and expected or intended injury. As 
to the wilful violation of a law exclusion, the court found that since this exclusion 
was not in the Wilcox Policy, but only in the Enumclaw Policy, it would not be 
considered. As to the expected or intended injury exclusion, the court found that 
there was no evidence that Wilcox expected or intended to injure anyone. In 
addition, the court stated that "[w]hile it may be argued that [Wilcox's] failure to 
report or warn of her husband's sexual misconduct could foreseeably result in 
injury to the minor plaintiffs in the underlying action, in this court's view 
foreseeability does not amount to an expectation of or an intent to cause injury," 
citing Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions. 100 Idaho 914,607 P.2d 422 (1980). 
The court then reviewed the business pursuits exclusion of the Wilcox Policy. 
In this regard, the court followed the rationale of Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 
Sipple, 255 N.W.2d 373 (Minn.1977), and found that "the acts of molesting the 
children were not acts that contributed, or furthered the interest of, the Wilcox 
business." Thus, the court ruled that the business pursuits exclusion does not bar 
coverage for Wilcox as to those children who may have been molested at the 
Child Development Center by her ex-husband since Wilcox was not engaged in 
any business pursuit. 
As to the children who may have been molested at the Wilcox home while 
Wilcox and her ex-husband were providing respite or foster care for them, the 
district court turned to the definition of "business pursuits" given in Black v. 
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 449, 767 P.2d 824 (Ct.App.1989). With this 
definition in mind, the court concluded that Wilcox's "activities in providing 
respite or foster care did not constitute a business." Particularly, the court found 
that Wilcox and her ex-husband "provided respite and foster care primarily for 
humanitarian reasons, and not for commercialism or profit," that the activities 
were "performed intermittently and not on a regular basis," and that "any 
compensation received for such care was equalled or exceeded by the expenses 
involved." 
Initially, the district court concluded that the provision of the Wilcox Policy 
regarding the scope of coverage (the "occurrence" and "accident" provision) was 
"substantially the same" as the provision in the Enumclaw Policy. The court then 
found that the exclusion regarding a wilful violation of the law did not apply to 
Wilcox's conduct because only her ex-husband violated the law and because 
Enumclaw had not alleged that her ex-husband's conduct is imputed to Wilcox. 
Finally, the district court found that the business pursuits exclusion of the Wilcox 
Policy was substantially the same as that in the Enumclaw Policy, and, thus, 
inapplicable. The court granted the Wilcox/intervenor motion for summary 
judgment. 
Enumclaw filed a notice of appeal on June 26, 1991 .... 
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123 Idaho at 4-7, 843 P.2d at 154-157 (emphasis m bold supplied) (emphasis m italics m 
original). 
The district court's analysis in Wilcox is identical to the arguments made by the Cooks in 
this case, to-wit: (1) whether or not there is coverage has to be viewed from the Cooks' position, 
not Chisholm's; (2) the Court has to distinguish between the claims Stanczak asserts against the 
Cooks versus the claims asserted against Chisholm for this coverage determination; and (3) that 
what the Cooks are alleged to have done is an "accident" from their perspective as they never 
committed an intentional act nor meant to cause harm to Stanczak. Unfortunately for the Cooks, 
the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mrs. Wilcox's claims for coverage in that case and rejected the 
district court's attempt to separate the claims asserted against Mrs. Wilcox from the claims 
asserted against Mr. Wilcox, the tortfeasor. Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court found in the 
Wilcox case that despite the separate allegations against Mrs. Wilcox and her specific conduct, 
there still was no "occurrence" under Mrs. Wilcox's homeowners' insurance policy because it 
was not her conduct which caused the injury, but rather, the conduct of her ex-husband. As a 
result, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held there was no "occurrence" under 
the policies in question and that the insurance company owed no duty to defend its policyholder, 
Mrs. Wilcox, for the claims asserted against her by the 12 abuse victims; and so ruling, the 
Supreme Court did not even reach the application of the intentional act exclusion. 
The Supreme Court's in Wilcox set forth the following analysis: 
The Enumclaw Policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including 
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially similar conditions." The Wilcox 
Policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including injurious exposure to 
conditions, which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or property 
damage." The district court found the term ''accident" to be ambiguous, and 
resolved the ambiguity by adopting a definition of "accident" found in an 
Oklahoma case, Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305 (Okla.1966). The district 
court stated the definition given in Penley as: "an injury is the result of an 
'accident' if it is not caused by intentional conduct." It adopted this definition of 
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"accident" from Penley because it reasoned that rules of construction required it 
to give the word a broad definition since the policies left it undefined. We 
disagree with the reasoning of the district court as well as its adopted definition of 
"accident." 
In Stein-McMurray Ins. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 818, 820, 520 P.2d 
865, 867 (1974), this Court stated: 
[W]here a word or phrase used in an insurance contract has a settled legal 
meaning or interpretation, that meaning or interpretation must be given even 
though other interpretations are possible. 
In other words, not every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be 
defined in the contract. Rather, insurance policies may contain words and phrases 
that simply have settled legal meanings or interpretations, and, thus, would not be 
ambiguous merely because the policy does not provide a definition. 
In this case, both parties have cited a number of definitions for the word 
"accident," including Couch on Insurance, Webster's New World Dictionary, 
Black's Law Dictionary, and cases from other jurisdictions. All of these 
definitions, with the exception of the Penley definition, are not mutually 
exclusive. In fact, the definitions cited by the parties say essentially the same 
thing. 
Accident. 
Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an event 
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency, 
an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the 
person to whom it happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence," 
and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening 
without intention or design. 
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979). 
ac • ci • dent (ak' si dent), n. 1. an undesirable or unfortunate happening, 
unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; 
casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens 
unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or cause .... 
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989). 
We hold that the word "accident," as used in an insurance policy such as the 
two policies in this case, and not otherwise defined in the policy, has a settled 
legal meaning or interpretation. 
With this definition in mind, we tum to the alleged acts of Wilcox. It is her 
conduct that we must look to, and not to her ex-husband's conduct, because she is 
the only one whose acts could be covered by the policy in question. The twelve 
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anonymous plaintiffs in the underlying action have alleged that Wilcox was 
negligent in failing to report or warn the proper authorities of the child 
molestation perpetrated upon minors by her ex-husband. Her alleged 
conduct is the failing to report or warn, while her ex-husband's conduct is 
the child molestation, which is intentional conduct and, thus, clearly not an 
"occurrence." 
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an 
"occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct which caused 
injury. The injury suffered by the minors is child molestation. While the acts 
or failure to act by Wilcox may have created or contributed to the 
environment which permitted her ex-husband's conduct, Wilcox did not 
commit the acts complained of by the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. 
Therefore, the Enumclaw Policy and the Wilcox Policy do not provide 
coverage for Wilcox. 
Because we hold that the policy in question does not afford coverage for 
Wilcox, it is unnecessary to consider the policy exclusions, the issue relating to 
whether the intervenors were parties entitled to attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 
41-183 9, and whether the district court could proceed on the Wilcox/intervenor 
motion for summary judgment if it found no "substantial and material difference" 
between the insurance policies. Further, the district court's award of attorney fees 
is vacated. 
The decision of the district court is reversed. 
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 8-9, 843 P.2d 158-159 (emphasis in bold supplied) 
( emphasis in italics in original). 
Later, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed its Wilcox holding in State Farm Fire and 
Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997), the facts of which are as follows : 
John and Jane Doe operated a day care business in their residence in Boise 
from 1973 through August 1991. The facility operated under both city and state 
licenses authorizing care for up to twelve (12) children per day. The three year-
old daughter of Jane and John Roe attended the day care from March 1988 to July 
1991. She was never at the residence other than as a client of the day care. 
The Does' thirteen year-old son helped out at the day care. He acknowledged 
that sexual conduct with the Roes' daughter occurred in the downstairs bathroom 
of the facility between late 1990 and July 1991. The Does' son told the Roes' 
daughter that a "green monster" would get her if she told anyone. In July 1991 she 
told her mother what had happened to her at the day care. State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company (State Farm) insured the Does under succeeding homeowners 
and umbrella insurance policies .... 
The Roes brought suit against the Does alleging the legal theories of 
assault, breach of contract, negligent entrustment, negligent supervision, 
negligent misrepresentation, negligent failure to notify a business invitee of a 
dangerous condition, failure to report child abuse under section 16-1619 of 
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the Idaho Code and civil claims for commission of a criminal act of lewd 
conduct, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or injury to a child (I.C. Section 6-
1701 ). State Farm provided a defense for this action under a reservation of 
rights. The Roes' action was grounded on the sexual abuse of their daughter 
and the alleged accompanying failure of John and Jane Doe to identify and to 
prevent their son's conduct. 
State Farm brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a 
determination that the sexual abuse is outside its policy coverage, asserting 
that the policies do not obligate it to defend or indemnify the Does against the 
allegations and claims in the Roes' action. The Roes petitioned to intervene in 
the action, alleging that the Does did not have sufficient assets to cover the cost of 
defense or pay any judgment. 
The district court granted summary judgment for State Farm, relying on 
Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4,843 P.2d 154 (1992). The district 
court held that the sexual abuse was not an "accident" or "occurrence" 
under the policy. The court cited Wilcox for the legal definition of "accident" 
as it is used in insurance policies: 
An accident within accident insurance policies is an event happening without 
any human agency, or if happening through such an agency, an event which, 
under the circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person to whom it 
happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence", and in its common 
signification the word means an unexpected happening without intention or 
design. 
n. I. an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused and 
usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap; 
automobile accidents. 2. An event that happens unexpectedly, without a 
deliberate plan or cause ... 
Memorandum and Order Granting Amended Motion for Summary Judgment 
(citing Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (1992) (citations omitted)). The 
district court referred to the conduct as "intentional acts of sexual abuse" and 
analogous to the conduct of Mr. Wilcox in Wilcox. 
The district court also held, on alternative grounds, that the defense and 
indemnification of the Does were excluded under the Business Pursuits Exclusion 
of the homeowners policies, the Business Operations Exclusion of the umbrella 
policy and the Child Care Services Exclusion applicable to all the policies. 
130 Idaho at 693-694, 946 P.2d at 1333-1334 (emphasis supplied). 
Like Stanczak, the injured plaintiffs in Doe asserted independent negligence claims 
against the insured parents, John and Jane Doe, for negligent entrustment, negligent supervision, 
negligent failure to notify a business invitee of a dangerous condition, etc. despite the fact that 
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the actual criminal conduct was committed by their son. The Idaho Supreme Court in Doe 
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to State Farm, finding that no 
"occurrence" occurred under the Does' homeowners' insurance policy despite the fact that 
separate and independent negligence claims were brought against the insured parents. The 
Supreme Court focused on the actual events that caused the damage to the Roes, not just the 
causes of action asserted against the insureds. Because the damage to the Roes was caused not 
by the negligent acts of the parents, but by the actions of their son, the Supreme Court found 
there was no "occurrence" under the policy, and once again, did not even reach the question of 
the applicability of other policy exclusions. The Supreme Court's analysis in Doe is as follows: 
Under the coverage provision of the State Farm homeowner policy there 
is liability coverage for an insured when a claim is made or suit is brought 
against an insured based on an "occurrence." The policy defines an 
"occurrence" as an accident, including exposure to conditions, which result in 
bodily injury or property damage. Under the umbrella liability policy, coverage is 
provided if the insured is legally obligated to pay damages for a "loss." The 
policy defines "loss" as an accident that results in personal injury or property 
damage. Each policy limits liability coverage to "accidents;" however, the 
policies do not set forth definitions for "accident." 
Whether an insured acted wilfully, intentionally or maliciously, relieving 
the insurer of liability under the policy, is a factual determination. Farmers 
Ins. Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho 914,607 P.2d 422 (1980). The absence of such 
a determination precludes summary judgment for the insurer. Id. In this case 
the district court found that the conduct in issue constituted "intentional acts 
of sexual abuse" and was not an "accident" or "occurrence" under the 
applicable policies. 
This Court defined "accident" in Wilcox, noting that, "[w]here a word or 
phrase used in an insurance contract has a settled legal meaning or interpretation, 
that meaning or interpretation must be given even though other interpretations are 
possible." 123 Idaho at 8, 843 P.2d at 158 (1992) (quoting Stein-McMurray Ins. 
Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 818, 820, 520 P.2d 865, 867 (1974)); see also 
City of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201, 899 P.2d 411, 414 
(1995). Insurance policies may contain words that have settled legal meanings or 
interpretations and are not ambiguous merely because the policy does not contain 
a definition. Id. at 8, 843 P.2d at 158. 
The Wilcox Court referred to the following two definitions of "accident" as the 
"settled legal meaning or interpretation:" 
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Accident. 
Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an event 
happening without any human agency, or, if happening through such agency, 
an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the 
person to whom it happens. A more comprehensive term than "negligence," 
and in its common signification the word means an unexpected happening 
without intention or design. 
... 1. an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused and 
usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss; casualty; mishap: 
automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens unexpectedly, without a 
deliberate plan or cause .... 
123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (citations omitted). Ms. Wilcox's failure to 
report or warn the proper authorities of the child molestation perpetrated 
upon minors by her ex-husband was "not an 'occurrence' under the policies 
because it was not the conduct which caused injury." Id. 
The facts in this case clearly show that the abuser understood the sexual 
nature of his conduct as well as its wrongfulness. He threatened the child by 
telling her that a "green monster" would get her if she told anyone of his behavior. 
The conduct occurred in the downstairs bathroom of the residence in a location 
where his conduct would not easily be detected. The Does' son's conduct was 
not "without intention or design." Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. An 
accident is an unexpected event which is the result of unintentional conduct or an 
intentional act which results in unexpected consequences. The district court 
found the facts established "intentional acts of sexual abuse." There is no 
other reasonable interpretation of the facts. This intentional conduct, with 
consequences that could be expected, cannot be characterized as an accident. 
Therefore, there was no "occurrence" within the meaning of the policy. 
The policies in question do not afford coverage because there was no 
"occurrence." It is unnecessary to consider the Business Pursuits Exclusion of 
the homeowners policies, the Business Operations Exclusion of the umbrella 
policy and the Child Care Services Exclusion applicable to all of the policies. 
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Doe 130 Idaho 695-696, 946 P.2d 1335-1336 (footnotes 
omitted) ( emphasis supplied). 
In the case at bar, this Court is compelled to follow the controlling Idaho precedent of 
Wilcox and Doe, supra, and in so doing, finds that notwithstanding the types of claims Stanczak 
has asserted against the Cooks in the Stanczak Amended Complaint, there is no coverage under 
the Policy for those claims, because the conduct that caused Stanczak's injuries was being shot 
by Chisholm. Stanczak's injuries were not caused by any alleged failure of the Cooks either "to 
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inspect and keep the premises reasonably safe and warn of known dangers" or "to properly 
supervise ... Chisholm .... " Ritchie Deel., Ex. F., pp. 4-5, at ,r,r 3.2.2, 3.2.7. 
As the Supreme Court makes abundantly clear in Wilcox: 
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an "occurrence" 
under the policies because it was not the conduct which caused injury. The injury 
suffered by the minors is child molestation. While the acts or failure to act by 
Wilcox may have created or contributed to the environment which permitted 
her ex-husband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained of by 
the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw Policy and the 
Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox. 
Mutual o.f Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (emphasis in bold supplied). 
So, too, in this case, while the Cooks' acts or failure to act as alleged in the Stanczak Amended 
Complaint may have created or contributed to the environment which permitted Chisholm's 
conduct, the Cooks did not shoot Stanczak. The shooting of Stanczak by Chisholm was not an 
accident. As such, there can be no covered "occurrence" under the Policy, and having found 
there was no "occurrence," the Court need not even reach the applicability of other policy 
exclusions. Therefore, in light of the clear holdings in Wilcox and Doe, and liberally construing 
all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Cooks, the Court finds that there is 
no genuine dispute that Farm Bureau has no duty to defend or provide coverage to the Cooks or 
Chisholm for the claims made against them in the Stanczak Amended Complaint. 
***** 
For all the above reasons, the Court finds that Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. Accordingly, the Court declares there is no coverage under the Policy for 
Stanczak' s claimed injuries or damages sustained from the June 28, 2015, shooting, as outlined 
in the Stanczak Tort Action; and Farm Bureau has no duty to defend the Cooks or Chisholm 
against the claims made in the Stanczak Tort Action. 
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Lastly, with regard to the Cooks' two counterclaims against Farm Bureau for Breach of 
Contract and for Declaration of Coverage-without coverage there can be no breach of the 
Policy. See Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 173, 180, 45 P.3d 829, 836 
(2002) ("Implicit in this instruction is that there must be coverage under the policy for Robinson 
to recover on the breach of contract claim, a proposition that cannot be disputed.") Therefore, 
the Breach of Contract counterclaim is dismissed; and having declared there is no coverage, the 
counterclaim for Declaration of Coverage is also dismissed. 
D. Farm Bureau is the prevailing party and is entitled to costs. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(B) provides: 
Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court must, in its sound discretion, consider the 
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an action 
prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and on so finding may apportion the 
costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after 
considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resulting 
judgment or judgments obtained. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) (emphasis supplied). 
Summary judgment having been granted to Farm Bureau on its declaratory judgment 
action, and the Cooks' counterclaims having been dismissed, the Court, in the exercise of its 
discretion, finds that Farm Bureau is the prevailing party in this matter. 
As the prevailing party, Farm Bureau is entitled to costs as a matter of right under Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(A), (C). Fann Bureau is also entitled under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) 
to such discretionary costs that "were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). 
Costs are awarded against Edgar and Laurie Cook who were claiming coverage under the Policy. 
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E. Farm Bureau is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
Farm Bureau has requested attorney's fees under Idaho Code §§ 10-1210, 12-121, 12-
123, and 41-1839 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 57. Amended Complaint, p. 8, ,r 3. 
Idaho code§ 41-1839, which governs the allowance of attorney's fees in suits against or 
in arbitration with insurers, provides in part: 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of statute to the contrary, this section 
and section 12-123, Idaho Code, shall provide the exclusive remedy for the 
award of statutory attorney's fees in all actions or arbitrations between 
insureds and insurers involving disputes arising under policies of insurance. 
Provided, attorney's fees may be awarded by the court when it finds, from 
the facts presented to it that a case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Section 12-120, Idaho Code, 
shall not apply to any actions or arbitrations between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under any policy of insurance. 
LC. § 41-1839 (emphasis supplied). 
The Court finds that Farm Bureau is not eligible for an award of attorney's fees under 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). The Court also finds, from the facts presented, that this case was not 
brought, pursued or defended by the Cooks frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation 
under Idaho Code § 12-123. Having so found, and § 41-1839 and § 12-123 providing the 
exclusive remedy for the award of statutory attorney's fees, and Farm Bureau proving no 
contractual basis for such an award, the Court finds that Farm Bureau is not entitled to fees. 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant Stanczak's Motion to Strike is MOOT. 
2. Plaintiff Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
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3. Judgment is granted in favor of Farm Bureau and against the defendants on Plaintiffs 
Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. The Cooks' counterclaims for Breach of 
Contract and Declaration of Coverage are dismissed. 
4. The Court declares there is no coverage under the Cooks' Farm Bureau Insurance Policy 
for any and all claims asserted against the Cooks and Chisholm by Stanczak in Bonner 
County Case CV-2016-0679; and Farm Bureau has no duty to defend the Cooks or 
Chisholm against the claims made against them in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Farm Bureau shall submit within fourteen (14) days 
of the date of this Order, a Memorandum of Costs, itemizing its: (i) costs as a matter of right; and 
(ii) discretionary costs, if any, with the showing required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The 
defendants may object in the time and manner provided in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. 
The Court shall enter a Judgment in accordance with this decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this£!_ day of January, 2017. 
~~~~~ 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 
Idaho ("Farm Bureau"), and against Defendants Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook and Joseph 
Stanczak, on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. 
2. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook's counterclaims are dismissed. 
3. The Court hereby declares that: 
a. There is no coverage under Edgar and Laurie Cook's Farm Bureau Insurance 
Policy for any and all claims asserted by Joseph Stanczak, in Bonner County Case 
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CV-2016-0679, against Edgar and Laurie Cook, individually, as husband and 
wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground, and Michael Chisholm; and 
b. Farm Bureau has no duty to defend Edgar and Laurie Cook or Michael Chisholm 
against any of the claims made in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679. 
4. Costs are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook, 
jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined. 
DA TED this Ji)iay ofJ, uary 2017. Q ~ ,____ 
lb u~h- J~1 
Barbara Buchanan 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
) 
) Case No. CV 2016-0000590 
) 
) ORDER SETTLING AMOUNT 




EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband 








On January 20, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, together with a final Judgment, which granted 
judgment in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farm 
Bureau"), and against Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook ("Cooks") and Joseph Stanczak, in the 
above-entitled matter. In the Memorandum Decision and Order, the Court found that: 
As the prevailing party, Farm Bureau is entitled to costs as a matter of 
right under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(A), (C). Farm Bureau is also 
entitled under Rule 54(d)(l)(D) to such discretionary costs that "were necessary 
and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be 
assessed against the adverse party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Costs are awarded 
against Edgar and Laurie Cook who were claiming coverage under the Policy. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 26. 
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On February 2, 2017, Farm Bureau filed its Verified Memorandum of Costs. On 
February 9, 2017, the Cook's Opposition to Farm Bureau's Memorandum of Costs was filed. No 
hearing has been requested. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(6), 
the Court enters this Order settling the dollar amount of costs to be awarded to Farm Bureau. 
II. DISCUSSION 
Farm Bureau is awarded the filing fee of $221.00 as a cost as a matter of right. However, 
the Court finds that it is not reasonable for Farm Bureau to assess against the Cooks the $150 fee 
for service of the Amended Complaint and Summons upon the co-defendant, Joseph Stanczak. 
Further, Farm Bureau is not entitled to any of its claimed discretionary costs of $1,507.44, for 
photocopying/imaging, transcripts, mileage/travel reimbursement, and Westlaw research, 
because it failed to show how any of these costs "were necessary and exceptional costs, 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Therefore, Farm Bureau is entitled to costs in the total amount of $221.00 
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT costs 
are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook, jointly 
and severally, in the amount of $221.00. 
The Court shall enter an Amended Judgment in accordance with this decision. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this J;j_ d-ay-of__,rs=· br_u_ry_, 2,-· -------
Barbara Buchanan 
District Judge 
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JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 
Idaho ("Farm Bureau"), and against Defendants Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook and Joseph 
Stanczak, on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. 
2. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook's counterclaims are dismissed. 
3. The Court hereby declares that: 
a. There is no coverage under Edgar and Laurie Cook's Farm Bureau Insurance 
Policy for any and all claims asserted by Joseph Stanczak, in Bonner County Case 
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CV-2016-0679, against Edgar and Laurie Cook, individually, as husband and 
wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground, and Michael Chisholm; and 
b. Farm Bureau has no duty to defend Edgar and Laurie Cook or Michael Chisholm 
against any of the claims made in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679. 
4. Costs are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $221.00. 
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,. A /, .. . 
lY r-_-_ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs/Respondent, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR., and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife; and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK, 
Defendants/ A ellants, 
Case No. CV 2016-0590 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEY, JAMES L MARTIN; AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr. and Laurie Frances Cook, 
husband and wife and the marital community thereof, appeal against the above named Respondent to the 
Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered January 20, 2017; and the Memorandum Decision and 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment entered January 20, 2017, Honorable Barbara 
Buchanan presiding. 
2. That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 1 
l/t1i~A ri~d41t 
A "'RO=ESSlONAL se::wrcE COR?ORATlON 
250 Nortr11eSI Blvd., &.its 206 
Co9ur d' Alen,;t ld;;iho 83814 




























Order described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to Appellate Rule 11. 
3. Appellants appeal from the District Court's Order granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the following basis: 
4. 
5. 
a. Whether the District Court erred in ruling that the claims against Cooks did not 
constitute an "occurrence" under the policy. 
No Order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the transcript in 
electronic and hard copy: 
a. No transcript has been requested. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 






Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, dated 6/3/2016. 
Edgar and Laurie Cook's Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim, dated 
8/10/16. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, dated 1/20/17. 
Judgment dated, 1/20/17. 
The appellant request NO exhibits. 
8. I certify: 
(a) 
(b) 
That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Kathy Plizga, Court Reporter 
Bonner County Courthouse 
215 S. 1st Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Reporter's transcript. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 2 
Pa/'dh-~£#~att 
A "'RO~ESSiONAL SE"IV!CE COR;>QRATiQr,. 
250 NorttlWeet Blvd. &.rte 206 




























(c) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been 
paid. 
( d) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
DATED this 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
Z-K:' day of ,-4'£:::) , 2017. 
MIC 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LAWYERS, a Professional 
Service Corporation 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 3 
~/td&>n~'9 '&datt 
A "'RO;:ESSlONAl SE~\/lCE CORPORATrn, 
250 Northwest Blvd. SJite 206 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814 




























I hereby certify that I caused a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing to be D mailed, 
postage prepaid; D hand <letim ~ sent 
via facsimile on the£a.ay o ,·v~ 2017, to: 
James L. Martin 
Moffatt Thomas 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
Fax: 208/385-5384 
Wes S. Larsen 
James Vernon & Weeks, P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Fax: 208/664/1684 
Kathy Plizga 5-<A-+ l/ .-~ 
Court Reporter i).5. r-1~,.,J 
Bonner County Courthouse 
215 S. First Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
MI~ T. HOW ARD 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 4 
Pa/t4a,,;b ~" %a,.datt 
A ;,ROFESSiONAL SERVICE CORPORATION 
2--50 Norcw1sz1 Blvd" Suite 200 
Coeur d'Alene. k!aho 83814 
a~-· ~-,,no, AQ"7 'l'ffi'l 
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·' 
STATE OF IDAMO 
CDU~.JT~( OF BJJHNER 
FfRST JUOiC!;\L D!STRlCT 
2011 JMl 20 PM 2: 56 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAH07 
) 









EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, husband 







JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: 
I. Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of 
Idaho (""Farm Bureau"). and against Defendants Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook and Joseph 
Stanczak, on Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief. 
2. Defendants Edgar and Laurie Cook's counterclaims are dismissed. 
3. The Court hereby declares that: 
a. There is no coverage under Edgar and Laurie Cook's Fann Bureau Insurance 
Policy for any and all claims asserted by Joseph Stanczak, in Bonner County Case 
JUDGMENT-I 
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CV-2016-0679, against Edgar and Laurie Coo~ individually, as husband and 
wife, and d/b/a Bloom Lake Campground, and Michael Chisholm; and 
b. Fann Bureau has no duty to defend Edgar and Laurie Cook or Michael Chisholm 
against any of the claims made in Bonner County Case CV-2016-0679. 
4. Costs are awarded in favor of Farm Bureau, and against Edgar Cook and Laurie Cook, 
jointly and severally, in an amount to be determined. 
DATED iliis 20ay of t":C l~- -
Barbara Buchanan 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
this -:2_8 day of January, 2017, to: 
James L. Martin 
Benjamin C. Ritchie 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Michael T. Howard 
WINSTON & CASHATT, LA WYERS, PS 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Wes S. Larsen 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, PA 
J 626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
JUOGMENT-2 
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James L. Martin. ISB No. 4226 
Tyler J. Anderson. ISB No. 6632 
Benjamin C. Ritchie. ISB No. 7210 
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 





ST.J.Tt CF /JAf-:O 
COUt-!TT' or BJt.;HER 
FtRST .JU0!CL\L fLSTr\C-;-
2017 HAR -8 PM 2: I I 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent Farm Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Idaho 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 1HE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO, 
PlaintlfflRespondent, 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK, JR. and LAURIE 
FRANCES COOK, husband and wife, and 
JOSEPH STANCZAK., 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-2016-0590 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM 
BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO'S REQUEST 
FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN 
THE CLERK'S RECORD AND 
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT- 1 ciient:4373110.1 
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1-1age ;j 
COMES NOW, the plaintiff-respondent, Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance 
Company of Idaho, by and through undersigned counsel of record, pursuant to Idaho Appellate 
Rule 28(c) and hereby requests that the following additional documents be included in the 
appellate record: 
• 10/20/2016-Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutua1 Insurance Company ofldaho's 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 10/20/2016-Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Fann Bureau Mutual 
Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
• 10/20/2016-Declaration of Steven Johnson in Support of Plaintiff Fann 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho's Motion for Summary 
Judgment with exhibits; 
• 10/20/2016 Declaration of Benjamin C. Ritchie In Support of Plaintiff 
Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary 
Judgment with exhibits; 
• 10/20/2016-Declaration of Barbara E. Mayne in Support of Plaintiff Fann 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ofldaho~s Motion for Sununary 
Judgment with exhibits; 
• 12/07/2016-Defendant Stanczak's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff 
Fann Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
• 12/09/2016·Edgar and Laurie Cook's Memorandum in Opposition to Fann 
Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
• 12/14/2016-Plaintiff Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's 
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
• 
Pursuant to this Motion, Farm Bureau is likewise seeking to order the transcript 
from the hearing on Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary Judgment, which occurred on 
December 21, 2016 at the Bonner County Courthouse before the Honorable Barbara A. 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT· 2 cnent:431ano.1 
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Buchanan at 1 :30 p.m. and would request that transcript also be a part of this record on appeal. 
A copy of this request is being provided to the Court Reporter as well. 
DATED this 8th day of March, 2017. 
MOFFATT, TuOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
es L. Martin-Of the Firm 
ttom.eys for Plaintiff/Respondent Farm Bureau 
utual Insurance Company of Idaho 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT-3 c1ien1:4373110.1 
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1-1age ::, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of March, 2017, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS 
IN THE CLERK'S RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Michael T. Howard 
WINTON & CASHATT 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 765-2121 
Attorneys for Edgar and Laurie 
Cook 
Wes S. Larsen 
James, Vernon& Weeks, PA 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Joseph Stanczak 
Kathy Plizga 
Court Reporter 
Bonner County Courthouse 
215 S. 1st Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83 864 
Facsimile: (208) 263-0896 . 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(X) Facsimile 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT'S FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS IN THE CLERK'S 
RECORD AND REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT- 4 c11enu31:mo.1 
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3/8/201'/ 3 : O'/: 'll JJM 
MOFFATT 
THOMAS 





Boise ID 83701-0829 
208.34 5 .2000 
208.385.5384 FAX 
(208) 3 85-53 2 7 
From: Pamela E. Buckley Date: March 8, 2017 
Legal Administrative Assistant to James L. Martin 
Re: Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho v. File No.: 13900.0252 
Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr., et al. 
Number of pages being transmitted including the cover page: 5 
Please call fax operator at 208.345.2000 if all pages are not received. 
Name Organization 
To: Bonner County Clerk First Judicial District 
cc: Michael T. Howard Winston & Cashatt 
Lawyers, PS 
cc: Wes Larsen James Vernon & Weeks, 
PA 
cc: Kathy Plizga Bonner County 
Courthouse 
Message: 
Fax No. Voice No. 
208-263-0896 (208) 265-1432 
(208) 765-2121 (208) 667-2103 
(208) 664-1684 (208) 667-0683 
208-263-0896 
Attached is Plaintiff Respondent's Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho's Request 
for Additional Documents in the Clerk's Record and Request for Transcript for filing with the 
Court. 
Thank you. 
PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY 
The following message constitutes confidential attorney-client information, or other confidential communication. 
If you have received this communication in error, do not read it. It is not intended for transmission to, or receipt by, 
any unauthorized persons. Please destroy it without copying it, and notify the sender by calling 208 345-2000, so 
that our address record can be corrected. Thank you. 
Client:4375909.1 
BOISE • POCATELLO • IDAHO FALLS 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK JR. and 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, 
Husband and wife 
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CL.El~!-\ DIST RI Cl COURT 
) SUPREME COURT NO. 44897 
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CV2016-0590 
) 
) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 












I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that the following is offered as the Clerk's 
Exhibit on Appeal: 
NO EXHIBITS 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
.:?.o+l day of 0..,~ J ,2017. 
2011 APR 20 AM II: t.O 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF11TA"H1 _PU~-
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMP ANY OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK JR. and 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, 
Husband and wife 




) SUPREME COURT NO. 44897 
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CV2016-0590 
) 
) 













I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County ofBoMer do certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, correct and complete Record of the pleadings 
and documents requested by Appellant Rule 28. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
,-QC)it- dayof ~ / ,2017. 
Clerk's Certificate 
Michael W. Rosedale, 
Clerk of the District Court 
.. , -,i C Ot iDAHO 
::~c,t;:.:T y o:=- BONHER 
FIF;'.~ '." .JU'.JlGl/\L O!STRJCT 
2011 APR 20 AM II: 40 
CLEFd·\ Di STR!GT COURT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 6Fil>1\: ~ TY 
FARM BUREAU INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff - Respondent 
vs. 
EDGAR WILKINS COOK JR. and 
LAURIE FRANCES COOK, 
Husband and wife 




) SUPREME COURT NO. 44897 
) BONNER COUNTY NO. CV2016-0590 
) 
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I, Michael W. Rosedale, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonner, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by 
United Postal Service, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of Record in 
this cause as follows: 
James L. Martin 
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields 
PO Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
ATTORNEY FOR FARM BUREAU 
Michael T. Howard 
Winston & Cashatt 
250 Northwest Blvd., Suite 206 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 814 
ATTORNEY FOR EDGAR AND LAURIE COOK 
Wes. S. Larsen 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 
ATTORNEY FOR JOSEPH STANCZAK 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court this 
/::)dk day of Q~ / , 2017. 
Certificate of Service 
